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For Arabic terms and citations this dissertation uses the system developed by the International 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Among the large number of identity groups engaged in contentious politics against perceived 
marginalization or repression today, some use violent tactics to reach their aims, whereas 
others employ nonviolent means despite very similar conditions. Existing theories in civil war 
studies can neither account for this variance nor adequately explain the micro-processes of 
conflict escalation from nonviolent to violent. So far, they have predominantly focused on 
macro-level structural factors, neglecting both meso- and micro-level, in order to explicate the 
outbreak of violent intra-state conflict. Theoretical models can be grouped around those 
arguing for the decisive impact of political opportunity, economic incentives, resource 
mobilization, exclusive identities, grievances, and state failure respectively for the 
mobilization of armed fighters. Methodologically, quantitative approaches dominated 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, with qualitative studies existing merely on the margins. 
Only recently has there been a shift in focus towards placing a stronger emphasis on 
individual agency and on an increased interest in micro-level processes. Hence, the puzzle so 
far remains unsolved.  
  
In this dissertation, I argue that a more ideational perspective works to overcome the deficits 
of established approaches, helping to identify and elucidate factors that lead to the choice of a 
violent or nonviolent path.   
 The discipline of social movement studies has developed the so-called ‘framing approach’ 
in order to account for collective action. The framing approach emphasizes the role of 
cognitive schemata of interpretation (i.e. frames). It argues that strategic movement leaders 
rhetorically create persuasive frames which mobilize certain people among the audience to 
join the movement and engage in collective action (such as e.g. rallies, strikes, fighting etc.). 
Since both protests and civil wars are forms of contentious politics – merely on different 
levels – this theoretical approach with its methodological ‘tool kit’ appears promising in 
regard to resolving the research puzzle.   
 By means of two detailed case studies – the violent Houthi rebellion in Northern Yemen 
and the nonviolent Southern Yemeni secessionist movement – the role of specific frames and 
framing processes shall be explicated and their impact evaluated. In adopting such a 
perspective, the dissertation does not seek to render the more structuralist theoretical 
approaches obsolete; rather, it intends to propose an integrated model that combines and 
complements both structural factors and framing processes.  
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Case 1: The “Houthi Rebellion” 
After the end of the Shiʿa Zaydi imamate in Northern Yemen in 1962, the Zaydi population,1 
particularly the elites, the Hashemites or sādah, suffered a massive loss in status.2 Not only 
were they deprived of their former privileged access to social and political power; anti-Zaydi 
resentment among the Sunni population, grounded in their prior status benefits, unfolded 
more openly. This was bolstered by the post-revolution nationalist narrative, which sought to 
increase regime legitimacy via fostering a negative picture of the imamate, strengthening 
tribalism, and emphasizing the ‘otherness’ of the sādah.3 Additionally, a political and 
economic marginalization of the Northern region, where the majority of the Zaydi population 
lived, and a growing influence of Sunni Islam in Zaydi heartland, continually mounting since 
the 1970s,4 exacerbated Zaydi grievances. In particular the spread of Wahhabi Sunni religious 
institutions was perceived as a threat to Zaydi identity.5  
 Badr al-Din al-Houthi, a distinguished Zaydi scholar and sādah, had already started 
campaigning for a revitalization of faith and a mode of “cultural self-defense”6 as early as the 
late 1970s. Legitimized by his social and symbolic capital, he mainly employed religious 
sermons and statements to invigorate Zaydi messages. After the Yemeni unification and the 
connected extension of political freedom and opportunities for activism, a number of al-
Houthi family members entered official politics. However, these members soon felt that the 
new founded al-Haqq party and its role could not live up to their expectations in representing 
Zaydi interests, causing disenfranchisement.7 Parallel to the political activism, younger 
members of the Houthi family had engaged in more popular mobilization activities. They 
initiated the ‘Shabab al-Mu’imin’, ‘Believing Youth’, who actively organized Zaydi religious 
and cultural activities through mediums such as youth camps, and had a significant impact on 
a cohort of young men. Since 1997, Hussein al-Houthi, one of Badr al-Din’s sons, led the 
                                                          
1 Yemen is divided into a majority of approximately 55% Sunni Muslims, mainly of the Shafi’i school, and a 
‘minority’ of about 35–45% Zaydi Shiʿa Muslims. These are estimates because of a lack of available data 
concerning religious affiliation. Some authors (e.g. Sarah Philipps, “Cracks in the Yemeni System”, Middle East 
Report Online (July 28, 2005) speak of a lower percentage of only 20–25%, however, most sources cite accounts 
ranging from 35–45%. 
2 Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge”, Carnegie Papers 110 
(April 2010); International Crisis Group (ICG), “Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb”, Middle East Report 
86 (May 27, 2009).  
3 Andrew Dumm, “Understanding the Houthi Conflict in Northern Yemen: A Social Movement Approach” 
(master’s thesis, American University, Washington D.C., 2010). 
4 Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in 
Yemen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
5 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi 
Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010). 
6 Dumm, “Houthi Conflict”. 
7 Salmoni et al., Regime. 
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group which at its height allegedly reached 15,000 young men with its camps – participation 
in which had become a question of prestige among many families of social standing.  
 Because the Zaydi shared in the general criticism voiced by Muslims worldwide against 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they were further alienated when President Saleh sought a 
closer relationship with the United States after September 11, 2001. They furthermore 
considered this action an indirect means of strengthening the US-ally Saudi Arabia, their 
enemy. The al-Houthis thus began denouncing the Saleh regime as an ally of the US and 
Israel (known to be an archenemy according to sentiments within the Arab world, having 
interests regarded as congruent with the US). They continued to state that the regime was an 
illegitimate representative of the Yemeni people. In one notable case, the Believing Youth 
initiated protests purporting anti-US and anti-Israel slogans after Friday prayers.8 In 2002, the 
charismatic Hussein al-Houthi coined the one slogan which would become the distinctive 
mark of the developing Houthi movement: “God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, 
Curse upon the Jews, Victory to Islam”.    
 The message initially appears only to connect with the predominant anti-US and anti-Israel 
discourse and does not present anything new or exceptional. However, an additional 
significance emanates from the specific context and mode in which the slogan was employed, 
that is, in the way it connected to meaning-laden narratives and gained symbolic value when 
the Saleh regime tried to suppress movement followers from chanting it. It is here that the 
spiral of escalation began. When both sides found themselves irreconcilable despite mediation 
attempts, Saleh, in June 2004, officially announced the commencement of conflict. Hussein 
al-Houthi’s subsequent death during an attempt to arrest him in September the same year led 
to a significant expansion of the movement9 (leadership shifted to his brother and cousins). 
Soon thereafter, a frame shift occurred and hostilities openly broke out between the group 
who was later on labeled “Houthi rebels” and government troops.  
 Six rounds of armed conflict between 2004 and 201010 turned the North, especially the 
Sa’ada region, into a humanitarian emergency with large numbers of internally displaced 
people11 and destruction of which the area has not yet recovered. A truce was reached in 
February 2010, but skirmishes continued. Reliable casualty numbers are not available; rough 
                                                          
8 Boucek, “War in Saada”. 
9 Iris Glosemeyer, “Local Conflict, Global Spin: An Uprising in the Yemeni Highlands”, Middle East Report 232 
(Fall 2004). 
10 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question”, Middle East Report 114 
(October 20, 2011); Salmoni et al., Regime; Boucek, “War in Saada”; Marieke Brandt, “Shifting the Power 
Structures: Political Developments in Sa’da after the End of the 6th Houthi-War” (paper presented at the DAVO 
Congress, Berlin, October 6, 2011).  
11 Numbers range between 200,000 and 350,000 IDPs depending on the sources. 
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and very conservative estimates count 4,705 immediate casualties12 between June 2004 and 
July 2008, thus excluding the last interim phase and the sixth war. Despite its extensive and 
well-elaborated communication apparatus, the group has never clearly stated its aims. 
Government accusations always held that they were striving to restore the Zaydi imamate, 
which the Houthis repudiated until November 2012, when Abdul Malik explicitly called for a 
restoration of the imamate in a speech, but never repeated.13 
 Since the end of the last war, the Houthis have gradually become more included as a 
political force. Nevertheless, their repeatedly proven capacity to mobilize tens of thousands 
for public celebrations was reemployed for a coup in late 2014. 
  
Case 2: The Peaceful Southern Movement 
When compared to the ‘Houthi Rebellion’ – as it is referred to in politics and media – a 
second major conflict in the country shares a number of traits but has taken a significantly 
different course: the so-called ‘Southern issue’ contested by the Peaceful Southern 
Movement. 
 Tens of thousands14 of protesters from various regions of Southern Yemen took to the 
streets in Aden on April 27, 2013, marking the nineteenth anniversary of the commencement 
of the civil war between the former Northern and Southern Yemeni state in 1994. Across the 
Southern governorates, demonstrations and marches complemented the by then well-
established civil disobedience campaign, in which all businesses and facilities close for half a 
day on Wednesdays and Saturdays. There was an outright shut down of public life.15 It was 
the sixth time within few months and it would not be the last.   
 Iḥtilāl – occupation – by a Northern-dominated regime is the situation description 
unequivocally provided by activists of the Yemeni “Peaceful Southern Movement” when 
asked about the circumstances of life in the South and the reasons for their engagement in 
long-term protest against the government. The list of their grievances is long. It goes back to 
                                                          
12 See Salmoni et al., Regime. 
13 The speech was held on November 3, 2012, al-Ghadeer Day, an important Shiʿa holiday on which Ali Ibn Abi 
Talib was installed as successor to the Prophet. A transcription can be found on the Houthi website: 
http://www.ansaruallah.com/news/4533 (accessed May 11, 2013).  
14 Southern Yemeni sources speak of ‘one million’ which has become a symbolic number many times referred to 
when speaking about protest participation during the Arab Spring. This paper, however, will be using 
conservative estimates when reliable numbers are unavailable and will only refer to the numbers stated by 
movement actors when the discrepancy highlights a specific aspect.  
15 “Large Protest in Southern Yemen to Mark Anniversary of Start of Civil War Demand Secession,” 
Washington Post, April 27, 2013, accessed May 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/5-
soldiers-2-al-qaida-militants-killed-in-central-yemen-intelligence-officer-assassinated/2013/04/27/135a4320-
af3c-11e2-b59e-adb43da03a8a_story.html. “Disobedience and Demonstrations in Southern Yemen on the 
Anniversary of the Civil War,” Al Jazeera, April 27, 2013 [Arabic], accessed May 7, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/ bd004702-bae9-48ba-86e8-cb00e236d470.  
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the unification of the formerly independent states of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the 
North and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the South in 1990. What 
had been longed for – unity – was soon after its realization perceived as having paved the way 
for a relationship based on Northern domination rather than equality and successive 
harmonization of the two systems and societies. The marginalization of Southern civil 
servants in the state apparatus, centralization in the North, inefficiency, high inflation, 
impoverishment, corruption, clientelism, and the removal of women from their earlier visible 
roles in public life, all based on spreading “hardline religious moralizing”16 created significant 
disillusionment among the former citizens of the PDRY. A brief civil war ensued in April 
1994, which ultimately the South lost on July 7 the same year. From this date on, the 
beginning of the perceived ‘occupation’ was set and the disenfranchisement of Southerners 
was aggravated: Military personnel were discharged in great numbers, as were civil servants; 
property (including houses, but also factories, commercial buildings, fisheries, and else) was 
seized through opaque processes by Northerners – in many cases army officers – and never 
returned; infrastructure and public facilities suffered from neglect and continuously 
deteriorated. Unemployment rose to before-unknown levels. “[A]fter 1994 Southerners have 
almost lost their citizenship to their own homeland”, said a Southern Movement supporter in 
the UK, expressing widespread sentiments.17  
 A number of Southern protest groups with different constituents and strategies emerged 
among exiles and the diaspora in Yemen over the years.18 Yet despite their efforts, none of 
them gained momentum. This changed when in 2006/2007 three grassroots movements 
coalesced to unitedly strive towards calling attention to their grievances: an association of 
retired army officers calling for the reinstatement of their pension payments and the 
reemployment of Southern civil servants, unemployed youths, and retired diplomats 
protesting against hostilities. Since this spark, the Peaceful Southern Movement or ‘Hirak’19 – 
as it is commonly referred to in Arabic – has developed into a sweeping popular movement 
supported by and, consequently able to mobilize wide strata of society. Concurring that the 
South exists ‘under Northern occupation,’ adherents are hence united by the same shared 
perception of injustice characterized by threats of further discrimination, dispossession, and 
                                                          
16 Susanne Dahlgren, “The Southern Movement in Yemen”, ISIM Review 22 (Autumn 2008): 50f. 
17 Interview with a Hirak supporter living in the UK, April 26, 2013. 
18 Information on the movements stems from the Yemeni-American blogger Sama'a Al-Hamdani: 
http://www.yemeniaty.com (accessed March 15, 2013) and was cross-checked in interviews with UK-based 
Southern activists in April 2013. 
19 The full name is ‘Al-hirak al-janoubi al-silmi’, ‘the Peaceful Southern Movement(s)’. While in Arabic the 
short name is ‘Hirak’, foreign media and academics tend to shorten its name to ‘Southern Movement’; I will in 
the following predominantly adopt this practice for the sake of improved legibility. 
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repression of their legitimate demands. Beyond these grievances, reference to cultural 
distinctiveness and identity plays a prominent role in fostering the division line20 between the 
perceived tribal – read: backwards – Northern Other and the “civilized”21 Southern Self. 
Similarly conspicuous is the framing of identity as ‘South Arabian’, not Yemeni.  
 Concerning its goals, the messages spread by the movement became less unequivocal and 
developed over time. At first the demands were made within a discourse concerning both 
national equality and a change in the relations between the North and the South within the 
unified state. Over time and in the face of mounting government repression, protests and 
demands intensified. Calls for secession grew louder and more popular since their original 
voicing in 2009. ‘Self-determination’ constitutes the most prominent demand,22 yet the 
interpretation of its implication varies. “Al-qarār qarārna”, “the decision is ours”, proclaims 
a central slogan in the marches and demonstrations, bridging the positions by stating that, 
whichever approach is taken, it must be the Southern population who decide on it.  
 The magnitude and long-term persistence of the protest actions demonstrate a mobilization 
capacity that needs to be taken seriously by the regime. They represent a challenge to its 
position, as well as a threat to overall security all the more so since Yemen has one of the 
most heavily armed populations in the world. Notwithstanding this potential for armed 
escalation, all initial civilian actions remained peaceful in face of severe repression by 
government forces, which resulted in 969 dead and injured activists in 2012 alone according 
to a Southern-based human rights organization.22 Even in light of accumulating frustration 
and repeated attempts by prominent individuals to call for a more militant stance, the Hirak 
has continued its nonviolent path to date and keeps emphasizing it as sine qua non 
characteristic of the movement. 
 
Comparing the Cases  
The two movements feature multiple similarities. Both emanate from specific identity groups 
with their own narratives of distinctiveness and past grandeur. While for the Zaydi Houthis 
this is grounded in one thousand years of prevailing imamate rule, for Southern Yemenis it 
originates from a perceived well-functioning (socialist) civil state with comprehensive social 
service provision for all. Additionally, there exists a self-perception of being more “civilized” 
                                                          
20 ICG, “Breaking Point”.  
21 Mentioned numerous times in interviews with Southern activists in the UK in April 2013. 
22 Stephen Day, “Updating Yemeni National Unity: Could Lingering Regional Divisions Bring Down the 
Regime?”, Middle East Journal 62, no.3 (2008): 417–436. 
22 Southern Observatory for Human Rights, Annual Report for 2012. The People of the South: Between the 
Authorities’ Hammer and Al-Qaeda’s Anvil (Bern, Switzerland, April 26, 2013). 
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than the tribal north23 of the country, due to a stronger inclusion into international trade 
relations and the British colonial influence. At the respective times of movement formation, 
both identity groups suffered from relative deprivation in terms of basic services, 
infrastructure, employment, equal opportunities, and social status as compared to the 
preceding periods, which their respective narratives refer to. In the South, these grievances 
apply even more comprehensively to the whole population and the loss they feel has occurred 
more recently. The economic situation of the average Yemeni citizen was, and continues to 
be, dire with more than one third of the population not being able to fulfill their basic food 
and non-food needs in 2005/06 and with 12.5% of the population living even below the food 
poverty line.24 Apart from the urban-rural divide on poverty, with the urban areas performing 
better than rural areas, there is no clearly identifiable part of the country in which poverty is 
prevalent. Protests or rebellion, respectively, are directed against the government, which have 
been identified as the immediate originator of the grievances. They have lasted for a number 
of years during the recent decades and can still be considered ongoing despite the calming of 
large-scale hostilities in the North. With 54.8 arms per 100 persons, the rate of private gun 
ownership in Yemen is the second largest worldwide, according to a survey in 2007,25 
signifying a high degree of access to means of fighting. Moreover, the large proportion of 
young males within the population (median age 18.5 years26) emphasizes the potentially 
available number of combatants.27  
 In regard to political inclusion and socioeconomic inclusion, there is slight evidence that 
the South is disadvantaged since the systems’ fusion after 1990 and the war in 1994. The 
comparatively larger administrative apparatus of the former socialist state was shrunk and 
jobs were lost; structural adjustment programs and privatization efforts saw the capital of 
Sana’a profit more than the Southern regions; military and security positions were filled by 
Northerners; and regime supporters were not only given priority to acquire Southern property 
at low cost after 1994, but in general were better included into the regime’s patronage system, 
                                                          
23 The differences in the importance of tribal structures in the North and South will be elaborated at a later point. 
Here shall only be noted that Southerners generally attribute Northerners to be determined by their tribal 
affiliations and ‘tribal culture’. 
24 Government of Yemen/World Bank/United Nations Development Program, Yemen Poverty Assessment 
(November 2007). Due to a lack of reliable statistics on Yemen, the year 2005/06 has been selected to account 
for the socio-economic conditions at the time when both movements became openly active (the Houthis 
commenced armed struggle in 2004, the Hirak started protests in 2007). 
25 Aaron Karp, “Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms – Annexe Online”, Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns 
and the City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, August 27, 2007), Chapter 2 (Annexe 4). 
26 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, accessed May 23, 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html; 2013 estimates.  
27 For detailed numbers on the male population of the 16–44 years range in 2004 in the various Yemeni 
governorates see: Salmoni et al., Regime, Annex A, Table A.1, “Estimated Population of Yemen Governorates 
by Age Groups and Gender”, 282. 
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be they Northerners or Southerners, but the former constituting a majority. The loss of 
positions and the new ‘mechanisms of resource allocation’ were felt more disproportionally 
by the population used to a socialist system providing welfare and employment. Even though 
there exists a plurality of parties, Southern citizens do not feel well represented by the Yemeni 
Socialist Party, which constitutes the remains of the former Southern ruling party, due to it 
being divided and of little importance and appeal. Many former leaders live in exile. 
Government positions filled by Southerners are considered to be more of symbolic value than 
of de facto importance.28 The fact that Hadi, a Southerner, is president is being dismissed as 
negligible since he is not considered to be a ‘true Southerner’. The Zaydi population is, by 
comparison, significantly better included and represented, also due to the crosscutting 
relations in Northern tribal loyalties and alliances. Major repression against both groups 
started when their activism became visible in larger numbers. For the Houthis, this quickly led 
to the first round of fighting in 2004, whereas in the South it resulted in larger-scale detention, 
civil victims of various incidents during early protests, and ever-increasing numbers of 
victims at later points. In December 2009, Human Rights Watch reported “Unlawful Use of 
Deadly Force against Peaceful Protesters”, “Arbitrary Detentions and Unfair Trials”, “Press 
Censorship and Attacks against Journalists and Newspapers”, and “Detention of Academics 
and Other Opinion-makers”.29 Before the outbreak of the conflicts and large-scale repression, 
there were already reports of brutal mistreatment of oppositional figures in the South such as 
scholars, writers, journalists, or intellectuals voicing protest against discrimination since the 
mid-1990s.30 Equally, the Houthis repeatedly claimed arbitrary detention and crackdowns on 
youth meetings in the early 2000s. 
 
The Puzzle: Why is There Variance in Movement Action Under Most Similar Conditions? 
Despite all the similarities between the two protest movements – not the least of which is the 
state’s failure to provide services and repression – the Houthis and the Hirak have taken 
different paths: violent insurgency31 on the side of the Zaydi group versus nonviolent protest 
actions on the side of the Southerners. So far, there is no conclusive answer as to why we 
observe this variance.  
                                                          
28 ICG, “Breaking Point”. 
29 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to 
Southern Movement Protest” (December 2009). 
30 Day, “Updating”, 423. 
31 The terms ‘rebellion’ and ‘insurgency’ are used interchangeably in this dissertation. Moreover, I will not 
distinguish between ‘armed (intra-state) conflict’ and ‘civil war’ due to reasons of practicality and style.  
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In order to account for the outbreak of violent intra-state conflict, existing approaches in civil 
war studies have hitherto predominantly focused on structural factors on the macro-level.32 
They claim that structural factors (of various kinds and possibly in varying combinations) 
causally relate to violent collective action: 
 
structural factors      violent collective action 
 
Figure 1.1.: Causal Model of Established Theoretical Approaches in Civil War Research 
 
The most widely established theoretical models33 within this realm focus on opportunity, 
grievances, and identity as key factors leading to violent collective action:  
 According to the opportunity approach34, the decisive factor for the outbreak of intra-state 
armed conflict is merely “conditions that favor insurgency”35; grievances do not play any role. 
Such conditions are realized when we can observe: state weakness (proxied by low per capita 
income and recent regime change), rough terrain (where rebels are able to hide), a large 
population (expands the recruitment pool of young men), a low level of education, and 
external assistance.36 The well-established ‘greed thesis’ is related to the opportunity 
argument but places its emphasis more specifically on the motivational aspect: It holds that 
intra-state armed conflict is the result of economic motivation among rebels. Rebel leaders are 
aiming to seize control of lootable resources (e.g. diamonds, oil etc.) in the absence of more 
lucrative modes of income in a context of poverty and lack of perspectives for potential 
adherents.37 
 In the logic of the grievances approach, political violence is the result of frustration due to 
feelings of injustice within a social group38. The experience of socioeconomic 
                                                          
32 Recently there has been a shift in focus towards a stronger emphasis of individual agency and an increased 
interest in micro-level processes. However, these studies have not been able to provide answers to the research 
question, either.  
33 Other models will be included in the discussion in 2.1.  
34 Most prominently represented by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War”, The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic 
Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War”, Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 
1–27; Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 1, Africa 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005). 
35 Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”, 75. 
36 The mentioned proxies cover only the most widely used; there are numerous others. For more details see 2.1.1.  
37 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 
(2004): 563–595; Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen 
Cases”, International Organization 58, no.1 (Winter 2004): 35–67. 
38 Within social movement studies, David Snow further highlights the importance of a distinction between 
individual and collective ‘mobilizing’ grievances for the analysis of social movement emergence. According to 
him, only the later qualify to generate collective action. David A. Snow, “Grievances, Individual and 
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marginalization, political discrimination and exclusion, limited freedom, and repression 
causes frustration, then anger, and lastly aggressive behavior and violence against the 
perceived source of these grievances in order to overcome injustice. Proxies used for the 
measurement of grievances are: GDP/capita, education level, life expectancy, political and 
cultural discrimination, loss of power due to recent regime change, repression, and oil 
production. All of these increase grievances among the affected population and thus, in the 
logic of the theory, increase the probability of collective action.  
 A variation of the grievances theory is the horizontal inequalities hypothesis put forward 
by Frances Stewart.39 Horizontal inequalities refer to inequalities between identity groups40 in 
the areas of political participation, economy, social aspects, and cultural status. If such 
inequalities are severe and consistent, they can result in large-scale group mobilization and 
potentially in violence.41 
 Proponents of identity approaches emphasize the importance of cultural differences based 
on ethnic or religious affiliation for the legitimization and mobilization of violence against the 
out-group. Within the wide range of identity-based models, which generally argue along 
feelings of superiority or discrimination of one group versus ‘the other’ or multiple others, 
three variations are frequently highlighted separately. According to the primordialist 
argument42, some identity groups are inherently prone to violence and thus constitute ‘natural 
rebels’. A very similar essentialist perspective is taken by those arguing along the concept of 
“ancient hatreds”43 between groups: These long-standing hostile feelings are assumed to erupt 
in violence if an opportunity presents itself. A third line of argumentation stresses the 
importance of myths, symbols, and narratives in creating antagonism between collectives 
with strongly held identities; they either directly express hostile opposition, or are 
reinterpreted in such a manner, in both cases posing an imminent threat towards the respective 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Mobilizing”, in Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, ed. David A. Snow et al. 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 540f. 
39 Frances Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: An Introduction and Some Hypotheses”, in Horizontal 
Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Frances Stewart 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3–24. See also: Gudrun Østby, “Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities 
and Violent Civil Conflict”, Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 2 (2008): 143–162; Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik 
Cederman and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global 
Data Set”, American Sociological Review 72, no. 2 (2009): 316–337.  
40 This distinguishes them from vertical inequalities that exist between individuals. 
41 Importantly, Stewart extends the argument after the analysis of a number of cases, in that already the 
“perceptions of horizontal inequalities affect the likelihood of conflict”. Frances Stewart, Graham K. Brown, and 
Arnim Langer, “Major Findings and Conclusions on the Relationship between Horizontal Inequalities and 
Conflict”, in Horizontal Inequalities, 285–300, here: 293. 
42 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996). 
43 Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (London: Papermac, 1994).  
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group.44 All three perspectives rely on the analysis of variously conceptualized ‘cultural 
components,’ the depth of which ranges from clustering societies into religious categories 
varying in a presupposed ‘violent’ nature to a more detailed look into symbolic complexes. 
  
While all of these theoretical models have made important contributions to the analysis of 
civil war onset by highlighting different dimensions of conflict, identifying relevant factors 
for its intensification, and illuminating correlations between these factors and social action in 
many cases, they cannot account for all variance in collective action we observe. 
Additionally, based on the presence of certain structural factors, they many times incorrectly 
predict violent escalation for cases in which either non-violent action prevails or there is no 
collective action at all. In sum, they lack empirical validity. The comparison of the Houthi 
rebellion and the Southern Movement protests serves as an excellent example in this regard: 
Under most similar structural conditions,45 which feature elements of most proxies used in the 
presented theories, the former employs violent means in pursuing their goals while the latter 
remains non-violent in its protest. In the logic of the existing approaches, this variance should 
not exist, i.e. they fail with their explanation. Their deficit is that they only provide a black 
box explanation, which leaves out the mechanisms of how structural factors translate to 
violent collective action, e.g. what happens between the opening up of political opportunities 
and protest or even rebellion.46 This is mainly due to their mere focus on the macro-level. 
Although structural approaches adumbrate that factors on the meso- (organizational) and 
micro- (individual) level are present and in some way “connect” the independent and 
dependent variable, they neither explicitly specify them nor do they consider them in their 
explanations. However, it would be of crucial importance to do so in order to understand why 
collective actors change their behavior.47 This desideratum shall be tackled in the following.  
       
 
 
                                                          
44 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001); Elizabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambrudge 
University Press, 2006); Marc Howard Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).  
45 On John Stuart Mill’s ‘method of difference’ in theory building see: Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for 
Students of Political Science (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 23. 
46 Karl-Dieter Opp, Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A Multidisciplinary Introduction, 
Critique, and Synthesis (New York: Routledge, 2009), 323.  
47 Opp, Theories, 352. 
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The Argument: The Role of Framing for the Mobilization of Collective Action and the Choice 
of Strategy 
As I already stated in the beginning, I argue that the inclusion of a more ideational perspective 
into models of conflict escalation helps to overcome the deficits of established approaches 
and to identify and elucidate factors that lead to the choice of a violent or non-violent path. 
This will be done by adopting a ‘framing perspective’ as it was developed within social 
movement studies. Framing processes and the agency involved mediate between structural 
conditions and actual collective action. Their specification illuminates the ‘black box’, 
emphasizes the significance of the meso- and micro-level, and thus constitutes a significant 
contribution to the explanation of protest behavior.  
 
From a framing perspective meaning is pivotal, for it is assumed to be prefatory for 
(collective) action.48 Based on the constructivist and symbolic interactionist premise that 
meaning is never intrinsically given but can only arise “through interpretive processes 
mediated by culture”49 and is socially negotiated, the framing approach aims to illuminate 
these processes for the study of social movements. More precisely, it asks how signifying 
work or meaning construction employed by social movement actors translates into the 
mobilization of collective action and how the content of the ‘meaning packages’ conveyed 
influences the choice of means and strategies to reach the movement’s goals. The process in 
which meaning is strategically articulated, negotiated, contested, modified, and rearticulated50 
is thereby referred to as ‘framing’, the product as a ‘collective action frame’ (hereafter: 
frame). 
 The concept of ‘frame’ is borrowed from Erving Goffman;51 it is defined as a cognitive 
schema of interpretation which fulfills the function of guiding the perception and 
representation of reality by focusing attention on certain aspects and not others, tying 
elements together to packages or sets of meaning, and possibly reconstituting the way in 
which some elements are understood and related to each other or to the actor.52 In other 
words: “Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit 
                                                          
48 Robert D. Benford, “An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective”, in Sociological 
Inquiry 67, no. 4 (1997): 409–430, here: 410. 
49 David A. Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”, in Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 470–
474, here: 470. 
50 Benford, “Insider’s Critique”, 410.  
51 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York et al.: Harper & 
Row, 1974). 
52 Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”. 
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theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters.”53 Primary frames are present in 
all each life situation to enable individual action; they are not consciously manufactured but 
unconsciously adopted through socialization and applied in context. In distinction to such 
‘natural’ frames, strategic frames can be intentionally created by certain actors in order to 
influence the individual’s perception and resulting action. ‘Collective action frames’ belong to 
this category of strategic frames; they fulfill the same principal tasks of selecting and 
increasing salience as everyday life frames, but differ in their primary mobilization function: 
mobilizing consensus, mobilizing action, and demobilizing counter-mobilization of 
adversaries.54 To successfully attain these mobilization aims, strategic social movement actors 
need to attend to the three core framing tasks of ‘diagnostic framing’, i.e. the interpretation of 
the (problematic and pressing) status quo, including the question of who is to be blamed for it; 
‘prognostic framing’ in form of a proposed solution to the predicament and the way to reach 
it; and, lastly, ‘motivational framing’ by accenting and highlighting the urgency, severity, and 
benefits of action while overcoming associated risks and fears.55 As a subsequent criterion for 
successful mobilization, the resulting frames need to resonate with the targeted audiences: 
They need to be coherent and to be in line with structural and ideational conditions, and the 
frame articulators themselves must be perceived as credible.56 
 It becomes obvious that frames do not exist isolated from structural conditions; rather, they 
are based on them, yet not determined by them. Movement actors, on the other hand, are 
assumed to possess agency in their strategic frame development and alignment efforts.57 
Depending on their goals and the respective opportunities and constraints provided by the 
structural conditions, they “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text”58. For example, as has already been argued, grievances alone 
cannot explain the outbreak of violence. Nevertheless, they play an important role in the 
mobilization process: Without – at least perceived – grievances, there is no psychosocial 
reason for individuals to react to attempts for mobilization. They thus constitute an essential 
element in the overall course of mobilization, which can sufficiently be explained only by 
                                                          
53 Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left 
(Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1980), 6. 
54 Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”, 471. 
55 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization”, in From 
Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, 
and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1988), 197–217. 
56 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology 26 (August 2000): 611–639.  
57 William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
58 Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, Journal of Communication 43, 
no. 4 (December 1993): 51–58, here: 52. 
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attribution to framing processes. In these, they are made salient in a diagnostic way (including 
the attribution of responsibility or blame), and transformed into something “sufficiently 
serious to warrant not only collective complaint but also some kind of corrective, collective 
action”59. In the concrete cases under analysis, the framing actors would have to convince the 
members of the respective identity groups that they as a group suffer from social exclusion (in 
form of discrimination and else), that they are existentially threatened by state failure and/or 
repression, and that the remedial action the framing actors call for is not only necessary, but 
will also be effective in resolving the situation.60 Which form exactly the action is to take 
(inter alia, if it will take a violent or non-violent path) thereby depends on what is (and can be, 
depending on the context) specified in the prognostic frame.  
 The interrelations can accordingly be visualized in the following way:  
 
 
Figure 1.2.: Integrated Model for the Explanation of Collective Action 
 
The mechanism is constituted by (a) the given structural conditions, which affect the (primary 
framework of) (b) strategic actors, who, based on their own perceptions and strategic interests 
and goals, elaborate and promote (c) a collective action frame, which influences (or at least 
seeks to influence) (d) the audience to take (e) collective action in the form delineated by the 
frame. In this, it is important to point out that through the successful resonance of the frame 
among the audience, or lack thereof, the audience in turn impacts the frame or, more 
precisely, it affects the way in which the strategic actors modify and re-adapt the frame in the 
dynamic process of frame alignment in order to achieve greater resonance.61 
In comparison to the established approaches, the suggested model shifts the analytical 
focus from the structural context on the macro-level to the relevant actors and processes 
which – I claim – are decisive for concrete developments and outcomes of contentious 
political action located on the meso- and micro-level. It emphasizes not only the 
cognitive/ideational component, but at the same time the agency of actors, the dynamic and 
                                                          
59 Snow, “Grievances, Individual and Mobilizing”, 541. 
60 On efficacy belief see: Opp, Theories, 341. 
61 See also: Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho, “Frames and Their Consequences”, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodwin and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 187–209. 
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interactive character of the processes involved in frame development and resonance, and, 
lastly, the aspect of contingency entailed in all of this. In doing so, it does not intend to 
completely break with existing perspectives but to provide an extension, “to investigate and 
illuminate what these other perspectives glossed over, namely the matter of the production of 
mobilizing and countermobilizing meanings and ideas.”62 
 
The Analysis 
The analysis of the cases will be guided by two questions: Firstly, why (and how) strategic 
movement actors construct particular frames rather than others; and secondly, why 
constituents take corresponding action or not. Both questions thereby involve the dimensions 
of frame content as well as framing processes.  
 
As has been elaborated, to be successful in mobilizing collective action within identity 
groups, frames need to appeal to these respective identities, group values, and beliefs to tap 
into existing group discourses and need to be verified by empirically observable events. These 
are main criteria in frame development and need to be taken up by the framing actors. For 
both identity groups under analysis, I will therefore highlight relevant details of their history, 
the geographical, social, religious, economic, and political conditions they live in, as well as 
values, beliefs, and narratives that shape their group identity. Certain aspects of importance 
such as tribalism, colonial legacies, and neopatrimonialism will be highlighted.63 Taken 
together, these constitute the ‘background layer’ of context to which the ever more limited 
‘focal lens’ of discourses frames ultimately refer to, and which they selectively accentuate.  
 Concerning the ‘intermediate layer’, the location and depiction of significant discourses 
will be included, in addition to the recounting of meaningful events. A perceived threat to the 
identity group on this level would present a good discursive foundation for corresponding 
threat frames and thus be of special importance.  
 Finally, as ‘front layer’, relevant frames (in regard to the research questions) will be 
identified and set out in detail. Through the dissection into layers not only do the specific 
elements of each layer become explicit. Furthermore, the interrelatedness and 
interdependence of background conditions, discourses, and frames surface clearly.64 On a 
                                                          
62 Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”, 474. 
63 What must not be forgotten is that – allegiance to the ideational perspective taken – in any case we deal not 
with ‘given facts’ with an inherent truth-claim, but always with perceptions. This will be reflected in the 
presentation as in the appraisal of all material. 
64 See also: Marie-Eve Desrosiers, “Reframing Frame Analysis: Key Contributions to Conflict Studies”, 
Ethnopolitics 11, no. 1 (2012): 1–23. 
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general level, the dissection traces the necessary ‘anchoring’ frames needed in order to be 
convincing, and hence enables us to assess their quality in this regard, e.g. the number of 
identity-relevant components a frame includes, if it draws on myths or symbols of great 
importance, if it relates to prominent discourses, etc.  
 Robert Benford and David Snow have conceptualized these considerations in depth in their 
discussion of frame resonance,65 which will also be the analytical criteria employed for the 
analysis and evaluation of frame contents.  
Two categories of actors are under analysis, namely the strategic movement actors (mainly 
elites), who construct and articulate frames – I will refer to them as ‘framers’ – and the 
audience, consisting of those who already participate in the movement, the general public 
who shall be persuaded to join, opponents who shall be demobilized, and potential external 
observers. The categories thus refer to individual as well as collective actors, in other words, 
they bridge the micro- with the meso-level. How they connect and what this implies for the 
framing process will be taken up in the respective chapter. On the empirical level, I will, 
based on a detailed description of each of the movements under analysis, determine who are 
the respective framing actors and introduce them in regard to their biography, their social, 
political, and movement roles, as well as important personal connections and networks. Their 
main tasks as framers lie in frame development, i.e. the transformation of an issue or 
grievance into something that needs urgent change and their participation therein.66 These 
related processes will be identified and contextualized, as will be the actors, topics, and events 
of the contested processes, points of high overall significance for they mirror the most critical 
and crucial aspects in regard to resonance. Counterframing by the government, the 
movements’ arch opponent, has elevated prominence here since it poses the axis conflict 
within the act of political contestation. At the same time, the government is also among those 
groups subsumed under the general category of audience (from a movement framer 
perspective). Its characteristics as a potential target group or incidental audience will be 
elaborated, as will be those of the others listed above. The larger and more inclusive actors are 
– the general public, for example – the less specific the delineation of ‘characteristics’ is; it 
will more so refer to general cultural traits instead.  
Subsequent to frame development follows the dissemination to and (in case of success) 
adoption of frames among the targeted group. As has been stated before, both processes are 
interdependent in that unsuccessful frame resonance leads to constant reformulation and 
                                                          
65 Snow/Benford, “Ideology”; Benford/Snow, “Overview”.  
66 Ibid. 
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adaptation of frames.67 At the end of the process we see either collective action or no action. 
If there is no action at all, the frame failed. If, on the other hand, we can observe collective 
action, it can again adapt two specifications: It can either be the action that was called for in 
the frame, or any other. For either of the two options I will attempt to clarify their grounds: 
What has been called for in the frame? Which were the circumstances in which the action 
took place? Have there been other incentives? Can we rule out that coercion played a role in 
“mobilization”? Who exactly are the actors? Which role did timing and setting play? Did the 
alternative action have any anticipating articulation? How did the action in turn change the 
situational context for successive frames? Can we identify any evidence during the action 
itself that relates back to the frame and helps to establish a connection?  
Successful resonance, however, cannot and must not be inferred from collective action 
alone. Observable collective action and a corresponding frame only establish correlation; a 
frame can be resonant without immediately visible collective action, due to e.g. massive 
repression, lack of resources or else. Therefore, resonance will be deduced from the 
audience’s articulation of their perceptions. Since the perceptions themselves cannot be 
reached by any method, the closest we can get towards proving resonance is by critically 
assessing the actions and statements of the individuals and collectives we are interested in. 
The audience’s articulation of their perceptions will thus be captured directly through inquiry 
and indirectly through the analysis of their statements in other contexts (discussions, forums, 
written form, etc.). Key questions would be: Which aspects are most prominent, i.e. resonated 
best? Is there a consensus regarding the perception of the situation even if the population has 
not been mobilized (for violence)? These would imply a partial success of the framing, 
namely the diagnostic component.68 The same also holds for the prognosis. In conclusion, a 
high degree of congruence between the frame and their perceptions accordingly provides 
evidence for successful resonance and makes a strong case for the overall argumentation. 
 
The analysis is based on sources stemming from the movements (members and elites), non-
movement Yemeni nationals, the Yemeni government, national and international media, 
national and international non-governmental organizations, and researchers. Observations 
during interviews and data collection further complement these sources. The assessed scope 
of media covers written, audio, and visual spectra as well as spatial arrangements. In addition 
to the interviews and group discussions I conducted, it ranges from reports, to articles, printed 
                                                          
67 Polletta/Ho, “Frames”. 
68 Cf. Desrosiers, “Reframing”. 
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movements material, media and otherwise published interviews, printed speeches and 
lectures, books, newspapers and magazines, tokens, artifacts, photographs, graffiti, paintings, 
slogans, chants, banners, statements, audio recordings with speeches or lectures, and else 
(cassette tapes, MP3, podcasts, streamings and other online formats), videos (mainly 
published on YouTube), websites, web forums, blogs, to various social media sites 
(Facebook, Twitter and else).  
The method chosen to analyze the core data is ‘qualitative content analysis’ as developed 
by Philipp Mayring.69 It refers to a systematic, rule- and theory-guided qualitative text 
analysis that uses coding and categorizing to condense the meaning of texts/communication 
and thus allows the deduction of certain aspects like possible intentions of the speaker, etc. It 
is based on a model of communication that includes many dimensions of the context; hence, it 
provides a guideline for the analysis of the embeddedness of the communication and possibly 
even the strategies used to attain a certain resonance. The aim is to be able to identify clear 
themes and categories that fall into one or more dimensions of frames, and to assign them to 
strategic framing (like e.g. frame alignment). This will be conducted for the identified core 
corpus of sources. The remaining sources will be analyzed on the bases of the inferred frames.  
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
In Chapter Two, I discuss the theoretical backgrounds, first on explanations for violence in 
civil war studies,70 and second on collective action in social movement studies. Both 
disciplines share certain ideas that have influenced their respective theory development at a 
certain point during their evolution. To these belong the assumptions that collective 
grievances, resource availability and mobilization, as well as a (political) opportunity for 
action, play a role in the escalation of violence or collective action. While the research on 
armed insurgencies has added considerations along the lines of ‘identity’ and the impact of 
‘neopatrimonialism’ to its core theoretical approaches, those studying collective action have 
turned toward ‘framing’ (which will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Three) and 
‘organization’ to explain the trajectory of collective action. The respective strengths and 
shortcomings of each approach is highlighted, and their explanatory power will later be tested 
for the two case studies (Chapter Six). 
 Chapter Three introduces the framing approach. It traces the origins of the concept of 
frame in the works of the sociologist Erving Goffman and its further evolution and integration 
                                                          
69 Philipp Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken (Weinheim/Basel: Beltz, 2010). 
70 I use the terms ‘civil war’, ‘armed (intrastate) conflict’, ‘insurgengy’, and ‘rebellion’ interchangeably. 
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into a wide range of disciplines, e.g. communication science. How framing has become a 
popular concept in social movement studies will be treated in a second step. ‘Collective action 
frames’ are attributed with a high potential for mobilization – if they are constructed in a 
culturally appropriate, credible, and convincing way, they are effectively distributed to the 
appropriate audience; they can prevail over competing frames. I present the seminal framing 
model established by David Snow and Robert Benford, discuss competing models and 
disputed aspects, and on this basis lastly develop a personal integrated model of framing for 
the explanation of movement strategies (violent vs. nonviolent) in the realm of conflict 
studies. 
 A background on Yemen – its history, sociology, politics, and economy – is provided in 
Chapter Four. Beyond mere facts and figures, the focus therein is on deconstructing certain 
dominant assumptions about the country’s territorial cohesion and essentialist social groups in 
one part, and on delineating important narratives (‘unity’) and discourses (‘Saudi dominance’) 
as an ideational setting from which the movement frames emanate and to which they are tied 
in the other. 
 Chapter Five is dedicated to a detailed introduction into the two movements. Each of them 
is introduced and its characteristics and evolution are depicted. For the Houthi case, I define 
two phases – prior and after the killing of Hussein al-Houthi and the subsequent escalation 
from nonviolence to violence – which are then analyzed in regard to the frame shift that has 
taken place. Since there is no such drastic shift for the Hirak, I identify phases based on 
smaller, yet potentially consequential changes and on these grounds examine shifts in its 
framing. 
 Chapter Six tests the explanatory power of the established theoretical approaches for the 
cases and concludes by stating which factors are significant and will be entered into the 
integrated framing model.  
 Chapter Seven comprises the framing analysis. All framing dimensions will be 
successively elucidated, and the coherence of the frames will be assessed and correlated with 
the resonance they generate, including the perceivable collective action. I am thus able to 
trace the impact of frame shifts for both cases, supporting my argument that it is the frames 
which make the difference. 
 Finally, Chapters Eight and Nine conclude the dissertation. They provide a comparative 
interpretation of the findings and once more broach central issues such as the significance and 
explanatory power of correlations between frame content and protest events, and the impact 
of movement structure on movement actions. A final discussion and assessment of my 
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findings is followed by a brief summary and outlook on potential consecutive research 
questions resulting from my study.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theoretical framework of the dissertation sets out to integrate theoretical concepts 
stemming from both civil war studies and social movement research. The following chapter 
will present the necessary background by introducing the main theoretical strands from each 
of the disciplines.  
 
2.1. Explaining Violence in Civil War Studies 
The study of intra-state armed conflict evolved in the context of decolonization and the 
related increase of such conflicts (in comparison to the earlier dominance of inter-state war). 
Early explanations for the outbreak of violence were rooted in social-psychology. Ted Gurr in 
his seminal work “Why Men Rebel” (1970) posed that relative deprivation led to frustration, 
which ultimately triggered aggression and hostilities.71 He considered intra-societal cleavages 
along identity lines as a significant dimension to elucidate in this context. In addition, Gurr 
stressed the importance of people’s beliefs about the utility of their actions, the interactions 
between contentious acts and the government’s capacity for repression and appeasement, and 
the role of the media for spreading ideas. While these aspects have regained attention in later 
decades and generally have not lost their timeliness in current research, his work has 
nevertheless received rigorous critique in a number of regards. First and foremost, Gurr based 
his model on the presupposition that political violence was non-rational. While this 
assumption had been contested numerous times before, at the latest Mark Irving Lichbach 
demonstrated how the sequence of “anger-grievance-rebellion” could be explained within a 
rational choice framework.72 In addition, prominent scholars of social movements engaged 
with Gurr’s model and each suggested a different mechanism: Theda Skocpol stressed the 
decisive impact of social and political structures, Charles Tilly positioned the processes of 
political mobilization at the center of his extensive work, while Sidney Tarrow focused on 
mass social movements.73 The fruitfulness of an integrative perspective that takes up elements 
                                                          
71 Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). He defines relative deprivation as 
“actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value 
expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value 
capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping” (p. 24). 
72 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). For a 
positioning and discussion of “Why Men Rebel” 40 years after its first publication see: Ted R. Gurr, “Why Men 
Rebel Redux: How Valid Are Its Arguments 40 Years On?”, E-International Relations, November 17, 2011, 
accessed July 14, 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/11/17/why-men-rebel-redux-how-valid-are-its-arguments-40-
years-on/#_ftn6.  
73 Ibid. Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1978); Sidney Tarrow, Power 
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from both disciplines – civil war research and social movement studies – and from a range of 
theoretical models is the main argument of this thesis and will be elaborated in detail; serious 
engagement and discussion between influential scholars on the topic, however, can be traced 
back to this early period. 
  After a declining interest in – and, resultingly, the studies of – civil wars during the height 
of the Cold War, in which research on inter-state (proxy) wars dominated, the 1990s saw a 
renaissance of the discipline. The high death toll of civil wars during that decade, which were 
often referred to as ‘ethnic wars’, reignited the question about why they broke out in the first 
place. Besides approaches focusing on (ethnic) identity as explanatory factor, economic 
perspectives became increasingly popular and, from the late 1990s onwards, played a 
dominant, though far from unchallenged, role in the field. This fact strongly impacted on the 
‘methodological suitcase’ of the discipline.  
 In regard to methodology, conflict research as a discipline has been shaped by its ascent 
during the height of behaviorism in the late 1950s; positivism dominated and pushed more 
interpretist assumptions into the background. With this, it introduced a divide between 
“quantitative-systematic-generalising” and “qualitative-humanistic-discursive”74 approaches, 
which for a long time were perceived as mutually exclusive and led to heated discussions 
between proponents of the respective research traditions. Only in recent years has the divide 
been bridged and the mutual gain of complementary or integrative research become accepted 
and valued. Moreover, as approaches from other disciplines (such as history, anthropology, 
sociology)75 gradually enter the field, so do more disaggregated data sets76 (assisted e.g. by 
GIS-technology), and an overall a stronger inclusion of the micro- and meso-levels77. All 
these are fertile developments, to which this dissertation seeks to contribute. 
  Established theoretical approaches can be grouped into three predominant strands: those 
focusing on opportunities, grievances, or identity as explanatory (meta)variable.78 In the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
74 Govinda Clayton, “Quantitative and Econometric Methodologies”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars, ed. 
Edward Newman and Karl DeRouen, Jr. (London/New York: Routledge, 2014), 28–40, here: 29.  
75 See: Newman/DeRouen (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars.  
76 Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Introduction to Special Issue ‘Disaggregating Civil 
War’”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (August 2009): 487–495.  
77 Nils B. Weidmann, “Micro-Level Studies”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 67–78.  
78 Alternative divisions include e.g. ‘opportunity vs. motive’ (identity should be added) or the triad of ‘identity, 
institutions, and economy’. For the former: Päivi Lujala, “Valuable Natural Resources”, in Routledge Handbook 
of Civil War, 119–130; Gudrun Østby and Henrik Urdal warn of overemphasizing the divide; they instead 
underline that many measures equally well describe opportunity and motivation. Gudrun Østby and Henrik 
Urdal, “Demographic Factors and Civil War”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 131–144, here: 142. For the 
latter: Margit Bussmann, Andreas Hasenclever and Gerald Schneider, “Identität, Institutionen und Ökonomie: 
Ursachen und Scheinursachen innenpolitischer Gewalt”, in Identität, Institutionen und Ökonomie: Ursachen 
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following, I will present each of these strands and the most important theories subsumed 
under them. First, I will introduce their respective perspectives and core assumptions, 
subsequently their measurement and the critique they received. In the context of the case 
studies, I will later test their comparative explanatory power and lay open their limitations 
before I then conduct the frame analysis as suggested in my model. 
  
2.1.1. Opportunity 
Opportunity approaches can be subdivided into two major strands: one focusing on economic 
arguments, i.e. opportunity costs, the other one taking an institutional perspective, i.e. arguing 
with opportunity structures enabling political violence. Both assume the rationality of actors 
and neglect or even deny the role of grievances79, which had been at the heart of the earlier 
relative deprivation argument.  
 
Economy – Opportunity Costs 
The economic opportunity approach is closely tied to the names of Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler. In their much-debated 2004 publication “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”80 they 
put forward the argument that rebels are inherently motivated by financial gains. Recruitment 
for armed groups will thus be successful when fighting provides a more profitable source of 
income than alternatives. This will be the case especially in countries where regular sources of 
income provide merely low financial return, i.e. poor countries, and where the exploitation 
natural resources on the other hand promise high and quick profits. In the literature, the 
argument has become popular as the ‘greed hypothesis’.81 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
innenpolitischer Gewalt, Politische Vierteljahressschrift, Special Issue 43/2009, ed. Margit Bussmann, Andreas 
Hasenclever and Gerald Schneider (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009), 9–38.  
79 Grievances are associated with “a deprivation of basic needs of some sort, claims of rights based on identity, 
react to discrimination”. I. William Zartman, “Need, Creed, and Greed in Intrastate Conflict”, in Rethinking the 
economics of war: The intersection of need, creed, and greed, ed. Cynthia J Arnson and I. William Zartman 
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), 256–284, here: 262.  
80 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 
(2004): 563–595. 
81 A similar proposition has been made by Georg Elwert, who poses that the exploitation of natural resources, 
trade in drugs, narcotics, and arms, human trafficking, and kidnapping in the context of armed conflicts creates a 
war economy which becomes perpetual, significantly prolongs wars, and makes their settlement much more 
difficult. Georg Elwert, “Gewaltmärkte. Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität von Gewalt”, in Soziologie der 
Gewalt, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Special Issue 37/1997, ed. Trutz von Trotha 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), 86–101. 
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Following intense debate about the theoretical assumptions and the research design,82 they 
both advanced over the subsequent years and, in 2009, published the results in form of the 
‘feasibility hypothesis’. It holds that rebellion will occur wherever it is financially and 
militarily feasible (specifying that these would be “relatively rare circumstances”).83  
 Key issues raised in the discussion of both hypotheses concern the theoretical 
presumptions as well as the operationalization: Critics challenged the complete denial of the 
role of grievances;84 the mere focus on the rebels while the state is disregarded;85 the validity 
of the proxies used;86 underspecified causal mechanisms;87 and low levels of significance for 
several indicators.  
 Collier himself together with Nicholas Sambanis in 2005 published the two-volume work 
“Understanding Civil War” in which they discussed the weaknesses inherent in the greed-
based model and moreover argued in favor of a rapprochement of their own quantitative 
model and qualitative approaches. Presenting a wide range of case studies form Africa and 
Asia, they demonstrate how these can enrich the theoretical assumptions and economic 
model, for the identified limitations and challenges are numerous. First, the quantitative 
literature does not agree on one clear definition of civil war, which creates difficulties not 
only in comparing research designs and finding, but even more significantly in regard to 
coding civil war onset and determination.88 Furthermore, the most important proxies are 
critically evaluated.89 The Collier/Hoeffler model uses ‘GDP/capita’ as a proxy for the 
opportunity costs of rebel recruitment: The lower the GDP/capita, the lower the recruitment 
costs for rebels (for the less attractive are other income opportunities). James Fearon and 
David Laitin, however, in their prominent study in 2003 use GDP/capita as a proxy for state 
weakness, which they hold to be causally related to opportunity structures enabling rebellion 
                                                          
82 See among others: James D. Fearon, “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 483–507; David Keen, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, International Affairs 
88, no. 4 (2012): 757–777.  
83 Collier/Hoeffler/Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance”, 3. As the authors note, the hypothesis is a 
refinement off the so-called ‘Machiavelli Theorem’ advanced by Jack Hirshleifer. Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark 
Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
84 E.g. Keen, “Greed and Grievance”; Jeffrey Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative 
Research Findings”, International Studies Review 11 (2009): 707–735.  
85 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political Science 
Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90. 
86 Nicholas Sambanis, “Conclusion: Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War”, 
Understanding Civil War. Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 1: Africa, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis 
(Washington: World Bank, 2005), 303–334. In 2009 Collier/Hoeffler themselves explicitly recognized the 
challenge to gather appropriate data and proxies for their model. Collier/Hoeffler/Rohner, “Beyond Greed and 
Grievance”.  
87 Sambanis, “Conclusion”. 
88 Ibid. Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is a Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational 
Definition”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 814–858. 
89 For the following discussion of proxies: Sambanis, “Conclusion”.  
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(see below).90 Sambanis thus questions what exactly it is that GDP/capita is supposed to 
measure, given that these competing (and many other) hypotheses use it as a proxy.91  
 ‘Male secondary school enrollment’ is employed as a proxy by Collier/Hoeffler; low rates 
are claimed to indicate lower recruitment costs as well. The mechanism remains unclear; 
alternative approaches, for instance, suggest that secondary schooling could equally well be 
used to further certain (e.g. nationalist) educational content, thus catalyzing conflict and 
recruitment.92 Or, alternatively, some studies find a connection between higher education and 
subsequent unemployment, which fosters frustration and increases the number of youth 
willing to join armed groups.  
 The same problem of inconsistency or underspecificity, respectively, concerns ‘economic 
growth’ and ‘natural resources’: Would not preceding low level violence (potentially 
triggered by something else) already decrease economic growth,93 implying that there is an 
issue of endogeneity in the causal mechanism? Does natural resource wealth serve to motivate 
civil war onset or is its looting rather a means to sustain it?94 Besides, are all resources 
significant?95 How does grievance come in here, i.e. unequal distribution of natural resource 
income?96 What about its location97 and the state’s economic dependence? 
                                                          
90 Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”.  
91 Other critics e.g. additionally underline that while economic misery and decline tends to be widespread, the 
outbreak of armed conflict is much more limited; hence, any explanation which to a large degree builds on such 
a proxy necessarily misses out significant dimensions. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), The Political 
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).  
92 Keith Darden, “The Scholastic Revolution”, Mimeo (New Haven: Yale University, 2002). 
93 Sambanis, “Conclusion”.  
94 Philippe Le Billon, for example, finds that “’contraband goods such as gemstones, drugs, and narcotics” 
prolong conflicts, but do not increase their likelihood. Philippe Le Billon, Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits 
and the Politics of Resources (London: Hurst, 2012), 15f.  
95 As Lujala points out, there is wider agreement about the impact of oil and secondary diamonds, while findings 
on timber and narcotics remain inconclusive. Lujala, “Valuable Natural Resources”. For studies on the role of oil 
and diamonds see: Fearon, “Primary Commodity Exports”; Marcartan Humphreys, “Natural Resources and 
Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 508–537; 
Philippe Le Billon, “Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars”, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 98, no. 2 (2008), 345–372; Michael L. Ross, “A Closer Look at Oil, 
Diamonds, and Civil War”, Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 265–300. For timber see: Le Billon, 
Wars of Plunder; Siri Aas Rustad et al., “Foliage and Fighting: Forest Resources and the Onset, Duration, and 
Location of Civil War”, Political Geography 27, no. 7 (2008): 761–782. For narcotics see: Joshua Angrist and 
Adriana Kugler, “Rural Windfall or Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 90, no. 2 (2008): 191–215; Päivi Lujala, “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict 
and Rebel Access to Natural Resources”, Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1 (2010): 15–28.  
96 This leads to the aspect of ‘horizontal inequalities’ as put forward by Frances Stewart; see 2.1.2. Frances 
Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies 
(Basingstoke: Palgave Macmillan, 2008); see also: Gudrun Østby, Ragnhild Nordås and Jan Ketil Rød, 
“Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 2 
(2009): 301–324.  
97 It appears that only when the resources are located in the region of conflict do they increase duration and 
severity of hostilities. Halvard Buhaug and Päivi Lujala, “Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in 
Quantitative Studies of Civil War”, Political Geography 24, no. 4 (2005): 399–418; Päivi Lujala, “Deadly 
Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict”, Journal of 
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‘Rough terrain’, so Collier/Hoeffler argue, provides rebel hideouts and the percentage of 
territory of a state which consists of either mountains or forested area is resultingly assumed 
to increase risks. Besides the argument that sanctuaries might equally be located across 
borders and else, Sambanis underlines that such refuge would rather serve conflict duration 
rather than onset.  
 Among the demographic factors ‘population size’, ‘diasporas’, and ‘ethnicity/social 
fragmentation/polarization’, each raises more questions than the preceding one. While 
population size was found very robust over a range of studies (based on the presumption that 
the higher, the easier it is to find challengers to the regime), the factors related to population 
growth, like population density, dispersion, and urbanization, were similarly discussed. Most 
remained inconclusive, with the effect of density being predominantly refuted.98 Diasporas 
are assumed to support groups financially, with human resources mobilized through kin 
networks, and through influencing the governments in their host countries; Sambanis, 
however, points out that not only are such diaspora collectives no unified entities; 
furthermore, could any other network in theory replace their suggested roles. Of the 
‘ethnicity/social fragmentation/polarization’ triad, merely the last component proved robust 
over a number of publications.99 A main point of critique is the neglect of the function of 
institutions for the inclusion or exclusion of groups; this cannot be proxied in the suggested 
model.  
 The last proxy that Sambanis treats in some detail is ‘political institutions’. While 
Collier/Hoeffler consider e.g. the regime type as insignificant (it would represent a grievance), 
others come to different conclusions (see below). Gurr100 moreover accentuates the need to 
distinguish between new and established democracies for it impacts on the credibility and 
legitimacy of the government – both factors which cannot be easily coded.  
 Numerous other aspects like regional variation, the role of elites and leadership, transitions 
from one kind of violence to another, and the historical dimension of conflicts remain 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Conflict Resolution 53, no. 1 (2009): 50–71; Lujala, “Spoils of Nature”. If oil is located offshore, it has no 
impact on conflict onset. Lujala, “Spoils of Nature”; Michael L. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth 
Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
98 For an overview and discussion see: Østby/Urdal, “Demographic Factors and Civil War”, especially Table 
11.1. They furthermore discuss migration, differential sex ratio, and differential ethnic growth. 
99 The Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) is frequently criticized as an inappropriate measure; it 
neither reflects any real categories of fractionalization, nor the salience of such potentially fractionalizing 
categories. Sambanis, “Conclusion”, 319f. On the index and the measurement of fractionalization in general: 
Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization”, Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June 2003): 155–194; James D. 
Fearon, “Ethnic structure and cultural diversity by country”, Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June 2003): 195–
222. 
100 Ted R. Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington: U.S. Institute of 
Peace, 2000).  
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undisclosed from this perspective. Gains from a complementary integration of qualitative 
studies can help not only to improve the data and its depth, but moreover to better elucidate 
processes, and assist the development of an improved operationalization by revealing 
potentially omitted variables and mechanisms.101  
 
Institutions – Opportunity Structures 
Another major strand of opportunity approaches does not merely focus on the rebels’ side, but 
bring the state back in. Several perspectives share the same core argument: That state-capacity 
should be at the center of interest. The grounds for why this should be so then expand to 
include ‘weak-state’ arguments, claiming that a lack of state capacity leads to an opportunity 
for rebellion, a security dilemma, or – in relation with regime type of regime change – to 
instability. Neopatrimonialism and its consequences (in both directions) form another variant 
of institution-based explanations.102  
 James Fearon and David Laitin (2003) relate “conditions that favor insurgency” to weak 
states, which lack the political, bureaucratic, and military capabilities to effectively control 
their territory and are thus more volatile to challengers due to “fear and opportunities”.103 
They proxy state capacity with GDP/capita, suggesting that the higher the income, the 
stronger the state.104 Besides a lack of consideration of motives, critics have attempted to 
disprove the assumed correlation (and posed causal mechanism) between strong military 
(proxied by military spending) and risk of insurgency. Margit Bussmann’s study provides 
evidence for this counterclaim, while Hanne Fjelde and Indra de Soysa demonstrate the 
superiority of good governance over both cooptation and coercion as regime mechanisms to 
spark compliance.105 Both these and a later study of Fearon (2010) provide convincing 
evidence for the significance of state institutions, yet rather in regard to the factors of trust 
                                                          
101 Collier/Hoeffler/Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance”; Sambanis, “Conclusion”.  
102 In line with these is furthermore Gurr, who claims that “[s]trong states have the capacity to either accomodate 
or suppress demands for self-determination at low cost.” (Peoples versus States, 82). Sambanis, however, poses 
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103 The argument is rooted in a Hobbesian worldview. Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”. 
104 Other indicators they find significant are population size, new statehood, oil export, instability (years since 
regime change), and mountainous terrain. Ibid.  
105 Margit Bussmann, “Peitsche oder Zuckerbrot? Staatskapazität und Bürgerkriege”, in Identität, Institutionen 
und Ökonomie, 258–282; Hanne Fjelde and Indra De Soysa, “Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State 
Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961–2004”, Conflict Management and Peace Science 26 (February 2009): 
5–25. Robert Bates on the other hand argues in the opposite direction: He accuses predatory governments of 
creating insecurity among the population, which then breeds discontent and conditions for insurgency. His 
model, however, was criticized as presuming undercomplex causal machanisms. Robert H. Bates, When Things 
Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Klaus 
Schlichte, “With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups”, Contemporary Security Policy 
30, no. 2 (August 2009): 246–264. 
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and legitimacy than suppressive means.106 Edward Newman supports these findings and 
furthermore highlights the nexus between state building measures107 and armed conflict. State 
building necessarily involves centralization and regulation measures, so the argument, and 
hence “threaten[s] territorially outlying power centres”, specifically those in more peripheral 
and autonomous areas. The resulting tensions and opposition can then lead to mobilization for 
insurgency.108 Unfortunately, his theoretical model remains without empirical support.  
 The development of a security dilemma for groups who no longer see themselves protected 
by the state was an argument stemming from theories originally employed to explain inter-
state conflict.109 In the wake of the huge transformations triggered by the collapse of the Cold 
War state system after 1990 and the resulting regime changes, it was also applied to intra-state 
conflicts.110 It argues that in a security vacuum due to weak statehood, distrust between 
collectives with diverging identities increases and othering intensifies; each collective 
subsequently creates a protective (and potentially offensive) enclave and the ensuing overall 
situation is one in which small incidents can spark the outbreak of open hostilities.111 What 
they propose is a simplistic mechanism based on quasi-primordialist traits. It leaves no room 
for ambiguities in between the groups (for the role of perceptions and misperceptions), does 
not explain how the exclusive group-building occurs (who mobilizes? how?), and remains 
equally vague concerning deterrence. In sum, although certain assumptions about the 
                                                          
106 James D. Fearon, “Governance and Civil War Onset”, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, 
World Bank, August 31, 2010. The indicators he uses are based on expert opinion due to a lack of alternative 
measures. See also: Håvard Hegre and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, “Governance and Conflict Relapse”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (February 2014): 1–33. 
107 The relationship between processes of state formation and revolutions and wars, respectively, has already 
been elucidated by Charles Tilly; he emphasizes the role of the coercive apparatus at the top of the state: the 
stronger internal cohesion here (which in his model is fostered by inter-state war), the smaller the risk for civil 
war. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Charles Tilly, “War 
Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschenmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–191; Charles Tilly, 
Coercion, Capital and European States (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). For a discussion of Tilly’s work and the 
works of Michael Mann, who argues in a similar vein, see: Siniša Malešević and Niall Ó Dochartaigh, 
“Sociological Approaches”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 54–66.  
108 Edward Newman, “Statebuilding, Upheaval, and Civil War”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 173–185.  
109 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 157–180; 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).  
110 Erik Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy, Report 
No. 52 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1999); Erik Melander, “The 
Geography of Fear: Regional Ethnic Diversity, the Security Dilemma, and Ethnic War”, European Journal of 
International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009): 95–124; Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, 
Peace, and the Global System, 3rd ed. (London: Sage 2012). Paul Roe, “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic 
Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?”, Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 2 (1999): 183–202.  
111 Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 35, no. 1 
(1993): 27–47; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict”, International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 41–75. Note that these authors make the argument merely in 
regard to ethnic groups.  
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processes of collective hostility development are worth taking into account, it on the whole 
cannot provide a satisfying approach due to the inherent limitations.  
 The question to what extent regime type and regime change influence the risk of civil war 
onset has led to intense debates.112 In line with the ‘democratic peace’ paradigm, Håvard 
Hegre (2001) has suggested the so-called ‘inverted-U’ relation between regime type and the 
outbreak of armed conflict: While the two poles of the democracy-autocracy spectrum are 
both relatively stable (yet, risk is slightly higher for autocracies), anocratic regimes in 
between suffer from increased risks.113 Although there were attempts to refute this relation by 
laying open endogeneity issues,114 Kristian Gleditsch and Andrea Ruggeri could show how 
democracy does have a negative effect on risk and how the risk for escalation is linked to the 
type of leadership entry and his or her respective time in office: During the initial period of 
irregular entry into office of the head of state, the risk for conflict outbreak is about three 
times as high as in case of a regular entry; over time, however, it approaches the regular 
level.115 Recent research furthermore argues that the first democratic elections after regime 
change open a specifically vulnerable phase,116 other pose that regime change generally 
generates a dangerous constellation and opens up a window of opportunity for contention.117 
Yet, micro-mechanisms and ‘soft factors’ (such as credibility, legitimacy, trust etc.) once 
more remain underspecified and hence explanations based merely on regime type and regime 
change can only be found lacking.118  
                                                          
112 For a brief overview see: Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Håvard Hegre, “Regime Type and Political 
Transition in Civil War”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 145–156.  
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Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War 1816–1992”, American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 
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and Simon Hug, “Elections and Ethnic Civil War”, Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 3 (2013): 387–417.  
117 Adam Przeworski, Michael A. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and 
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118 Gleditsch and Hegre, for instance, criticize the use of democracy as a proxy for a variety of characteristics, 
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A final variable worthwhile to look at in the context of state-capacity is neopatrimonialism. 
Neopatrimonialism is understood as a complex system of patrimonial (i.e. personalized and 
subordinate to one ‘patron’) and legal-rational bureaucratic domination,119 in which close 
networks of power control resources access and allocation. Two different mechanisms are 
suggested to be active in states with neopatrimonial character: First, as William Reno 
claims,120 armed groups can be rooted in patronage-based politics. Those striving for the 
ruling power set up militias to foster their claims and to later on assist in securing their 
position against contenders and in keeping open channels of resources influx (through all 
means possible), so the presupposition. This constellation is vulnerable to catalyzing the 
spread of violence once the patron is no longer able to tie his subjects reliably to his authority 
or if he loses control over local strongmen, who in turn manage to challenge him and his 
militia with own gangs, and a spiral ensues. In conclusion: Strong neopatrimonial regimes can 
prevent armed conflict, while weakness (or regime change resulting in a change of the patron 
and his network) heightens the risk of escalation.  
 A second perspective, pushed forward by Fjelde (2010),121 on the other hand does not see 
the structural conditions of neopatrimonialism as such responsible for the origin of armed 
groups; it rather proposes that neopatrimonial authoritarian regimes are able to coopt potential 
challengers and thus neutralize their opposition.122 Again, a strong authoritarian regime is 
considered preventive to the outbreak of intra-state violence. Based on her findings, Fjelde 
moreover suggests that conditions under regime change depend upon the kind of regime that 
assumes power; she distinguishes between military regimes, monarchies, single-party 
regimes, and multi-party electoral autocracies, concluding and concludes that “a takeover by a 
military regime does not seem to be accompanied by the same immediate increase in political 
risk as the introduction of multi-party electoral autocracy”.123 While this last aspect should be 
                                                          
119 For a detailed conceptual elaboration see: Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: 
Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept”, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 45, no. 1 
(2007): 95–119, here: 105.  
120 William Reno, “Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups”, Civil Wars 9, no. 4 (2007): 324–342.  
121 Fjelde, “Generals, Dictators, and Kings”.  
122 The role of cooptation in regard to horizontal inequalities between groups (without the regime type 
distinction) has also been discussed by Frances Stewart, Graham K. Brown, and Arnim Langer. They find that 
“the political cooption of the leadership of disadvantaged minorities by the dominant group is often sufficient to 
prevent conflict without the necessity of undertaking policies to improve the socioeconomic position of these 
groups.” Frances Stewart, Graham K. Brown, and Arnim Langer, “Major Findings and Conclusions on the 
Relationship between Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict”, in Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: 
Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Frances Stewart (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 285–300, here: 291.  
123 Ibid., 216. This claim is based on the ‘cooptation capacity’ she ascribes to the various regime types: Due to a 
lack of political institutions such as parties, military regimes lack organizational reach into society and hence 
need to employ force/sanctions; since these create and catalyze the opposition they seek to suppress, they are the 
regime type most at risk. Monarchies share the lack of organizational outreach, yet, they usually possess 
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valued as it opens the discussion within institutional approaches for a further investigation of 
the impacts of different kinds of regime types, it at the same time does not provide solutions 
to the specific challenges related with research about neopatrimonialism: Given the complex 
and obscure nature of neopatrimonial relations and networks, the collection of data poses a 
major obstacle. Besides, the exact mechanisms are theoretical still underspecified – and, 
building on the former problem, prone to remain so.  
 Despite these and potential further limitations, it is nevertheless worthwhile to at least 
tentatively or theoretically incorporate considerations about neopatrimonialism into models of 
conflict escalation: Not only do such structures pervade an extensive number of states to one 
degree or another; moreover, they equally connect the economic with the institutional 
dimension, bring in individual actors, their grievances and strategic choices, and – in positive 
distinction from other perspectives – allow for dynamic processes over short periods of time.  
 
2.1.2. Grievances 
Grievance-based approaches advance the importance of elucidating the motives of actors to 
explain the onset of violence. Two major strands can be distinguished: one emphasizing the 
role of (horizontal) inequalities, the other focusing on repression as catalyst. While especially 
the former builds on Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, there are significant differences, the 
most important of which is the acknowledgement that actors’ behavior is rational.124  
 
Inequalities 
Social inequality has predominantly been measured based in income inequality between 
individuals (i.e. vertical inequality) in which the Gini coefficient was used as a proxy. 
However, studies investigating inequality in this mode have found no consistent evidence for 
a causal relationship between inequality and armed conflict onset.125 Attention has thus 
shifted towards horizontal inequalities, i.e. inequalities between collectives. A seminal 
publication in this regard is a volume edited by Frances Stewart in 2008.126 Together with her 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
religious or other legitimation and lack the expertise in regard to the employment of force, thus being weaker at 
it; still, the have an increased risk. Multi-party electoral autocracies on the one side possess parties through 
which an autocratic ruler can aim to bind people to him, yet, there is also a legitimate way of opposition. Hence, 
along the spectrum, single-party regimes can best institutionalize cooptation and by doing so limit the risk of 
violent opposition.  
124 The fact was eventually also acknowledged by Gurr, “Why Men Rebel Redux”.  
125 Juha Auvinen and E. Wayne Nafziger, “The Sources of Humanitarian Emergencies”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 43, no. 3 (1999): 267–290; Paul Collier “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War”, Oxford 
Economic Papers 51, no. 1 (1999): 168–183; Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”.  
126 Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities.  
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co-authors, she not only develops the category of horizontal inequalities and tests a number of 
hypotheses; she also provides empirical testing and evidence for the existence of a 
relationship between such differences between groups and the outbreak of violence.  
 Horizontal inequalities (HIs) can be distinguished into economic, social, political and 
cultural status HIs. Economic HIs refer to inequalities in income, employment opportunities, 
and assets of all kinds (financial, natural resource-based, social, human). Social HIs subsume 
disparities in access to social services such as housing, education, and health. Political HIs 
include inequalities in political freedoms and access to political offices and power (e.g. seats 
in parliament, positions in the army, the cabinet, local government etc.).127 And, lastly, 
cultural status HIs “refer to differences in recognition and (de facto) hierarchical status of 
different groups’ cultural norms, customs and practices”.128  
 Two aspects are moreover crucial for an understanding of the interrelation between these 
HIs and conflict onset: First, different dimensions of HIs mutually reinforce each other, hence 
potentiating risks.129 Second, not merely do factual HIs increase perils, but a perception of 
HIs is already sufficient to evoke corresponding reactions.130 The latter observation is 
extremely significant in regard to the overall research question of this dissertation: As Langer 
and Stewart point out, if people act upon perceptions and not objective measures (of which 
they might not be aware), those with the ability to influence these perceptions have the power 
to impact on mobilization. This assumption is part of my core argumentation, which, 
however, goes beyond this isolated relation to elucidate the complex processes at work in 
shaping perceptions. In reverse, it is also my main critique or, rather, a major deficit of the HI 
approach so far: It has sharply identified the role of perceptions and successfully substantiated 
                                                          
127 Comparative research has found credible evidence that political exclusion of groups poses a risk, and that this 
risk additionally increases with the co-presence of socio-economic HIs. For the former: Andreas Wimmer, Lars-
Erik Cederman and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Data 
Set”, American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 316–337. For the latter: Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. 
Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global 
Comparison”, American Political Science Review 105, no. 3 (2011): 478–495. Relevant in this regard is 
moreover what Matthew Gibney refers to as “stunted citizenship”, i.e. limitations to the exercise of rights and 
freedoms due to informal structures such as racism, sexism, economic deprivation, and similar factors. Matthew 
J. Gibney, “Who Should Be Included? Noncitizens, Conflict and the Constitution of the Citizenry”, in 
Horizontal Inequalities, 25–40, here: 27.  
128 For the above distinction: Arnim Langer and Frances Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict. 
Conceptual and Empirical Linkages”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 104–118, here: 105. Langer and 
Brown specifically explicate three dimensions of cultural status HIs: (1) the recognition of religion and religious 
observances, (2) language rights and language recognition, and (3) the recognition of ethnocultural practices 
such as rituals, dress, customary law, holidays etc. Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, “Cultural Status 
Inequalities: An Important Dimension of Group Mobilization”, in Horizontal Inequalities, 41–53. 
129 Langer/Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities”, 105f. 
130 Ibid., 112.  
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the claim with empirical evidence from case studies,131 yet, so far not delved further into the 
mechanisms at play. How can actors influence perceptions? Alternatively, how do they 
change over time and with varying circumstances? When are statements credible? Which 
conditions need to be fulfilled so that people cross the threshold between perceiving a 
grievance and taking action? These and further questions remain unanswered.  
 What is acknowledged in regard to the presumed but still underspecified mechanisms, 
however, are three further specifications: That not only those who are disadvantaged perceive 
HIs and mobilize, but that the advantaged might do the same out of fear of “losing out”;132 
that different strata of groups may be motivated by varying HIs (e.g. leaders rather by 
political HIs, ordinary people rather by socio-economic and/or cultural status HIs);133 and that 
HIs between collectives make group boundaries more salient and consequently enable 
mobilization along the perceived identity boundaries (reversely, minimizing these disparities 
reduces this salience).134  
 All these are productive findings, also in regard to the framing model, I will develop in 
3.2.; they will correspondingly be accounted for in both the model and the empirical analysis 
in the case studies.  
 Besides the noted virtues of the HI perspective in regard to integration into a model based 
on framing, the challenges it faces when approached the way it commonly is, i.e. at least 
partially by quantitative measurement, are mainly threefold according to Langer and Stewart: 
how to define group boundaries, a lack of data about HIs, and how to conduct comparisons.135 
Although they are certainly correct concerning group boundaries and comparisons, it 
somewhat surprises that while they explicitly highlight the role of perceptions (taking a 
constructivist perspective), they still cling to mourning the lack of quantifiable data (in a quite 
positivist manner). While this remains unfortunate, the approach overall provides valuable 
impulses.  
                                                          
131 Arnim Langer and Ukoha Ukiwo, “Ethnicity, Religion and the State in Ghana and Nigeria: Perceptions From 
the Street”, in Horizontal Inequalities, 205–226; Arnim Langer and Satoru Mikami, “Relationship Between 
Objective and Subjective Horizontal Inequalities: Evidence From Five African Countries”, in Preventing Violent 
Conflicts in Africa, ed. Yoichi Mine, Frances Stewart, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, and Thandika Mkandawire 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 208–251; Arnim Langer and Kristien Smedts, “Seeing is Not 
Believing: Perceptions of Horizontal Inequalities in Africa”, CRPD Working Paper 16, KU Leuven: Centre for 
Research on Peace and Development (CRPD), 2013.  
132 Frances Stewart, Graham K. Brown, and Arnim Langer, “Policies Towards Horizontal Inequalities”, in 
Horizontal Inequalities, 301–325, here: 302.  
133 Langer/Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities”, 106; Arnim Langer, “Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group 
Mobilisation in Côte d’Ivoire”, Oxford Development Studies 33, no. 1 (2005): 25–45.  
134 The authors stress their constructivist conception of identity in this regard. Langer/Stewart, “Horizontal 
Inequalities”, 106f. See also: Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts 
(Washington: Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 3.  
135 Langer/Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities”, 106–109.  
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Repression 
Repression can be defined as the “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an 
individual or organization (...) for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as 
deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging (...) to [the] 
government”.136 Which form exactly it takes is usually specific to the situation and the 
repertoire of the respective regime; it can reach from restriction on the freedom of speech and 
assembly all the way to torture and mass killings.137 Moreover, its effect on challengers is 
equally ambiguous:138 There is evidence that it depends upon when repression is used, how 
strong it is, and against whom it is employed. In consequence, it can escalate, deescalate, or 
remain without any effect. When used preemptively against leaders, it can help to restrain 
escalation; when employed reactively and indiscriminately against movement followers and 
others, it spurs escalation.139 Furthermore, the legality of repressive actions matters. If 
opposition members/challengers are pursued by legal means, it helps to deescalate opposition, 
while illegal actions such as arbitrary killings and detention tends to further escalate.140 
Lastly, the strength and extent of repression has an immediate effect on opposition. 
Overwhelming repression (exercized by a strong state) can simply eliminate challengers, 
while anything less (i.e. significant but not completely annihilating force) can lead to further 
escalation.  
 Using the Philippines since the 1970s as an example, Klaus Schlichte attempts to specify a 
mechanism of repression.141 It holds that rapid social change can lead to an overloading of the 
regime; the subsequent political exclusion of parts of society then provokes organized 
opposition, which in turn is countered by repression. As a result, we see a radicalization of 
that opposition and ensuing armed conflict. Notwithstanding, the merits of having a model 
mechanism, it remains too ideal typical to be of wider explanatory reach, for it cannot account 
                                                          
136 Christian Davenport and Molly Inman, “The State of State Repression Research since the 1990s”, Terrorism 
and Political Violence 24 (2012): 619–634, here: 620.  
137 Ibid. Autocratic regimes usually use more severe repression in order to make dissent and resistence more 
difficult and costly. Gleditsch/Hegre, “Regime Type”, 147.  
138 Scott S. Gartner and Patrick M. Regan, “Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between 
Government and Opposition Violence”, Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (1996): 273–287; Mark I. 
Lichbach, “Deterrance or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 31, no. 2 (1987): 266–297.  
139 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic 
Movement”, in Islamic Activism, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 61–
88. 
140 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends. Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14–34. She makes the same argument for terrorism.  
141 Klaus Schlichte, „Mit dem Staat gegen den Staat? Die Formierung bewaffneter Gruppen”, in Identität, 
Institutionen und Ökonomie, 283–306.  
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for numerous contingencies involved, specifically for the range of possible detours through 
interactions between central actors.  
 As has been noted before, in order to exercise intense repression, leaders need not only to 
secure sufficient resources, but furthermore rely on a compliant security apparatus to execute 
their orders.142 If these forces refuse or defect, the leader’s intentions for repression will 
idle.143 Consequently, in order to carry out repression, a regime needs internal strength as well 
as resources, or, from the opposite perspective, a weak regime will have difficulties in regard 
to successful repression, which will serve the challengers.144  
 These aspects and the inconclusive effects suggested above indicate the challenges 
involved in any attempt to consider repression in models of conflict escalation: Since it is 
necessary to take into account the precise context, state capacity, interactions between those 
involved, timing, target, extent of repressive measures, and other contingencies (e.g. media 
coverage which can amplify the impact of repression in either direction), repression and its 
repercussions can merely be explicated in case studies; any attempt at ‘measurement’ appears 
idle. Hence, it will remain a ‘soft’ factor in grievance approaches, due to its interdependence 
with other (equally ‘soft’) factors.   
 
2.1.3. Identity 
Proponents of identity approaches emphasize the importance of inter-group cleavages for the 
legitimization of violence by an ingroup against an outgroup. Distinction based on ‘ethnic’145 
or religious collective identity rank most prominently among the explanatory variables.  
                                                          
142 Neil J. Mitchell, Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, Followers, and the Violation of Human Rights in Civil War 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).  
143 For a recent discussion of the directions repression can take and trigger, particularly in regard to the 
limitations it faces, see: Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 68ff.  
144 An additional aspect is highlighted by Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, who explicate how from the 
leader’s perspective cooptation limits the need for repression. Erica Frantz/Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator’s 
Toolkit: Understanding How Co-Optation Affects Repression in Autocracies”, Journal of Peace Research 
(2014): 1–14.  
145 From a constructivist point of view, I regard the category “ethnic” as highly problematic. Among my main 
concerns is the explicitly or implicitly ascribed essentialism that overwhelmingly comes with its definition and 
use. This critical positioning consequently extends to any attempts to quantify and map presumed ethnic 
affiliation in projects like ‘Monorities at Risk’ (MAR) located at the University of Maryland or in indices such as 
the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) and comparable ones. I categorically dispute that they can 
depict anything but (at best) crude, momentous reifications of fluent, context-specific, and mostly external 
attributions. In view of the limited space available here, I shall not go into further discussion but do so on 
another occasion. On the ELF see: Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization”, Journal of Economic Growth 8 
(2003): 155–194; James Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country”, Journal of Economic Growth 8 
(2003): 195–222. 
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There are, however, significant disagreements not solely about a definition of collective 
identity, but moreover about its ontological status: Primordialists assume an essentialist 
quality of (collective) identity, whereas constructivists conceive it as “molded, and mobilized 
in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centers of power”146, or, using the prominent term 
of Benedict Anderson, as “imagined”.147 The copious literature dealing with issues of identity 
can for the most part be subsumed under one of these two strands.  
 This cannot be the place for a detailed discussion of the variety of definitions of identity; 
for civil war studies, the following definition by Fearon, based on an ordinary language 
analysis, has proven viable and sufficient for practical operationalization. According to him, 
identity is "(a) a social category, defined by membership rules and (alleged) characteristic 
attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) socially distinguished features that a person takes a 
special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (or [a] and [b] at 
once).”148 What it is, that is common among a group with a collective identity, is explicated 
by Donahoe et al. as “shared traits, material and symbolic resources, situations, interests, 
attitudes, and practices” which are regarded as “signs of affiliation with others, based on ties 
of nationality, ethnicity, “race” [understood as in anglophone discourse], kinship, language, 
religion, local or regional origins, historical experience, social class, generation, gender, or 
participation in a social movement”.149 
 Although much has been written about the specific, allegedly “perilous” role of religion as 
a catalyst of conflicts, I agree with what has been indicated above and convincingly explicated 
by Andreas Hasenclever: That ‘religious identity’ is functionally equivalent to all other 
specifications of collective identities, i.e. is can serve as much as a means for mobilization for 
armed conflict (and conflict settlement, for that matter) as any other category.150 In regard to 
                                                          
146 Karen A. Cerulo, “Identity Construction: New Issues, New Direction”, Annual Review of Sociology 23, no. 1 
(1997): 385–409, here: 387.  
147 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991). For a critique of the distinction between primordialism, constructivism, and variously defined 
instrumentalism see: Brian Donahoe et al., “The Formation and Mobilization of Collective Identities in 
Situations of Conflict and Integration”, Working Paper 116, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 
Working Papers, Halle/Saale, 2009.  
148 James D. Fearon, “What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?”, unpublished manuscript, Stanford 
University, 1999.  
149 Donahoe, “Formation”, 2.  
150 Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, “Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to 
the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict”, Millennium 29, no. 3 (2000): 641–674; Andreas Hasenclever and 
Alexander De Juan, “Grasping the Impact of Religious Traditions on Political Conflicts: Empirical Findings and 
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19–47; Andreas Hasenclever and Alexander De Juan, “Die Ambivalenz religiöser Integration: Zur erzeugten 
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unziviler Konflikte, ed. Sabina Ferhadbegović and Brigitte Weiffen (Paderborn: Konstanz University Press, 
2011), 225–248. See also: R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and 
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the case study on the Peaceful Southern Movement, I would like to specifically point out the 
inclusion of local/regional origins and historical experience.  
 In the following I will present the three predominant perspectives on the role of identities 
for the onset of armed intra-state violence: primordialism, a variant of which is the ‘ancient 
hatred’ hypothesis, and finally what has been termed ‘symbolic politics’.  
 
Primordialism 
The primordialist argument that some identity groups are inherently prone to violence is only 
marginally made since is it a very broad and general assumption.151 Identity in the primordial 
understanding is rooted in the biological nature of humans; it ascribes ethnic identity as 
unchangeable, mostly physical, traits. Non-physical, cultural characteristics are suggested to 
exist merely to strengthen ethnic identity cohesion. Membership of ethnic identity groups is 
resultingly inherited and – with an assumed preference for endogamy – remains consistent 
over generations.152 Exclusion of non-member forms the complementary process. On a 
political level, these fixed identities are considered to lead to group-specific demands153 and, 
so the assumption, ultimately include the quest for self-determination in a nation-state.154  
 The most vocal criticism against primordialism denounces its static understanding of 
identity: Not only does the origin of identity groups remain unaccounted for, but also change 
over time (which is not supposed to exist), and dissolution.155 In addition, (ethnic) groups are 
reified “as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed”.156 If that was 
so, how comes that the relations between groups vary over time? And what about intra-group 
conflict, fractionalization, and cooperation with other groups against one’s own? 
 When giving it a constructivist turn, one assumption of the primordialist stance might be 
salvaged: Its emphasis on harsh ingroup-outgroup distinction and the related engagement to 
foster one’s groups’ position and demands. As Turton poses, the power of ethnicity or “its 
very effectiveness as a means of advancing group interests depends upon its being seen as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Reconciliation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Alexander De Juan, Innerstaatliche Gewaltkonflikte 
unter dem Banner der Religion – die Rolle politischer und religiöser Eliten (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010).  
151 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations. 
152 J. Milton Esman, An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict (Malden: Polity Press, 2004).  
153 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Donald Horowitz, 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Walker Connor, Ethno-Nationalism: 
The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).  
154 Neal G. Jesse, “Ethnicity and Identity Conflict”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 93–103.  
155 Ibid., 94. 
156 Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity Without Groups”, Archives Européennes de Sociologie XLIII.2 (2002): 163–
189, here: 164. 
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‘primordial’ by those who make claims in its name.”157 Other scholars have termed the 
tendency of ‘ordinary social actors’ to make sense of their or others’ belonging in racial or 
ethnic categories as “participants’ primordialism”158 or ‘psychological essentialism’159; yet, as 
they have simultaneously stressed, this can never be an analytic point of view160 – plus, it 
leads us ever deeper into constructivism which will be treated below.  
 
‘Ancient Hatred’ 
The ‘ancient hatred’ hypothesis is merely a variation of primordialism. Long-standing 
animosities, hatred,161 between groups finally lead to deadly conflict. While few scholars 
pursue this line of argument, it is prominent among journalists and frequently also among 
politicians, for it provides an apparent explanation for ‘sudden’ outbreaks of intense violence. 
The Balkan wars in the 1990s are a notable example,162 as are current newspaper headlines 
referring to ancient hatred between Sunnis and Shi’i in the Middle East or between Russians 
and Ukrainians.  
 The same criticism applies here as it had already been articulated towards primordialism 
generally.  
 
Before I turn to ‘symbolic politics’ as predominant representative of constructivist approaches 
to explain civil war onset, I would like to briefly mention rationalist approaches, which range 
somewhere between (neo-)primordialist and constructivist approaches for they contain both 
                                                          
157 David Turton, “War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence in North East Africa and Former 
Yugoslavia”, Oxford Development Studies 25 (1997): 77–94.  
158 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nation and 
Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1998), 158.  
159 Douglas L. Medin, “Concepts and Conceptual Structure”, The American Psychologist 44 (1989): 1469–1481.  
160 Brubaker, “Ethnicity”.  
161 To a certain degree, Roger Petersen pursues this road in his prominent work on the role of emotions in civil 
war. About hatred, he states: “[H]atred prepared the individual to act on historical grievances”. Roger D. 
Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For the link betweeen individual and collective emotion see 
ibid., p. 20, n. 13. In a recent book he delves deeper into the issue of hatred and explicitly elaborates in how far 
his concept of hatred as a “cultural schema” is different from the concept of ‘ancient hatred’: He argues that 
hatred between identity groups exists over time as one among the elements of a cultural repertoire, yet, it is only 
seldom activitate as such; when it is, it aimes at the extinction of the adversary, however. Besides, Petersen holds 
that this kind of hatred is not ‘ancient’, but rooted in not so historically distant collective memories of violence 
and suffering at the hand of the ‘other’; the ‘cultural schema of hatred’ contains a ‘script’ of the action to follow 
and can become activated in certain contexts or by certain events. The justification for violence equally follows 
established patterns. Elites are potentially able to instrumentalize the schemata for their own interests. Roger D. 
Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 43–47. This conceptualization of a ‘cultural schema’ (which Petersen adapts from 
Shelle B. Ortner) reminds of a frame.  
162 David Campbell, on the contrary, distangles the constructedness of ethnic enmity by a detailed description of 
the steps of construction: David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).  
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elements of ethnic essentialism as well as an instrumental use of identity by strategic political 
actors (though merely to a limited degree).  
 Two positions can be distinguished, based on the reasons for conflict they provide: First, 
there are those following David Lake and Donald Rothschild in their core assumption that 
fear in the sense of a security dilemma escalated ethnic conflict. Second, there are those in 
line with Lars-Erik Cederman and Andreas Wimmer, who argue along the lines of political 
exclusion of ethnic identity groups (stemming on data retrieved from the ELF; on my view on 
its reliability see my comment in one of the annotations above). Without going into any 
further detail about their specific designs or else, I simply want to underscore that they do not 
differ significantly from opportunity approaches as describes in 2.1.1.; they merely point out 
the role of identity therein, which is why I do not conceive of them as needing renewed 
discussion beyond this point.   
 
Constructivist perspectives overcome the static of primordialism with their emphasis on the 
moldedness and resulting formability of identities over time; they leave room for the 
development of new identities as well as the disappearance of others, hence creating a 
dynamic and ever-changing field. On the question of who or what influences the emergence, 
salience, and decline of identities, two markedly different emphases have been set: one 
stressing the instrumentalist employment by political and intellectual elites, whereas the other 
one considers “’discursive formations’ or cultural systems”163 as agents of construction.164 In 
other words, the pivotal distinction lies in the presumed intentionality involved.  
 Criticism165 has been voiced against constructivist perspectives mainly on the grounds of it 
being too ‘liberal’ in regard to the changeability of identities. Especially against 
instrumentalists, critics hold that their assumptions about identity activation appear to make it 
feasible too easily, too quickly; limitations to instrumental use and an inherent ‘reluctance’ of 
identities are not accounted for. Some therefore advocate for a holistic view, i.e. combining 
certain elements of a primordialist view (particularly the endurance of identity over time) with 
constructivist elements about its moldability;166 an example in this direction has been 
provided in the short section above.  
 
                                                          
163 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity”, 
International Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 845–877. Through their analysis of several qualitative 
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164 See Jesse, “Ethnicity”.  
165 Ibid.  
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Symbolic Politics 
Among constructivist approaches, the ‘symbolic politics theory’ as it was developed by 
Kaufman,167 deserves special consideration: According to this approach, identity groups168 are 
defined by long-standing myth-symbol complexes. The outbreak of inter-group violence is 
more likely the stronger a given myth positions one group in opposition to another and thus 
justifies hostility, and the more prevalent a perceived fear of extinction – in other words: a 
security dilemma – becomes. If an opportunity exists and leaders (elite-led mobilization) or 
decentralized actors (grassroots mobilization) adopt hostile programs, manipulate symbols to 
back them, and successfully stir emotional support, violent conflict can be triggered. 
Kaufman, however, holds that it is “unlikely if alternate (and less risky) avenues are available 
for addressing group fears and desires.”169  
 He himself notes the proximity of the arguments made in framing theory and of his own 
theoretical explanations, but he asserts that “[t]he value of symbolic theory is that it offers 
both an overarching framework that brings together most of the above insights [from framing 
and opportunity approaches, T.G.], while the focus on myth, symbols, and emotions explains 
what the others cannot.”170 While I agree that opportunity (or feasibility) is an important 
precondition without which (violent) rebellion cannot be feasible, and a highlighting of the 
emotional dimension has definitely been desirable and can provide a significant contribution, 
I do not consider them to be as decisive as Kaufman suggests.  
 Instead, I want to argue in favor of a different emphasis when combining the strengths of 
the approaches: The existence of strong symbols or myths of hostility or opposition against 
another collective in a situation in which a group suffers from (intense) grievances can 
facilitate framing processes aiming at violence, especially in regard to salience; the evocation 
of emotions like fear is implicit in these framing processes. And again, without an opportunity 
there will be no resulting collective action. The main question, hence, is not the existence of 
the myth-symbol-complexes, but how they are employed to mobilize constituents. In my 
reading of Kaufman and in his naming of the theory as “symbolic politics”, he actually 
highlights the momentousness of processes.171 With these processes being understood as 
                                                          
167 Stuart J. Kaufman “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence”, 
International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 45–86. 
168 In fact, Kaufman builds his theory around ethnic identities. Since in my understanding he makes a more 
comprehensive argument that reaches beyond only ethnic conflict, I interpret his approach to include other kinds 
of identity groups as well. 
169 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbols, Frames, and Violence: Studying Ethnic War in the Philippines”, International 
Studies Quarterly 55 (2011): 937–958, here: 946.  
170 Ibid., 955.  
171 He also explicitly mentions that “myths enabled group elites to manipulate emotive symbols to justify 
mobilization against the other group” (ibid., 937), but he does not give it the centrality I want to stress. 
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communication processes, we again arrive at framing, whose strength it is to elaborately 
explain the communicative mechanisms through which mobilization is achieved.  
 
Rogers Brubaker has hinted in the direction of framing and cognitive approaches more 
generally to be applied for a better understanding of identity construction: “Instead of simply 
asserting that ethnicity, race and nationhood are constructed, they can help specify how they 
are constructed.”172 He starts off with ‘groupness’ as the smallest collective entity concept, on 
which he concentrates his critique (holding that it is reified), yet perceives it as immediately 
tied to more complex identity definitions. ‘Ethnic identity’ to him is merely one among a 
variety of potential categories; it has been especially salient during the recent decades due to 
prominent conflicts in which identities were framed along ethnicity (i.e. there seems to have 
been a high feasibility to do so). Brubaker’s framing-concept is based on the ‘classics’ 
(Bateson, Goffman, Snow and Benford, Gamson et al.)173 when he states: “Framing may be 
the key mechanism through which groupness is constructed.” Under the section on “Ethnicity 
as cognition” he then explicates his thoughts:  
Ethnicity, race and nationhood exist only in and through our perceptions, interpretations, 
representations, categorizations and identifications. They are not things in the world, but 
perspectives on the world. (...) They include ethnically oriented frames, schemas and 
narratives and the situational cues that activate them, such as the ubiquitous televised 
images that have played such an important role in the latest intifada. They include 
systems of classification, categorization and identification, formal and informal. And they 
include the tacit, taken-for-granted background knowledge, embodied in persons and 
embedded in institutionalized routines and practices, through which people recognize and 
experience objects, places, persons, actions or situations ethnically, racially or nationally 
marked or meaningful.174 
Beyond the adoption of ‘framing’ for identity, Brubaker explicitly underscores the role of 
media for their spread and even takes a practice-theoretical view in regard to the embodiment 
and embeddedness of frames. While I strongly agree with this extended definition, it poses 
numerous methodological challenges and will be discussed further. 
 
2.1.4. Critique 
The preceding subsections have presented three predominant strands in the research on armed 
conflict: opportunity approaches (mostly connected to quantitative research), grievances 
approaches, and identity approaches (both of which rather employ qualitative study designs). 
                                                          
172 Brubaker, “Ethnicity”, 175.  
173 Ibid., 173. For a detailed discussion see chapter 3. 
174 Ibid., 174f. 
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For each strand, I pinpointed the major shortcomings in regard to theory, 
operationalization175, methods, and data. Overall, the most striking deficiencies in view of a 
satisfying theory of armed conflict onset are too strong a reliance on structural factors; an 
unfortunate tendency towards a predominance of quantitative studies in the field (which 
involve even more problematic factors than qualitative studies) to the detriment of alternative 
enhancement of qualitative study designs; unclear and underspecified operationalization (i.e. 
poor proxies); and finally oftentimes ill-conditioned data sources (which is partly related to 
the focus on the macro-level, where reliable data is often not available for certain/continuous 
time spans). Results are consequentially frequently ambiguous, contradictory, or – at worst – 
dubious. Additionally, models tend to be fairly static.    
 In recent years, however, the deficiencies and challenges have been noted by an increasing 
number of scholars, and promising tendencies can be observed, especially in regard to a turn 
to the meso- and micro-level. Part of these are a disaggregation of data (supported partly by 
GIS technology) to account for sub-national levels176 and an unassertive, yet advancing 
recognition of the potential of sociology, cultural anthropology, and ethnography for the 
field.177 The best option in my view – and this dissertation is part of that endeavor – is to 
focus much more on qualitative research on a limited number of cases in order to elucidate 
more clearly the mechanisms involved in processes of conflict escalation (and conduct)178 and 
merely then to transform the identified independent variables into a measurable form for 
qualitative large-N formats. This procedure would combine the respective strengths of both 
methodologies.179 The presumptive result on the other hand would with great likelihood 
present a model consisting of both structural and ideational factors on the micro-, meso-, and 
                                                          
175 See among others: Wimmer/Cederman/Min, “Ethnic Politics”. 
176 Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Introduction to Special Issue on ‘Disaggregating Civil 
War’”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (August 2009): 487–495.  
177 Paul Richards, “Anthropological and Ethnographic Approaches”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 41–
53; Malešević/Ó Dochartaigh, “Sociological Approaches”; Nils B. Weidmann, “Micro-Level Studies”, in 
Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 67–78. Into this direction aim three recent qualitative studies; although they 
are not specifically rooted in any of the above disciplines, their works focus on investigating micro-mechanisms 
at play during armed conflict. Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Klaus Schlichte, In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups 
(Frankfurt a.M./Chicago: Campus/Chicago University Press, 2009). Unfortunately, they center around conflict 
conduct and else, not on its onset.  
178 Weidmann correctly notes the challenge inherent in gathering anthropological/ethnographic data under 
conditions of conflict; notwithstanding, he at the same time provides a range of options on how to deal with 
various circumstances and makes a convincing point for the feasibility of studies in spite of such conditions. 
Weidmann, “Micro-Level Studies”, 73ff.  
179 There is prominent opposition against this point of view. Collier rejects ethnographic data, claiming that it 
was not reliable but gathered from people with a great interest in making up facts and overall merely anecdotal. 
He wants to exclusively rely on quantitative data (posing that it cannot lie – an assumption I in turn reject). Paul 
Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy”, Washington, World Bank, 2000. 
For a further discussion of Collier’s critique see: Richards, “Anthropological and Ethnographic Approaches”.  
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macro-level; it would rather not pass as parsimonious, but – so my claim – provide much 
better, more detailed, and more reliable results. 
 While they are still not sufficiently implemented, existing research does already include 
numerous presuppositions in this direction. For instance, the ‘horizontal inequalities’ 
approach inherently contains the idea of ‘mere’ perception triggering and shaping the course 
of people’s actions; however, it has so far not been taken seriously enough and is not yet 
sufficiently reflected in a systematic research methodology.180 The framing approach can 
close this gap. In fact, it has already been employed in this fashion,181 but nevertheless has so 
far not inspired the development of a systematic model.  
 Ohlson,182 on the other hand, has developed a model to explain the outbreak, conduct, and 
resolution of armed conflict. He refers to his framework as the ‘Triple-R Triangle’; it includes 
reasons, resources, and resolve as motives for the engagement in violent conflict. The 
questions which potential combatants have to ask themselves, so Ohlson, are: “Do we want to 
[go to war]? Can we [go to war]? Do we dare to [go to war]?”183 When translated into the 
language of the presented theoretical strands, the first question relates to grievances, the 
second to resources (i.e. opportunities), and the third, as he explains, to beliefs and decisions, 
which would be anchored in the question of ‘who are we?’ or ‘who do we want to be?’, 
hence, identity.184 With these three questions, he investigates the pivotal aspects of 
motivation, includes them in a model, and bridges the noted approaches. While it still lacks 
sophistication and methodological explication, it can serve as a solid basis to start the 
investigation of the proposed research topic. Framing then again closes the gap from these 
general assumptions on mobilization to the concrete mobilization for A or B, respectively.  
  
The concept of framing has been developed into the idea of ‘collective action frames’ in the 
discipline of social movement studies. In 3.1. I will introduce the central approaches of this 
discipline and subsequently present the framing approach in detail and develop my respective 
                                                          
180 To some degree, a mechanism has been hinted at in regard to cultural status inequalities and their effects on 
the salience of political and socioeconomic HIs. Besides, the emphasis on ‘salience’ also contributes to an 
advancement of a model, for it provides an idea about what makes the difference between various existing 
identity dimensions etc. Langer/Brown, “Cultural Status Inequalities”, 51ff.  
181 Alexander De Juan/Andreas Hasenclever, “Das Framing religiöser Konflikte – die Rolle von Eliten in religiös 
konnotierten Bürgerkriegen”, in Identität, Institutionen und Ökonomie, 178–208; Kaufman, “Symbols”.  
182 Thomas Ohlson, “Understanding Causes of War and Peace”, European Journal of International Relations 14, 
no. 1 (2008): 133–160.  
183 Ibid., 135. 
184 Ohlson actually mentions leadership and decision-making processes as variables behind the ‘resolve’ 
question; I, however, equally see the identity dimension as closely connected. Ibid., 134.  
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integrated framing model to explain the onset of armed conflict or its absence in favor of 
nonviolent protest.  
 Before, however, I will briefly delineate my design for testing the explanatory reach of the 
presented established approaches in the case studies. The actual testing will then occur after 
the case introduction in Chapter Six.  
  
2.1.5. Test Design  
In order to account for opportunity approaches, I will test 13 indicators. They have been 
selected based on the works of Håvard Hegre/Nicholas Sambanis185 and Jeffrey Dixon186, 
who each – with varying schemes – review numerous quantitative studies, compare/ 
streamline/integrate their designs, and evaluate the degree of congruence in regard to the 
identified indicators and proposed mechanisms. The indicators I use have resulted from an 
integration of their respective findings and from additional small choices I have made.187 
Although other indicators frequently appear in quantitative designs, I thus cover a solid, yet 
manageable range of the supposedly most significant indicators; concerning the variables they 
are posed to proxy and the mechanisms behind them, I will introduce the most frequently or 
convincingly188 mentioned ones.  
  
(1) Population size: size increases risk 
population size increases risk for it is easier to find challengers189  
(2) GDP/capita: the higher, the lesser the risk 
a. measure of the economy opportunity costs of war;190 b. proxy for state capacity191 
(3) economic growth: the higher, the less risk (disputed) 
annual change in GDP in percent192 
 
                                                          
185 Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset”, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (August 2006): 508–535. 
186 Jeffrey Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings”, International Studies 
Review 11 (2009): 707–735.  
187 I chose to integrate mountains/rough terrain, male secondary school education, and soil degradation although 
the confidence level was merely medium. The first two are very frequently included in models and might make a 
difference for Yemen; the latter is seldom included, yet, again in Yemen environmental factors might be an issue 
(water is but it was not found significant) and I hence chose to test for it as well.  
188 This strongly correlates with renowned studies and scholars.  
189 Collier/Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance”; Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”.  
190 Collier/Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance”. 
191 Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”.  
192 Collier/Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance”; Håvard Hegre, “Disentangling Democracy and Development as 
Determinants of Armed Conflict”, Paper Presented at the 44th Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association, February 26–March 1, Portland.  
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(4) political instability: instability increases risk 
years of the current regime; change = min. 3 points change in Polity IV193 
(5) military strength: size lowers risk 
governments with strong military can more effectively deter or repress insurgency 
before it rises to higher level;194 military expenditure, size of army 
(6) rough terrain: the more, the higher the risk 
mountains as rebel sanctuaries;195 percent of state territory 
(7) war-prone neighbors: the more, the higher the risk 
spatial contagion of violent conflict; neighbor at war/number of neighbors at war in 
given year196 
(8) level of democracy of neighbors: the more democratic, the lesser the risk 
poor/autocratic neighbors = ‘bad neighborhood’: make democratic transition in 
individual country harder and creates prolonged instability risks;197 Polity IV 
(9) oil exports: the larger, the higher the risk 
income generated by oil export provides government with rents independent of 
legitimacy;198 fuel/oil exports of goods/services as percent/GDP 
(10) peace years: the more, the lower the risk 
the longer a country is at peace, the lower the risk of another (civil) war because the 
conflict-specific capital remains unused and peace-specific capital is accumulated199 
                                                          
193 Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”; Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”; Elbadawi/Sambanis, “How 
Much War Will We See?”; Nicolas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes?,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 no. 3 (2001): 259–282; Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: 
Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
194 Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical 
Literature”, World Politics 52 (2000): 437–483; Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”. 
195 Fearon/Laitin, “Ethnicity”; Hegre, “Disentangling Democracy”; Buhaug and Rød, however, have shown that 
the actual mountainous areas are not the locations of armed conflict. Halvard Buhaug and Jan Ketil Rød, “Local 
determinants of African civil wars, 1970–2001”, Political Geography 25 (2006): 315–335. Moreover, the 
argument is made that rough/mountainous terrain rather aids the duraction of armed conflict than its onset. In 
addition, it is held that sanctuaries could equally be found elsewhere, e.g. across borders.  
196 Exact mechanisms remain unclear. Hegre/Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis”, 532f.; Sambanis “What Is a Civil 
War?”; Sambanis, “Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars”; James C. Murdoch and Tod Sandler, “Economic 
Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 91–110; 
Buhaug/Rød, “Local Determinants”; Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugee Flows and the 
Spread of Civil War”, International Organization 60, no. 2 (2006): 335–366.  
197 Sambanis, “Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars”; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, All International Politics is 
Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2002).  
198 Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From Thirteen Cases”, 
International Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 35–67; Michael L. Ross, “A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and 
Civil War”, Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 265–300; Volker Krause and Susumu Suzuki, “Causes 
of Civil War in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparison”, Social Science Quarterly 86, no. 1 (2005): 160–
177; Halvard Buhaug, “Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War”, Journal of Peace Research 43, 
no. 6 (2006): 691–708.  
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(11) males secondary school education: the more, the lower or higher (!) the risk 
a. higher education = to better income changes and decreases risk to be attracted to 
rebel income; b. high education + unemployment = high frustration, which can make 
rebel income attractive; same for well-educated but politically excluded 
(12) soil degradation: the more, the high the risk 
 complex! high levels increase risk, moderate do not; in politically stable countries 
increases risk, in instable do not200 
(13) consistency of democratic institutions: the higher, the lower the risk 
 democracy/anocracy/autocracy: a. the higher the level of democracy, the lower the 
risk; b. anocracies have higher risk;201 c. new democratic regime in first years higher 
risks202  
 
Measures for grievances include the various dimensions of horizontal equalities (see 2.1.2.) 
plus repression, i.e.: inequalities in income, employment opportunities, and assets; disparities 
in access to social services; inequalities in political freedoms and access political offices and 
power.203 Moreover, cultural discrimination204, life expectancy, loss of power due to recent 
regime change, and the distribution of resource wealth. Repression is assessed in regard to 
form, intensity, and duration.  
 Identity-related factors can merely be approached by investigating the rights given to 
different identity groups, their inclusion, and everyday discrimination on the one hand, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
199 Collier/Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance”; Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”; Fearon/Laitin, 
“Ethnicity”.  
200 Clionadh Raleigh and Hendrik Urdal, “Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict”, 
Political Geography 26 (2007): 674–694.  
201 Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”. 
202 Gurr, “Peoples Versus States”.  
203 Comparative research has found credible evidence that political exclusion of groups poses a risk, and that this 
risk additionally increases with the co-presence of socio-economic HIs. For the former: Andreas Wimmer, Lars-
Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Data 
Set”, American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 316–337. For the latter: Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. 
Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global 
Comparison”, American Political Science Review 105, no. 3 (2011): 478–495. Relevant in this regard is 
moreover what Matthew Gibney refers to as “stunted citizenship”, i.e. limitations to the exercise of rights and 
freedoms due to informal structures such as racism, sexism, economic deprivation, and similar factors. Matthew 
J. Gibney, “Who Should be Included? Noncitizens, Conflict and the Constitution of the Citizenry”, in Horizontal 
Inequalities, 25–40, here: 27.  
204 For the above distinction: Arnim Langer and Frances Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict. 
Conceptual and Empirical Linkages”, in Routledge Handbook of Civil War, 104–118, here: 105. Langer and 
Brown specifically explicate three dimensions of cultural status HIs: (1) the recognition of religion and religious 
observances, (2) language rights and language recognition, and (3) the recognition of ethnocultural practices 
such as rituals, dress, customary law, holidays etc. Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, “Cultural Status 
Inequalities: An Important Dimension of Group Mobilization”, in Horizontal Inequalities, 41–53. 
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hostile myths and symbols etc. on the other. Assessment here relies more strongly on ‘soft’ 
factors, discourse analysis, and qualified evaluation.  
 
2.2. Studying Social Movements and Collective Action 
The discipline of social movement studies (as a subdiscipline of sociology) investigates the 
development, dynamics, and decline of collectivities who with various strategies aim at the 
acceleration, forestallment, or reversion of social change. Based on shared norms and values, 
movement adherents organize themselves in networks and act with the goal to influence 
situations which they perceive as problematic and/or threatening by articulating them publicly 
and pressing relevant authorities to attend to the associated claims and demands.205 
 Although researchers highlight different aspects, all social movements share a number of 
traits: They are change-orientated (to varying degrees); they have the character of challengers 
or defenders of existing institutional structures; they are collective endeavors; they act outside 
of existing institutional or organizational arrangements or sometimes mix those with channels 
within these structures; they are organized; and they display a certain degree of temporal 
continuity.206 Typologies of movements can be developed along these criteria, taking into 
account, for example, the degree of change a movement is striving for (reform vs. revolution) 
or strategic/tactical variations (violent vs. non-violent).207  
 Key analytical issues which guide research on social movements are, first, their 
emergence: Main associated questions concern the roles that grievances and a sense of 
efficacy play for the mobilization of adherents, and how certain sets of contextual conditions 
influence the emergence and the development of movements. Second, their recruitment and 
participation processes: Who participates, in which way, and why do some individuals 
participate while others with similar characteristics do not? Third, their dynamics: Who are 
relevant actors and leaders, how are their organized, and what are their relationships? How 
does a movement operate, according to which processes and mechanisms, and how are 
strategies developed and followed? And fourth, their consequences and outcomes: For whom 
                                                          
205Thomas Kern, Soziale Bewegungen. Ursachen, Wirkungen, Mechanismen, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2008; Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768–2004 (Boulder: Westview Press, 2005). He 
also includes the aspect of “public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment” 
(p.7); David A. Snow, Social Movements, in Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 2013, 1200–
1204, here: 1200. 
206Snow, “Social Movements”, 1201. 
207Ibid., 1201–1203. 
48 
 
do they make which kind of difference? Do they in fact challenge authorities and bring about 
social change? To which extent do they fulfill other functions or play other roles?208  
 
In the following, I will present a brief overview of theoretical approaches in the study of 
social movements.209 They do not always follow each other chronologically or build on each 
other, but oftentimes exist in parallel.  
 As noted earlier, there are striking equivalents in the theoretical developments of civil war 
studies and social movement research: Key terms and variables such as grievances210, 
resources, opportunities, identities, and frames can be found in both, and it seems only natural 
to merge insights from both fields in regard to the impact of these factors. 
 
2.2.1. Grievances 
Early Approaches: Studying ‘the Masses’ 
Initial research on collective behavior occurred in the late 19th century under the impression of 
the century’s revolutions and social protests and was influenced by the emerging discipline of 
psychology. The basic assumption was that masses acted irrationally and absorbed and 
obscured individual judgement in favor of some ‘group mind’.211 The reasons for this 
exceptional behavior were supposed to be found in the failure of society to provide 
appropriate inclusion and opportunities for people; due to this, frustration and aggression 
caused deviant behavior and led to social breakdown. In other words, collective behavior, 
understood as emotional outbursts, not rational action, was pathologized.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
208 Ibid., 1203. 
209 Since the focus lies on the framing approach, the presentation of former approaches will not be exhaustive but 
merely limited to major contributions in the field.  
210 While social movement theory predominantly does not employ the term ‘grievances’ (with the exception 
Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans), the content of what is subsumed under ‘structural strains’ 
is usually congruent with civil war studies’ definition of grievances, which is why I am referring to it. Crucially, 
however, this does not imply any assumption of irrationality, but merely refers to the causes for action, not the 
mechanisms: ‘Classical theory’ proposes that people participate in protest to express their grievances stemming 
from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice. Cf. Steven M. Buechler, “Strain and Breakdown 
Theories”, in Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 1253–1259; Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and 
Bert Klandermans, “The Social Psychology of Protest”, Current Sociology 0, no. 0 [sic!] (2013): 1–20. 
211 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd. A Study of the Popular Mind (Atlanta: Cherokee, 1982 [1895]). Other authors at 
that time similarly referred to ‘crowd psychology’ or ‘crowd mentality’. James B. Rule, Theories of Civil 
Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).  
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Breakdown Theories – The ‘Classical Model’ 
These basic ideas were taken up by American sociologists in the mid-20th century,212 most 
notably by the prominent representative of Chicago School symbolic interactionism Herbert 
Blumer213. As indicated in the name, the focus of that school was on interaction between 
individuals. Blumer considered a disruption of social life to cause equally disruptive 
psychological states in people, who then aggregate into collectives and finally crowds and 
groups with a shared identity and common demands. These processes are held to occur 
spontaneously, unregulatedly, and unstructuredly.214  
 Structural functionalists likewise provided a theory in the line of breakdown approaches. 
Neil Smelser, a student of Talcott Parsons, proposed his “Theory of Collective Behavior” in 
1962.215 Instead of interactions, structural conditions constituted the independent variable, 
particularly structural conduciveness, structural strain, and social control. Individuals had to 
react to these structures216 and collective behavior was regarded as one facilitated by these 
structures; they channeled individuals into collectives (often referred to as ‘crazes’ – again 
“representing [...] collective behavior as non-normative, exceptional, and destabilizing”).  
 Lastly, relative deprivation as put forward by Ted Gurr217 (see 2.1.) closed the chapter of 
breakdown theories. Although the assumption that a discrepancy between expectations of 
prosperity and reality should lead to frustration and aggression appeared to have empirical 
commensurability at first glance, critics soon mounted macroeconomic evidence that 
presumably contradicted it218; besides, psychological measures were solely applicable to a 
limited degree due to the inherent challenges involved. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
212 Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, An Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1969 [1921]).  
213 Herbert Blumer, “Collective Behavior”, in An Outline of the Principles of Sociology, ed. Robert E. Park (New 
York: Barnes and Noble, 1939), 219–280.  
214 See also: Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1972). For a discussion see: Hank Johnston, What is a Social Movement (Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press, 
2014), 28–33; Buechler, “Strain and Breakdown Theories”.  
215 Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1963). 
216 A simlar argument was made by William Kornhauser who draws a connection between alienation of the 
individual in modern society and the search to overcome it through participation in collective behavior. This 
approach, based on the sociology of Durkheim, is referred to as ‘mass society theory’. William Kornhauser, The 
Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959).  
217 Ted Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence”, World Politics 20, no. 2 (January 1968): 245–278; Gurr, 
Why Men Rebel.  
218 Clark McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991).  
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Criticism of the classical model stresses three main weaknesses: First and foremost, the 
irrationality assumption it roots in. Second, the inherent determinism common to all models 
except for Gurr’s219. And third, the individualistic, almost atomistic, focus it adopts. Yet, it at 
the same time made important contributions, some of which would lie dormant in subsequent 
theories, namely the focus on individuals, their perceptions, and emotions.  
 
The Emergence of Social Movement Studies 
The social protests of the 1960s, especially the civil rights movement, created new interest in 
the study of this phenomenon and resulted in the final establishment of social movement 
studies as a dynamic new field of social science. Scholars sought to understand how 
mobilization actually occurred.  
 A first decisive step they took was to abandon the prior axiom of irrationality as a motor 
for the association of people in groups posing demands;220 on the contrary, they perceived 
social movements as a continuation of politics with the aim of getting grievances addressed 
and achieving desired change.221 Moreover, grievances were found insufficient to explain 
protest; grievances abound, so the argument, whereas collective action – strategic action, no 
longer behavior – does not.  
 So why do some aggrieved people engage in protests and other actions while others do 
not? Three theoretical strands of answers were provided to this question, with one focusing on 
economy (resource mobilization), one taking a political perspective (political opportunities), 
and one arguing along social psychology (efficacy).222  
 
2.2.2. Resource Mobilization 
Proponents of resources mobilization theory (RMT) argue that the availability of resources 
makes the difference between mobilization and its failure. Merely sufficient resources, 
primarily understood as financial resources, provide a movement with the means to reach out 
to people, spread their messages, hold events, and mobilize – this was the presupposition 
                                                          
219 Gurr likewise modifies basic assumptions to give space to resistence, emphasizes the organizational character 
of movements (instead a presumed character), and takes a step in shifting the implicit value bias from the 
negative (breakdown) to the positive (opportunity to act against deprivation).  
220 Mancur Olson’s book The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965) was seminal for this step. He theorized that people carefully weighed the costs 
and benefits of participation in collective action; incentives were thus the key for mobilization. Critics found his 
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221 Bob Edwards and Patrick F. Gillham, “Resource Mobilization Theory”, in Encyclopedia of Social and 
Political Movements, 1096–1101.  
222 See Stekelenburg/Klandermans, “Social Psychology”. 
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made by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald223 based on the observations of the numerous 
movements springing up in the 1960s and 1970s. Movements are understood to function 
similar to businesses and the language used in the approach mirrors this:  
[M]ovement mobilization is linked to organizational structure, material resources, cost 
reduction, strategic planning, and the professionalization of movement activists, 
especially among the upper-level strategists in large movement organizations whom they 
call social movement entrepreneurs.224 
Social movement organizations (SMOs) compete for participant mobilization; those with 
similar goals form social movement industries (SMI), which again are integrated into social 
movement sectors (SMS). Strength or potential could accordingly be measured in ‘hard data’, 
i.e. financial capacity and flows, organizational structures (e.g. numbers of staff, level of 
organization etc.), members, contributions and else.  
 While this scheme provides supposedly ‘clear’ orientation in a field, which had up to then 
suffered from the bias of being involved with all-too obscure and deviant phenomena, and 
notwithstanding the pivotal contributions RMT made by its highlighting of rationality, 
economic considerations, collective (vs. individual) action, strategies, and organization, it 
nevertheless comprises a number of significant downsides: In turning away from irrationality, 
its overtly rational and economic scheme it had gone too far, critics said. By overemphasizing 
these elements – without even providing a precise definition of resources225 – RMT did not 
account for the role of grievances and the ideational sphere of participants anymore, thus 
drawing a very one-dimensional picture.226 Additionally, only formal organizational 
structures were acknowledged, while the multiple networks of which people are part and 
which serve as important channels of resources of all kinds, did not get any theoretical 
recognition.227 On this basis, it was not possible to convincingly explain why some topics, 
                                                          
223 James D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, The Trends fo Social Movemnets in America: Professionalization 
and Resource Mobilization (Morristown: General Learning Press, 1973); James D. McCarthy and Mayer N. 
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224 Johnston, What is a Social Movement, 40. 
225 Karl-Dieter Opp, “Explaining Contentious Politics: A Case Study of a Failed Theory Development and a 
Proposal for a Rationale Choice Alternative”, Raymond Boudon: A Life in Sociology, vol. 2, ed. Mohamed 
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Sociology 92, no. 1 (July 1986): 64–90; Roger V. Gould, “Collective Action and Network Structure”, American 
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grievances, and demands resulted in protests whereas others did not.228 Besides, its 
hypotheses could not explain which form of movement would evolve or how a protest would 
develop.229  
 These points of critique were articulated mainly by scholars who came from or were 
becoming interested in the recent theoretical turn in social sciences that reached social 
movement studies in the early 1980s: the linguistic or cognitive turn.230 Its main 
manifestation, the framing approach, will be discussed in detail chapter 3; I do not want to 
foreclose it at this point. Rather, I will present the second direction, which the quest to 
understand mobilization on rational grounds took in the 1970s: political opportunity structures 
(POSs).  
 
2.2.3. Political Opportunity 
Scholars in the POS tradition consider protest as a continuation of normal political processes. 
Hence, they answer the question of why some aggrieved people become mobilized for protest 
while others do not with a reference to the presence of POSs.231 These are defined as “features 
of the political environment that increase the chances of success in political action”.232 Since 
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there is no ultimate limit to the kind of opportunity one could think of,233 the term absconds 
from further definition. Yet, as Opp critically notes, what does not become clear in 
McAdam’s conceptualization is the difference between a ‘political’ and a ‘non-political’ 
opportunity structure.234  
 While McAdam had conceptualized his original model of ‘political process’ around three 
elements, namely ‘expanding political opportunities’, ‘established organizations’, and 
‘cognitive liberation’235, and he specifically emphasized the function of the latter as most 
important catalyst of mobilization, all but POSs got pushed into the background. Its reduced 
form was employed in a wide range of research and found praise for its apparent applicability 
to partly dispersed topics. At the same time, however, this raised serious concern about 
conceptual overstretching and resulting arbitrariness: “Political opportunity may be discerned 
along so many directions and in so many ways that it is less a variable than a cluster of 
variables – some more readily observable than others.”236  
 In addition to this quite fundamental questioning of the plausibility of employing the 
approach all too widely, other critique stressed its structural bias, its rational bias, its neglect 
of the role of emotions, and the allegedly “narrow focus on states as targets and neglect of 
non-political movements”237.  
 From the discussion of the theory arose a number of extensions to it. Jake Goldstone and 
Charles Tilly, for instance, consider threats to be the opposite, yet functional equivalent to 
opportunities in the model.238 When movements are facing threats, so the presupposition, they 
can be prompted to act in order to counter them; a frequent example are e.g. right-wing 
movements that strive to prevent change. Generally, opportunities and threats come mixed – 
or are perceived as either/or, i.e. what some might perceive as an opportunity, others might 
perceive as threat.239  
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The criticism expressed by Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper aims at the alleged reductionist, 
rigid, and objectivist understanding of the contexts in which movements operate. Instead, they 
highlight the inherent contingency of any specific situation:  
[A]n extraordinarily large number of processes and events, political and otherwise, 
potentially influence movement mobilization, and they do so in historically complex 
combinations and sequences. (...) Such opportunities, when they are important, do not 
result from some invariant menu of factors, but from situationally specific combinations 
and sequences of political processes – none of which, in the abstract, has determinate 
consequences.240  
Along the same lines, i.e. contingency and the wider socio-cultural and historical context, 
others have furthermore pointed out both “discursive opportunities”241 (understood as 
“conducive cultural trends, ideas, and language”242) next to mere political ones and the 
possibility that movements might create opportunities themselves as a result of becoming 
(pro)active243; the latter option specifically will be treated below in the section on the more 
interactive model of ‘dynamics of contention’.  
 While the aspects of criticism noted above already create a more complex picture than the 
reductionist variant of McAdam’s original approach, the last major point of critique does the 
same, yet merely reintroduces what he had previously accounted for (and even stresses) in his 
model: perception (in McAdam’s term: ‘cognitive liberation’).  
 Based on his study of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Charles Kurzman became a vocal 
proponent of a more social-constructivist perspective. He found that opportunities were not a 
simply given condition or not, but that even in the absence of “opening opportunities” or 
when they are highly restricted or uncertain, mobilization emerged – and movements could 
succeed, as his example demonstrated.244 The pivotal factor, he was convinced, was hence to 
be found in the perception of actors. Their appraisal, based on emotions and the meanings 
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they attributed to the situation, made the difference between action and non-action. Kurzman 
thus made it his credo to “[t]ake protesters’ beliefs seriously”.245  
 He wrote at a time when the framing approach had already entered into social movements 
studies, yet, had merely found unassertive recognition. During the second half of the 1990s, 
however, the discipline gradually disbanded its predominant rationalist bias and the role of 
‘meaning-making’ came to the fore. Beliefs, collective identity, moral judgement, and 
narrative structures became topics of investigation, or, as in some cases, earlier research on 
the margins of social movement studies now gained wider attention and inclusion into 
mainstream models. The social psychological perspective is an example of the latter; even 
before the constructivist turn, scholars had investigated the role of efficacy and collective 
identity for mobilization.  
  Efficacy beliefs in this context are defined as an individual’s expectation that it is possible 
to alter conditions or policies through collective action246: the stronger the efficacy beliefs, the 
higher the probability that an individual will participate in protest. It has thus a clear agency 
component. However, beyond individual efficacy belief, it is crucial that both group efficacy 
beliefs247 and political efficacy beliefs248 are existent.249  
 This perspective brought up the issue of collective identity. Collective identity refers to a 
salient common social identity of a group of people, on behalf of which they think, feel, and 
act, and which involves a conscious distinction from others.250 Which role does it play? Is it a 
mere precondition for mobilization via group efficacy? Or is there a need to acknowledge the 
influential role of collective identify among the factors that decisively contribute to the 
overall outcome as a resource for and outcome of activism? It was the latter hypothesis to be 
confirmed in a number of studies.251 Efficacy alone was criticized as too instrumental a view; 
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rather, identification with a group was found to be a catalyst for people to contribute in 
communal protest.252 It is interwoven with the processes of ‘consensus mobilization’ and – 
building on it – ‘action mobilization’.253 A whole chain of steps is involved, as Bert 
Klandermans suggests, ultimately leading to a selective process which leaves merely a small 
number of those, who in principle agree sufficiently with the causes and demands of a social 
movement to actually participate in action.254 Again we see contingencies and complexities 
involved. 
 
This wide field of aspects supposed to be involved in the mobilization for social movements 
ultimately led to the acknowledgement that simple, linear models do not suffice to explain the 
processes under investigation. There was a need for a more interactive, dynamic perspective 
that was able to reconcile the logics of structure or context and the logics of agency or action. 
Tilly has dedicated much of his academic career to the historical comparison of revolutions 
and social upheaval. One of the central concepts – or maybe the central concept – which 
emanated from these extensive studies is the concept of ‘repertoire of contention’. A 
repertoire is defined as the entirety of available forms of contentious action among a 
collective based on experience and knowledge, or, in Tilly’s words: “claims making 
routines”255 that comprise the “whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of 
different types on different individuals”.256 Examples comprise, for instance, the founding of 
associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, 
demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering.257 
Repertoires are not static but become constantly reinvented, modified, extended, and scaled 
down; “they are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of 
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choice” and they are disputed.258 They are built upon resources as well as ideational 
components259, and provide insights into both internal processes and a movement’s reaction to 
and interaction with authorities and their measures of confronting the challengers. The sum of 
these actions and interactions form ‘contentious practices’ within ‘contentious politics’.  
 Contentious politics brings together contention, collective action, and politics. It “involves 
interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to 
coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are 
involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties”.260  
 The research program stemming from this concept has two important implications: First, it 
looks at mechanisms and therein makes use of the synergies of previous approaches, i.e. it 
manages to overcome pitfalls due to reductionist views by integrating the core aspects.261 
Second, it provides a framework for the futile integration of social movement studies and civil 
war studies:262 In their conception, social movements, civil wars, and revolutions can all be 
characterized as form of contentious politics; they merely differ in regard to dynamics, their 
respective combination of performances (i.e. the sum of collective actions), and the level of 
violence they produce. If that is the case – and I agree with the assumption – these varying 
forms of contentious politics can be assumed to involve the same mechanisms. For instance, 
in regard to mobilization:  
Mobilization involves interaction between challenging actors and their targets, based on 
combinations of well-known and innovative forms of contention, around claims that are 
framed in ways that both attract support and communicate messages to both targets and 
significant others. As long as the same mechanisms and processes can be identified in 
different forms of contention, they can be studied together irrespective of the boundaries 
that scholars have established between these forms [highlighted T.G.].263  
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I advocate that indeed the same mechanisms and processes can be found active in two 
different cases which ultimately took diverging forms of contention: the Houthis took the road 
to civil war, while the Hirak kept its character as a (nonviolent) social movement. Two 
movements, same mechanisms.  
 While the remaining – central – approach of social movement studies, i.e. framing, has 
found wide application in social movement studies (and other disciplines), this has not been 
the case in civil war studies. The following chapter seeks to close this gap by providing a 
theoretical model which combines the strengths of approaches from both disciplines, but 
particularly elucidates the role of framing. 
 Before I proceed, however, I briefly want to present one more recent perspective on 
escalation processes which emphasizes the internal organization of movements, i.e. the meso-
level beyond networks and resource mobilization. While my findings refute the central 
hypotheses, I nevertheless consider it to be a potentially fertile contribution to a better 
understanding of movement dynamics.  
 
2.2.4. Organization 
Wendy Pearlman refers to her approach as ‘organizational mediation theory of protest’.264 She 
holds that the organizational structure mediates between structural factors and violent and 
nonviolent movement action, respectively. According to her, what needs explanation is less 
the question why movements use violence, but rather, why they do not use nonviolence to 
reach their aims. She reasons – taking a very Hobbesian perspective – that it is because of the 
challenges involved in keeping a movement peaceful: Movement cohesion (defined as “the 
cooperation among individuals that enables unified action” and proxied by leadership, 
institutions, and the “population’s sense of collective purpose”)265 is a necessary condition for 
nonviolent action for it facilitates indispensable mass mobilisation, discipline, and strategic 
coherence. Fragmented movements, on the other hand, are held to be more likely to employ 
violence because fragmentation weakens constraints on escalation, generates incentives for 
violent means, and impedes efforts to end hostilities.266  
 Her claims rest on the inherent assumption of incoherence and instability in a movement: 
“[N]onstate groups face some of the same burdens as states, such as creating social order and 
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centralizing decision making.”267 Failing to recognize this and instead presuming the 
opposite, i.e. coherent and stable movement units, is her main point of criticism of 
predominant approaches, which she accuses of oversimplification in the wake of 
factionalization, infighting, and other forms of aggressive competition and conflict. Besides, 
the state may have an interest in fueling such divisions (e.g. through repression) in order to 
trigger its fission into smaller, more manageable units. The downside of such meddling might, 
however, be an actual encouragement of violence, or, rather, the stabbing of its capacity to 
preclude violence.268  
 Sources of cohesion are supposedly education, urbanization, and mass media, which are 
presumed to “facilitate compatible value orientations, correspondence in communication 
codes and culture, and a dense web of social and economic transactions”.269  
 With her theoretical suggestions, Pearlman makes a number of valuable points: she 
highlights processes on the meso-level, which are often neglected by other approaches; her 
perspective takes into account sub-units of a movement; it stresses the interaction between the 
state and these sub-units; and overall emphasizes the permanent fluidity and contention that 
occurs within collectives. On the positive side of the scale, she thus adds a dynamic 
perception of intra- and extra-movement interaction, which I find very conducive concerning 
a better, more detailed, understanding of these processes. Future research should take them 
into account. On the negative side, however, she puts the previously noted, highly Hobbesian 
presumption of ever-present and untamable violence. Based on my own empirical findings I 
disagree with this disquieting axiom, and – from this basis – would ask for wider evidence for 
her claims. While Pearlman provides a rich case study of the Palestinian movement over time, 
she merely touches upon Northern Ireland and South Africa as comparative cases; additional 
cases might well serve to assert her theoretical argument. 
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3. THE FRAMING APPROACH 
 “There are many political movements that try in vain to activate people who, in terms of 
some allegedly objective interests, ought to be up in arms.”270 The framing approach has been 
developed as an ideational alternative to structural approaches in social movement studies. By 
focusing perceptions instead of allegedly ‘real facts’, it helps to elucidate three dimensions of 
(social) interpretive processes: First, it offers a model of consensus building in collectives; 
Second and related, it specifies and illuminates the specific roles and interaction between 
individuals and collectives in negotiating meaning; and third, it demonstrates the interrelation 
with persuasion and strategic action. This chapter first introduces the framing approach as 
such and subsequently presents the integrated framing model this dissertation puts forward. 
 
3.1. Framing in Social Movement Studies 
In the early 1980s, the field of social movement studies began to absorb linguistic and 
cognitive approaches. Mere POSs were found to be insufficient to explain movement 
mobilization and action, and scholars increasingly turned back to social psychological ideas. 
It was no longer structures (alone) that needed to be analyzed, but rather the meaning people 
attributed to them. Constructivist ideas were thus embraced.    
 “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”271 The famous 
‘Thomas theorem’ of the sociologist William I. Thomas is commonly cited as one of the early 
points of reference for a phenomenologically anchored constructivism as it was developed by 
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their influential “The Social Construction of 
Reality” (1966).272 Its central assumption is that human action is based on socially 
constructed, subject-dependent reality rather than any kind of objective reality. It develops in 
interaction and is transmitted by signs, with a special role attributed to language. 
This reality, however, is neither homogenous, nor static; on the contrary, it is  
complex, dynamic, multivocal (and disputed), as well as multilayered. The only way to 
approach it is therefore via the actors’ interpretation, resulting in interpretism as the 
epistemological-methodological position of choice.  
                                                          
270 William Gamson, Talking Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 6. 
271 William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas, The Child in America. Behavior Problems and Programs (New 
York: Knopf, 1928). Similarly stated by George Herbert Mead in 1936: “If a thing is not recognized as true, then 
it does not function as true in the community.” George Herbert Mead, Kant. The philosopher of the Revolution, 
in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Merritt H. Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1936), 25–50. 
272 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966). 
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3.1.1. The Roots of Framing as a Concept 
A concept to approach the ‘actor’s interpretation’ or perception was found in Erving 
Goffman’s understanding of a ‘frame’ as a ‘schema of interpretation’.273 Goffman, coming 
from symbolic interactionism, was interested in the cognitive organization of individual and 
social experience.274 His claim was that at any given moment, humans interpret their 
surroundings in order to make sense of them and guide their actions. To master this cognitive 
challenge, they unconsciously employ interpretive schemata to “to locate, perceive, identify 
and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large”.275 This process 
necessarily includes filtering and condensing information, which led him to the metaphor of a 
frame.  
 A frame fulfills three core tasks:276 First, quite literally like a picture frame, a cognitive 
frame focuses attention to a certain piece of reality  and brackets the rest. Second, it ties 
together what is contained within the frame, and by doing so constructs an interpretation of it 
at the exclusion of alternative interpretations, which would have been possible with a slightly 
different section of reality.277 And third, it opens up the option of a transformation of how a 
certain aspect of reality is perceived (in the sense of interpreted) in regard to the actor or in 
regard to other elements within or outside the frame.      
 Each individual continually employs an infinite number of everyday life frames (he also 
refers to them as “primary frameworks”) and adapts them depending on the situation, i.e. 
generates and modifies cognitive structures to produce meaning of context; this meaning 
attribution then guides individual action. 
 Building on this fundamental model, three aspects deserve special attention: First, primary 
frameworks do not evolve spontaneously, but are deeply rooted in culture and socialization. 
Second, although they are always specific to the individual, since they are the product of 
culture and social life, their basic content is usually shared among a collective; frames hence 
qualify as ‘collective schemata of interpretation’. Third, frames are not static, but are 
constantly modified in what Goffman calls “keying processes” (and what was later referred to 
                                                          
273 Goffman, Frame Analysis. He adapted the concept from the cultural anthropologist Gregory Bateson. Bateson 
had used the term ‘frame’ first in 1954 to denote the delineation of a situation of ‘play’ (in which certain social 
rules appplied, according to him) from other situations. Gregory Bateson, “A Theory of Play and Fantasy”, first 
read publicly in 1954; published in: Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in 
Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972).  
274 His well-established publications center around questions of everday interactions and communicative acts 
therein.  
275 Goffman, Frame Analysis, 21. 
276 For the following: David A. Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”, in Encyclopedia of Social and Political 
Movements, 470–475, here: 470.  
277 Snow calls this the “articulation mechanism”. 
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as ‘framing’); again, these occur in social settings and are thus open to the possibility of being 
influenced, intentionally or unintentionally.  
 It is these qualities which made the concept attractive for social movement scholars,278 
since it helps to address the crucial question of how a shared interpretation of a given situation 
can be reached (as a precondition for collective action279). Looking back to the initial period 
of framing in social movement studies, David Snow formulated its added value and the 
rationale for integrating it as follows: “The framing perspective emerged not as an alternative 
to other perspectives on social movements, but to investigate and illuminate what these other 
perspectives glossed over, namely the matter of the production of mobilizing and 
countermobilizing meanings and ideas.”280 How this was operationalized in a model will be 
the topic of the next section.  
 
3.1.2. Collective Action Frames 
The birth of framing in social movement research can be dated back to 1982, when William 
Gamson, Bruce Fireman, and Stevan Rytina published “Encounters with Unjust Authority”.281 
Therein, they aimed to shed light on how people questioned the interpretation of 
circumstances under unjust rule by rejecting authoritative media representations in favor of 
                                                          
278 The concept of a cognitive frame and the process of framing have found wide resonance in numerous 
academic disciplines, particularly in communication and media research (see e.g. the works of Robert Entman, 
Shanto Iyengar, Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, and Dietram Scheufele) organizational psychology and 
economics (Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman), political discourse analysis (George Lakoff), rhetorical 
criticism (Jim A. Kuypers) and others. It would lead too far to discuss each strand; instead, I will include 
relevant aspects merely where they provide additional insights. One of these would be Robert Entman’s attempt 
to bring together the varying definitions of what he refers to as a “fractured paradigm”; although this attempt was 
made at an early stage of framing research, it adds a dimension I consider worth acknowledging besides 
Goffman’s and later Snow’s and Benford’s conceptualizations: moral evaluation. According to Entman 
“[f]raming essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. 
Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe (...)”. Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a 
Fractured Paradigm”, Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 51–58, here: 52. An alternative 
definition – which essentially is not too far from the above – understands a frame to be “a general, standardized, 
predefined structure (in the sense that it already belongs to the receiver’s knowledge of the world) which allows 
recognition of the world, and guides perception […] allowing him/her to build defined expectations about what 
is to happen, that is to make sense of his/her reality”. What it adds is a stronger emphasis on the preexistance of 
the activated interpretation which I consider very relevant. Paolo Donati, “Political Discourse Analysis”, in 
Studying Collective Action, ed. Mario Diani and R. Eyerman (London: Sage, 1992), 136–167; Hank Johnston, 
“A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata”, in Social Movements and 
Culture, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 217–
246. 
279 Cf. Klandermans’ differentiation between ‘consensus mobilization’ and ‘action mobilization’‘ as two steps in 
the mobilization process.  
280David A. Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”, in Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 470–
474, here: 474. 
281 William Gamson, Bruce Fireman, and Steven Rytina, Encounters with Unjust Authority (Homewood: Dorsey 
Press, 1982).  
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their own, socially mediated interpretation. One of the hypotheses was that a collective would 
more likely be able to ‘break the frame’ provided than an individual, based on careful 
weighing of a misrepresentation and subsequent ‘reframing’ as intermediate step towards 
collective action; they found it supported, although the precise mechanisms remained obscure.  
 On the basis of these findings about reframing with its active distancing and denouncing of 
the misrepresentation, Gamson in the following years developed his model of collective 
action frames.282 His focus thereby lay on “how people negotiate meaning”, i.e. the social-
psychological processes of how individuals become active participants in collective action 
from the point of view of potential movement members.283 As basic components of collective 
action frames he identifies three elements: injustice, agency, and identity.284   
 Injustice frames contain the grievances people are holding and give them sense through 
moral indignation. Moreover, it creates a “politicized consciousness” to challenge those who 
inflict harm or suffering on them; the ‘we’ hence counters the ‘them’.285 Agency frames foster 
people’s efficacy beliefs. They “empower people by defining them as potential agents of their 
own history. They suggest not merely that something can be done but that ‘we’ can do 
something”286 that leads to positive change. Lastly, identity frames or the identity component 
(which is already inherent in the other two frames or components287) constitute the collective 
that is affected by the grievances as the ‘we’ and sets it into opposition to a defined ‘they’ 
with allegedly different values and interests. Gamson specifically emphasizes the role of a 
clear adversary to blame; in case of its absence, “the potential target of collective action is 
                                                          
282 William A. Gamson, “Political Discourse and Collective Action”, International Journal of Social Movements, 
Conflict, and Change 1 (1988): 219–244; Gamson, Talking Politics; William A. Gamson, “The Social 
Psychology of Collective Action”, in Frontiers of Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon Morris and Carol 
McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 53–76; William A. Gamson and Andre 
Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach”, American 
Journal of Sociology 95 (1989): 1–37. Snow pointedly summarizes the differences between a simple “‘everyday 
frame’ and a collective action frame as follows: Collective actions frames differ “in terms of their primary 
mobilization functions: to mobilize or activate movement adherents so that they move, metaphorically, from the 
balcony to the barricades (action mobilization); to convert bystanders into adherents, thus broadening the 
movement’s base (consensus mobilization); and to neutralize or demobilize adversaries (counter-mobilization).” 
Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”, 471.  
283Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective”, in Frames of Protest: 
Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham: 
Rowman/Littlefield, 2005), 1–29.  
284 Gamson, Talking Politics, 7. From here on I use simply ‘frame’ instead of ‘collective action frame’ for 
reasons of legibility and simplicity; yet, I refer to the concept of collective actions frames. 
285 Ibid.; Fredrick C. Harris, “Specifying the Mechanism Linking Dissent to Action”, Boston University Law 
Review 89, no. 2 (April 2009):605–608; for more general considerations see: Oppositional Consciousness: The 
Subjective Roots of Social Protest, ed. Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001); Johnston/Noakes, “Frames of Protest”, 6.  
286 Gamson, Talking Politics, 7. 
287 As Dietrich Busse points out, frames “are recursive structures: they contain frames and are part of 
superordinate frames” [translated T.G.]. Dietrich Busse, Frame-Semantik: Ein Kompendium (Berlin/Boston: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 819. Hence, a distinction between frames and frame components is contingent.  
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likely to remain an abstraction”288 which in turn leads to various challenges in regard to 
organizing and motivating this action.  
 For Gamson, injustice frames are what count to bring people to the streets, what ultimately 
triggers protest. And again, the perspective is stemming from the actors.  
 
The second and even more influential early scholar of collective actions frames is David 
Snow, who developed his concept to a large extent together with his colleague Robert 
Benford. With a similar understanding of framing generally, they set off with the explicit aim 
to shed light on social movement recruiting and participation processes by developing an 
appropriate conceptual apparatus and theoretical orientation, something they had found 
lacking within the field at that point in time.289 Consequently, their focus lies on the 
interaction between social movement ‘entrepreneurs’ or leadership and those they sought to 
recruit.290   
 From this perspective, they conceive of collective action frames as an instrument291 used 
by strategic actors (movement leaders) to a number of ends: to explain, condense, and connect 
situations and events, mobilize followers, gain the support of formerly neutral persons, and 
demobilize potential adversaries. In order to reach these aims, frames need to fulfill three 
main functions: diagnostic frames identify a situation as a social problem and point at those 
responsible for it; prognostic frames articulate a possible solution and strategies; and 
motivational frames serve as a “call to arms” and provide the necessary vocabulary of 
motive.292 The quality of the frames regarding their mobilizing capacities thereby depends on 
how “clearly specified, richly developed, and well integrated” all three components are.293 
                                                          
288 Gamson, Talking Politics, 7.  
289 David A. Snow, Robert D. Benford, Holly J. McCammon, Lyndi Hewitt, and Scott Fitzgerald, “The 
Emergence, Development, and Future of the Framing Perspective: 25+ Years since ‘Frame Alignment’”, 
Mobilization 19, no. 1 (2014): 23–45, here: 26.  
290 Johnston/Noakes, “Frames of Protest”, 5. 
291 For a critique on the instrumentalist perspective see Desrosiers, “Reframing”; In an eye-opening passage of 
the reflective article by Snow, Benford and others 25 years after the initial publication, Benford states that they 
on purpose emphasized the strategic, instrumentalist aspect in that initial article in order to ‘align’ it with the 
predominant resources mobilizationa and structuralist approaches in the field and thus gain acceptance. Only in 
their later development of the approach did they highlight an interactionist, constructivist, and discursive 
interpretation of it. Snow et al., “Emergence”, 29f.  
292 Benford/Snow, “Framing Processes”. The term ‘vocabularies of motive’ refers to four impulses for action 
whose evocation Benford considers to be the core task of motivational framing, namely: severity, urgency, 
efficacy, and propriety. Robert D. Benford, “‘You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey’: Collective Action Frames 
and Vocabularies of Motive within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement”, Sociological Quarterly 34 (1993): 
195–216. Motivational frames moreover need to create enough motivation too overcome fears as well as the 
‘free-rider problem’ conceptualized by Olson, i.e. the question why the individual should participate in costly 
action since he/she will benefit of the goal in any case (for it poses a public good and is thus indivisible and 
nonexcludable). Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).  
293 Polletta/Ho, “Frames”.  
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This touches upon the two essential processes they see involved in mobilization: successful 
frame development and the successful dissemination to and adoption of frames among the 
targeted group (frame resonance). Both processes are interdependent in that unsuccessful 
frame resonance leads to constant reformulation and adaptation of frames. Moreover, frame 
contestation may occur at all stages, either internally or externally or both.294  
 
Ultimately, the components of their model are not so different from Gamson’s: The creation 
of a collective identity occurs in the ‘Snow model’ as well as in Gamson’s;295 part of the 
motivational framing and, potentially, the prognostic framing as well is the invocation of 
agency; and, moreover, the diagnosis more often than not comprises an injustice 
component296. This notwithstanding, the vast majority of studies have employed Snow’s 
model, given its superior operationalization. I, too, will follow this path to a high degree, yet 
include some additions in my own proposition; hence, Snow and Benford’s concepts deserve 
a more detailed presentation and discussion. I will proceed along the three steps introduced 
above: frame development, frame resonance, and frame contestation.  
 
Frame Development 
As has been noted, framing collective action in the context of social movements is understood 
as a strategic297 and instrumental act. It is “signifying work or meaning construction”, more 
precisely  
An active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of 
reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual 
in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that what is 
evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is 
                                                          
294 Benford/Snow, “Framing Processes”. 
295 See also: Scott A. Hunt, Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, “Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the 
Social Construction of Movement Identities”, in New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, ed. Enrique 
Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph Gusfield (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1994), 185–208; David A. Snow 
and Peter B. Owens, “Social Movements and Social Inequality: Toward a More Balanced Assessment of the 
Relationship”, in Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality, ed. Jane McLeod, Edward Lawler, and 
Michael Schwalbe (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 657–681, here: 667–671. Here Snow notes that collective 
identity as a result of the identity work rendered by individuals and groups in a social movement, is both 
constitutive of a successful collective action frame and itself functions like a frame; it is an “open subject of 
collective contestation and change over time”.  
296 Snow and Benford acknowledge that basically all political and economic movements contain an injustice 
frame, yet point out that others such as religious and self-help movement not necessarily do so. Benford/Snow, 
“Framing Processes”; Noakes/Johnston, “Frames of Protest”, 6.  
297 For a detailed discussion of the role of strategy and choices in social movements see: James M. Jaspers, “A 
Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social-Movement Choices”, Mobilization 9, no. 
1 (1997): 1–16.  
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contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only 
differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them.298  
The agency of ‘framers’, however, not only is challenged by contesters from within the 
movement as well as external ones (as will be treated below); it is furthermore dependent on 
and constrained by the cultural and discursive background they act in.299 This fact has two 
sides to it: First, it sets limits to the cognitive range of the framers. As Marie Desrosiers puts 
it: “Frames are never produced ex nihilo. Framers have social [and cultural] backgrounds that 
shape their reasoning and limit their ability to think ‘outside the box’ when developing 
frames.”300 Second, even more importantly, since the frames they construct need to resonate 
with the audience they target, they must be well-connected or aligned to their “cultural tool 
kit”301 of “meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives, and the like”. 
Not only is it the “resource base” new frames are created from; they are moreover “the lens 
through which [they] are interpreted and evaluated”.302  
 Hence, a proper ‘fit’ is essential for the success of the first step303 in the process, i.e. frame 
development.  
 How to achieve this fit through frame alignment was the first issue Snow et al. extensively 
discussed in a paper (1986).304 With the aim of communicating their frames to an audience of 
potential constituents, framers need to choose from the available cultural tool kit and bind 
together elements (objects, events, situations, experiences, and sequences of action)305 in a 
manner that provides a new perspective on them.306 Moreover, they need to amplify the 
                                                          
298 Benford/Snow, “Framing Processes”, 614.  
299 And, in turn, they impact on and change that cultural background. Ibid., 629. On the dependence on the 
cultural and (discourse) structural background see also: Snow, “Framing and Social Movements”, 474. 
Highlighted in: Goodwin/Jasper, “Caught in a winding, snarling vine”; they furthermore critize what they 
perceive as ‘reification’ of culture in framing theory (p. 48); James M. Jasper, The Art of Moral Protest 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).  
300 Desrosiers, “Reframing”, 4.  
301 Swidler, “Culture in Action”, cited in: Benford/Snow, “Framing Processes”, 629.  
302 Ibid. Kurzman similarly holds that “meaning-making refers to collective contest over interpretation. 
Institutions, repertoires, and rituals offer a set of ready-made – though always contradictory – interpretations that 
allow people to assimilate information into established categories of understanding.” Again, the point of the 
inherent contradiction highlights the contentiousness and dynamic of the process. Kurzman, “Meaning-Making”, 
6. 
303 The term ‘step’ shall not indicate linearity in the process. Rather than a sequence of framing tasks, all 
elements constituate constantly fluid and adaptable elements in relation to changing circumstances and framers’ 
strategies.  
304 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment”. The criteria for evaluating the fit (linked to assessing frame resonance) have 
been at the core of their second core publication two years later: David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 
“Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization”, International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 
197–217. 
305 See also: Snow/Benford, “Ideology”. 
306 Benford/Snow, “Framing Processes”, 614. Though discourses do not appear in this model explicitly, they 
should be seen as intermediate between culture and frames, for they are located in between. A further discussion 
of discourses in this regard follows below.  
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frames, i.e. specifically accentuate certain core elements of their interpretive scheme; this 
refers especially to values as well as beliefs307 of their audience and is in practice often done 
in captive formulations or visuals, e.g. through slogans, symbols, images or else.   
 The ultimate aim of these discursive and strategic processes is frame transformation (what 
Goffman termed (‘keying’)308: a redefinition of primary frameworks or prior frames “in terms 
of another framework, such that they are now ‘seen by the participants to be something quite 
else’”309, involving a change in urgency and seriousness of the issue “such that what was 
previously seen as an unfortunate but tolerable situation is now defined as inexcusable, unjust, 
or immoral, thus connoting the adoption of an injustice frame or variation thereof.”310 
 The content of the frames needs to comprise a clear diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational component. Their formulation is the second important step. 
 Two aspects that impact the development of these dimensions require attention in this 
regard: First, competition with other movements in the field, and second, change over time. 
As Benford/Snow note, all framing actions take place in a “multi-organizational field”311, in 
which the various movements need to distinguish themselves to attract adherents. While 
diagnostic frames are frequently similar, the prognoses (i.e. the answer to the question: what 
shall we do?) usually vary, not only in regard to the precise measures and the extent to which 
they are employed, but also concerning the radicalness they exhibit. This directly connects to 
the second consideration of change over time. Social movements are in constant interaction 
with the context they operate in and dynamically adapt to it through the modification of their 
strategies and – within limitations – their frames. In doing so, framers need to maneuver in 
between intentions, contextual opportunities and constraints, and the resonance they create 
                                                          
307 They subsume: beliefs about the seriousness of the grievance or issue; whom to blame; the probability of 
change and efficacy of collective action; the necessity and propriety of action; and stereotypes about the 
antagonists. Snow et al., “Alignment Processes”, 470. See also for numerous references on these issues. The 
assumption is that a share of the audience already shares these values and beliefs, yet has so far not been 
mobilized; once they are, they furthermore bring in their own networks and thus expand the potentially 
mobilizable target group.  
308 Frame transformation can be understood as the sum of frame bridging, i.e. connecting previously 
unconnected elements, frame amplification (as described), and frame extension, i.e. the extension of a 
movement’s boundaries to encompass incidental elements, which are highly salient to the target audience, so that 
they get attracted (for instance music styles). Snow et al., “Alignment Processes”, 472ff. Noakes/Johnston even 
note a lack of analytical benefit from a distinction of neither frame bridging/frame amplification/frame 
transformation nor (in regard to resonance) empirical credibility/experiental commensurability; empirical 
research has found no support for it. Noakes/Johnston, “Frames of Protest”, 12; with reference to: Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements”, in Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–20.  
309 Snow et al., “Aligment Processes”, 474, with reference to Goffman, Frame Analysis, 45.  
310 Snow et al., “Aligment Processes”, 474, with reference to Gamson/Fireman/Rytina, Encounters.  
311 Benford/Snow, “Framing Processes”, 617.  
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among their constituents (see below). The radicalization of movements provides a telling 
example. While in the beginning a movement might rather activate existing narratives and its 
frame merely be marginally different from widespread frames in the field, it can – through 
more or less notable modifications – transform them and over time evolve into highly distinct, 
radical, and potentially violent movement. This may even include a distinct kind of language 
or ‘jargon’ which fosters internal cohesion the more it distances itself from others and from its 
environment (a consequence of radicalization). Donatella Della Porta, for instance, provides 
such an example for violent leftist groups in Italy in the 1970s.312 She proposes the existence 
of recursive processes between language and action which spiral ever further into violence.  
 These considerations lead to the next dimension of successful framing: the question of 
when frames resonate with the target audience.  
 
Frame Resonance 
The success of any framing crucially depends on whether or not it is able to create resonance 
among its (potential and already active) adherents. Besides an adequate distribution (including 
reach, accessibility, duration, and cultural appropriateness), the ‘quality’ of frames is decisive. 
 For Snow and Benford, the overarching criteria for successful frame resonance are the 
production of credibility and salience. Both of these evaluation criteria are again subdivided 
into three dimensions. Credibility thereby consists of: (a) the consistency of articulated values, 
demands, and actions; (b) empirical credibility, i.e. apparent correspondence between the 
frame and real events; and (c) the perceived credibility of frame articulators, often based on 
prestige, knowledge, and traditional legitimacy. Salience on the other hand is created by: (a) 
the centrality of the issues, values, and norms articulated in the frame within the life of the 
target group; (b) experiential commensurability, meaning the closeness to everyday 
experiences of the target group; and (c) narrative fidelity/cultural resonance to myths in an 
appropriate language.  
 Noakes and Johnston have – considering the partially low degree of distinction between 
the categories in empirical research as noted above – collapsed these criteria into three core 
qualities they consider most relevant: cultural compatibility between frames and the cultural 
‘tool kit’; “internal consistency of the movement’s beliefs, ideology, claims, and actions”; and 
relevance “in the lives of the targeted audience”.313   
                                                          
312 Donatella Della Porta, “Clandestine Political Violence: A Global Comparison”, presentation within the 
Collaborative Research Centre 923 “Threatened Order. Societies under Stress”, Tuebingen (Germany), May 17, 
2013.  
313 Noakes/Johnston, “Frames of Protest”, 15.  
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While I completely agree with this assessment, I will in my own analysis seek to highlight 
Snow and Benford’s distinctions as far as possible in order to provide a higher degree of 
differentiation; if this should not be feasible due to the data, I will refer to these more general 
terms.   
 Similar to what has been acknowledged in regard to change over time and radicalization, 
the dimension of ‘cultural compatibility’ requires attention as to the degree of variation it 
contains. Tarrow314 convincingly argues that – notwithstanding the need for this kind of 
compatibility – movement frames still have to contain new interpretations in order to have 
any effect, “[s]ince popular culture mostly contains interpretations of situations synchronized 
to support the status quo”315. Hence, frames must differ in order to push followers over the 
edge and advance oppositional action.  
 
One specific version of frame deserves mentioning, with considerations for both frame 
development and resonance: the so-called ‘master frame’. Empirical research has identified 
periods in which certain overarching frames are very successfully employed by a variety of 
movements and diffuse to others, thereby expanding their range of implication. These 
‘overarching frames’, characterized by a wider scope and influence than regular frames, are 
referred to as ‘master frames’.316 Examples are, for instance, the equal rights and 
opportunities frame during the civil rights movement which was subsequently adopted by a 
variety of marginalized sectors of society; Gamson’s injustice frames can be categorized as 
master frames, as can justice, oppositional, hegemonic, imperial, anti-imperial, and market 
choice frames.317  
 Not only do strategic framers take into consideration the existence of master frames and 
decide on connecting to them or not;318 moreover, the existence of master frames has an 
influence on the audience: Individuals might already have a clear stance towards a 
predominant master frame and might resultingly be more or less likely to open up to a new 
                                                          
314 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
315 Noakes/Johnston, “Frames of Protest”, 9.  
316 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest”, in Frontiers in Social 
Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 
133–155. See also: William J. Swart, “The League of Nations and the Irish Question: Master Frames, Cycles of 
Protest, and ‘Master Frame Alignment’”, Sociology Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1995) 465–481.  
317 Robert D. Benford, “Master Frame”, in Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 723f. He underlines 
that the concept was developed as an alternative explanation to the issue of ‘cycles of protest’. The later have 
been defined by Sidney Tarrow as “a phase of heightened conflict across the social system with rapid diffusion 
of collective action” and a rapid pace of innovation therein. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 199.  
318 They will in consequence encounter either opportunities or constraints or both on this basis.  
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movement’s frames.319 These are significant contextual conditions which require active 
calculation.  
 
Frame Contestation 
Contestation has appeared repeatedly in the passing320 and finally receives its share in 
coherent treatment. Frame contestation refers to the assertion of frames against internal and 
external resistance and competition or a possible incoherence or contradiction between frames 
and events. Hence, the ‘arena of contestation’ (a term accounting for its dynamic 
multidimensional character) consists of three levels, each with its particular challenges.  
 Internal contestation challenges the cohesion of a movement. Although these are common 
issues, since framing claims (diagnosis, prognosis, motivation) “are rarely unanimous within a 
movement”321, members and leaders need to take care of differences in opinion in order to 
prevent a drifting apart and factionalization – which ultimately leads to a weakening of the 
movement which can be ruinous.  
 External resistance and competition predominantly points to other, similar or oppositional 
movements, the state, and the media apparatus322 with whom a movement might intentionally, 
or out of necessity and pressure, engage in contestation for its survival and position. Each 
party involved thereby employs its own framing in competition to, or directly targeting, its 
adversary. The media partly forms a personal force and can partly be utilized by parties, 
especially the state (the more so in authoritarian regimes).323  
 Lastly, incoherence or contradiction between frames and events. Since this aspect is 
necessarily contingent, movements can merely react to them, particularly to changes, and 
adapt their framing as far as possible to (re)create credibility and salience. Alterations in 
political and discursive opportunity structures likewise fall into this category.324  
  
 
                                                          
319 Contingencies include membership in other movements with close demands (i.e. increased competition for 
adherents); prior memberships with bad experiences (i.e. increased hurdles to recruitment); or, on the positive 
side, existing networks to other movements in the field, which might lower the cost of recruitment.  
320 Two brief quotes by Kurzman highlight the ubiquity and constitutive charcter of contestation in the realm of 
social movements. He states that: “All action involves meaning-making, just as all action involves contention.” 
And much in the same vein: “Social movement activists make meaning, challenging established meanings.” 
Kurzman, “Meaning-Making”, 6. 
321 Snow/Owens, “Social Movements and Social Inequality”, 662; see also: Robert D. Benford, “Frame Disputes 
within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement”, Social Forces 71, no. 3 (1993): 677–701. 
322 The works of Entman are insightful as to the role of the media.  
323 For a pointed discussion of the role of the media see: Noakes/Johnston, “Frames of Protest”, 19. Moreover: 
Tarrow, Power in Movement, 119.  
324 See Noakes/Johnston, “Frames of Protest”, 20; among others they propose that framing and opportunity 
structure recursively influence each other.  
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3.1.3. Critique and Extensions 
Snow and Benford’s approach has received extensive praise, critical discussion, and demands 
for further elaboration. Critique aims at different directions. To name but the most 
important:325 (1) There were repeated calls to further clarify the distinction between frames 
and other forms of discursive structures such as discourses, ideologies, and narratives. (2) A 
number of scholars conceive of the approach as too static and elite-centered and propose a 
more decentered perspective, which leaves room for multivocality. (3) Critical voices from 
within demand more diachronic research with multiple cases, the inclusion of ‘failed 
framing’, stronger causal claims instead of mere description, and lastly, a better integration of 
framing with other theoretical perspectives, namely resources mobilization, political 
opportunity, and cultural perspectives. (4) The critical observation that “resonance is often 
still conflated with (successful) outcomes” is paired with calls for improved 
operationalization of resonance.  
 
Distinguishing Discourse, Ideology, Narrative, and Framing 
Social movement theory has dealt with the question of how frames and discourses relate in a 
variety of ways and from a variety of perspectives – at times without a clear definition about 
what they understand by the multi-layered and difficult to grasp concept of discourse (and its 
contentious brother ‘discourses’). Results often comprise of very general delineations: 
“Whereas a frame can be seen as a delimited ideational package, discourse is the sum total of 
talk produced by an organization, institution, or society at a given point in time.”326 
“Discourses have a greater diversity of idea elements, more conflict, and more inconsistencies 
than frames.”327    
 A more fruitful perspective has been offered recently by Baumgarten and Ullrich328, who 
draw on Foucault’s concepts of power, discourse, and governmentality to explore the 
interrelatedness of frames/framing within a social movement and discourse.  
                                                          
325 Given the inherent meta-epistemological implications whose discussion would lead too far, I do not treat 
obvious critiques from proponents of structural approaches who criticize the approach on the basis of not being 
structural enough.  
326 Hank Johnston, “Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis”, in Methods of Social Movement 
Research, ed. Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, 62–91; see also: Hank Johnston, “A Methodology 
for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata”, in: Social Movements and Culture, ed. Hank 
Johnston and Bert Klandermans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 217–246. 
327 Myra Ferree and David Merrill, “Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: Thinking about Social Movements in 
Gendered Frames”, in Contemporary Sociology 29 (2000): 454–462. 
328 Britta Baumgarten and Peter Ullrich, “Discourse, Power and Governmentality. Social Movement Research 
with and beyond Foucault”, Discussion Paper, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), April 2012. 
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 (1) Framing occurs within a discourse: Discourses regulate knowledge production and by 
doing so they define the boundaries of what can be communicated (and even thought of) 
within a society at a given time. It thus shapes the context in which all framing occurs and at 
the same time enables and restricts it. 
 (2) Frames contribute to discourses and influence them: Frame resonance not only depends 
on the context, but also on the arena and role of the framers. Using their agency, framers can 
either contribute to the discourse by reinforcing the existing issues and concepts, or influence 
its boundaries by shifting its focus, contesting certain areas or bringing up new issues and 
concepts.  
 (3) Social movements contain their own discourses that enable and restrict framing: Over 
time, social “movements develop their own specific discursive mechanisms that enable, but 
also restrict, framing of actors within the movement” [emphasis TG]. The product – frames – 
are thus not only the expression of strategic instrumental action, but also of the identity and 
internal system of knowledge of the movements’ members. 
  (4) Actors (framers as well as targeted individuals) are shaped by discourses: Discourses 
(and other practices of power regulation) shape the subjectivity of the individual. They thus 
affect the mobilizational potential of social movements.  
 (5) Social movements are the products of discourse: Resulting from 3 and 4: By enabling 
framing as the offspring of a given social situation that is itself shaped by power relations and 
the related discourses329, those discourses indirectly produce the social movements through its 
members and favorable circumstances. 
 This perspective provides a few new aspects in regard to framing and frame analysis: 
Where the framing approach is often understood to emphasize the strategic rational actor and 
his agency, Foucault’s discourse theory brings in the “cultural context” in a theoretical way: 
as structure. This structure, however, is not deterministic, but constructed and shapeable. 
The existence of structure in this sense is also implicated within the framing approach by the 
need for frame alignment and cultural resonance.330 Both processes reach beyond the 
autonomous actor and make it necessary for him to relate to existing structures.331  
I thus consider it helpful to include the outlined aspects as a fruitful contribution to 
approaching frame alignment and cultural resonance. 
                                                          
329 According to Foucault, discourses are based on power relations and produce power relations. 
330 It is quite explicit in those two processes. One could also argue that it is a precondition or context to most of 
the other points as well.  
331 Desrosiers (2012) makes a similar argument: “Framing theory, as I adopt it, is therefore a perspective that 
succeeds in bridging the instrumentalist and social-psychological divide on the issue of communication. Framing 
proposes to account for a purposeful agent located amidst, yet engaging with, social structures. In other words, 
framing captures the middle ground between strategic and interpretive considerations.”  
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The delineation between frames and ideology unfortunately has not yet reached this level of 
sophistication. There is agreement about the fact that ideology refers to a more 
“encompassing systems of belief” and are “more complex and less specific” than frames.332 
However, according to the well-established definition put forward by Swidler, it shares a 
number of traits with its ‘cousin’: “a highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual 
system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to problems of social action”.333 From the 
perspective of an analysis of research employing the concept, a more practice-oriented view 
potentially even better grasps the distinction: ideology is a more static and descriptive system 
of beliefs etc. opposed to the highly agentic frames (as Snow et al. want them to be 
conceived) and it is usually used in too monolithic a mode.334 For now, this shall suffice as a 
working definition.  
 In regard to an understanding of narrative I am in this specific context following Polletta335 
in plainly using it interchangeably with ‘story’ and ‘cultural myth’, and locating it within the 
cultural background of a society or identity group. In distinction to the above presented 
discursive forms, its core definition does not contain any (implicit or explicit) calls to action, 
i.e. its function differs. Yet, it is widely employed in alignment processes and hence comes to 
play a notable role in recruitment due to the strong cultural resonance which can be achieved 
through it.  
 
Decenteredness and Multivocality 
Several critics have elaborated on what they perceive as (a) too static an understanding of 
frames, (b) too unified and homogenous a treatment of movements, and (c) too strong an 
elite-focus concerning framing processes. Ultimately, these critical points are all related.  
 Marc Steinberg, one of the early proponents of a more discursive perspective, thus 
criticizes what he considers an understanding of frames as relatively stable systems of 
meaning, building on a coherent “belief system”:  
The representation of a frame as a discrete text, however, is a reification of disparate and 
discontinuous discourse processes. Often such work depicts a particular configuration of 
                                                          
332 Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou, and Stefan Malthaner, “A Contentious Politics Approach to the Explanation 
of Radicalization”, in Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the 
Escalation of Political Conflict (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 14.  
333 Swidler, “Culture in Action”, 279.  
334 Snow and Byrd morever denounce that the treatmentof ideology in the literature “tends not only to ignore 
ideological variation, but also glosses over the kind of discursive work required to articulate and elaborate the 
array of possible links between ideas, events, and action.” Snow/Byrd, “Ideology”. See also: Colin J. Beck, 
“Ideology”, Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 586–590.  
335 Francesca Polletta, “Contending Stories: Narrative in Social Movements”, Qualitative Sociology 21, no. 4 
(December 1998): 419–446.  
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statements, symbols, and meanings as emblematic of underlying and enduring collective 
understandings produced in protracted ideological struggles.336  
He counters this by suggesting the importance of what he calls “discursive repertoires” for the 
analysis of framing processes. According to Steinberg, the social production of meaning “is 
essentially dialectic, dynamic, and riven with contradictions […] within specific historical 
situations”.337 In opposition to a “belief system”, he emphasizes disorderliness or fuzziness 
because the process of meaning structuration is done in use, interactionally, creating “action-
specific discursive repertoires”338 on which all kinds of actors can draw, regardless of any 
kind of elite status or not.  
 Similar to Steinberg’s dialogic approach, Marek Payerhin, and Cyrus Ernesto 
Zirakzadeh339 reckon movements to be built around internal discord, multivocality, and 
decentralization. Despite this, however, they also acknowledge that the classical framing 
approach with its emphasis on movement elites and shared perceptions contain a kernel of 
truth considering that leaders would always strive to contain disparate voices and opinions. 
They are seeking for a middle ground between what they call a sole framing approach – 
accentuating coherence and stability – versus a sole negotiation approach perspective, 
stressing fragmentation and flux.  
 In their critique, Dorothy Holland, Gretchen Fox, and Vinci Daro focus on the process of 
movement identity formation, which they conceive as difficult and contentious “amidst 
multiple discourses and practices”340. Against a concentration on leaders and their strategies, 
which they consider as untenable assignment of ontological coherence, as reification, they 
make a case for the situatedness of movement actors as well as the identities, discourses and 
practices they cultivate. Movement identity formation, according to them, is a continuous, 
fundamentally dialogic and contentious process. “A decentered approach to social 
movements”, they argue, “clarifies some of this complexity by recognizing that versions of 
the collective identity of a movement are being formed in multiple sites (e.g., at protests, in 
the building of alliances, through media work) and places (e.g., different locales, different 
communities, any headquarters that the movement may have).”341 Cultural artifacts have a 
special importance in the production of collective identity, as they among others can show 
                                                          
336 Marc Steinberg, “Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn”, 
Theory and Society 27: 845–872, 1998, here: 848. 
337 Ibid., 851f. 
338 Ibid., 856. 
339 Marek Payerhin and Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, “On Movement Frames and Negotiated Identities: The Case 
of Poland’s First Solidarity Congress”, Social Movement Studies 5, no. 2 (September 2006): 91–115. 
340 Dorothy Holland, Gretchen Fox and Vinci Daro, “Social Movement and Collective Identity: A Decentered, 
Dialogic View”, Anthropological Quarterly 81, no. 1 (2008): 95–126, here: 95. 
341 Ibid., 98f. 
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through three ethnographic case studies. With Francesca Polletta342 they caution against too 
strong an emphasis of strategic options and a perception of identity solely as easily mobilized 
resources and rather put forward how (cultural) practices and artifacts influence movement 
formation and re-formation processes.  
 I agree with the various points these critiques343 make and strive to illustrate the aspects 
they raise – especially multivocality, contentiousness, decenteredness, and situatedness – in 
detail in the case studies.  
 
In regard to the critical points under (3) and (4), I hope to provide a minor contribution 
myself. My cases contain not only ‘failed framing’; the model I propose moreover aims to 
combine theoretical elements from both different disciplines (civil war studies and social 
movement research) and from structural approaches besides framing alone. In addition, I aim 
to trace resonance among the audience and suggest a conceptualization for it. In the following 
I seek to introduce my model to this effect.  
 
 
3.2. Developing a Framing Model for the Mobilization for Violence 
Until now, armed conflict research and civil war studies have each constituted distinct areas 
of specialization and theory development, and have barely influenced each other despite a 
number of parallels. Admittedly, foci differ: While social movement studies overwhelmingly 
deal with political contention in industrialized countries, which rarely involves continued 
intense outbreak of violence, this violence is the main depended variable for scholars of 
armed conflict, which in turn tends to occur in non-industrialized countries. The few cases in 
which the theoretical viewpoints of the two disciplines were brought together, this occurred 
under the auspices of structural approaches, i.e. resource mobilization or political opportunity 
structures.344 The framing approach has so far not found systematic entry into civil war 
studies.345 
                                                          
342 Francesca Polletta, “Culture In and Outside Institutions”, Research in Social Movements, Conflict and 
Change 25, 2004, 161–183. 
343 Similar points are also raised by: Charles Kurzman, “The Poststructuralist Consensus in Social Movement 
Theory”, in Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, ed. Jeff Goodwin and James M. 
Jasper (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2004), 111–120; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Opportunity Spaces, Identity, 
and Islamic Meaning in Turkey”, in: Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 270–288; Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather 
Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004). 
344 E.g. Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism; Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance 
in the Islamic World (Boulder et al.: Lynne Rienner, 2003). Notable exceptions are: De Juan/Hasenclever, 
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With the following model, I present a suggestion on how to integrate the analytical strengths 
of both disciplines in order to increase our understanding of the (micro-)mechanisms of 
conflict escalation.  
   
3.2.1. Core Assumptions 
First, both social movement protest and civil war are forms of contentious politics; they form 
a continuum. Therefore, they can (and should) be scrutinized with the same conceptual and 
analytical instrumentarium.  
 Second, as I have presented, both disciplines look back on comparable conceptual and 
theoretical trajectories and have highlighted similar structural factors, i.e. grievances, 
resources, and opportunities, in addition to the dimension of identity. Extensive empirical 
research has demonstrated the explanatory value of structural approaches; on the other hand, 
however, it has likewise shed light on existent deficits they exhibit. Acknowledging both, I 
argue that the most fertile development should be an exploration of an integrative approach 
bridging the disciplines and exploiting their respective theoretical insights. Therein, structural 
factors should be complemented by ideational – framing – processes.  
 Third, a qualitative research design is indispensable within this framework.  
 Fourth, the approach and the model will be incongruous with a demand for strict 
parsimony, for they include a multiplicity of factors to account for. The benefit of increased 
comprehension of the mechanisms involved, however, clearly outweighs this slight deficit. 
After all, armed conflict is complex.  
 
3.2.2. Operationalization 
Whatever their aims or goals, the grievances, beliefs, and motivations that mobilize 
individuals to engage in collective action on the basis of perceived inequality are never 
mechanistically derived from existing social conditions. Inequality does not exist apart 
from the comparison processes that create an apprehension of it and the claims-making 
and framing processes that construct injustice frames around these perceptions. 
Moreover, perceptions of inequality are much more widespread than the mobilizing 
grievances that impel individuals to engage in collective action. Because of this, 
collective actors must engage in various forms of meaning and identity work, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Framing religiöser Konflikte”; Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization: A 
Framing Approach”, Mediterranean Politics 14, no. 3 (November 2009): 365–383. 
345 See: Tanja Granzow, Andreas Hasenclever, and Jan Sändig, “Introduction: Framing Political Violence – A 
Micro-Approach to Civil War Studies”, Civil Wars 17 (3) [forthcoming]. Another recent theoretical exploration 
stems from Desrosiers, “Reframing”. 
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generation of incentives for action, in order for social movement mobilization to become 
possible.346  
In this passage, Snow and Owens broach the core of the research question about how frames 
mediate between structural and identity factors and the mobilization for collective action – 
whichever form the latter takes. Moreover, they highlight the numerous elements involved, 
whose relation to each other needs specification: goals, grievances, beliefs, motivation, 
mobilization, collective action, perception, inequality, social conditions, claims-making, 
framing processes, injustice frames, construction, meaning and identity work, incentives, 
social movement (mobilization). To systematize them and additional relevant components in a 
sound model is the ultimate aim of this dissertation.  
 In line with what I presented in the introduction and the previous chapters, I assume that 
framing processes, consisting of strategic actors, (a) collective action frame(s), and an 
audience, mediate between structural factors and collective action. The relationship between 
the elements is thereby reciprocal.    
  
 
Figure 3.1.: Integrated Framing Model  
 
In other words, I propose that the mechanism is constituted by (a) the given structural 
conditions, which affect the (primary framework of) (b) strategic actors, who, based on their 
own perceptions and strategic interests and goals, elaborate and promote (c) a collective 
action frame which influences (or at least seeks to influence) (d) the audience to take (e) 
collective action in the form delineated by the frame. In this, it is important to point out that 
through the successful resonance of the frame among the audience, or the lack thereof, the 
audience in turn impacts on the frame or, more precisely, it affects the way in which the 
strategic actors modify and re-adapt the frame in the dynamic process of frame alignment in 
order to achieve greater resonance. 
 For the purpose of elucidating the ‘black box’ in between structural factors and collective 
action, i.e. gather evidence to support my model, I will employ a comparative case study 
research design with two most-similar cases; under most similar structural conditions they 
                                                          
346 David A. Snow and Peter B. Owens, “Social Movements and Social Inequality: Toward a More Balanced 
Assessment of the Relationship”, in Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality, ed. Jane McLeod, Edward 
Lawler, and Michael Schwalbe (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 657–681, here: 677f.  
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vary in their collective action: in one case we see armed conflict while in the other merely 
nonviolent protest. I claim that the variation lies in the framing processes. 
 To demonstrate this, I will successively present and analyze each of the involved factors.  
 
In lieu of the specified drawing of frames on the cultural and discursive background, I will in 
a first step provide the relevant details. These include the general setting and social groups as 
well as an outline of recent history, because frames resort to discourses, narratives, and myths, 
and these are historically embedded; besides, historical experiences have shaped the 
(collective) identity of all parties involved.347 Additionally, I will draw attention to discourses, 
which play a role within the respective movements’ framing.  
 The second step comprises the introduction of the social movement actors, i.e. movements, 
origins, leadership (until disproven, I take an elite-centered perspective on framing), and 
collective action over time. This forms the foundation for the explication of the ‘strategic 
actors’ element of the model as well as the interdependent elements of audience and collective 
action. Together with the background, this moreover characterizes the range of opportunities 
and constraints the movement and its leadership (i.e. the prime framers) face. 
 Step three consists of the testing of the explanatory power of the presented structural 
approaches. It will be conducted in an absolute, as well as in a comparative mode to uncover 
(a) if there is a risk for the escalation of violence or not according to the logic employed, and 
(b) in how far these risks vary between the two cases. The results will reveal two things: First, 
the deficits of existing approaches in explaining what we observe. And second, they identify 
those structural factors, which do have an impact in each case and thus form part of the 
model.  
 The fourth step is dedicated to the framing analysis according to Snow and Benford’s 
model: On the basis of my sources (see 3.2.4.) I will identify the framing elements in the 
movements’ communication, explore the resonance among constituents as well as the general 
audience (i.e. non-followers within the respective identity groups and the wider Yemeni 
population including potential opponents), and shed light on processes of contestation. The 
time span under investigation thereby includes the period from the emergence of organized 
opposition (i.e. movement formation) until March 2015, however, with limited attention to the 
post-conflict phase for the violent case. This diachronic perspective enables the identification 
of phases of and shifts in framing over time, as requested by critics of a static model. 
                                                          
347 See Fernand Braudel’s seminal elaborations in this regard. Fernand Braudel, “La longue durée”, Annales. 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales 13, no. 4 (October–December 1958): 725–753.  
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However, due to the dependency of analyzed data on availability, such a periodization can 
merely be tentative; nevertheless, it to a certain degree brings to the open the dynamics of 
continuous frame adaption in response to feedback and interaction with both audience and 
contesters and to changing context.  
 I conceptualize the frame dimensions according to Snow and Benford, whereby – as 
previously noted – a clear distinction between very close concepts is not feasible in all cases. 
This specifically applies in regard to a strict delineation of the motivational component; it is 
frequently implicit in the other two dimensions, yet will be noted twice in its double function.  
 From a core framing corpus, which will be identified in the basis of its prominence (i.e. 
reach) and comprehensive positioning/treatment of the core issues (problem/solution/path to 
solution), the main issues (frame elements) and lines of argument will be identified through 
qualitative text analysis (see 3.2.5.). They will be assigned to the diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational component. All other sources are subsequently analyzed in terms of these 
elements: In which mode are they distributed? How are they embedded into varying contexts? 
How are they taken up, referred to, appraised? Who does so? With which frequency? In which 
contexts? How are articulators judged? How do these processes vary over time? Are there 
discrepancies and contradictions? On the basis of these overarching questions, other notable 
aspects will be adopted inductively.  
 Frame distribution is traced through various kinds of media (print, audio, video, images). 
Limitations persist due the impossibility of tracing immediate interpersonal communication 
and new media. There is evidence that, particularly, messenger services played a significant 
role in distribution and mobilization, yet it remains untraceable.  
 Contestation is incorporated in two ways: Internal contestation is present by highlighting 
apparent intra-movement tensions or conflicts and presenting alternative framing attempts, if 
applicable. They may contain either a diverging diagnosis or prognosis or both. The same in 
principle applies to external contestation; contesting frames and framing are treated in the 
identical mode as movement frames. Yet, they oftentimes exhibit specifically offensive and 
defaming language against the respective movement, which will be particularly noted. 
Additionally, false accusations are often rampant in this context. Consistent with 
constructivist premises, I will not – neither for movement frames nor for contesting ones – 
assess or judge the validity of claims as such; in highly obvious cases of inconsistency or 
stark discrepancy with reality, however, it will be a criterion as to the credibility of a frame.  
 The analytical conceptualization and analysis of resonance is the greatest challenge in 
frame analysis. Since frames are cognitive schemata, i.e. occurring as mental processes in 
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individuals, they cannot be recorded. Their existence and shape can merely be deduced by 
other means. It would be tautological to infer resonance phenomenologically from movement 
participation. The best alternative hence consists in the analysis of people’s statements about 
their thoughts and feelings on the contested issue.  
 With this come a number of inevitable biases: What people say with a high probability 
does not accord with what they think. Disparity may be the result of mere articulation (i.e. 
how to express thoughts); strategic decisions in regard to social acceptability in their context 
or by the interviewer or else; employed instrumentally with a hidden agency; or influenced by 
regular processes of ex-post interpretation and memory (a factor which tends to amplify with 
temporal distance to the period of reference). These biases need to be acknowledged and are 
met with a critical stance towards all sources and their assessment. Non-resonance even raises 
the predicament for the necessity to establish that a person was either not exposed to a frame 
or exposed it, but without resonance. The first is highly difficult to substantiate, the latter 
functions as described for resonance but accounts for opposition.     
 Contingency is a prevalent condition in all these processes. This fact can merely be noted, 
but not be analytically approached in any satisfying mode.   
 Step five involves the case comparison348 in order to clarify findings according to the 
research questions: First, why and how do strategic movement actors construct particular 
frames rather than others? And second, why do constituents take corresponding action or not? 
The comparison treats the issues of structural factors, framers, frames, audience, framing 
context, contestation, and collective action based on the preceding chapters. The findings will 
disclose their relation, particularly trajectories, frame shifts, and the correlation (or lack 
thereof) between frames and actions.  
 Finally, the sixth and last step presents the discussion of the theoretical implications, the 
review of the proposed model and its value, and an outlook on possible areas of further 
investigation.  
 
3.2.3. Criteria for Case Selection 
The search for cases aimed at ‘identity groups living under comparable conditions of state 
repression, marginalization or state collapse and perceiving a threat against their collective’. 
Cases have been selected with a foremost focus on their suitability for a two-case most-
similar case design. Regional preference was thereby given to the Middle East due to the 
                                                          
348 For the guiding principles on which the comparison draws see: Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), particularly 67–72.  
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author’s regional and language specialization and, besides, a lack of empirical studies on 
movements and armed conflict on the region at the time of selection.349  
 Further criteria for the two cases were: Approximately same scope of movement (size, 
duration), situated in recent history (criterion concerning data availability), synchronic and 
diachronic variation in reaction to the perceived threat under otherwise comparable structural 
conditions of strain.  
 The Zaydi Houthi rebels and the Peaceful Southern Movement in Yemen qualified as best 
and virtually exclusive cases within this framework. While intra-state comparison was not 
among the original criteria, it assisted the stabilization of comparable structural conditions.  
 The fact that the Houthis constitute a religious identity group does not affect the study; as I 
elaborated earlier, I do not consider religion as a mobilizational category sui generis with 
specific dimensions or mechanisms, and hence do not distinguish between groups on these 
grounds. Zaydism is treated as a common cultural background with a variety of specific 
discourses; Houthi framing heavily utilizes religious language as another group might use a 
different kind of language. The analytical framework remains the same. 
 The Peaceful Southern Movement, on the other hand, demands independence and thereby 
qualifies as a self-determination movement. The literature on conflicts over self-determination 
holds that this group of conflicts is particularly likely to trigger an escalation of violence 
leading to civil war.350 This is not the case in Yemen, which thus makes for an interesting 
case. As for the Houthis and religion, I again hold that self-determination merely marks the 
discursive field to which framers connect but does not constitute a category of movement sui 
generis.351  
 Although the characters of the two movements appear to differ in that the Houthis appear 
to more like an organization while the Hirak is an umbrella for numerous organization, a 
comparison is nevertheless justified: As will be elucidated, the Houthis are hardly a coherent 
and unified actor, but likewise comprise a number of lose branches; they are thus different 
only in degree, not in quality.  
 
                                                          
349 This situation evidently changed in the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011.  
350 For an overview see: Monica Duffy Toft, “Self-Determination, Secession, and Civil War”, Terrorism and 
Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012), Special Issue: Theoretical and Empirical Progress in Research on Political 
Violence, 581–600.  
351 Beáta Huszka recently published a comparative study of framing in secessionist movements. Unfortunately, it 
does not include an analysis of resonance. Beáta Huszka, Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict. Debate-
Framing and Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2014).  
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3.2.4. Data Selection and Acquisition 
Data collection aimed at a relevant sample of sources on the movement’s framing attempts, 
resonance among the audience, and contestation over the time of movement activity (which in 
both cases was merely slightly (i.e. months) longer than the period of collective action. 
Previous times were predominantly considered through the lens of secondary literature. 
Specifically phases of heightened activity and changes in action were sought to be covered 
with as wide a range of high quality sources as possible. While this was not always feasible, 
the overall collection contains a significant and sufficient number of sources.  
 These encompass: interviews with movement leaders, activists, and other audience 
(personal and published), speeches of movement leaders and political actors, a variety of 
movement print publications, newspaper articles, governmental and non-governmental 
reports, focus groups, website/blog/web forum content, social media content (written, audio, 
visual), opinion pieces, poems, TV broadcasts, documentaries, photographs, exhibition 
content, cartoons, tokens, flyers, and else.  
 Kind and specific scope of sources vary between Houthis and Hirak, which are in part 
related to their different modes of communicating. I want to merely highlight the respective 
specificities: For the Zaydi group I draw on an extensive corpus of Hussein al-Houthi’s 
lectures given between late 2001 and mid-2003 (a total of 91 lectures with each between 15–
25 print pages)352. It is programmatic for it lays out the frame basis for the movement; even 
after the frame shift and escalation it remains the central point of reference. Hence, it is the 
core corpus for the Houthi frames before 2005. With ‘Al-Haqiqa’ (‘The Truth’), the 
movement issued its own magazine from 2007 onwards, which will be analyzed; and in the 
wake of increased Internet availability and use from about the same time onwards, it not only 
set up various websites, but was extensively posting video clips on platforms such as 
YouTube. A selection of about 400 of these will likewise be evaluated. In late 2012 and 2013, 
the movement created an exhibition to present the civil war from their perspective. Extensive 
photo documentation made it possible to take the exhibits into account as sources. 
Unfortunately, sources regarding resonance are more limited for the case, since direct 
interviews proved impossible; while I was assured that many Houthi followers were open to 
talk about their views, attempts for contact with specific persons over and again failed. Hence, 
I mainly draw on quotes in media articles and commentaries in print and digital movement 
communication.  
                                                          
352 I thank the American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS) in Sana’a, specifically Stephen J. Steinbeiser, for 
their kind assistance in the acquisition of these and other sources.  
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Sources for the Hirak include email, telephone, and social media communication and 
discussion with 41 activists and a total of 15 semi-structured interviews and three group 
discussions with activists living in the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany. Moreover, there is 
plentiful public discussion through opinion pieces and various kinds of self-promoted 
movement publications that aim to raise awareness about their struggle which Southerners 
conceive of as neglected. Contrary to the other case, direct interaction with activists provided 
ample data on resonance.  
 Government counterframes were treated by investigating official speeches, documents, 
articles from state and non-state media, and policies.  
 For both movements I, to a limited extent, scraped together social media data, mainly from 
Facebook. A systematic analysis proved difficult due to fluidity, not solely of the type of 
medium, but furthermore due to the tendency of both movements (but even more so the 
Houthis) to frequently create new movement sites and profiles, use a number of them at the 
same time, close some fast – in short, due to a lack of persistence in spite of presence.353 Use 
of the sources acquired on such platforms is hence limited as a complementation to the other 
sources and treated like comments on websites and else.354   
 Potential biases beyond what has already been brought up comprise the selective 
compilation of sources, aggravated by the lack of presence in the field due to the strained 
security situation at the time of the research. Most contacts could thus merely be established 
mediately or through the Internet. Strategic concealment and the impossibility to enter into all 
relevant fields of movement interaction have been mentioned before.  
 Assumptions about the reach of the Internet need to be reflected in the face of its merely 
slowly expanding reach in Yemen.355 
 
 
                                                          
353 An additional challenge is the still very young and dynamic field of methodological exploration about the 
adequate use and analysis of what has been labelled ‘big data’.  
354 I thereby consciously neglect the specific character of the medium; however, since my use is merely 
complementary I hold this to be permissible.  
355 The World Bank (WB), World Data Bank, accessed June 26, 2014, http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
data/views/reports/tableview.aspx.  
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Year 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Internet users  
(per 100 people)356 
0 1 1 5 7 10 12 15 17 20 
 
Table 3.1.: Internet Users in Yemen 
 
These low numbers notwithstanding, one has to note a few relativizing factors: According to 
my conversations with Hirak activists, the use of the internet in Yemen hardly ever occurs 
individually, but overwhelmingly in small groups, i.e. has a wider outreach. Activists – often 
technically affine youths but also intellectuals and long-term oppositionals357 – moreover very 
consciously make use of the medium to interact with other movement members, 
sympathizers, and supporters, many of who are living abroad.358 In conclusion: While it 
would be a pitfall to assume too high an impact for online framing, the opposite holds equally 
true. Despite a low penetration rate, the internet is used in a highly effective manner by the 
movements. 
 To conclude: While the general scope of data for both movements is about equal, the 
balance thus varies. What this implies for the analysis will be discussed in the following.  
 
3.2.5. Data Analysis 
The research employs mixed-methods;359 moreover, it triangulates by combining both a 
combination of data sources and methods of analysis.360 Disregarding critical voices, it is the 
                                                          
356 Indicator definition: “Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 
12 months. Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital 
TV etc.”. Ibid.  
357 Some data on the most popular social network Facebook: Total Facebook users (April 2013): 610,780; 
penetration of population: 2.6%; penetration of online population: 20.56%; user age distribution: 18-24yrs. = 
45%, 25-34% = 30%. Socialbakers: http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/yemen (accessed April 12, 
2013).  
358 Contacts with family and friends in the diaspora were very close in all cases I encountered and exchange was 
reported to be daily or even more frequent. Messenger services and social media platforms play an important 
role here, but regular telephone contact was likewise reported to be very prevalent.  
359 For a recent compilation of methodological practices in social movement research see: Donatella Della Porta 
(ed.), Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  
360 Phillip M. Ayoub, Sophia J. Wallace, and Chris Zepeda-Millán, “Triangulation in Social Movement 
Research”, in Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, ed. Donatella Della Porta (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 67–96, here: 67.  
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best practice “of verification that increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and 
methods”.361  
 For essential texts, I employed qualitative text analysis. First, I coded the respective core 
corpora for each of the movements, i.e. excerpts of Hussein al-Houthi’s lectures and 
programmatic Hirak texts (such as their political program, a petition to the EU in which they 
depict their issue, slogans etc.) with the help of ATLAS.ti. I developed codes inductively with 
the criterion of capturing the main themes of these texts.362 Through clustering and lastly 
subsuming similar codes under meta-categories, I came up with a limited number of core 
themes – or frame elements. Guided by these, yet open for extension or modification, I then 
scanned the remaining textual sources stemming from the movement. The result was a list of 
frames for each of the three dimensions (see 7.1.1. and 7.2.3.), in sum: the central movement 
frames.  
 In the interview transcripts and other sources for resonance I checked for correspondence, 
discrepancy, and opposition. Along comparable lines, I proceeded to counterframing. Online 
sources were in principle treated in the same way, yet it was marked that attribution of origin 
might potentially be questioned.  
 In the presentation of the cases and my argument I cite extensively. I do so not merely to 
support my claims, but rather to provide an impression of the tone and nuances of the sources 
and the interwovenness of the three levels (frame, discourse, cultural background) I 
delineated. I am convinced that ‘letting the sources speak’ is a method far more capable of 
conveying these complexities and interconnections than a higher degree of abstraction.363 In 
addition, the reader has a better chance to assess my propositions and come to own 
conclusions.   
 Audio sources were treated like text and partly transcribed to facilitate evaluation; musical 
elements were interpreted in regard to text, if applicable, and in their quality as musical 
pieces. Visual sources (cartoons, photos, images, graffiti, installations etc.) were similarly 
analyzed in regard to text/script, content, emphasis, overall composition, context, and mode of 
                                                          
361 Sabina Yeasmin and Khan Ferdousour Rahman, “Triangulation Research Method as the Tool of Social 
Science Research”, BUP Journal 1, no. 1 (2012): 154–163, here: 156.  
362 See Lasse Lindekilde for an outline on how to conduct frame analysis and a delineation from discourse 
analysis: Lasse Lindekilde, “Discourse and Frame”.  
363 For a comparable mode of presentation in a similar case study see: Jeroen Gunning and Ilan Zvi Baron, Why 
Occupy A Square? People, Protests and Movements in the Egyptian Revolution (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014).  
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distribution, if applicable.364 In this, the distinct quality and function of images was borne in 
mind.  
 Images are powerful instruments for movements, for they “are associated with a complex 
stock of cultural knowledge and experiences, frames and identifications”365; this means that 
they can tap a pool of shared meaning in other and more efficient modes than language.366 
Due to their usually high degree of credibility, visuals not only disguise their quality as a 
frame, but also unfold a specifically high impact.367 Images attract preferred attention and 
transmit concentrated packages of meaning; moreover, they “implicitly diffuse political 
arguments outside of a context of cognitive linguistic discourse, often with unnoticed and 
powerful emotional consequences”.368 Besides, they can reach out to an even wider audience 
such as the illiterate, those not speaking the language, or children. 
 On a strategic and instrumental level, images – especially photos of injustices369 – make 
problems visible,370 as protest (and the transmission of images thereof) does with the 
opposition and its claims. Pictures of large crowds thus challenge the regime, spread its 
visibility, and strengthen the opposition by demonstrating that their numbers, i.e. the power 
                                                          
364 Challenging to answer but worth reflecting is furthermore the question of what is absent in an image. Axel 
Philipps, “Visual Protest Material as Empirical Data”, Visual Communication 11, no. 3 (2012): 3–21, here: 8. 
365 Nicole Doerr, Alice Mattoni, and Simon Teune, “Toward a Visual Analysis of Social Movements, Conflict, 
and Political Mobilization”, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change: An Annual Compilation of 
Research, vol. 35, ed. Patrick G. Coy (Bingley: Emerald, 2013), xi–xxvi, here: xii.  
366 Slogans are distinct in this regard in that they exhibit an equally multi-layered, persuasive, and arousing 
quality. For a discussion of their impact especially in the Southern Yemeni case see: Anne-Linda Amira 
Augustin, “Tawra Tawra Ya Ganub”. Slogans as Means of Expression of the South Arabian Independence 
Struggle, in Graffiti, Writing and Street Art in the Arab World, Romano-Arabica XV (Bucharest: Center for 
Arab Studies, 2015), 39–57, here: 39. 
367 Catherine Corrigall-Brown, “The Power of Pictures: Images of Politics and Protest”, American Behavioral 
Scientist 56, no. 2 (2012): 131–134, here: 132; in reference to: Paul M. Messaris and Linus Abraham, “The Role 
of Image in Framing News Stories”, Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the 
Social World, ed. Stephen D. Reese, Oscar Gandy, Jr., and August E. Grant (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 
2001), 215–226. 
368 Doerr/Mattoni/Teune, Visual Analysis, xix. The spontaneous emotional impact is almost impossible to access 
as an observer. The art historian Erwin Panofsky made an intriguing suggestion for a conceptualization of the 
persuasive impact of images on the individual. He differentiated between a dimension of iconography (which 
describes images and gives meaning to the objects and scenes represented) and iconology (an intuitive 
interpretation of the intrinsic meaning based on comparing ‘formal arrangement and technical procedures’ in 
different pictures. Erwin Panofsky, “Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance 
Art”, in Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History, ed. Erwin Panofsky (Garden City: Doubleday 
Anchor, 1955): 26–54, here: 38.  
369 Images are powerful sysmbols of injustice and make for social outrage, as for instance pictures from Abu 
Ghraib have demonstrated. Yet, they can also situate the ‘we’ in slightly more moderate contexts than immediate 
prison torture. Thomas Olesen has traced the impact of the case of the young Egyptian blogger Khaled Said who 
was beaten to death by Egyptian police in 2010. Activists juxtaposed pictures of his wrecked body post-mortem 
with a portrait of the lively young, urban middle class man. It was a symbol of injustice which resonated widely 
with existing injustice frames in Egyptian society. Doerr/Mattoni/Teune, Visual Analysis, xvii, in reference to: 
Thomas Olesen, “‘We Are All Khaled Said’: Visual Injustice Symbols in the Egyptian Revolution, 2010-2011”, 
in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 3–26. 
370 John A. Guidry, “The Struggle to Be Seen: Social Movements and the Public Sphere in Brazil”, International 
Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 16, no. 4 (2003): 493–524.  
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and solidarity of a collective.371 The Internet and especially social media carried this to 
another level by ousting official media from its privileged position of reporting, 
institutionalizing rapid and far-reach horizontal communication and information distribution 
instead.372  
 Audio, visual, and performance elements bear a number of similarities in this regard. They 
have found explicit recognition in the analysis; while details for each source would have led 
too far, significant or outstanding aspects will be mentioned. Specifically videos stemming 
from the Houthis are intriguing in this respect, for they combine the power of visuals 
(exponentiated in part by the fact that it is moving pictures) with the emotionally capturing 
impact of music and culturally highly resonant forms of poetry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
371 Emanuela Guano, “Ruining the President’s Spectacle: Theatricality and Telepolitics in the Buenos Aires 
Public Sphere”, Journal of Visual Culture 1, no. 3 (2002): 303–323.  
372 Yet, the fact that “[p]rotests are not perceived as what they are on the ground but what they look like in press 
photos and television news images” (Doerr/Mattoni/Teune, Visual Analysis, xiv) is not without problems since it 
opens the door to manipulation and abuse – a fact of which an increasing number of people are aware and which 
influences the degree to which they question what they see, potentially backfiring at movements.  
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4. YEMEN – CONTINGENCY AND NEGOTIATION 
Taking an interpretist and agency-centered perspective anchored on the meso- and micro-level 
makes it necessary to first deconstruct popular presumptions about the nature of the Yemeni 
state and society, and in their stead open up a wider, less deterministic arena of action. In 
doing so, I follow the articulate call by Isa Blumi to abandon the dominant generic and often 
‘orientalist’373 categories subsuming Yemeni subjects in favor of a more complex, 
disaggregated understanding of individual and collective actors and motives.374  
 The first section is dedicated to the ‘deconstruction’375 of a coherent geographical space. It 
serves to locate the state’s historical predecessors and the embeddedness of current 
geographical and identity disputes therein. Historical figures and events are a point of 
reference in which numerous recent discourses and frames are anchored or linked to. In 
analogy to the deconstruction of geographical space, the second section does the same for 
presumably essentialist collective actors, such as ‘tribes’, which are all too often attributed 
with primordialist characteristics detached from any context and devoid of an admission of 
individual agency. Against this background, I then present two important narratives or 
discourses, respectively, in regard to the two movements under analysis: the narrative of 
‘Yemeni unity’ (whose reality is a grievance of the Southern Movement) and the discourses 
surrounding Saudi and US interference in Yemeni affairs (a grievance of the Houthis). A 
description of the political situation (with special consideration of the two Yemeni states and 
their unification) as well as the economic conditions completes the chapter. As far as possible, 
I strive to distinguish between the central actors and themes in the North for the Houthis, and 
in the South for the Hirak. This will, however, not always be possible since many are 
interrelated and/or relevant for both. 
 
4.1. Deconstructing Presumptions I: Coherent Geographical Space 
What is it that (supposedly) constitutes ‘Yemen’ as a country and state?  
 Similar to the situation of most countries at one point or another, attempts to replace spatial 
ambiguity with clear territorial attributions and boundaries in modern ‘Yemen’ are rooted in 
colonial endeavors. As Paul Dresch has pointed out in his seminal work on Yemen’s history, 
                                                          
373 See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978). 
374 Isa Blumi, Chaos in Yemen. Societal collapse and the new authoritarianism (Abington: Routledge, 2010) 
375 ‘Deconstruction’ is a great word for a very modest step I can take within this framework. It should be 
comprehended as stating my intention (hinting at my perception of these dimensions) rather than making a claim 
about a program I am able to satisfyingly unfold.  
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written and unwritten evocation of a natural unit of Yemen goes back to the rise of Islam, 
while reference to the region’s grandeur is even pre-Islamic.376 Identity ascriptions as 
‘Yemeni’ are equally present in literary accounts over the centuries. The need for a durable 
fixation of what this unit was meant to be exactly, however, was imported only with the 
Ottoman and British imperial interventions in the 19th century and their resulting 
administrative needs. Mapping was the first step in establishing knowledge, thereby a certain 
power over the newly taken territory, and also the entry point into the arena of contestation 
for space and authority over it. John Willis illustrates this process; in his excellent 
deconstruction of Yemen’s historical geography, he provides detailed accounts on how the 
British Empire sent out its cartographers and administrators in order to establish Imperial 
Arabia.377  
 
4.1.1. The British Protectorate in South Arabia 
After establishing themselves in the port town of Aden in 1839, the British slowly deepened 
and expanded their sphere of influence. The colonial model they strived to reproduce was 
taken from their experience in administrating colonial India: a mixture of direct and indirect 
rule. Aden, initially supposed to be only a coaling station, was soon developed into a free port 
in 1850 and prospered as settlement, commercial center, and military base. The core and heart 
of British South Arabia, it was the seat of the ‘Aden Residency’ and thereby under direct rule. 
The hinterlands, on the other hand, were to be administered through indirect rule. The mission 
of exploring and drawing maps was therefore not limited solely to territories, but 
simultaneously included the population inhabiting these territories. These ordering processes 
with the final aim to “exterminate ambivalence”,378 subsequently invented the ‘nine tribes of 
the Aden hinterland’ as they were called in an 1873 memorandum.379 
 Eager to secure the hinterlands and convinced to do so through ‘natural local authorities’, 
they designated those they perceived as ‘native chiefs‘ and from there on engaged with them 
on the basis of this historical and genealogical imagination.380 The British aimed to empower 
                                                          
376 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1; see also: 
Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 25. 
377 Here and in the following: John Willis, Unmaking North and South. Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857–
1934 (London: Hurst & Company, 2012). 
378 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), cited in: Willis, Unmaking, 
71; as numerous critiques of colonial anthropology, Blumi (Chaos, 20) notes how (later on) the works of 
functionalist anthropologists assisted in cementing these attributions. 
379 Willis, Unmaking, 23–24. 
380 For more on the technique of rule which Nicholas Dirks coined the British “ethnographic state” see: Nicholas 
B. Dirks, Castes of Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
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these ‘chiefs’ with a threefold objective: to guard free trade in the hinterland, to exert a 
civilizing influence upon the ‘martial tribal’ population, and to form a “bulwark” against the 
Ottomans in the North.381 A closer look into who really were their allies discloses the 
disputability of the inherent logic of this policy goal.   
 These ‘tribes’382 consisted of a de facto group of notable families of the respective areas, 
whose common marker was their opposition to the Northern Zaydi imamate’s interventionist 
pursuits in the 18th century. They were most of the time based on shared lineage, contrary to 
what the British opted to discern, however, their influence over local collectives was anything 
but given, exclusive, or absolute. Quite the opposite: It had to be continuously negotiated, 
loyalties were context-specific and partial (divided between e.g. religious, traditional, and 
economic authorities, all entailing different rights and responsibilities), and the legitimacy of 
authority had to be constantly renewed. Conflict was pre-determined, for “rather than adjust 
their understanding of local social and political forms, the British attempted to create a master 
for those who had none”.383 And those people clearly and vehemently rejected such pursuits. 
Ultimately, the British succumbed.  
 The mountainous region of Dhaleh, for instance, frontier with the Northern Mutawakkilite 
Kingdom of the Imam Yahya and traditional central node in important trade routes, presented 
such a case of ambiguity. Its hybrid form of local authority remained illegible to the colonizer 
– as, in fact, did the geography of the rather remote area. The undeclared border war between 
Imam Yahya and the British (1918–1934) brought into the open the conflicting, often 
overlapping orders: Actors maneuvered between the Imam’s forces attacking from the North 
in the name of Islamic unification, the protectorate forces, who acted only reluctantly 
according to their obligation to actually protect their subjects, and their own genuine interests. 
When aerial photography came to their support, the British were finally able to master the 
geographical details and, through bombardments, discipline those who rejected allegiance. In 
1934, the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty reinforced what had already been agreed on as the border 
between North and South in 1905. 
 Dhaleh as a central location along the North-South border remained faithful to its legacy as 
will be seen later; it is still a region of heightened resistance against perceived intruders. 
                                                          
381 Willis, Unmaking, 42–43. 
382 The following sections deals with the deconstruction of essentialist understandings of ‘tribal’ and ‘sectarian’ 
groups. I chose to hyphenate these concepts until I have clarified my specific understanding of their implication.  
383 Ibid., 71.  
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 Today, it is an area of more militant struggle of Southern Movement affiliates against 
government military units.  
 
4.1.2. The Ottoman Occupation 
After the first occupational period in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire returned 
to Yemen and established an initial foothold on the coast of the Red Sea in 1849. They pushed 
for Sana’a at a time of political vacuum due to factional fighting and continuous decline of the 
Zaydi imamic state384, consolidated their presence in 1872 and consequently increased 
colonial competition with the British in this sphere.385 In the South they expanded their reign 
up to the town of Ta’izz, close to the frontier of the British-controlled areas, while the 
highlands just a little North of Sana’a remained under the rule of the Zaydi imam. Overall, 
they were met with little enthusiasm. Quite to the contrary, Ottoman rule met opposition and 
resistance by highland and coastal ‘tribes’ throughout the 1870s and 1880s. Moreover, 
following the old imam’s death and the transition of rule to Imam al-Mansour in 1890, they 
faced a new, articulate, and actively mobilizing adversary who led the North into a general 
uprising in the late 1890s. His claims to authority rested on religious (descent from the “pure 
line of the Prophet”386) as well as historical legitimacy (stemming from the Qasimi dynasty) 
and bolstered his call for a restoration of just Islamic rule in face of Ottoman (religious and 
profane) corruption. 
In his evaluation of the Ottoman occupation of Yemen, Thomas Kühn considers the result as a 
primary example of Ottoman state orientalism, guided by their conception of insurmountable 
differences between Sunni (themselves and a majority of the population in the Empire) and 
Shiʿa(the Zaydis).387 Essentializing the ‘other’ was their path of choice, just as the British did, 
for they, too, had failed to comprehend the moral and social order of whom they 
encountered.388 And whom they encountered had proven more resourceful at opposing them 
                                                          
384 Steven C. Caton, “History”, in Middle East in Focus: Yemen, 29–87, here: 66. 
385 Caton, “History”, 65. 
386 Quoted in: Ibid., 113, with reference to: Sayyid Muhammad Al-Hariri al-Hamawi to Imam al-Mansur, 
November 2, 1891, as quoted in: Ali b. Abdullah al-Iryani, Sinat al-Imam Muhammad bin Yahya Hamid al-Din, 
ed. Muhammad Isa al-Salihiyya (Amman: Dar al-Bashir, 1996), 373. Those who descent from the family of the 
Prophet through the line of Ali are referred to as ‘Hashemites’ in a larger context or ‘sayyid’ (pl. sadah) 
specifically in Yemen. More see chapter 4.1.2.1. 
387 Thomas Kühn, “Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference and 
Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872–1919”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, 
no. 2 (2007): 27–29. 
388 Willis, Unmaking, 113. 
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 than they had presumed. This would be another recurring experience made by outsiders in the 
region.  
 
4.1.3. The Zaydi Imamate 
Zaydi imams had ruled the North of Yemen since the late 9th century. Imam Yahya was a self-
conscious successor to this line and convinced of re-strengthening the imamate after the 
decline of the 19th century. Being designated imam – an office by appointment based on 
descent and merit389 – was no guarantee to unlimited following and loyalty by one’s subjects. 
Rather, it positioned him as the protector of shariʿah law and Zaydi scholarship and traditions 
within the sociopolitical setup of Upper Yemen. He was the principal mediator “in an intricate 
and delicate balance with tribal custom (ʿurf qabaʾilī)”;390 he had to constantly build alliances 
with the ‘tribes’ and often faced contestants to the imamate as well as opposition to his 
rule.391 The areas he claimed sovereignty over were populated not solely by Zaydis but also 
Shafi’i Sunnis and few Ismailis, which presented an additional aspect to be considered.   
 Yahya held his ground in this field, and after the Ottomans withdrew in 1918/19 he 
commenced his project of state-building in line with a Western understanding of territorial 
rule. This included expanding the territories under his control, like prominently the Tihama 
region on the Red Sea coast in 1926, a strong bastion to which his opponents had withdrawn 
over time, and restructuring the ways in which he governed them. Some reforms were clearly 
taken from the Ottoman administration, for example the establishment of a standing army 
(admittedly of poor quality, as many authors underline,392 but still a development) and 
modern means of communication over distance – which revolutionized his command over 
space.393 The rhetoric he employed for the implementation of a more centralized statehood 
was thereby closely linked to deeply-rooted Islamic discourses of reform (islah), revival 
(iḥyāʾ), and renewal (tajdīd), which take as their guiding principle the reassessment of the 
current state of religious piety and practice with what is demanded by the Qurʾan and 
                                                          
389 He was chosen based on his fulfillment of the traditional criteria: the imam had to be of the Prophet’s kin, 
learned, i.e. capable of independent judgment in matters of law (mujtahid), and a warrior in the name of Islam 
(mujāhid) in order to comply with his duty of khurūj, ‘coming out’ against oppression. Furthermore, he had to 
formally summon for allegiance (daʿwah). Willis, Unmaking, 113; Dresch, History, 5; Wedeen, Peripheral 
Visions, 33; Gabriele von Bruck, “Regimes of Piety Revisited: Zaydi Political Moralities in Republican Yemen”, 
Die Welt des Islam 50 (2010), 185–223, here: 186. 
390 James Robin King, “Zaydi Revival in a Hostile Republic: Competing Identities, Loyalties and Visions of 
State in Republican Yemen”, Arabica 59 (2012): 404–445, here: 405. 
391 Exemplary for his maneuvering along different lines of power and of bargaining his own position in the face 
of strong shuyukh are the descriptions of concrete events provided by Blumi (Chaos, 84ff.).  
392 So e.g. Caton, “History”, 67. 
393 Here and for further details on these reforms see: Willis, Unmaking, 120ff.; Dresch, History, 28ff. 
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Ḥadīth.394 His style of rule was very personalized. He took care of things the way he saw fit or 
– in interaction with outsiders, for example – he deemed necessary.395 The loyalty of families 
of influence was secured through the so-called ‘kaf īl’ system: son(s) of these families were 
kept as ‘guests’ (read: hostages) of the Imam and treated according to the quality of the 
relation.396 Also in other aspects, his reign was focused on the internal and on the preservation 
of his control. Over time and with increased engagement of the elites with reform-oriented 
Arab writers like Mohamed Abduh or Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, criticism grew. Critics saw 
the country in a state of disclosure to modernity, both on the level of basic infrastructure, 
health, and education, as well as necessary social and political reforms.397 When he declared 
his son Ahmad Crown Prince and referred to the state as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom in the 
mid-1920s, he furthermore weakened his stance, for the installment of dynastic rule was the 
anathema to the Zaydi traditions of the imamate and awakened very negative remembrances 
of the (ultimately declining and decried) Qasimi dynasty of earlier centuries. Ultimately in 
1948, his unpopularity led to him being assassinated. Nevertheless, his son Ahmad took over 
the imamate until he died of natural causes in 1962.   
 His successor, Imam al-Badr, finally did not manage to overcome the massive resentment 
which had built up. He was ousted by the Revolution of September 26, 1962; the imamate 
state was turned into the Yemen Arab Republic, and from there on Zaydis (and especially 
Zaydi elites, the Hashemites) were subjected to social and political marginalization and 
despise.398 As the Republicans saw it, the prior social order that, on the grounds of religious 
belonging based the Hashemites on top of the social hierarchy, had to be surmounted in favor 
of a Republican state ideology. The road toward this goal led through the systematic 
exclusion of Zaydis from state offices and, more fundamentally, through dismantling the 
Zaydi religious identity by converging them under Sunni schools (madhāhib, sg. madhab).399 
In the long run, the massive frustration and grievances stemming from these experiences 
would lead to revivalism and opposition, with the Houthis being considered its most militant 
manifestation.  
                                                          
394 Willis, Unmaking, 141.  
395 For the latter, a situation in which Yahya had to accept the limits of his power in interaction with the 
Ottomans, see Blumi, Chaos, 84ff. Wedeen underlines the importance of physical presence for his sovereignty to 
be visible for his people and to be executed, similar to medieval European potentates (Peripheral Visions, 33–
34).  
396 Caton, “History”, 67.  
397 Ibid. 
398 For well-grounded elaborations on this marginalization and its manifestation in everyday life and interactions 
with non-Zaydis see: Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen. Ruling Families in 
Transition (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). On discrimination and denigration in the political field see: 
King, “Zaydi Revival”.  
399 Vom Bruck, Islam; vom Bruck, “Regimes”; King, “Zaydi Revival”. 
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The expansion of the House of Sa’ud in what was to become Saudi Arabia, and its impact on 
Yemen serve as the historical root of the current topic of the northern border of Yemen.400 
From 1902 throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, the wake of Ottoman decline and lastly 
withdrawal, Prince Abdul Aziz Al Sa’ud (‘Ibn Sa’ud’) started his military and diplomatic 
conquest of the interior Arabian Peninsula and the holy cities. In 1926 he declared himself 
sultan, six years later king. The ‘Asir and Najran regions, traditionally considered part of 
Yemen, were among the areas he fought for and finally secured control over in the Treaty of 
Ta’if in 1934.401 The already highlighted characteristic of these regions, especially ‘Asir, as 
centers of trade routes and commercial exchange, however, persisted. Since family and 
commercial relations disregarded formal territorial ascriptions, the zone continued to be 
permeable (e.g. for smuggling, human traffic, as well as animal pasture), with borders being 
more than porous and repeatedly disputed until the 2000s.402 The role this plays in the Sa’dah 
conflict, and how it interrelates with the Houthis, will be taken up again in the elaboration of 
the regional context of the Houthi movement and the grounds for frame resonance. At this 
point, I merely want to direct attention to the principle issue of these borderlands.  
The objective of this section was to briefly touch upon the various spaces and geographies 
bound together under the name of ‘Yemen’, and sketch the actors and processes involved in 
their construction in recent (formative and still influential) history. I aimed to show how 
external actors have always had their difficulties in reading local structures and seeing beyond 
primordial ascriptions they – as in the case of the British – had invented themselves. Yemen’s 
geographies abide in permanent construction, through contestation, fluid alliances, and 
networks based on collective imaginaries as well as down-to-earth interests. Rather than being 
essentialist and static or dominated by outsiders, locals with a good sense for fine-grained 
contextual particularities adjust to multifold contingencies – paired with fierce resistance 
where considered necessary.   
                                                          
400 Dresch (History, 33) present a very illustrative map of Saudi expansion in the early 20th century and 
‘classical’ Yemen. Its central strength is the vagueness of territorial extension it conveys. 
401 Caton, “History”, 67. 
402 Blumi, Chaos, 104ff. He also briefly mentions the fact that the Treaty of Ta’if explicitly allows for some  
identity groups to move across the borders freely, and how these groups are party constructed around primordial 
notions of ‘tribe’ as this concept had been conceptualized by the British (p.107). For more on these border issues 
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) see chapter 4.1.5.1. on Yemen-KSA relations.  
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In this context I also introduced the areas which remain most highly contested and with strong 
collective imaginaries: most crucially the North-South divide and its frontier and the northern 
border region, and, besides, the Tihama coast and the eastern Hadhramawt, for they are still 
relevant for understanding the current conflicts in the North and the South of Yemen.  
  
4.2. Deconstructing Presumptions II: Essentialist Collective Actors 
“Categories are not groups, but they do make groups thinkable and legible, and indeed help 
constitute groups as objects available for self-identification.”403 The following section seeks 
to make social actors in Yemen and the Yemeni context ‘legible’ for the subsequent case 
studies. It thereby adheres to the same critical guiding principles as the previous section. 
Additionally, central discourses will be presented as well as a basis for the well-founded 
interpretation of both movements’ framing.   
 
4.2.1. Tribes 
Yemen is a country seductive to orientalism. In particular its ‘tribal’ traditions foster this 
trend: ‘primordial’, ‘martial’, ‘backwards’, and ‘unrulable’ are just some of the most common 
characterizations provided.404 
 In line with the works of a number of well-known anthropologists working on Yemeni 
societies, I want to counter this image with a more complex, more dynamic, and above all, 
less deficit-based one.405 The first issue to note is that Yemeni society is not solely comprised 
of ‘tribes’.406 They do play a prominent role. However, other social categories or status 
groups exist alongside them. Marieke Brandt, who works on Upper Yemen, distinguishes four 
traditional social categories (from higher to lower social prestige): the religious aristocracy of 
                                                          
403 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 170. 
404 For some ambiguous example from an academic background see: Khaled Fattah, “Yemen: Sectarianism and 
the Politics of Regime Survival”, in Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, ed. Lawrence G. Potter (London: 
Hurst & Co., 2013), 207–228, here: 220f. 
405 Blumi (Chaos, 19) makes a similar point when he argues that “[t]he application of [generic categories of tribe, 
sectarianism] obfuscates local dynamics and (…) denies us access to the micro-politics that shape the manner in 
which people in various parts of Yemen calculate their respective interests, concerns and ambitions via-à-vis 
each other and the larger region.” 
406 Charles Schmitz sets the range of estimates of the prevalence of tribes to as wide as 20–80% (James McCune, 
“Tribes and Tribalism in Yemen. A Joint FCO Research Analysts and Stabilisation Unit Workshop, April 26, 
2012 – Workshop Report”, published online June 18, 2012, accessed June 6, 2014, 
http://www.sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/geographic/middle-east-north-africa/yemen/410-tribes-and-tribalism-in-
yemen -a-joint-fco-research-analysts-and-stabilisation-unit-workshop.html). 
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the sādah (sg. sayyid);407 the [formerly] hereditary “jurist administrators” of the quḍāh 
(sg.qāḍī);408 the qabāʾil (sg. qabili), i.e. members of the tribes; and, lastly, the “weak people” 
or ḍuʿafāʾ (sg. ḍaʿīf).409 The sādah have already been briefly introduced and their status will 
be elaborated further in the case study introduction on the Houthis. Their privileged role in 
society was based on central religious and legal functions for a long time, like the application 
of shariʿah (religious) law. Furthermore, they established and inhabited numerous so-called 
hijrah settlements; these places were sanctuaries in which violence was strictly prohibited and 
they were thus used as safe havens and for mediation in feuds and other conflicts.410 The 
qabāʾil, on the other hand, were supposed to ‘protect’ the other groups. Like education 
constituted and continues to constitute an important feature for the self-conception of the 
sādah, the capacity to resolve conflict (and thus ‘protect’) carries a comparable value for the 
wide social (moreover: sociopolitical) category of qabāʾil.  
 Yemen’s qabāʾil share a common claim of descent based on which they subdivide into 
confederations (the greatest and most influential of which are the Hashid and the Bakil) which 
again consist of numerous qabāʾil and their respective subsegments.411 Since the qabāʾil of 
Yemen are sedentary with their livelihoods based on agriculture and fishing, they are 
associated with bounded territories over which they exert sovereignty.  
 This model, however, is not only abstract; it is likewise idealized to a high degree, as 
anthropological as well as more theoretical literature tells us. First, the perception of shared 
ancestry and thus shared identity is hardly understood literally by the members of the qabāʾil; 
they are well aware of its construction and only apprehend it as a “statement of identification 
following the general Middle Eastern practice in conceptualizing groups as kin”.412 Second, 
qabili belonging is not static or essentialist; rather, affiliations are changeable and their 
                                                          
407 Johann Heiss presents the historical changes the term underwent in: Johann Heiss, “Ein šayh ist ein šayh, aber 
was für ein Ding ist ein sayyid?”, in Veränderung und Stabilität. Normen und Werte in islamischen 
Gesellschaften, ed. Johann Heiss (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005), 
121–136. 
408 I will abstain from dealing with them in detail for they no longer exist in this function.  
409 Marieke Brandt, “Inhabiting Tribal Structures: Leadership Hierarchies in Tribal Upper Yemen (Hamdan & 
Khawlan b. ‘Amir)”, in Southwest Arabia across History. Essays to the Memory of Walter Dostal, ed. Andre 
Gingrich and Siegfried Haas (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2014). Steven 
Caton on the other hand equally refers to four status groups, but mentions “tribes”, “sadah”, “khaddam” or 
“servants thought to be of Arab ethnicity”, and “akhdam” or “servants thought to be of African descent” (Steven 
C. Caton, “Social Groups and Ethnicity”, in Middle East in Focus: Yemen, 165–187, here: 165). I follow Brandt 
in her distinction, which from my view more comprehensively covers the whole population, for the “du’afa” are 
in my understanding comprised of more than just “khaddam” and “akhdam”.  
410 Caton, “Social Groups”, 178. He also states that many were also centers of religious learning.  
411 For a detailed case study of qabila moieties as well as inter-tribal relations see Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order. 
Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 121ff. Note that, 
however, on p. 307 she distinguishes her findings from what Dresch has described (Dresch, Tribes).  
412 Brandt, “Inhabiting”, 4.  
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meaning is context-specific.413 Such changes have frequently been documented by observers 
of the political and social changes of the last decades.414 They oftentimes serve strategic 
(political) interests and have been a relevant factor in the Sa’ada conflict in which both the 
regime and the Houthis have mobilized tribal networks and tried to motivate people to change 
allegiances.415 Third, more fundamentally and in line with my main aim to deconstruct 
essentialist assumptions about collective actors, I want to argue that the whole attempt to 
grasp the meaning and significance of such categories is idle insofar as that there cannot be a 
valid outcome resulting from this. I follow Lisa Wedeen’s interpretivist stance that “there is 
no such thing as a self prior to social interaction: selves are produced and continually 
reproduced in relation to others”.416 Identity is hence a fluid concept evoked in historically 
contingent, performative processes. She explicates these presuppositions for various groups in 
Yemen, and carves out the relationship between discourses, resulting group solidarity, and 
subsequent political actions. Organizations as mobilizing actors contribute to these processes 
as do specific events which can trigger or exacerbate actions and/or the salience of group 
belonging.417 In sum, Wedeen’s elaborations demonstrate the importance of a wider 
contextual knowledge in order to approach the question of social categories. There are 
obvious practical limitations to such a proceeding; however, I will strive to provide the 
necessary width and depth to properly embed my assumed identity groups.  
 With these demurs articulated, it is still very worthwhile to turn to the emic definition of 
social categories in general to outline the discursive horizon of self-ascription and to be able 
to discern the connecting points and narrative strands which strategic actors take up and use to 
their ends.  
 Again: What does it mean to belong to the qabāʾil of Yemen? Beyond ascriptions of tribal 
belonging based on genealogical and territorial position, Caton emphasizes the emic 
definition of what constitutes a qabili on the individual level. According to his local 
                                                          
413 For an example of changing tribal affiliation, see: Paul Dresch, “Imams and Tribes: The Writing and Acting 
of History in Upper Yemen”, in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philipp S. Khoury and 
Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 255; Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 173. 
414 Weir describes how defecting from one’s tribe to another is an institutionalized form of protest for individuals 
as well as collectives in the northern highlands: Weir, Tribal Order, 113. 
415 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 171  
416 Ibid., 182. See also her reference to Hannah Arendt “in understanding identities as what results from public 
speech and action; through public words and deeds, actions ‘make their appearance’ in the world” (16). Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 179. 
417 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 178. 
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informant, it comprises of: piety, the possession of weapons and the ability to use them 
properly, knowledge of tribal law (ʿurf), the aptitude to compose poetry, and dancing skills.418 
Three of these five criteria – weapons, customary law, and poetry – immediately serve as 
instruments of conflict resolution in line with the social duties of the qabāʾil noted above; 
piety and dancing skills do so only mediately, for they provide social and cultural capital and 
thus enhance individual prestige, i.e. one’s position within a dispute. Honor (sharaf) and 
autonomy are the core values on which qabili self-conceptualization rests.419 The fulfillment 
of his social duties falls into this realm and thereby receives its great significance. Thus, in 
order to serve as protector of his family and the presumably ‘weak’ non-tribal populace in the 
territories of his tribe, a qabili can employ force;420 the plentitude of accounts of tribal 
feuds421 bears witness of this as does very openly the huge presence of weapons among the 
qabāʾil422 and rituals423 surrounding them. As to the rationale for ostentative weapon display 
(and use) in recent times, Heinze convincingly argues for an interpretation of the survey data 
she presents to reflect a desire for security provision through state institutions, while at the 
same time as these are felt lacking or corrupted.424 In consequence, qabāʾil prefer to take over 
security issues by themselves on a smaller, thus harder to regulate, scale. Ideally, however, 
                                                          
418 Caton, “Social Group”, 165ff.; Steven C. Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon”. Poetry as Cultural Practice in 
a North Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1990), 26. 
419 For detailed accounts on qabila values (qabyala) and honor see: Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government, and 
History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon 1989); Nawja Adra, Qabyala: The Tribal Concept in the Central 
Highlands of the Yemen Arab Republic (Philadelphia: Temple University, PhD dissertation, 1982).  
420 Robert B. Serjeant has compared their social function to that of an “arms bearing aristocracy”. Robert B. 
Serjeant, “South Arabia”, in Commoners, Climbers and Notables: A Sampler of Studies on Social Ranking in the 
Middle East, ed. Christoffel A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: Brill 1977), 226–247, here: 227. 
421 Exemplary: Caton, Peaks; Dresch, Tribes; Weir, Tribal Order. Such feuds can result in circles of ‘blood 
revenge’ (zahirat ath-tha’r) which sometimes last for decades without anyone remembering the original conflict 
details.  
422 The availability and presence of weapons will be discussed in chapter 4.2.1. Cf. also Marie-Christine Heinze, 
“On ‘Gun Culture’ and ‘Civil Statehood’ in Yemen,” Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red 
Sea 4, no. 1 (2014): 70–95, note 4: Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns 
and the City, (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007), Annexe 5. “The Small Arms Survey bases its numbers for 
Yemen on a study conducted by Miller, which came to the conclusion that ‘Yemen has between 6–9 million 
small arms, most of which are from the former Eastern Bloc countries or China, with fewer numbers of various 
makes and models from other countries, some dating back to the early nineteenth century’ [Derek B. Miller, 
Demand, Stockpiles, and Social Controls: Small Arms in Yemen (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2003), vii]. While 
still a large number in relation to its population of approximately twenty-four million people, Miller’s results 
thus significantly reduce the general estimate of sixty million small arms in the hands of Yemenis, which 
continues to circulate in the country.” For more information see also the Yemen Armed Violence Assessment 
(YAVA), accessed September 15, 2014, http://www.yemen-ava.org/.  
423 Most prominently the bar’a, a ritual performance many times including weapons; according to the most 
recent anthropological study by Ulrike Stohrer, it serves as a rite de passage as conceptualized by Arnold van 
Gennep for the “neutralization and integration of potentially dangerous strangers” when they encounter each 
other, i.e. as a preventive measure to avoid possible tensions. Ulrike Stohrer, Bar’a. Rituelle Performance, 
Identität und Kulturpolitik im Jemen (Berlin: Schwarz 2009; cited also in Heinze, “Gun Culture”, 84f.); Arnold 
van Gennep, Les rites de passage (Paris: Emile Nourry, 1909); Caton, Peaks.  
424 Heinze, “Gun Culture”, 77; 92. 
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protection should be provided through the mitigation of tension and, in case of open conflict, 
through mediation (ṣulḥ) and arbitration (taḥkīm). This is the task of the sheikhs and an 
important source of their authority.  
 Beyond mediation and arbitration, sheikhs are responsible for administrative, jurisdictive, 
and representational issues, in short: for securing the social and economic well-being of their 
respective qabila.425 Furthermore, they lead their constituents in armed conflict in the case 
that all prior attempts for peaceful settlement of disputes have failed. It is important to note 
that they do not possess coercive power over their co-qabāʾil, nor do they automatically 
inherit their office. Rather, their assumption of office partly rests on descent from a family in 
which there have been prior sheikhs as well as on election out of a number of qualified 
candidates. Hereditary and social prestige plays a role here, as does knowledge (especially of 
tribal law), skills, and their position within social and political networks, i.e. the patronage 
system. Their power is temporary; it fluctuates and needs to be asserted through ‘good 
performance’ and strategic/diplomatic comportment. Accordingly, their behavior is far more 
practical and adopted to specific contexts than primordially determined in any way. The civil 
war in Upper Yemen that followed the end of the Imamate era (1962–1970) provides a good 
example. It forced many sheikhly families to take a stance and join either the royalist, that is 
pro-Imam, or republican camp. These choices affected their political, and with that social, 
position for a long time. Due to their capabilities in mobilizing their constituents for one side 
or the other, sheikhs were sought-after subjects for clientelist networks.426 Accordingly, while 
in the 1960s ambitious sheikhs would already receive various resources and could employ 
them to secure or expand their role in their respective community, the 1970s – following the 
victory of the Republicans – were the heyday of sheikhly inclusion into the newly developing 
state patronage system427 (financed to large extent by the first oil boom in the Gulf) as well as 
political offices. The family of prominent Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar of the Hashid tribal 
confederation, for instance, lives on the social, political, and economic capital he had been 
able to build during this period beyond his death in 2007.428   
 The described processes which rearranged the social order of Upper Yemen during this 
                                                          
425 The subsequent paragraphs build on the detailed and very illustrative elaborations on the social position and 
role of tribal sheikhs by Brandt (“Inhabiting”). For a more historical account see also: Serjeant, “South Arabia”.  
426 Brandt, “Inhabiting”, 29; cf. her reference to Dresch and Burrowes (Paul Dresch, “The Position of Shaykhs 
Among the Northern Tribes of Yemen”, Man 19, no. 1 (1984): 31–49; Robert Burrowes, The Yemen Arab 
Republic. The Politics of Development, 1962–1986 (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987). 
427 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 175. One facet of many was their role in the implementation of development 
projects in the 1970s, a task which the government was incapable of fulfilling itself and handed over to local 
‘brokers’. Weir, Tribal Order, 289ff.  
428 Cf. Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 174–175; Brandt, “Inhabiting”, 18. 
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period were far from conflict-free; struggles for power between various involved parties, 
among them the respective regimes, were the order of the day.429 In parallel to the ascension 
of some sheikhs, however, the losers can easily be identified: What we observe clearly 
reflects a replacement of the formerly dominant sādah elite. But also the sheikhs had to pay a 
price for the wealth they accumulated. While in the beginning the ability to gear resources 
towards their communities also strengthened their position in these communities, the more 
they got pulled into the regime’s neopatrimonial grip (especially since Saleh’s ascent to 
power in 1978), the less attention they paid to their traditional duties and the looser their bond 
with their people became. Regime co-optation often involved political offices or business 
opportunities which required them or at least induced them to spend extended periods in the 
capital Sana’a. Not being present, then, they could not appropriately attend to local concerns 
and were thus soon critically perceived as distant, as “absentee sheikhs”,430 an oxymoron that 
should have consequences (to be explicated below) when considering that their main task 
supposedly consisted in mediating social affairs.431  
 Based on his studies of poetry among the qabila of Upper Yemen,432 Caton convincingly 
positions mediation in its sociopolitical context: “Mediation implies ‘controlling’ society’s 
members through persuasion; hence persuasion, and not the exercise of force, becomes the 
basis of power.”433 This notion of power is closely linked to the core of qabili self-
conceptualization around honor and autonomy434 as noted earlier: Through the creation of 
(highly complex, as Caton demonstrates) poetry, honor is displayed as well as the ability to 
think independently and position oneself politically; besides, it reflects the autonomy of the 
poet. On the one hand, it also conserves the autonomy and honor of the audience who need to 
be persuaded and cannot be forced. It thus opens up a space for negotiation and a symbolic 
exchange of blows (of a rhetorical kind, which, however, can actually lead up to the symbolic 
                                                          
429 For a detailed micro-study of such disputes see Weir, Tribal Order, 284ff.; Charles F. Swagman, “Tribe and 
Politics: An Example from Highland Yemen”, Journal of Anthropological Research 44, no. 3 (1988): 251–261; 
also: Brandt, “Inhabiting”.  
430 Gerd-Rüdiger Puin, “The Yemeni hijrah Concept of Tribal Protection”, in Land Tenure and Social 
Transformation in the Middle East, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1984), 483–
494, here: 489 (cited in: Brandt, ‘Inhabiting’, 31). 
431 Dresch, History, 160; Sarah Phillips, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis (New York: Routledge, 
2011): 53f.; Brandt, “Inhabiting”, 29ff. 
432 Caton, Peaks. 
433 Steven C. Caton, “Power, Persuasion, and Language: A Critique of the Segmentary Model in the Middle 
East”, in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19 (1987): 77–102, here: 80. For more on the role of 
oratory in the political field from an anthropological perspective see: Maurice Bloch (ed.), Political Language 
and Oratory in Traditional Society (London/New York: Academic Press, 1975).  
434 Caton, Peaks, 22; 109ff.; 164. Steven C. Caton, “The Poetic Construction of Self”, in Anthropological 
Quarterly 58, no.4 (1985): 141–151.  
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use of violence as well).435 Poetry as a means of communication is employed in various social 
contexts; in mediation and arbitration it has a vital role. It is embedded in a complex system 
of rules, at the core of which lies the obligation to accept mediation and arbitration as superior 
to forceful action in dispute.436  
 Besides the sheikhly role, the topic of mediation elucidates another weighty point: Not 
only sheikhs, but all qabila should be able to master the art of oral persuasion which lies at 
the basis of composing poetry; correspondingly, such symbolic communication will always be 
understood and thus needs to be considered when looking at and analyzing political 
communication processes in Yemen.437 It pervades all levels of (political) communication up 
to the state level;438 extensive distribution and correspondingly a great impact of single pieces 
due to technological advances in recording since the 1970s make it a prime medium for 
influencing public opinion.439 What Caton holds to be the key for understanding “the exercise 
of power (…) through persuasion” should therefore also specifically be taken into account in 
order to understand frame development, resonance, and competition, since they equally 
involve negotiation for interpretational sovereignty.440  
 All these deeply rooted, intricate practices which could only be hinted at give proof of the 
high value attributed to nonviolent conflict resolution in Yemeni (qabili) society.441 It thus 
poses a contrast to connotations the light-blooded, inherently martial tribesmen so often 
depicted. Certainly, the ideal of smooth mediation in real life remains insurmountable. The 
numbers of homicides related to social violence are increasing, for Heinze,442 this is a 
signifier that the mechanisms for prevention are failing. She attributes this failure to three 
factors: failure or evasion of qabili conflict resolution, due to its negligence of individual 
                                                          
435 Steven C. Caton, Yemen Chronicle. An Anthropology of War and Mediation (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2005). 
436 Persuasion in the form of poetry is a “constitutive social practice” which creates social and political reality. A 
sheikh’s withdrawal from this field therefore equals a withdrawal from communal life altogether, at least in his 
social role. Even sporadic absence can be harmful since matters are seldom simple and clearly demarcated in 
duration. On the contrary: How tedious, overflowing, and at times incomprehensible to the outside observer 
these maneuvers can turn out to be is captured by Caton’s meticulous description in his 2005 monograph, in 
which he contextualizes a two-decade-long dispute between a village and a sanctuary. Steven C. Caton, Yemen 
Chronicle. 
437 Ibid., 56ff. 
438 In a study of the use of poetry to influence the imam, Lucine Taminian for example distinguishes between an 
“advice genre” shaped by traditional religious jurisprudential (fiqh) language and discourse and an “eulogy 
genre” with more emotional metaphors/tropes. Therein we can see how the discursive anchoring differs 
depending on the function. Lucine Taminian, ‘Persuading the Monarchs: Poetry and Politics in Yemen, (1920–
1950), in Le Yémen Contemporain, ed. Rémy Leveau, Franck Mermier, and Udo Steinbach (Paris: Édition 
Karthala, 1999), 203–219.  
439 Cf. Flagg Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media. Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
440 Caton, “Power”, 82. 
441 Cf. ibid., 89; Caton, Peaks, 108. 
442 Heinze, “Gun Culture”, 87f. 
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justice in favor of keeping up social harmony and honor; the weakness of these mechanisms 
in dealing with conflict once it has erupted and between socially unequal parties; and, lastly, 
the described erosion of sheikhly legitimacy due to their inclusion into regime patronage in 
combination with a general weakening of customary law under conditions of social change.443 
“(A)lternative normative systems (religious beliefs, codified law)”, she concludes, “have so 
far been unable to fill the void, particularly as these are not framed in the language of honor, 
moral equality and collective responsibility that informs practices of social violence.”444 All 
of this, however, provides a differentiated picture of the relation between qabili society and 
violence. I also noted that sheikhs (as one group among many) are included in the intricate 
patronage network the regime – specifically Ali Abdullah Saleh – has knit over the last 
decades. Acknowledging that, it still needs to be viewed as more than just static; rather, it has 
and has always had to be flexible enough to adapt to shifting situations – I will elaborate 
further on that at a later point. Individuals have always had options and acted strategically 
according to context, their objectives, and their means at hand, while the perception of all of 
these plays a greater role than any kind of ‘given facts’. Alliances are temporary and shifting; 
they are stimulated by (monetary) incentives as well as persuasion.445Qabila are not 
homogenous within their groups; nor are they primordial. And while qabili affiliation still 
plays an important role in self-identification towards others, it is always situational and can be 
superseded by other categories such as region, profession, or else.446 In sum: A deficit-based 
view on qabili belonging is inadequate; on the contrary, among the different qabāʾil there 
exist highly sophisticated systems of interaction which are all but static.447  
 Similar arguments against primordial conceptualizations as have been presented can be 
made for other groups in Yemen, especially the various Islamist actors. Two out of these I 
want to highlight for their undeniable relevance to Zaydi as well as to Southern grievances: 
the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis.  
 
                                                          
443 How there is a demand for conflict mediation but a lack of arbitrators is highlighted in: Small Arms Survey, 
‘Under Pressure. Social Violence Over Land and Water in Yemen’, no. 2 (October 2010): n. 79; n. 80.  
444 Ibid., 88. 
445 One could argue that incentives also persuade. By persuasion I understand only rhetorical persuasion as I 
have described above.  
446 Heinze, “Gun Culture”, 78ff. 
447 What I have presented here on qabyala is in most cases based on research in the North of Yemen. The 
position and role of qaba’il in the South is different most prominently due to historical reasons: the socialist 
regime during the PDRY strove to eliminate their social specificity. However, the South also remains connected 
to qabila values and norms. Brandt, “Inhabiting”, 3 (note 2); for a more contested view on the role of former 
tribal leaders in the Southern state see the comments by Elham Manea in: McCune, Tribes and Tribalism, 8. 
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4.2.2. Islamist actors 
Laurent Bonnefoy identifies five ideal-types of Islamists in Yemen, which he distinguishes 
along the criteria of their “participation in party politics, loyalty to the ruler, significant 
episodes of confrontation with the state, and overt stigmatization of other religious and 
political identities”448. The variations shown by the groups provide evidence further 
necessitating a closer examination of groups’ positions and roles in the complex setup of 
Yemenis society and politics. 
 Main leaders 
or 
organizations 
Direct and 
overt 
participation 
in party 
politics 
Automatic 
loyalty to the 
republican 
ruler 
Significant 
episodes of 
violent 
confrontation 
with the state 
Participation 
in 
interreligious 
violence and 
stigmatization 
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
Al-Islah Party Yes no no yes 
Violent 
‘Jihadi’ 
Fringes 
Al-Qaeda 
affiliates 
No no yes yes 
Salafis449 Muqbil al-
Wadi’i  
(died 2001) 
No yes no yes 
Sufis Dar al-
Mustafa 
No yes no no 
Zaydi 
Revivalists 
Hizb al-Haqq; 
Hussein al-
Houthi  
(died 2004) 
Yes no yes yes 
 
Table 4.1.: Main Islamist actors and their interactions with the state and other religious groups450 
 
The Muslim Brothers 
Historically, the first Islamist group that established itself in Yemen was the Muslim 
Brotherhood.451 The anti-Imamate opposition since the 1940s, closely connected with the 
name of the political reformer Qa’id Muhammad Mahmoud al-Zubayri (d. 1965), was 
                                                          
448 Laurent Bonnefoy, “Varieties of Islamism in Yemen: The Logic of Integration Under Pressure”, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs 13, no. 1 (2009): 2.  
449 Bonnefoy uses the term “Salafists” here, while at other times referring to “Salafis”, specifically in his book on 
the topic. I consider ‘Salafis’ to be slightly less negatively connotated and thus preferable.  
450 Taken from: Bonnefoy, “Varieties”, 2; spelling slightly abridged, highlighted TG. 
451 For the following paragraph see ibid., 3f. 
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inspired by the writings of Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt. After the 1962 revolution, al-Zubayri quickly became disillusioned 
with the new regime due to its manifold disagreements and perceived lack of legitimacy. He 
initiated a campaign of reconciliation and integration of the different segments of society, 
which would become his legacy (he was assassinated in 1965) and one of the founding 
principles of the republic. During this configurational phase in the setting up of the state, the 
Muslim Brothers acquired positions in many institutions, namely in the educational sector and 
throughout security forces, and since then presented an influential parameter in politics. 
Special significance, also in regard to Zaydi grievances,452 must be attributed to the parallel 
school system they had helped to create since the 1970s, the so-called ‘Scientific Institutes’ 
(maʿāhid ʿilmyīah). Designed to counter feared expansion of socialist thought in the border 
regions with the Southern Yemeni state, financed for that purpose to a large extent by Saudi 
Arabia, these religious colleges were only integrated into the public school system in 2002 – 
and only against broad opposition.453 By then they had impacted on consecutive cohorts of 
pupils.454 With the opening up of the political field and increasing opportunities for formal 
political participation in 1990, the Muslim Brothers (or those Islamists generally believed to 
be close to them and thus conflated under the umbrella term) convened a variety of actors 
from not only Islamist, but also tribal and professional backgrounds, and formed Al-Islah 
Party (Reform Party).455 Led by prominent Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, head of the Hashid 
tribal confederation and speaker of parliament, until his death in 2007, the party regularly 
participated in the democratic process and can be said to have been an integral part of the 
regime and governing bodies all over the country with a fair share of votes in elections. In the 
1994 civil war, Islah456 supported the government militarily with militias – in great part 
formed of so-called ‘Arab Afghans’ returning from fighting in Afghanistan – as well as 
                                                          
452 Cf. among others: vom Bruck, Islam.  
453 Bonnefoy, “Varieties”, 8. The debate reaches back to 1982 and is mirrored in repeated aggressive oral and 
written statements by Islah representatives: Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and 
Religious Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 155–157. 
454 Bonnefoy cites sources that estimate the number of pupils between 326,000 in 1994–1995 (attending 1,381 
scientific institutes) and around 600,000 in 2001 (Salafism, 156). 
455 The full name is ‘Al-Tajammu al-yamani lil-islah‘ (‘Yemeni Congregation for Reform‘). Jillian Schwedler 
provides deeper insights into Islah’s evolution: “The Yemeni Islah Party: Political Opportunities and Coalition 
Building in a Transitional Polity”, in Islamist Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 205–229; Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: 
Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). On an attempt to 
distinguish three dominant groups of influence among Islah (1. Islamist, 2. Tribal, 3. “Patrimonialistic” Wing), 
see: Ludwig Stiftl, “The Yemeni Islamists in the Process of Democratization”, in Le Yémen Contemporain, ed. 
Rèmy Leveau, Franck Mermier, and Udo Steinbach (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1999), 248–266. 
456 For more on Islah in the context of the 1994 war see: Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, “Stereotypes and 
Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (1995): 
405–431.  
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ideologically with anti-socialist (i.e. anti-secessionist) fatāwa by its (in)famous radical 
ideologist Abd al-Majid al-Zindani (born 1942). Both of these facts show another, less 
‘democratic’ or clear-cut, political face of Islah’s activities: Until today, Southerners 
incriminate these militias of looting and extensive violence against civilians and hold a bitter 
grudge against al-Zindani for his incentive fatāwa, which aimed at setting people against each 
other in the name of religion.457 Al-Zindani, who has spent a considerable period in Saudi 
Arabia, has allegedly been some kind of “spiritual mentor” to Osama bin Laden.458 During the 
1980s he arranged for Yemeni fighters to join the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and 
subsequently never managed to alleviate allegations of openly training jihadists, even less so, 
for in 1993 he founded, and from then onward headed, the religious Al-Iman University in 
Sana’a, on whose structure and curriculum it was and still is highly difficult to get reliable 
information.459 Al-Zindani’s relationship with Saleh was sufficiently good for him to be 
appointed to his five-man presidential council from 1993–1997 and to secure himself and his 
university Saleh’s protection against US and other accusations of unacceptable militancy.460 
Overall, at this point there is little to add to Bonnefoy, who closes his presentation of al-
Zindani by emphasizing his “ambiguous role, acting both as a mainstream popular figure (his 
criticism of American foreign policy is commonly accepted by Yemenis) and a marginal one, 
as he represents a bridge to a type of violent militancy that does not appeal to many”.461  
 
The Salafis 
Salafism462 is a strand of Sunni reformism which goes back to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya 
in the 14th century CE and whose central aim, to reestablish religious practice in the form 
observed by the first Muslims, was taken up and further developed by thinkers from the 18th 
century CE onwards.463 The term ‘Salafism’ or ‘Salafi’ is often time conflated to include all, 
partly very different, strands of the movement. The well-known strive to return to an Islam as 
                                                          
457 Along the same lines, Al-Zindani’s fatwas are claimed to be linked with the murder of Southern YSP 
politician Jarallah Omar in 2002 and other murders. Gregory Johnsen, “Profile of Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-
Zindani”, Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 7 (2006).  
458 He later on (before 9/11) distanced himself from Bin Laden and denied to have received any funding for his 
religious Al-Iman University. Johnsen, “Profile”. In February 2004, al-Zindani was listed “specially designated 
global terrorist” by the USA and as “individual belonging to or asociated with al_Qaeda” by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1267. Gregory Johnsen, “Yemen’s Al-Iman University: A Pipeline for Fundamentalists?” 
Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 22 (2006). 
459 The number of students enrolled in 2006 ranged around 4,600. Johnsen, “Al-Iman University”.  
460 Ibid. 
461 Bonnefoy, “Varieties”, 4.  
462 For this paragraph see Bonnefoy, Salafism, 39ff. 
463 Bonnefoy, Salafism, 42–43; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983).  
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practiced by the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih), a certain literalism in reading the Qurʾan 
and the Prophetic traditions (Ḥadīth and tawhid), and – in reverse – a rejection of all 
innovation (bid’a) or local particularity. This includes what separated them from mainstream 
Sunnis, namely the refutation of the four legal schools (madhhab) of Sunni Islam464, the 
Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali, and Shafi’i school, the latter being predominant in Yemen. The main 
accusation Salafis hold against them is their distance to the pure original Islam by the 
jurisprudential practices of imitation (taqlid) and analogical reasoning (qiyas) as well as 
decision-making based on the consensus of the ʿulamāʾ (ijma). In their stead, they put 
emphasis on establishing the authenticity of tradition (in the sense of passing down) over the 
generations of the first Muslims and strict observance of these models. As with tribalism, 
there is a tendency to view Salafism in Yemen as essentialist as well; furthermore, is it often 
claimed to be ‘imported’ from or even strategically exported by Saudi Arabia and equaled 
with the Saudi Wahhabi tradition. The latter can be attributed to the prospering and rapid 
spread of Salafism at a time when the Wahhabi kingdom was considered to strongly influence 
Northern Yemen after the revolution and the establishment of socialist South Yemen. 
Zaydism was being marginalized and (strict) Sunni education held high in the scientific 
institutes, plus there were large numbers of Yemeni migrants working in Saudi Arabia who 
returned and brought with them religious practices that resembled much more the literal 
interpretations of Saudi Wahhabism than the local traditions of the Shafi’i school; 
furthermore, there were financial flows from Saudi Arabia (by Saudis or successful Yemenis) 
in favor of Sunni/Salafi institutions such as mosques etc. All this seemed to fit into the picture 
of deliberate proselytizing efforts by the problematic northern neighbor – a supposed 
interference, which is even today very much alive in various discourses and keeps being fed 
(out of conviction) by those critical of Saudi involvement. Bonnefoy, however, presents a 
detailed account on the specificities of Yemeni Salafism and the ambiguity of its relations 
with Saudi Arabia. His main arguments build on the concept of translocality, i.e. the 
assumption “that concepts and ideas adapt to their new context and face resistance when they 
travel”.465 Rather than being important and part of a(n attempted) “Saudisation”466 of Yemeni 
society, he elaborates on the role of transnational interactions on all levels, especially the 
migratory experience, the de facto impact of Saudi support and simply the availability of 
higher quality religious material (audiocassettes, books, television) and scholarships for study, 
                                                          
464 These thinkers include for instance Muhammad Bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), Muhammad al-Shawkani 
(1759–1834), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abdu (1849–1905) or Hassan al-Banna (1906–
1949). 
465 Bonnefoy, Salafism, 17. 
466 Ibid., 5. 
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but also the inconsistencies, compromises, and adaptations of everyday practice and everyday 
politics,467 the influence of syncretism, nationalism, and tribalism on the figuration of a 
specifically endogenous Yemeni Salafism (he calls it the “Yemenisation” of Salafism).468 The 
situatedness of actors and the historical context are simultaneously underlined by the 
relevance of the individual experiences of leaders. Muqbil Bin Hadi al-Wadi’i can be said to 
have been the most influential person in shaping and promoting Salafism in Yemen. Born into 
a humble existence as a Zaydi qabili in the late 1920s or early 1930s, al-Wadi’i early in his 
life developed a feeling of discrimination by social and religious hierarchies: His origins and 
the attitude of those socially superior to him allegedly barred him from access to higher 
religious education. Instead, he pursued theological studies in Saudi Arabia throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, where he slowly turned his back on his native denomination469 in favor of 
Sunni Islam. After his expulsion from the kingdom in 1979 (on the grounds of anti-monarchy 
contacts) he returned to Yemen and soon founded the Dar al-Ḥadīth study center in the small 
town of Dammaj in the Sa’ada Governorate – where he had prior felt so disgraced by the 
Zaydi elites and still faced a hostile environment.470 The institute quickly prospered, partly 
due to support by rich businessmen and remaining contacts from his time in Saudi Arabia. It 
attracted students first from the region, then from Muslim countries all over the world. 
Around the Dar al-Ḥadīth developed a whole network of bookstores, stalls selling his 
recordings and other material, and al-Wadi’i made it his mission to speak and teach in even 
the remotest places. In the 1990s al-Wadi’i’s former students began to establish their own 
institutions or mosques in other regions of Yemen and the mother institute alone housed more 
than 1,000 resident students.471 One of the most distinct features was political quietism, 
formulated in strict repudiation of the core Zaydi principle of khurūj. 
We do not accept revolt (khurūj) against leaders of Muslims, even if they are not perfect. 
We do not believe that coups d’état can be the source of reforms, rather they bring 
corruption into society. In return we accept the combat against the leaders of Aden, as 
long as they continue in atheism and socialism, and call people to worship Lenin, Marx, 
and other impious leaders.472 
                                                          
467 An excellent example for such everyday politics is given by Diane Singerman for a Cairene community. 
Comparable processes can be assumed for Yemen as well. Singerman, Avenues. 
468 Bonnefoy, Salafism, 237. 
469 The term ‘denomination’ is used in preference over ‘sect’ for its more neutral connotation. Besides, I consider 
Zaydism to be distinct and large enough a religious subgroup to deserve the naming as denomination.  
470 Bonnefoy, Salafism, 57. 
471 Ibid., 59. 
472 Muqbil al-Wadi’i, ed., Tarjamat Abi Abd al-Rahman Muqbil Bin Hadi al-Wadi’i [Biography of Abi Abd al-
Rahman Muqbil Bin Hadi al-Wadi’i] (Sana’a: Maktabat al-Athariyya, 1999), 136 (cited in: Bonnefoy, Salafism, 
90). 
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In the eyes of Salafism, all other denominations were dividing Muslims and creating fitna, 
chaos, which is why they reject them.  
 What plays into this rejection of other Muslim groups cannot solely be explained on 
theological grounds; it should also be understood as a conscious move of distinction on the 
competitive field for religious allegiance. The last group Muqbilian Salafism opposed (next 
to, of course, US and Western influence) were the ‘erring Southern infidel communists’ – on 
the grounds of lacking true faith and in addition for allegedly receiving support by treacherous 
Saudi Arabia. The claim to refrain from politics must therefore be critically evaluated: 
Salafists did play a very political role in their offensive position against so many other groups 
(they participated in operations against Zaydis and against Sufi shrines and took a very vocal 
stance against the Houthis from 2004 onwards)473 and acted as a convenient tool for regime 
politics, for their abstention from official politics and critique of the ruler indirectly, but 
notably, supported the ruling regime. Thus, they could count on “benevolent tolerance”474 in 
return. Al-Wadi’i died in 2001. Salafism remains very strong to date, and the Dar al-Ḥadīth 
still prospers and defends its existence in the antagonistic Zaydi/Houthi environment of 
Dammaj. Since mid-2013, open fighting between Houthi supporters and Salafis in the area 
has made the news and can be interpreted in the context of the renewed mobilization of the 
Houthis and their political claims from 2014 onwards. 
I do not wish to delve deeper into the other branches of Islamism in Yemen. The ‘violent 
jihadi fringes’,475 namely represented by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has 
gained extensive scholarly476 and media coverage in recent years due to increased activity and 
attacks, the short-lived 2011 territorial conquest in Abyan Governorate, and the subsequent 
expansion of US-drone attacks in the South. Although it represents a factor of high relevance 
to national and international politics, AQAP does not play a significant role in the argument 
of the dissertation and will thus only be marginally mentioned. Similarly, although Sufism 
constitutes an influential societal actor of political importance in the eastern parts of the South 
(preeminently Hadhramawt) and as such plays a role in regime politics as well, it will not be 
discussed, either.477 Zaydi revivalism on the other hand will be dealt with in detail in the 
                                                          
473 Ibid., 273 ff.  
474 Bonnefoy, “Varieties”, 5. 
475 Ibid., 4. 
476 As a commendable example see: Gregory Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and the Battle for 
Arabia (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2013); furthermore interesting is the brief comparison between Houthi 
and AQAP narratives in: Lucas Winter, “The Ansar of Yemen: The Huthis and al-Qaeda”, Small Wars Journal, 
May 1, 2013.  
477 For some core insights on Sufism in Yemen see: Alexander Knysh, “The Tariqa on a Landcruiser: The 
Resurgence of Sufism in Yemen”, Middle East Journal 55, no. 3 (2001): 399–414. 
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section on the background and history of the Houthi rebellion.  
 At this point, the specific differences between the various Islamist groups, however, 
remain significant. They partly constitute, as well as reflect, the genuine and deep-rooted 
(theological) differences and related conflict lines between them, they are partly the result of 
more conscious, strategic distinction and delineation (as laid out for the Salafi-Zaydi divide in 
regard to khurūj which was actively promoted by al-Wadi’i). The antipodal stances Salafis 
and Zaydi revivalists take on issues of political participation and loyalty to the religious 
leader, along with the general tendency towards interreligious violence and stigmatization 
among all groups (except for the Sufis), speak in this regard. It is crucial to understand these 
critical points in order to properly evaluate the disputes and fighting. I seek to explain and the 
frames that relate to the specific ‘other’ in each case, above all the Zaydi-Salafi fighting and 
the conflict between Islah and the Peaceful Southern Movement (and prior to its 
establishment Southern socialists more generally).  
 
4.3. A United Yemen? 
When in 1990 the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
were unified, the step was met with euphoria478 by some and deep skepticism by others.479 
Scholars, too, were divided in their outlook on a unified state: while some highlighted the 
commonality between the two peoples and cultures, which had never before lived together 
under united rule, others pointed out the many obstacles the process was to face, the divides 
between different groups of actors, and the unpreparedness with which everything took 
place.480 A closer look at the concepts of unity and nation in the Yemeni context provides not 
only illuminating insights into the historical process of the genesis of nationalism and the 
unification, but, more importantly, it paves the way for understanding the recent struggle of 
the Southern secessionist movement as well as being able to provide an ample example of 
framing, frame contestation, and lastly the failing of a frame in a different, albeit related, 
context to the research question.  
  
                                                          
478 Cf. Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 
183; Brian Whitaker, The Birth of Modern Yemen, accessed March 23, 2015, http://al-bab.com/birth-modern-
yemen-introduction, 5ff. 
479 Whitaker, Birth, 26ff. 
480 For a good example see the varied discussions of different aspects of unity, its genesis, and problems in: 
Michel Tuchscherer, “Le Yémen, passé et present de l’unité”, La Revue du Monde Musulman et de la 
Méditerranée 67 (1994). 
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It is thereby important to note the different reference systems that the terms ‘nation’ and 
‘unity’ belong to: ‘nation’ refers to identity, to ‘Yemeni-ness’ (however that term is filled), 
whereas ‘unity’ in this context denotes the political concept of a unified (nation)state. A 
nation is not a phenomenon sui generis. Rather, a nation is a persuasive strand or, in the 
famous term coined by Benedict Anderson, an ‘imagined community’ based on the 
assumption of shared traits and a sense of belonging together. It “is imagined as a community, 
because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may peril in each, the nation 
is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that 
makes it possible (…) not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”481 
Differently put: a ‘nation’ is a frame.482 So, how did it come to be in the Yemeni context? 
And how did it achieve precedence over other forms of solidarity? Or, did it even take 
precedence over other forms of solidarity? And what is its relation to the ‘unity frame’? 
The name ‘Yamanah’ dates back to even pre-Islamic times and roughly indicates a part of 
contemporary Yemen;483 the Qurʾan speaks of ‘Yaman’ as the entire territory south of the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina.484 Despite this common reference (with multiple 
connotations, though!) and despite the belief in shared genealogical roots in the mythical 
figure of Qahtan, there was no conceptualization equaling a ‘nation’ until well into the 20th 
century. While Imam Yahya repeatedly lay claims to ‘Greater Yemen’ (al-yaman al-kubra), it 
cannot be reconstructed in detail what exactly he meant by this. He, as before the Ottomans, 
decidedly claimed to rule over Muslims, i.e. over a religiously defined collective. When 
referring to his subjects, the imam used the term ‘ahl’, which connotates kin, and not the more 
political and nationalist term ‘sha’b’ (‘people’).485 The latter would be more affiliated with 
the British-ruled South. As I have elaborated earlier, the British structured and ordered the 
South according to their administrative needs and thereby imprinted their own categorization 
on the territories they ruled. New forms of community were created (e.g. the ‘Nine Tribes’) 
                                                          
481 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London/New York: Verso, 2nd edition, 1991), 7. 
482 In a similar direction stirs Homi Bhabha with his semiotic or discursive approach: “The nation’s ‘coming into 
being’ as a system of cultural signification, as the representation of social life rather than the discipline of social 
polity, emphasizes th[e] instability of knowledge (…) The emergence of the political ‘rationality’ of the nation as 
a form of narrative – textual strategies, metaphoric elements, sub-texts and figurative strategems – has its own 
history.” Such a narrative perspective on nationalism fits very well into the Yemeni context with its powerful 
oral traditions (as has been argued in the section on poetry). Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 1990), 1f; for more on Arab Nationalism in general and a narrative perspective on it 
more specifically see: Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, ed., Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle 
East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
483 Whitaker, Birth, 5. 
484 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 25; Dresch, History. 
485 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 35f. 
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where formerly there had been quite different “practices of belonging”.486 The division lines 
were created relating to administrative practices separating towns (namely Aden) from the 
countryside;487 furthermore, the (at least urban) population got acquainted with distant 
bureaucratic administration, in opposition to the personalized imamic rule. Thus, the colonial 
setup had a weighty impact not only upon the later border delineation of the two Yemeni 
states, but also upon the respective outlook of citizens on and their relationship to the state.
  
Since the late 1920s or early 1930s, nationalist ideas began to spread. They originated in 
general Arab nationalism and were imported by intellectuals travelling to Cairo and other 
regional centers. Beyond travel and economic ties, media played a vital role for the 
dissemination of nationalist thought too. Nationalist newspapers were founded from the 1940s 
onward and other print material circulated. However, among the overwhelmingly illiterate 
population, it took different means to succeed. Radio and poetry, especially the latter, would 
provide the optimal instruments to reach them and to create a large audience.488Sawt al-Arab 
(Voice of the Arabs) radio in Cairo commenced its Pan-Arab broadcasting in 1953 and with 
the widening availability of transistor radios quickly expanded its coverage area. Yemeni 
nationalists appeared on stage and connected the idea of Pan-Arabism with nationalism, 
however, a downside was inherent as well: the need to bridge the likely competition between 
the grand idea of the Arab nation – a strong frame as well, due in part to the charismatic 
figure of Gamal Abdel Nasser – with the more parochial Yemeni nationalist frame.489  
 Poetry was even better suited, for it was genuinely anchored in Yemeni culture, widely 
used on many occasions, circulated orally, in written form, through the radio, and later on as 
                                                          
486 Ibid., 29. 
487 It is worth noting that the inhabitants of Aden – based on the experience of colonial importance and centrality 
– developed a sense of distinct Adeni identity, reflected in campaigns with the call “Aden for the Adenis” in the 
1960s as well as today by a small faction of the Hirak. Something very similar can be said about the people 
living in Hadhramawt, who were never really integrated into the British protectorate for reasons of distance. 
Hadhramis constantly felt close to the communities of early migrants and traders in places along the Indian 
Ocean and Southeast Asia – closer, some argue, than to their fellow Yemeni or even Southern Yemeni 
countrymen. This emphasis of Hadhrami identity is still an issue among Southerners and a challenge for the 
unity of the Southern Movement. Susanne Dahlgren, Contesting Realities: The Public Sphere and Morality in 
Southern Yemen (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 268f; Kevin Alexander Davis, “From Collective 
Memory to Nationalism: Historical Remembrance in Aden” (M.A. thesis, Georgetown University Washington 
D.C. April 2014); Linda Boxberger, On the Edge of Empire: Hadhramawt, Emigration, and the Indian Ocean, 
1880s–1930s (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Ulrike Freitag, Indian Ocean Migrants and 
State Formation in Hadhramaut: Reforming the Homeland (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Engseng Ho, The Graves of 
Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility Across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).  
488 For detailed elaborations and descriptive examples see Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 42ff. 
489 See Fred Halliday on this problem within the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the South: “The Formation 
of Yemeni Nationalism: Initial Reflections”, in Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, ed. Israel 
Gershoniand James Jankowski (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 26–41. He also underlines the 
contingency inherent in the development of Yemeni nationalism.  
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audiocassettes (in the latter form surmounting even the border between the YAR and PDRY), 
and predestined to connect references to the local with the nation. As Wedeen brings it to the 
point, “poetry worked as a performative, summoning into being nationalists by evincing the 
commonalities that could create them”.490  
 Interestingly, the revolutions of the 1960s and the precedent anti-colonial struggle in the 
South did not come up with a powerful unity frame that could have been well-aligned and 
built on the by then established nationalist frame. Nevertheless, few examples exist, such as 
this poem that was spread in the aftermath of the 1962 revolution:  
The homeland will never surrender or submit. 
Spirit in revolt, she fills her breast with pure air. 
See how she lifts her head and moves forward, 
Trampling with disdain these foolish idols…. 
 
What is North? And what the South? 
Two hearts whose joy and pain are joined 
Were united by hate and suffering, 
By history and by God. 
Shamsan [mountain near Aden] will soon meet its brother Nuqum [mountain near 
Sana’a].491 
The optimism voiced by the poet was soon to be shattered by the overwhelming historical 
developments: the civil war between royalist (i.e. imamist) and republican forces and their 
respective allies in the North would last until 1970, meanwhile the anti-colonial struggle in 
the South led to the formation of a socialist state. Hence, despite the existence of a unity 
frame, the political realities (often related to internal power struggles) and continuing 
instabilities of the two Yemeni states hindered unification for almost three decades.492 At the 
same time the vision of unity lived on, officially and unofficially. As Brehony notes, it is 
difficult to find any speech of either a Southern or Northern leader that does not refer to the 
aspiration for unification.493 That it was employed in wake of legitimizing strategies allows 
guesses about the resonance it was (at least assumed) to have among the populations. In fact, 
allusions to unity pervaded YAR and PDRY documents, institutions, and practices alike: both 
constitutions, anthems, more than one draft for a unification agreement (specifically after 
                                                          
490 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 48. A look at the ‘micro-mechanisms on the ground’ also avoids the trap of too 
strong a focus “on grand narratives constructed by and about elites”, as formulated by Philip S. Khoury, “The 
Paradoxical in Arab Nationalism. Interwar Syria Revisited,” in Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, 
ed. James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 273. 
491 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 45.  
492 Ibid., 50ff. 
493 Noel Brehony, “The Role of the PDRY in Forming a South Yemeni Identity”, in Why Yemen Matters. A 
Society in Transition, ed. Helen Lackner (London: Saqi Books, 2014), 123–141, here: 130. 
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short border wars in 1972494 and 1979) speak of, long for, and plan for a united Yemen;495 the 
existence of “Unity Ministers” as de facto envoys in the capitals (there were no official 
embassies, though)496 equally highlights the salience of the issue, even if they were 
considered to be merely symbolical.497  
 Notwithstanding all this, little progress was made towards unification, and there are good 
reasons to believe that the interest to take serious steps was limited at best among the elites in 
both systems, for the fear to lose power was constantly present. The historical opportunity 
came in the wake of serious intra-elite fighting in the PDRY in 1986, which left between 
5,000-10,000 regime members dead.498 The destabilizing effect this had on the system and the 
citizen’s trust in it, in addition to economic problems and dwindling support by the Soviet 
partner, led to the search for other options of economic and political stability. The YAR 
equally needed some political successes, which is why the idea to approach the issue anew 
appeared attractive to Saleh.499 1989 saw a number of meetings between Ali Salim Al-Beidh, 
then Secretary General of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party, and Saleh. The propositions 
changed several times, from closer cooperation to a transitional period until further steps 
would be taken and a referendum prepared, to federalism – and back.500  
Retrospectively, what happened exactly and why the rationales of both leaders changed back 
and forth can merely be speculated upon. The de facto developments were highly contingent 
and took on their own dynamic. While Saleh was hoping for small steps to his favor, Al Beidh 
in early December (without consulting his party) suddenly pressed ahead for unification after 
a phase in which he had seemed quite reserved and even seemed to be pulling back. Quite 
suddenly, they agreed on unification following a preparatory period of one year with a 
subsequent referendum. This schedule was even shortened by half and the referendum 
dropped when opposition started to organize in spring. Eventually, unity was declared on May 
                                                          
494 For the complete document see: Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy. The Case of South Yemen 
1967–1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Appendix 1, 233–236; see also for other examples 
of such documents and for a detailed dealing with the (discursive and factual) steps towards unification in the 
PDRY. Among others, he describes the shifts in official language from Pan-Arab unity towards Yemeni unity 
(pointed out also by Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 235, n. 72).  
495 According to Whitaker, some sources even speak of ‘re-unification’, specifically using the word ‘shatr’ that 
signifies not just parts of something but rather something which naturally is one but broken into fragments. 
Whitaker, Birth, 11.  
496 Personal communication with Mohammed Albasha, Press and Public Relations Officer at Embassy of the 
Republic of Yemen Washington D.C., April 13, 2014. 
497 Whitaker, Birth, 13f.  
498 Fred Halliday, “Catastrophe in South Yemen. A Preliminary Assessment”, Middle East Report 139, no. 16 
(March/April 1986). 
499 Blumi equally elaborates on the historical preconditions which made unification an attractive strategic move 
for both leaderships; he argues that they assumed it to strengthen their “respective authoritarian capacities”. 
Blumi, Chaos, 117–145, here: 119.  
500 For the following cf. Brehony, Yemen Divided; Whitaker, Birth; Halliday, Revolution. 
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22, 1990;501 detailed concepts on how to unify delicate aspects such as the legal system 
(especially in regard to the role of the shari’a), the civil service, the two armies, and the 
currency were postponed, as was the creation of a unified legislative body, elections for which 
should take place after 30 months. The majority of the population was enthusiastic 
immediately after the act; what had been discursively aimed at (according to framing theory: 
the prognostic frame) had been realized, the dialectic between the semiotic and the factual 
world had finally provided the desired result – so the assumption.502 The realities of failing 
integration503 soon turned the dreams and promises that were formerly connected with the 
unity frame into disappointment at best and a nightmare at worst, the latter concerning the 
Southerners in light of the massive losses, political murders, and discrimination they 
perceived themselves faced with. The unity frame and what it stood for quickly lost its 
persuasive strength and disintegrated in the South. With the civil war of 1994 in which the 
South sought secession (and lost), even the nation frame crumbled. For many it was replaced 
with a ‘South Arabian’ or ‘Southerner’ frame, emphasizing a distinct and non-Yemeni 
identity, in the sense that it was separate from and incommensurable with the Northern 
Yemenis504 now depicted as ‘backward, uncivilized Dahbashis’505. This distinctive identity 
was to be cultivated ever further,506 and was later on integrated into the frames constructed by 
the Hirak.507 Both nation frame and unity frame had failed.  
 
                                                          
501 The parallel world historical context with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
should be noted in regards to the dates.  
502 Even the established Yemen expert Paul Dresch was still overly convinced in 1993 (based on research 
conducted between 1990 and 1992) that nationalism had succeeded – alas, there remained a slightly careful 
addendum based exactly on his deep knowledge of the country: “Whatever criticism may be made of 
government, the nation it claims to represent is not in question. To an extent unusual in the Middle East Yemenis 
remain convinced nationalists. In religious, tribal and regionalist discourse alike the national idea is prominent. 
Something must sustain this. Yemen is a complex country.” However, his positive interpretation of a perceived 
unity despite all odds takes precedence in his description. Paul Dresch, “A Daily Plebiscite: Nation and State in 
Yemen”, La Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée 67 (1994): 67–77, here: 67. 
503 Floor Beuming, “The Merger of the Dagger and the Rifle. Failing integration of former South Yemen into the 
unified Republic of Yemen” (M.A. thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2004). 
504 Brehony, “Role of the PDRY”, 127; 136. 
505 The term ‘Dahbashi’ refers to a popular TV character of the early 1990s, a ‘stupid and lazy’ Highland 
Yemeni. The view of Northern backwardness had existed before, but now it was more proactively propagated 
and became dominant. Stephen W. Day, Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen. A Troubled National Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 151–153. 
506 At the same time, more regional identities began to flourish again as well, such as the Hadhrami to name only 
one. The proposal for a six-state federal solution as the outcome of the 2013/14 National Dialogue Conference 
tries to make allowance for these regionalisms.  
507 Brehony cites a telling tweet by a British-raised Yemeni Hirak supporter (@AliElbuka) that states: “Before 
unification, we were one people in two states, but after unification we became two people in one state”. (“Role 
of the PDRY”, 140.) It brings to the point the core of what I heard in many discussions with activists.  
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4.4. A Tale of Two States: YAR and PDRY 
When Imam Ahmad died in 1962, a military group called the “Free Officers” (inspired and 
supported by Nasser’s ideology and success) seized the opportunity for a coup. On September 
26, they overthrew the imamate and founded the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) with one of 
their leaders, Abd Allah al-Sallal, becoming president of the Northern Yemeni state.508 The 
ensuing opening of the country to external influences, however, in combination with the quick 
fragmentation of the young revolutionaries and the struggle of the ‘dethroned’ successor 
Imam Mohamed al-Badr to regain his rule sparked a civil war between pro-imamate 
(‘royalist’) forces and republicans. Both sides were backed by external powers, the Saudis on 
the side of the royalists and Nasserist Egypt on the side of the republicans.509 Since both 
parties were trying to win the support of the qabila, providing them with weapons among 
other services, they severely strengthened qabili autonomy (see elaborations on the qabila 
above) at the expense of the young state.510 In an attempt to secure the victory of the 
Republic, the Egyptians finally occupied the country and imposed an Egyptian-style 
bureaucracy whose lasting imprint (in a negative sense, for there was nobody to fill the 
resulting need for qualified and suitably experienced staff) was to outlive their withdrawal in 
1967. The same year saw al-Sallal ousted and Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani inaugurated as the 
new leader of the country. With him, a period of reconciliation commenced. A constitution 
was adopted in 1970 and the civil war finally officially ended.511 Nevertheless, the state was 
facing a multitude of challenges, the high degree of autonomy on its peripheries being a major 
one that constantly threatened the central government.512 The regime remained unstable; two 
presidents were murdered between 1975 and 1978 until a young and little-known military 
officer was maneuvered into office: Ali Abdullah Saleh (b. 1942). Few gave him a chance to 
last long – he would prove them wrong. He created a complex network of patronage links 
with which he succeeded in balancing the numerous competing actors and interests, 
                                                          
508 Beuming, “Merger”.  
509 Robert D. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic.  
510 Robert D. Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962–1990”, International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 23, no. 4 (1991): 483–506; Robert W. Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab 
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Martin’s Press, 1984).  
511 Some sources set the end of the civil war already in 1967 with the departure of the Egyptians. See for 
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Grenzen Asiens zwischen Globalisierung und staatlicher Fragmentierung, ed. Conrad Schetter, Stephan 
Conermann and Bernd Kuzmits (Hamburg: EBV, 2009), 137–178, here: 153.  
512 Blumi, Chaos, 118. 
116 
 
frequently playing one against the other, and thus in stabilizing his regime.513He employed 
family, qabili, regional, military, and Islamist connections (who strongly supported him 
against socialist actors) among others, and in the General People’s Congress (GPC) as the 
only legal ‘party’, he furthermore established a useful tool for the extension of his patronage 
network.514 
 
 
Figure 4.1.: The ‘regime Saleh’: circles of power and patronage515; Sanhan is Saleh’s qabila and 
“Bayt al-Ahmar” refers to the sheikhly extended family of the al-Ahmars (at the core of which was 
Abdullah al-Ahmar) 
 
Two men played the most prominent roles in Saleh’s network: Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein 
al-Ahmar (1933–2007) and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (born 1945, not related to the al-Ahmar 
sheikhly family). Abdullah al-Ahmar was the “sheikh of sheikhs” of the important Hashid 
tribal confederation, a successful businessman, head of the Islamist Islah party, and from 1993 
until his death in 2007, the speaker of the Yemeni parliament. His influence was undisputed, 
as was his importance for Saleh, who somewhat depended on him from the 1980s onwards, 
since he single-handedly bridged the three spheres of qabila, economy, and Islamists.516 
Although the relation was generally harmonious, Saleh was well aware of his heavy reliance 
upon al-Ahmar, something he was hoping to decrease in the wake of unification based on 
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prospectively large oil finds in the South which would provide him a higher degree of 
economic independence.517 When in 2007 Abdullah al-Ahmar died, he left a significant power 
vacuum. Although his sons Hameed and Hussein each strove for their own advantages and 
were certainly influential in certain spheres,518 they did not fill the void their father’s death 
had created.  
 General Ali Mohsen,519 a distant cousin of Saleh and among the founders of Islah, was for 
decades commander of the northwest military district and of the 1st Armored Division (until 
he was discharged by President Hadi in December 2012). Based in the so-called “Sanhan 
covenant”, i.e. the bargain the small Sanhan qabila made when they b(r)ought Saleh into 
presidency in 1978, Ali Mohsen was supposed to be the second man in the republic and the 
possible replacement of Saleh in case of assassination or else.520 Relations between him and 
his long-time ally Saleh had soured even before the latter made attempts to pass on office to 
his son in the early to mid-2000s, and Phillips argues that Saleh on purpose made Ali 
Mohsen’s deployment in the Sa’ada wars difficult by not providing him with the necessary 
equipment.521 Still, Ali Mohsen had and continues to have a strong support base among the 
military and at the same time possesses considerable economic assets which make him highly 
influential. Among the population, his forces were responsible for a high degree of 
destruction especially in the North, and thus he is as feared and hated as he is respected. 
 The clientelist system Saleh had created was highly sophisticated, which at the same time 
made it extremely responsive to even minor changes. His allies were of great influence 
themselves and he needed to ensure at all times that they would not alter their loyalties or 
become seriously engaged in rivaling him.  
The armed struggle against the British in the South commenced with the start of fighting in 
the town of Radfan on October 14, 1963. It ended with the departure of the last British troops 
on November 29, 1967. The period in between was characterized not only by the casualties 
resulting from armed clashes between Southern Yemenis and British, but also by complex 
contentions and skirmishes amongst various groups involved in the anti-colonial struggle, 
most prominently the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of 
Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY).522 Intra-elite disputes and the struggle for rule were 
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supposed to continue between various factions well after the proclamation of the independent 
People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY) on November 30, 1967. Leaders were young and 
full of confidence and tried to set up a ‘new society’ and state according to their ideological 
orientations, often paying little attention to the dire financial situation of the country they had 
inherited. Rather than a cohesive group with one coherent ideology and political goal, the 
then-leadership consisted of “a collection of powerful personalities”523 – a feature that 
remains prominent today among the leadership of the Hirak. Turbulent years followed524 
which on the positive side of the scale saw a takeover of the civil service the British had left 
behind; on the negative, there were massive cuts not only in staff (many of which had 
formerly been British senior officers) but also in salaries; the abolishment of ‘feudal rule’ by 
sultans and emirs – a majority of whom went into exile – and the confiscation of their 
property; several measures to eliminate the influence of qabila in the South such as the 
abolishment of names, disputes etc.; and a clear limitation of religion to the private realm in 
favor of public secularism.525 Eventually, the Marxist left succeeded and pushed through with 
their model for the state and society:526 The renamed People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (since November 30, 1970) set up a highly centralized, bureaucratic government 
modeled after the Soviet Union,527 with a leading Politburo and a Central Committee, the 
Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP, founded 1978) as single party organ of the regime, and mass 
organizations for the different spectra of society.528 Correspondingly, Marxist social policies 
were implemented, including free medical care, subsidized housing, women’s rights, and a 
strong focus on education and spreading literacy. Furthermore, qāt consumption was strictly 
limited to weekends and holidays (which set agricultural lands as well as water sources free 
for other use), and corruption as well as workplace absenteeism were successfully impeded. 
Notwithstanding these advances, they young state was not to be taken for a utopia: Contrary 
to the successes and highly positive perception of the social goals, which Brehony judges as 
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“progressive and well-intentioned”,529 both the economic and the civil-rights situation looked 
dire. The main criticism of a World Bank report in 1978 which classified the PDRY as one of 
the ‘least developed countries’ was the poor economic management and resulting low 
productivity of the centrally planned economy.530 As regards the human rights record, there 
were high numbers of political prisoners, disappearances, a strict security apparatus, and 
practically no freedom of speech and movement.531 Another destabilizing feature of the 
Southern regime was its continuous internal conflict, which culminated in a very brief but 
highly destructive and traumatizing civil war between two factions in 1986. It resulted in up 
to 10,000 casualties (mentioned above), among which were large parts of the Politburo; 
furthermore, around 30,000 of the followers of Ali Nasser Muhammad, then-President and 
originator of the Politburo massacre, as well as other influential figures left the South to the 
North or abroad.532 These events would weaken the PDRY government for the subsequent 
years.  
 The post-unification period brought many changes. What persisted, however, were two 
societies with two independent patronage systems and political cultures. Contrary to the 
highly personalized clientelist system of Saleh, the YSP’s power base consisted of trade 
unions; together they formed the core of the patronage network for the urban elite, mainly of 
Aden and Mukalla. Both systems continued to exist separately from each other, and formed 
the backbone of the traditional support networks people turned to when unification turned 
sour and the economy tumbled after the expulsion of Yemeni workers from the Gulf states in 
1991. Regarding political, cultural, and economic values, they differed mainly along the 
idealistic lines of autonomy and self-sufficiency in the North, combined with more 
conservative and traditionalist social values (both aspects of which were mirrored in the rather 
‘ad-hoc’ character of political parties) and the very bureaucratic, institutionalized and formal, 
state order of the South, with its organized participation (especially of women,533 which 
necessarily collided with northern views) and at the same time its distinct urban-rural division 
line.534 Where Northerners were suspicious of secular approaches and the high degree of state 
involvement in citizen’s lives, Southerners were equally distrustful towards the very ‘rural’ 
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traditions they had so actively combated and which now found their ways into society at large 
again, in a mode that made observers like critics refer to as ‘re-tribalization’.535 
Understandably, integration hardly thrived.536  
 Ultimately, Saleh proved more adept at asserting his rule. Where, prior to unification, his 
rule certainly fit the conventional definition of ‘authoritarian’, Blumi argues that since the 
1990s Saleh “has actually taken authoritarianism to a new level”.537 Based on a reductionist 
international perception of Yemen as primordially tribal and Islamist and in the wake of the 
post-9/11 War on Terror policies, which equally sought measures of low complexity, Saleh 
strategically employed these same stereotypes in order to push through with his politics of 
“controlled demolition”: He purposefully instigated violence against numerous groups and 
actors whom he depicted as opposed to ‘security’ and ‘state stability’ and thus eliminated 
potential rivals or inconvenient allies he formerly needed to integrate into his political 
calculations. He could rely on tolerance at least and periodically even on support for these 
practices by external powers such as the US, the GCC states, the EU etc.538 This perspective 
makes various moves of Saleh intelligible, among them his breach of traditional modes of 
mediation in favor of repression in the case of Hussein al-Houthi which led to the outbreak of 
the armed conflict in Sa’ada. I will take it up in both the analyses and show its explanatory 
value in regard to the cases. 
 
4.5. Central Discourses Surrounding External Actors 
External actors feature prominently in the frames of the Houthis and in discourses of 
resistance generally. The two most relevant references are made towards the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States (US). Their respective role in regard to Yemeni 
politics and society shall be elucidated in order to contextualize these references and thus lay 
a basis for their interpretation.  
 
                                                          
535 Beuming lists some related policies, their impact, and the perception among Southerners. Beuming, 
“Merger”, 94–100.  
536 For a discussion of factors conducive or impeding to integration, respectively, see: Beuming, “Merger”. 
537 Blumi, Chaos, 156. 
538 A similar argument in regards to ‘crisis as a tool for rule’ is made by Phillips, Politics. And how disorder 
ultimately profits the regime is pointed at by Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 151. 
121 
 
4.5.1. The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia (KSA) 
Yemen and its northern neighbor have historically had a difficult relationship. With the 
expansion of the House of Sa’ud in the 1920s and its subsequent establishment of the Saudi 
monarchy, several issues emerged that were to bedevil relations ever since. One was territory: 
Both ‘states’ had been struggling for dominance in the regions of ‘Asir, Najran, and Sa’ada 
from the early 20th century onwards. The Treaty of Ta’if in 1934 created a major point of 
reference in regard to the continuously debated border line, however, it remained vague on 
many aspects and the contractually fixed need for renewal every twenty lunar years generated 
insecurities for it produced a means to apply pressure on the respective opponent by 
threatening to terminate the regulations.539 The region was and is at stake, pervaded by trade 
routes and a prosperous (legal and illegal) border economy based on a constant flow of crops 
(including qāt), drugs, arms, and humans (cheap labor, increasing numbers of refugees from 
the Horn of Africa, political activists). Besides, the area is home to communities like the 
Wa’ilah, mostly Zaydis, whose subsistence relies on the free grazing of their livestock all over 
the territory. The latter, who at that time vehemently rejected the treaty specifically and state-
rule more generally, were granted special privileges of free movement around the border as a 
means of placation – an issue which would be raised again much later. 
Another issue concerned the dominance of the Saudis on the Arabian Peninsula. Although the 
economically and politically weak Yemen would at a first glance pose no obvious threat to 
the oil-rich KSA, at a closer look, there are some justified concerns from the Saudi 
perspective: The Sa’ud dynasty established its state through the conquest of the territory ruled 
by King (formerly Sharif) Hussein bin Ali of the Hejaz (of Hashemite descent); that their 
legitimacy is hence based on sole power and that they deposed a Hashemite ruler was to 
remain their Achilles’ heel. Zaydi Hashemites or sada, on the other hand, possess a lot of 
traditional legitimacy based on their descent from the Prophet’s family – a legitimacy which 
is still very highly regarded among Muslim communities worldwide.540 This fact made the 
KSA’s rulers wary of any hints that their legitimacy might be threatened by pro-Hashemite 
actors, more so since the Hejaz to this day continues to be resentful towards the historical 
intruders from Najd.541 In addition, the two Yemens after the 1960s revolutions formed the 
only republican states on the Arabian Peninsula and might thus well have posed a challenge to 
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the monarchies. The KSA accordingly took every opportunity to weaken the northern and 
southern republic by supporting their opponents, be it the royalists in the aftermath of 1962, 
the exiled sultans, emirs, and qabili leaders from the South,542 or other dissidents and exiles. 
Along the same lines, it sought to impede unification and did not refrain from indirectly 
supporting secessionist forces in the 1994 war.543 On the economic side, relations were coined 
by the extensive absorption of labor migrants from the YAR to the KSA544 and the resulting 
high dependence of large parts of Yemeni society on remittances,545 and by extensive aid 
provision.546 The high vulnerability this created became very clear in 1990. At the time of the 
Gulf War, Yemen was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council when in August 
it voted first on trade sanctions against Iraq, then on a military enforcement of the blockade, 
and lastly for military engagement to regain Kuwait. Yemen faced a dilemma, for it had good 
relations with Iraq, which it did not want to destroy, but at the same time feared for the 
remittances from the Gulf. It chose a middle path that would prove very costly: It abstained 
from the first two votes and voted ‘no’ on the last, favoring a regional solution. The KSA 
reacted more than disgruntled and immediately expelled an estimated 750,000547 migrant 
workers and cut all economic assistance,548 thereby causing a severe economic downfall in 
Yemen. Beyond the substantial loss of remittances, an increase of 7% in population within 
only three months and an additional 15% in total workforce overwhelmed the absorbing 
capacity of the economy, infrastructure, and social services, and led to a stark exacerbation of 
unemployment. In addition, (re)integration proved socially difficult for many who had in part 
spent long periods of their lives abroad and did not have many roots in their home country.549 
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Whitaker (Birth, 97) points out that in fact the resulting bitterness voiced on Yemeni streets was directed for the 
largest part against the KSA, while the US were judged wrong but did not receive the same emotional blame as 
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In the following years, the relations remained strained enough for the KSA to block Yemen’s 
application to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1996 and 1999, and it also 
interfered in the exploration of oil reserves by foreign companies close to the prospective 
border line by ‘warning’ these companies against pursuing their work.550 Yemen perceived 
this as a highly offensive act intended to block its economic ascension and related gain in 
independence. Despite all these drawbacks and repeated military incidents, tensions eased 
(due in part to international mediation) and in 1998 the KSA allowed a return of Yemeni 
workers. Based on a prior agreement in 1997, the two states signed the ‘Treaty of Jeddah’ on 
June 12, 2000, a de facto confirmation of the Treaty of Ta’if that regulated points the former 
had left open and finally fixed the cession of Yemen’s territorial claims to the disputed 
regions. Relatedly, the Saleh regime had since the mid-1990s allowed the KSA to tighten its 
border management regime. Population movement was restricted, and formerly privileged 
groups now needed a visa to cross the border area. Livelihoods of farmers, who could no 
longer care for their land and livestock as before, were threatened, as were the revenues of 
trade and smuggling. With the Treaty of Jeddah, border fortification progressed as did its 
enforcement. Local opposition formed, led by the charismatic Sheikh bin Shaj’i, who headed 
a 3,000-man militia. For about over two years they regularly clashed with Saudi forces and 
destroyed border demarcations while bin Shaj’i was able to mobilize wide support among the 
local population and officials alike, invoking honor and local autonomy. In a mode very 
similar to Hussein al-Houthi a few years later, bin Shaj’i mobilized against the inacceptable 
behavior of President Saleh who had conceded the territory to the KSA “something even 
Imam Yahya could not do”.551 The fact that in early 2004, the Saudis started to construct a 
complete border fence, and that they not only supported the Yemeni government (through the 
Hashid confederation) against the Houthis during the Sa’ada wars, but also actively entered 
combat themselves in late 2009, which aggravated the negative sentiments held against the 
monarchy.   
In sum, constant KSA interference in and mingling with Yemeni politics over decades 
constituted a permanent source of resentment among the population, despite the many ties 
connecting Yemenis with the monarchy based on the huge number of migrant workers and the 
related personal experiences of life there. This accumulated resentment could be tapped into 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
did the Saudis. Though equally considered in the wrong, Saddam Hussein was still admired for standing up 
against the US ‘like a man’. 
550 Whitaker, Birth, 91f.; Heinze, “Grenzproblematik”, 157. 
551 Blumi, Chaos, 110. 
124 
 
rhetorically when creating frames, and since the KSA is a close ally of the US, there was a 
‘connection of discontent’ drawn between the two.  
 
4.5.2. The United States (US) 
Yemen was marginal to US foreign policy interests until it became a threat to its security 
interests.552 Prior to 1990, the YAR was just one among the numerous recipients of US aid 
and considered of interest rather for its closeness and relevance to the US ally KSA, with 
whom it was also generally associated from within. Yemen’s performance in the UN Security 
Council vote at the beginning of the Gulf War led to a freezing of support and relations.  
 The country once again entered the stage of US foreign policy considerations after the 
bombing of the USS Cole in Aden Harbor on October 12, 2000, in which 17 American 
servicemen were killed and 39 injured. This and the ‘war on terror’ in the wake of 9/11 
shortly afterwards made Yemen a main theater of US counterterrorism operations.553Few days 
after the attacks, Saleh aimed to assure acquiescence of the main political actors in the 
country in regard to an articulation of anti-US sentiments.554 He travelled to Washington in 
November 2001 and assured President Bush of Yemen’s cooperation in fighting Al-Qaeda in 
his country; in a second visit to Washington and the subsequent G-8 Summit in Georgia in 
June 2004 he affirmed his stance and strengthened his ties with the US government.555  
 Cooperation began at the same time as his first visit, in November 2001, when the US 
opened a training facility for CIA and Special Operations forces. In 2002 the US conducted its 
first direct military operations in the country, among other air strikes the operation of the later 
infamous drones to kill terrorism suspects.556 When the 2009 attempted airplane bombing 
over Detroit could be connected back to Yemen, US involvement and interventions in the 
country again increased.557 Funding – large parts of which was tied to counterterrorism 
                                                          
552 Sheila Carapico, “No Quick Fix: Foreign Aid and State Performance in Yemen”, in Short of the Goal: U.S. 
Policy and Poorly Performing States, ed. Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert L. Ayers (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2006).  
553 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service Report, 
January 13, 2010. 
554 Samy Dorlian, “The Sa’da War in Yemen: Between Politics and Sectarianism”, The Muslim World 101 no. 2 
(April 2011): 182–201, here: 193. 
555 Cf. Interview with the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen (mid-2001–mid-2004), Edmund James Hull, in: 
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, ‘Yemen Country Reader’, accessed March 24, 2015, 
http://www.adst.org/oral-history/country-reader-series/, 197–217.  
556 Neta C. Crawford, “Civilians Killed in US Operations in Yemen”, report published on the website of the 
Costs of War Project: http://www.costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/13/attachments/Yemen11_30.pdf 
(accessed November 13, 2014). 
557 The new strategy towards Yemen was now referred to as the “National Security Council’s Yemen Strategic 
Plan” and aims at combatting AQAP, increased development assistance, and a maximizing of concerted 
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measures – reached an all-time high in 2010 and since then continues on a level above the 
pre-2010 allocations.558 For example, in 2010 Yemen with US-$252.6 million was the largest 
recipient of funds from the US Defense Department’s ‘1206 Train and Equip Fund’ 
designated for “equipment, supplies, or training of foreign national military forces engaged in 
counterterrorism operations” – it even surpassed Pakistan.559  
 Saleh’s rationale to allow US involvement in the country can most convincingly be 
attributed to his fear that Yemen might be next on the list of states to be punished for 
supporting terrorism if he refused to side with the US, as well as strategic considerations on 
the usefulness of US backing for his own dealing with opposition on the periphery.560 While 
he had not dared to lean towards the US during the 1990s due to his close involvement with 
Islamist actors and their clientelist integration into his patronage network, he now might have 
felt strong enough politically to face any possible consequences in this regard.  
 Among large parts of the population, however, a strongly negative perception of US 
political involvement in the Middle East dominated the post-2001 period, this feeling 
particularly resonating in Yemen. The highly unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
triggered protests, as did the continued incarceration of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay561 and the initiation of drone strikes against alleged Al-Qaeda affiliates in the country.562 
In addition, a connection was drawn to Israeli military suppression of the Second Intifada and 
resulting Palestinian suffering and oppression; Israeli policies were generally perceived as 
proxy of US policies and thus added to popular indignation.  
 Saleh’s stance towards the US consequently resulted in high unpopularity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
international efforts for the stabilization of Yemen. Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations”, 
Congressional Research Service Report, April 10, 2012, 9. 
558 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service Report, 
February 6, 2014, 11. 
559 Sharp, “Background”, 2012, 10. 
560 Salmoni et al., Regime, 124–127. 
561 Sharp, “Background”, 2014, 9. 
562 The first strikes in late 2002, however, were isolated cases. The U.S. dramatically increased the number of 
drone strikes starting in 2011, with a reported death toll of 424, including large numbers of civilians, until 
January 2015, according to the independent British NGO ‘Bureau of Investigative Journalism’, accessed March 
24, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/17/usyemen-investigate-civilian-deaths-airstrikes. Cf. related 
HRW: ‘US/Yemen: Investigate Civilian Deaths from Airstrikes’, December 17, 2013, accessed March 24, 2015, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/17/usyemen-investigate-civilian-deaths-airstrikes.  
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4.6. The ‘Sick Man’ on the Arabian Peninsula: Yemen’s Economic Struggle 
Yemen’s economic performance is a story of dependence upon contingent factors: From the 
1970s onward,563 the economy of both states strongly depended on the remittances of workers 
and aid provision by international donors.564 The oil boom period in the Gulf states between 
around 1973-1983 led to massive labor migration of overwhelmingly unskilled labor from the 
YAR (and to a much smaller extent565 also the PDRY) to the KSA, Kuwait, and other 
countries. What resulted from this was, on the positive side, a massive flow of remittances 
which significantly bolstered private consumption and the subsequent introduction of modern 
consumer goods such as refrigerators, television sets etc. into the country, while contacts with 
the outer world introduced new ideas and opportunities to a young generation; on the other 
side, however, there was a long list of negative effects. Besides the social divide created 
between those with relatives abroad and those without, emigration disrupted the national 
economy in multiple ways: The lack of labor led to a decline in agricultural production, a 
shortage of workers for industrial development, and wage increase which ever more inhibited 
investment in the productive sector but bore incentives for import as well as the set-up of 
small, individually owned businesses in the service sector – for which there was no 
correlating demand. At the bottom-line, remittances only benefited individuals and families, 
not the whole society and state,566 while the mounting costs of missed development 
opportunities were later to be paid by all.567  
 Maybe surprisingly considering the difference in the two systems during the Cold War 
period, both Yemeni states received high aid payments from very similar donors, the most 
generous among whom were the USSR, China, Eastern European states (for the PDRY), the 
World Bank, and the OPEC states. The US played only a marginal role and only in regard to 
the YAR and should be evaluated in light of its ties with the KSA. The payments were 
considerable, due to superpower competition at this strategically important location as well as 
                                                          
563 The socioeconomic struggles faced by the population in the early years of the PDRY are well depicted in: 
Fred Halliday, “Yemen’s Unfinished Revolution: Socialism in the South”, in MERIP Reports 81 (1979), 3–20. 
564 For a brief comparison of specific aspects of the YAR’s and the PDRY’s economy see: Sheila Carapico, “The 
Economic Dimension of Yemeni Unity”, in Middle East Report 184, no. 23 (1993).  
565 This was due to the fact that citizens of the PDRY were not exempt from the need for visa and work permits 
as were those of the YAR (see chapter 4.1.5.1.), and that the Southern government prohibited this kind of labor 
migration from 1973 onwards and thus reduced – but not stopped – the flow of laborers. Cf. Nora Ann Colton, 
“Yemen: A Collapsed Economy”, in Middle East Journal 64, no. 3 (2010): 410–426, here: 412. 
566 While she lays emphasis on the KSA, Kiren Chaudhry richly describes the impact of the remittances on the 
YAR: Kiren Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth. Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca/London: 
Cornell University Press, 1997).  
567 For more details and some quantitative estimates see: Colton, “Collapsed Economy”, 411–414. 
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the extraordinary wealth of the Arab oil-producers.568 Major projects which were 
implemented concerned infrastructure, including roads, ports, energy plants, and irrigation; 
agricultural development, oil exploration, education, and training. Large parts of the funds, 
however, went to arms or were immediately provided in the form of arms.  
Since the mid-1980s, conditions changed. The construction boom in the Gulf States tapered, 
and the afore-welcomed migrant workers began to turn into a nuisance. Some workers 
returned to Yemen, also in the light of wages that had adapted to the level of surrounding 
countries. As before, however, they did not invest but rather added to the expanding number 
of small businesses and to the informal sector.569 At the same time, aid payments from 
socialist countries declined significantly toward the end of the Cold War,570 adding to the 
economic constraints now faced by the regimes. On a rather prosperous decade from the early 
1970s to the mid-1980s followed years of austerity.571 Hope turned towards oil. In 1984, 
commercially viable finds were made in the Ma’rib area in the southeast of the YAR, 
followed by other finds close to or south of the border with the PDRY. This made unification 
more attractive and contributed to Saleh’s considerations in this direction. In spite of great 
anticipations, it quickly became clear that the deposits were modest in regional comparison 
and would suffice merely for moderate and medium-term extraction. Many estimates see the 
oil expire towards the end of the current decade.572  
 With the above situation and development in mind, 1990 was a year of catastrophe for 
Yemen’s economy. Firstly, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of socialist 
economies, these former donors and funds completely vanished. Secondly, the return of 
around 750,000 migrant workers after their expulsion from the Gulf by far overwhelmed 
Yemen’s capacity for absorption – in economic as well as in social terms. Thirdly, after their 
veto in the UN Security Council vote on measures against Iraq, the US cancelled their aid 
provisions as well, as did the KSA, further aggravating the lack of resources available to the 
state. Fourthly, oil prices fell markedly in that period, additionally reducing the modest 
revenues. Fifthly and lastly, unification posed enormous challenges in regard to the payment 
                                                          
568 Carapico, “No Quick Fix”, 191f. 
569 Colton, “Collapsed Economy”, 414; Nora Ann Colton, “Homeward Bound: Yemeni Return Migrants”, in 
International Migration Review 27, no. 4 (1993): 870–882. 
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Carapico, “No Quick Fix”, 192. 
571 What this meant on the micro-level for the population is graphically described for two households in: Sheila 
Carapico and Cynthia Myntti, “A Tale of Two Families. Change in North Yemen, 1977–1989”, Middle East 
Report 170 (1991). 
572 The World Bank, “Facing the Hard Facts in Yemen”, accessed November 11, 2014, 
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of wages to civil service employees, army personnel, the costs of infrastructure etc. and 
furthermore demanded complex measures in response to the transition from a socialist to a 
market economy – challenges which would not be adequately met. The overall results were 
devastating. On the economic side, the numbers were alarming: The balance of payments 
deficit rose from 12% of the GDP (1990) to 16% (1994); inflation from 33% (1991) to 
120%573 (1994); debt percentage of GNP from 100.1% (1990) to 189% (1994), and the deficit 
of the national budget from 11% (1991) to 22.5% of GDP. At the same time, official 
exchange rates remained inflated, the government increased the money supply, and debt 
overhang was at 200% (1993) among the highest in the world. What fell was GNP per capita, 
from US $570 in the YAR in 1984 to a low of US $217 in the Republic of Yemen (ROY) in 
1995.574 The social consequences are graphically captured by Carapico:  
The poverty rate doubled during the 1990s (...) Once rather rare, malnutrition now 
plagued nearly half of young children, a serious deterioration of nutritional standards 
from a generation earlier, when indigenous grains, vegetables, and dairy products were 
dietary staples. Whereas 1990s’ parents had experienced great gains in literacy in their 
school years, their children were crammed into crowded, crumbling classrooms. 
Households that secured water and electricity hookups not long before now found 
themselves unable to pay for these services. New fees made hospitals inaccessible to the 
burgeoning poor. Cities, which had seemed to offer a better life, had become crowded, 
messy, anomic places. High aspirations were dashed, prompting people to take to the 
streets on numerous occasions.575 
 
On top of all that came the civil war in 1994 and the resulting costs, so that in 1995 the 
government had to strike the flag and turn to multilateral donor agencies for help.576 The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank aided the country, under the 
condition of reforms along the lines of prescribed structural adjustment. Many of the 
measures taken to address the economic misery according to the principles laid out in the 
Washington Consensus577 placed a heavy burden upon the already struggling population, such 
as the discharging of thousands of civil servants, the cutting of subsidies on wheat, the 
lowering of the official exchange rate, and the implementation of a rigorous privatization 
                                                          
573 The inflation for food alone was 70% in 1994. Colton, “Collapsed Economy”, 420. 
574 Ibid., 417; Carapico, “No Quick Fix”, 195; Holger Albrecht, “The Political Economy of Reform in Yemen: 
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576 Loans and credits had de facto been barred to Yemen since 1992 due to its high debt burden. Albrecht, 
“Political Economy”, 135.  
577 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform”, in Latin American Adjustment: How Much 
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program.578 There is little clarity about the exact effects of the Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP); the literature, however, generally agrees that while GDP growth could be stimulated 
from 1995 onwards (due in part to high oil prices which fell again in 1998, creating new 
constrain), the social costs were high.579 Poverty rates continued to increase,580 as did 
unemployment; inflation remained high and increasing food prices were strongly felt by 
Yemen’s poor every time; similarly, the lifting of subsidies quickly turns existential.581 In 
total, the World Bank states that the reform program was poorly or not at all implemented and 
thus could not attain the planned long-time goals for the economy as a whole and for the poor 
specifically, while at the same time subsidies were not properly administered, either.582 As 
Colton points out, what happened during the 1990s was that the gap between the increasing 
poverty of the many and the accumulation of riches of the few widened. Where in previous 
decades limited prosperity was channeled to families through remittances, the profits of the 
novel main pillar of the economy – oil – did not trickle down to the general population but 
remained with government affiliates583 (often connected to grand elite families like the al-
Ahmars) and a newly emerging military and upper bureaucratic elite.584 Since the oil peak in 
2001, however, oil rents steadily have declined, and attacks by various discontent elements 
and groups do their share to aggravate the pressure that the lacking funds create.585  
 Besides oil, Yemen also possesses natural gas reserves. In 2009 the country opened its first 
LNG (liquefied natural gas) facility and commenced exportation. While LNG revenues will 
never come close to those generated by crude oil export, they aid the compensation of the 
decline of those returns. In addition, gas shall also be more widely used for energy production 
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in Yemen, in order to bolster the massive lack of power supplies. In all cases, however, 
infrastructure is the bottleneck. Attacks as well as insufficient facilities result in frequent 
electricity shortages and blackouts – a problem for the general population (only 40% of which 
have access to electricity at all)586 but even more so for industry and other businesses. It is one 
of the factors discouraging investment.  
 Additional systemic vulnerabilities587 that weigh heavily on both the populations as the 
investment climates are the already noted deteriorating security conditions, currency 
depreciation, pervading (elite) corruption, and lack of legal certainty and protection. The 
overall political instability created by the six wars against the Houthis in the North (2004-
2010), the 2011 Arab Spring events in Yemen and the subsequent regime change and power 
vacuum, the continuous climate of opposition in the South (since at least 2007), the threats 
emanating from Al Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as the recent Houthi 
takeover of the capital and ousting of the government features prominently among outside 
analyses and depictions of the situation in Yemen. With a sole focus on the economy, a brief 
look on the impacts of these conditions in a nutshell hints at some alarming facts: In the 
northern regions, the long-term armed conflict bred a kind of ‘war economy’ in the already 
porous border region with neighboring Saudi Arabia, in which the smuggle of qāt588 and 
weapons – which has existed for a long time prior to the wars – was of elevated importance. 
The ‘Yemeni Revolution’ of 2011 caused the GDP to nosedive with a shrinkage of 12.7%; 
though it recovered significantly in the following years, it still remains on a very low level. 
Average citizens feel these macro-developments most severely in form of the ever-rising 
unemployment and commodity prices, as well as pressing water589 and power scarcity. 
Without going into further details, the conclusion of the above elaborations makes very clear 
that the current socioeconomic state of Yemen as well as its perspectives are more than 
gloomy.   
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5. CASE STUDY INTRODUCTIONS 
This chapter presents the first of the two case studies. Its structure reflects the consecutive 
steps that are necessary to tackle the research question: The dissertation poses that in order to 
mobilize constituents through framing, actors (generally assumed to be the elites) need to 
convince the members of their respective identity groups that (a) they as a group suffer from 
social exclusion (in form of discrimination and else), that (b) they are existentially threatened 
by state failure and/or repression, and that (c) the remedial action the framing actors call for is 
not only necessary, but will also be effective in resolving the situation.590 Which form exactly 
the action is to take (inter alia if it will take a violent or non-violent path) thereby depends on 
what is (and can be, depending on the context) specified in the prognostic frame.              
 Accordingly, the chapter will seek answers to the following questions: What makes Zaydis 
an identity group? Who are the respective elites with influence? How do they develop a frame 
that fulfills the criteria of exclusion, threat, and feasibility of violence? Or do they construct 
something different? How do they distribute this frame? How successful are they therein? 
And can we assume a wide enough resonance to support the argument that it was the frames 
that ultimately led to the use of violence? 
 
5.1. The ‘Houthi-Rebels’ in Northern Yemen 
While I have previously emphasized the difficulty of defining identity categories, it is 
important to grasp the layers of Zaydi identity as a precondition to understand (a) the massive 
grievances stemming from the discrimination of the group suffering in the wake of the 
revolution, and (b) the prestige it still carries or at least the intense emotions involved in 
dealing with Zaydis and particularly sādah, which are a factor in mobilizational efforts. 
Moreover, the theological background is relevant for a later understanding of Hussein al-
Houthi’s framing, which is deeply rooted in doctrinal matters. The presentation of the case is 
partly thematic, partly chronological: Following the introduction of the identity group I 
proceed chronologically towards the actual conflict. In the section on the organization of 
opposition I present the name-giving family as the central framers, followed by the Zaydi 
revivalist organizations they engaged in and shaped, respectively. After the conflict 
description I first of all test the established theoretical approaches and elucidate their 
shortcomings in explaining the escalation. Against this background I then conduct a detailed 
frame analysis. The section on frame development is thereby divided into a non-violent phase 
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(Hussein al-Houthi’s extensive framing that served as the solid foundation of the Houthi 
movement) and the post-escalation phase of violence after his death, hence tracing the 
escalatory shift. The subsequent parts on frame distribution, resonance, and contestation 
contain this differentiation within their respective subchapters. Lastly, the brief summary 
recapitulates the main characteristics and findings for the later comparison with the Southern 
Movement.  
 
5.1.1. Zaydis as an Identity Group 
‘Being a Zaydi’ in Yemen contains a religious, political, social, economic, and physical 
dimension, all of which are inherently ambiguous. The reason for this lies in the character of 
Zaydism as in its protracted historical presence in northern Yemen, which fundamentally 
shaped the social, political, economic, and, lastly, geographical order along with the practices 
which occur therein. While ‘Zaydi’ always described a composite identity, it became even 
more versatile – both on a collective and on an individual level – in the context of 
discrimination and contestation after the Yemeni Revolution in 1962 that had brought Zaydi 
imamate rule to an end.591 This section will briefly outline the various dimensions of ‘Zaydi 
identity’; based on these general facets. The following section will then seek to trace the 
attempts Zaydis and specifically Zaydi elites made to cope with their experiences in the newly 
created, inherently anti-Zaydi state, i.e. how they strove to reconcile their Zaydiness with (or 
relinquish it under) the given circumstances.  
 Zaydism is a doctrinal school within Shi’i Islam. Shiʿa consider the Prophet’s son-in-law 
and cousin Ali ibn Ali Talib as legitimate successor to the caliphate (i.e. the religious and 
political leadership of the Muslim ummah) and are thus opposed to the de facto succession by 
Abu Bakr, a close companion of Muhammad, which should constitute the legitimate caliph in 
view of Sunni Islam.592 The crucial point of disagreement among the early followers lay in the 
question of the heredity of elective succession: Those in favor of Ali argued that the Prophet 
designated Ali as his successor and that all ensuing leadership has to stem from the bloodline 
of the Prophet’s family through Fatima and Ali, the ‘ahl al-bayt’ (‘people of the house’ of the 
Prophet). Their argumentation is based on the ‘Ḥadīth of the pond of Khumm’, in which 
Muhammad is said to have proclaimed: “Of whomsoever I had been master, Ali is to be his 
master. O God, be a supporter of whoever supports him (Ali) and an enemy of whoever 
opposes him and divert the truth to Ali” Sunnis acknowledge this Ḥadīth, however, they 
                                                          
591 Cf. vom Bruck, Regimes, 221f. 
592 The name ‘Shiʿa’ springs from ‘Shiʿa t Ali’, the ‘Party of Ali’.  
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interpret it solely as the obligation to particularly honor Ali and his descendants. They 
advocate in favor of elective succession based on religious and spiritual merit (which 
historically repeatedly resulted in the establishment of dynasties). For the immediate 
succession of the Prophet, those promoting election succeeded and the proponents of Ali 
acquiesced. Beyond succession, another central distinction between Shiʿa and Sunna concerns 
their respective (non)acknowledgement of the Prophetic tradition as recorded in the Ḥadīth. 
While an extended corpus of Ḥadīth is at the core of Sunni belief, only few are recognized by 
the Shiʿa. The term ‘Sunna’ or ‘Sunni’, as they refer to themselves, is a short form of ‘ahl as-
sunnah wa l-jamāʻah’, the ‘people of the Prophetic custom and the community (i.e. 
consensus)’.  
 The various branches of Shi’ism again differ in regard to the later succession of the 
‘imamate’, as they call the religious, spiritual, and political leadership. Based on their 
respective acknowledgement of subsequent imams, the most prominent branches are referred 
to as: ‘Twelvers’ or ‘Imamis’, the largest group dominant in contemporary Iran; ‘Seveners’ or 
‘Ismailis’; and ‘Fivers’ or ‘Zaydis’.593 Zaydism became rooted in Yemen in the 9th century 
with the entrance of Yahya bin al-Hussein (d. 911). He founded the first Zaydi state in 893 
and adopted the title ‘Hadi ila al-Haqq’, the ‘Guide to the Truth’; the doctrinal school that 
relies on his teachings is hence referred to as ‘Hadawi’.594 From this first state onwards, the 
north of Yemen would, with only short periods of intermittence, be ruled by a Zaydi imam 
until 1962.  
 Zaydism as a religious doctrine, and also in its function as a theory of state, requires a 
potential candidate for imamate rule to meet fourteen qualities, the most important of which 
are descendants of the ahl al-bayt, scholarly expertise in the field of religion, and the capacity 
to pronounce an independent judgment in legal cases (ijtihad), the ability to fight, justice and 
generosity, and the willingness to oppose tyranny and injustice.595 His primary duty is 
implementing Islamic law, in line with the Qurʾanic obligation for all believers but 
particularly for the imam to “command what is right and forbid what is wrong” (“al-amr bi 'l-
maʿruf wa 'n-nahy ʿani 'l-munkar”, sura 3, verse 104). Furthermore, his right and duty is to 
step up against illegitimate or unjust claimants to the imamate or unjust imams (‘zalim’ or 
‘oppressor’) as more legitimate claimant. The principle is referred to as ‘khurūj’ or ‘coming 
                                                          
593 ‘Twelvers’ take their alternative name ‘Imami’ or ‘Imamates’ from the fact that they still expect the return of 
the Twelfth Imam of ‘Mahdi’ who went into occlusion. ‘Ismailis’ and ‘Zaydis’ are denominated after their 
respective acknowledged imams Isma’il ibn Jafar and Zayd ibn Ali, the great-grandson of Ali.  
594 On the early history of Zaydism, see: Wilferd Madelung, Der Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim und die 
Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965). 
595 Vom Bruck, Islam, 33. See her work also for more details.  
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out/rising against’. Its inherently revolutionary potential will be a core aspect to be discussed 
in relation to the Houthis’ mobilization, i.e. their prognostic framing.596 There always must be 
an ahl al-bayt who qualifies as imam. However, as vom Bruck points out, people need not 
follow him automatically unless he makes a call for allegiance (daʿwah) and is recognized by 
the ʿulamāʾ and other notables who then pay homage to him (bay’ah).597 Multiple claimants 
and self-acclaimed or contestingly proclaimed imams have historically been as existent as 
periods of interregnum without imam.598 In addition, dynasties were – albeit undue according 
to Zaydi doctrine – established, namely the Qasimi dynasty (1598–1853) considered to have 
spun an age of Zaydi flourishing in the 17th century and the Hamid al-Din dynasty (1904–
1962), which was less positively remembered as a period of despotic rule.599  
 Apart from the aforementioned differences in regard to succession, khurūj, and Ḥadīth, 
differences between Zaydism and Sunni theological doctrine are modest; they relate to 
specific legal rulings, certain practices like praying and the call to prayer (adhan), as well as 
holidays.600 It was under Qasimi imams in the late 18th and early 19th century that attempts 
were made by a Zaydi scholar and longtime chief judge to further transcend the differences 
between the denominations, specifically in regard to dynastic rule (which he regarded 
legitimate), the Ḥadīth (large parts of which he acknowledged), and most importantly khurūj 
(which he repudiated). Considering the potential for acquiescence towards the ruler inherent 
in the latter and for the legitimization of dynastic rule specifically, Muhammad al-Shawkani 
(1759–1834)601 was held in high esteem by four succeeding Qasimi imams. Leading scholars 
                                                          
596 Similar points are made by Michael Cook in his extensive study of the principle of ‘commanding what is right 
and forbidding what is wrong’: He holds that political activism is characteristic of the sect (i.e. Zaydism; p. 231); 
that in the Zaydi exegesis of this duty, the taxes collected by a zalim are illegal (p. 239; this point is relevant in 
regards to the accusation that the Houthis called upon the population to stop paying zakat [religious tax] to the 
government; and furthermore that recourse to arms in khurūj is the duty of the imam, not the individual believer 
(p. 248). The latter underlines once more the strict hierarchy centered on a scholarly leader (potentially with a 
claim to the imamate) to lead the upsurge against an unjust ruler – an interesting angle to evaluate the strict 
hierarchy prevalent among the Houthis. Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
597 Ibid., 32. 
598 Wilferd Madelung, Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran (Albany: The Persian Heritage Foundation, 1988), 
86, and as cited in vom Bruck, Islam, 33.  
599 See Dresch, History, 43ff. 
600 The position of the arms during prayer differs. Also a practice not followed by Zaydis but Sunnis is the 
uttering of ‘amin’ at the end of prayer. Despite this, Zaydis are allowed to pray together with Sunnis and have 
historically done so in Yemen. Beyond the general Muslim holidays shared by both denominations such as 
Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, Eid Adha, etc., Zaydis celebrate Eid al-Ghadeer, on which they commemorate the 
designation of Ali as Muhammad’s successor; the highly meaningful event in regard to Zaydi identity was 
prohibited after 1962, became legalized again in 1990, and was again suppressed between 2004 and 2008. Zaydis 
celebrate the Prophet’s Birthday as do mainstream Sunnis (while Salafis and Wahhabis denounce it). Lastly, 
while Zaydi doctrine does not support the celebration of Ashura (the matyrdom of Hussein in Karbala), Hussein 
al-Houthi has given lectures on the occasion. Cf. Salmoni et al., Regime, 288–290. 
601 On Shawkani’s work and its impact see: Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam. The Legacy of 
Muhammad al-Shawkani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); vom Bruck, Regimes, 192.  
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consider the impact of his work as a ‘Sunnification’ of Zaydism. What was attractive to 
Qasimi rulers, then, would also be attractive to post-imamate republican rulers: The decades 
after the revolution were the heyday of government attempts to erase the legacy of a 
millennium of Zaydi rule and of renewed ‘Sunnification’ in line with and referring to 
Shawkani602 – to the chagrin of staunch Zaydis.603 
 Zaydism’s imprinting on the social order604 was in its constitution of the ahl al-bayt or 
sādah as hereditary elites on top of the descent-based social pyramid. They were the first 
among the Zaydis as the Zaydis were the first among the social groups in general. Endogamy 
was self-evident. While sādah could be found in a variety of occupational groups from 
religious scholarship, administrative positions, long-distance trade and crafts to agriculture 
(working in petty-trade in the suq, however, would have been reckoned shameful and was 
thus avoided), they first and foremost considered themselves as the preservers of religious 
knowledge, tradition, and – owing the high significance of descent – genealogy. In other 
words, in their view they were the custodians of Zaydi collective memory. Besides education, 
appropriate moral comportment was quintessential. As the introductory citation of a Yemeni 
proverb illustrates: Although one is born into a sādah family, sādah identity is acquired by 
merit. The ideal point of reference in this regard was the family of the Prophet itself, i.e. 
members of the elite families oriented their moral comportment to equal the tradition of the 
ahl al-bayt, once more emphasizing the importance of their genealogical connection, as 
Pottek stresses.605 In line with what has been delineated before, vom Bruck holds that “’being 
Zaydi’ is usually understood as involving critical examination of forms of domination and 
action against abuses of power”,606 thus highlighting the practical implications of the principle 
of khurūj. On the outside, sādah status was expressed in reverence by non-sādah and non-
Zaydis, the respectful address ‘sayyid’ or ‘sharifa’ (for females), and possibly the imamah, a 
male headgear predominantly worn by religious scholars.607 It is worthwhile to note that 
learning and morals were employed as “markers of social distinction” not only in distinction 
to non-sādah of all shades, but even among sādah, making those with fewer prestige the 
object of condescension.608 
                                                          
602 Salmoni et al. note how reference to Shawkani served the regime as evidence for a uniform, pan-Islamic 
identity devoid of a specifically Zaydi role. Salmoni et al., Regime, 72. 
603 Salafis and Wahhabis on the other hand consider him as their intellectual precursor.  
604 The following paragraph is based on: vom Bruck, Islam.  
605 Damaris Pottek, “Am Anfang des Krieges stehen die Worte” (Magisterarbeit, Universität Hamburg, 2010), 
23.  
606 Vom Bruck, Regimes, 191.  
607 Vom Bruck, Islam, 334.  
608 Ibid., 119.  
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Finally, Zaydism has likewise inscribed itself into the spatial order of north Yemen. As I have 
previously mentioned, the region is pervaded by a sacred geography of sanctuaries or ‘hujar’ 
(sg. ‘hijrah’).609 They are protected spaces associated with sādah religious learning and 
teaching as well as mediation. According to their protective relation in regard to sādah, qabili 
are responsible for safeguarding their inviolacy, with detrimental loss of honor striking the 
person who either violates its sanctity or fails to protect it.610Hujar turned into notable 
locations of Zaydi revival from the late 1980s onwards; similarly, they serve(d) as refuge for 
members of the Houthi family during the armed conflict with the government. Both aspects 
will be tackled below. Shrines of prominent Zaydi scholars or imams and prestigious mosques 
(such as the tombs of Imam al-Hadi, al-Hadi mosque etc.) likewise belong to the sacred 
geography, albeit in another fashion. Although the visitation of shrines is not anchored in 
Zaydism, believers do visit and pray at these locations;611 since this contradicts Sunni 
doctrine, they have become prime targets of Salafi attack.  
 
5.1.2. Zaydi Discrimination and Marginalization 
It was less the religious doctrine of Zaydism that would lead to its ultimate fate, but its 
specific political and social configuration that would lead to the overthrow of the imamate. 
Forces of opposition against the monarch had formed from the 1930s onwards, mainly among 
intellectuals exposed to the regional and international environment which in their view had 
shone a bad light upon the developmental status of their country.612 While the assassination of 
Imam Yahya in 1948 did not succeed in terminating the imamate as such, a coup in 
September 1962 led by the subsequent first President of the YAR, Brigadier General 
Abdullah al-Sallal, did. In the immediate aftermath, he proclaimed: “The corrupt monarchy 
which ruled for a thousand years was a disgrace to the Arab nation and to all humanity. 
Anyone who tries to restore it is an enemy of God and man!”613 He directly referred to the 
                                                          
609 For an attempt to identify and map the location of these hujar and relate them to Houthis areas of influence, 
see Salmoni et al., Regime, 69f.  
610 See Caton, Yemen Chronicle, for an extensive contextualization of his anthropological research in a hijra.  
611 Salmoni et al., Regime, 290.  
612 On the “Free Yemeni Movement” see: J. Leigh Douglas, The Free Yemeni Movement, 1935–1962 (Beirut: 
The American University of Beirut, 1987). See Willis, Unmaking, 382f. for a discussion of other forces/positions 
involved.  
613 “Yemen: Arabia Felix”, Time Magazine, October 26, 1962, accessed March 14, 2015, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874526,00.html. Brinkley Messick similarly cites the First 
Proclamation of the Republic: The politics of the republican state will reinstitute “the correct Islamic shari’a, 
after its death had been caused by tyrannical and wicked rulers” and that it will strive to achieve the “elimination 
of hatreds and envies, and divisions of descent and madhab”, Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State. Textual 
Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1993), 53.  
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danger of a reestablishment of the imamate by Muhammad al-Badr,614 the fugitive deposed 
imam who had fled to Saudi-Arabia and gathered support against the republicans. The war 
between ‘royalist’ forces supporting al-Badr (beyond Zaydi and qabili loyalists he received 
support from Jordan, the KSA, and Britain) and the ‘republicans’ (backed by 70,000 Egyptian 
troops615 and alleged weapon supplies by the Soviet Union) lasted until 1970, when the 
external powers had disengaged and the YAR had been officially recognized by the KSA. The 
royalists, who had territorially dominated the northern areas of Ma’rib, Amran, Al-Jawf, and 
Sa’ada, were defeated.616 
 Lacking a profound and ‘powerful founding ideology’, as vom Bruck claims,617 the 
republican state established persistent dissociation from the imamate’s political and social 
order as a core trait of its self-conception. It has perpetually – until today – repeated the 
accusation of “Zaydi-inspired activism [which] inevitably aims to reassert the exclusive rights 
of the ahl al-bayt”.618 The legitimacy of the Republic stemmed from the abolishment of 
descent-based rule and privilege; accordingly, and all the more so considering the first decade 
of being in a war with pro-imamate forces, the republican regime sought to extinguish the 
representations of what it opposed and what it subsumed under the spawns of ‘Zaydism as 
such’.619 Next to the physical elimination of royalist enemies in the outward war it waged was 
the removal of Zaydis from political, religious, and civil service positions and the seizure of 
certain Zaydi property; both were done in an unsystematic and far from exhaustive, but 
nevertheless observable, way. The now vacant positions in state administration were 
increasingly awarded to qabili sheikhs620 in an attempt to secure their loyalty in the war and 
beyond. Besides political positions, they furthermore received monetary and material 
incentives, reaching even the level of road and other infrastructure construction in the 1970s; 
Zaydi areas on the other hand were systematically excluded from such development activities 
and intensified inclusion into physical state building. Slowly but steadily, these coopted 
groups replaced the old elites, i.e. the regime succeeded in transforming a social order in 
                                                          
614 He died in London in 1996.  
615 These troops, who had been perceived by some as almost an ‘occupation army’ withdrew after the Egyptian 
defeat in the 1967 Six Day War. The war in Yemen is often evaluated as ‘Egypt’s Vietnam’ due to the high 
losses suffered.  
616 For more on the war see Dresch, History.  
617 Vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 203.  
618 Ibid. 
619 King elucidates how the regime’s master narrative was directed against Zaydi rule by linking Zaydism as a 
whole to imamate oppression and backwardness while portraying the republic in terms of ‘freedom’ and 
‘progress’. King, “Zaydi Revival”, 432.  
620 And other groups and influential personalities assumed to be of use to the regime. Two of those who 
established their privileged positions within the state system in this period were Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar and 
Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar.  
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which status was attributed based on descent into one in which it was based on economic 
success and inclusion into the system of state patronage (maḥsūbyīa).621 
 Far more perceivable and painful than this grand social reordering was, for sādah as well 
as non-sādah Zaydis, the immediate structural and particularly ideational discrimination they 
suffered. Zaydi learning had become suppressed in schools, hujar, and other places of 
learning while – as Zaydis claim – the official school curricula had begun discriminating 
against Zaydis and supporting hate speech. The confiscation of material from institutes, book 
stores, and private collections adds to these attempts of intercepting the transmission of Zaydi 
tradition,622 as does the fear of symbolic and physical assault due to one’s visible or simply 
known affiliation with the religious community. In her elaborate anthropological study of the 
Zaydi elite’s management of their (spoiled) identity,623 vom Bruck tells the stories of how 
numerous individuals of various age cohorts and from different social backgrounds 
experienced the “cataclysmic events” of the post-revolutionary period.624 Therein, those at 
school age recount how they were called names and excluded by schoolmates and exposed as 
‘bad examples’ by teachers alike; respected scholars remember how they were publicly 
humiliated by those throwing off their imamah in the street; how the respectful address 
‘sayyid’ became a nickname to be teased with; of public belittling; and how interactions 
among each other and with other social groups increasingly turned into minefields.625 She 
describes the accompanying emotions of confusion, sadness, shame, anxiety, a feeling of 
betrayal and estrangement – in short: of stigmatization and trauma.626 Evidently, memories 
differ, depending on the social position of the individual person and the intensity of the 
particular event or series of events. Especially for those who supported the revolution, the turn 
of the events that did not take into account the side they were on or even fought on was 
bitter.627 
 Zaydis and especially sādah had three options for how to reformulate their identity in 
reaction to these experiences: first, renounce their sādah identity; second, find a way to 
                                                          
621 Pottek, “Anfang”, 20f.; Sarah Philipps, Yemen’s Democratic Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronized 
and Pluralized Authoritarianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). She holds that the regime’s inclusion 
of some qabili and other groups served also to neutralize non-coopted qabili elements (p. 95).  
622 Cf. Samy Dorlian, La mouvance zaydite dans le Yémen contemporain. Une modernisation avortée (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2013), 24.  
623 Cf. Erving Goffman, Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963).  
624 Vom Bruck, Islam; here: 252.  
625 Vom Bruck provides examples of royalist and republican traditional poems (zamil) employed in denigrating 
the respective other in a ‘battle of words’. This once more emphasizes the importance of poetry in identity 
contestation and symbolic conflict behavior. Vom Bruck, Islam, 61f. 
626 Gabriele vom Bruck, “Evacuating Memory in Postrevolutionary Yemen”, in Counter-Narratives. History, 
Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi-Arabia and Yemen, ed. Madawi al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 229–245; vom Bruck, Islam.  
627 Vom Bruck, Islam, 249f.  
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redefine and reconcile their heritage with the new republican state order; and third, to revive 
their religious tradition in face of its suppression. Vom Bruck traces all three directions and 
suggests that they partly occurred in chronological succession and that the majority for a long 
time chose the middle ground. Some stuck to renouncement, few commenced revival early. 
She detects what she terms “self-willed amnesia”628: parents refrain from telling their children 
about their descent, families drop the parts of their names that identify them as sādah, 
ancestors and spiritual leaders are no longer commemorated, nor are rituals observed, there is 
no more striving to follow the Prophet’s family, occupational choices shift towards formerly 
less acceptable domains (such as petty trade), and importantly, endogamy is given up in favor 
of increased intermarriage with other social strata such as qabili from the 1970s onwards. 
Especially the latter caught wide attention, for it was formerly regarded as one of the most 
exclusive aspects of the social order that caused resentment among those barred from the 
eligible circle.629 By these measures, they were thus giving up the ‘historical depth’ 
(genealogy, memory) that has been constitutive for their self-conception.630 
 While the above describes the reaction of Zaydis/sādah to a threat predominantly to their 
social identity, a second major challenge entering the stage – this time foremost to their 
religious identity – contributed to changing the rules of the game: the rise of the Salafi and 
Wahhabi movements in the north of Yemen. In line with their policy of obliterating the Zaydi 
legacy, the regime supported the influx of asserters of the Sunni reform movement and the 
institutionalization of their places of worship and teaching.631 On the doctrinal level, 
Salafi/Wahhabi clerics in the KSA repeatedly declared Zaydis ‘unbelievers’ (‘kuffār’), by a 
speech act excluding them from the Muslim ‘ummah. This act of ‘takfīr’ is commonly 
associated with fundamentalist Sunni strands, the originators of which are reviled as 
‘mukaffirin’, which is prevalent among the defamed in Yemen in reference to their defamers. 
Speaking out against ‘takfīr’ was one of the first steps to counter discrimination on a doctrinal 
level (see next chapter).632 
                                                          
628 Vom Bruck, “Evacuating”, 239.  
629 On this, Shelagh Weir provides a telling illustration: The marriage of a sharifa with a qabili was accompanied 
by the following song: “Oh sayyids, you tricked us/With your turbans, remedies and charms/Whenever we 
proposed marriage, you said/‘With a sharifa, a sayyid’s daughter? It’s not allowed.’/God only knows whose 
book you studied!” Shelagh Weir, “A Clash of Fundamentalisms”, Middle East Report 27 (Fall 1997).  
630 As a reverse effect of the defamation which they took as a “personal affront”, vom Bruck notes an increased 
awareness among Zaydis of their “distinctness”. Vom Bruck, “Evacuating”, 72. 
631 See also: Gabriele vom Bruck, “Being a Zaydi in the Absence of the Imam. Doctrinal revisions, religious 
instruction, and the (re-) invention of ritual”, in Le Yémen Contemporain, ed. Rèmy Leveau, Franck Mermier and 
Udo Steinbach (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1999), 169-192.  
632 See Pottek, “Anfang”, 83–86, for an elaboration by Yahya al-Houthi on the Salafi/Wahhabi threat towards 
Zaydis generally and what he call the “takfiri-movement” in particular.  
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Two points can be added in regard to Salafi/Wahhabi success in proselytizing and in regard to 
an accompanying trend: What made their doctrines so attractive for Yemenis under the given 
circumstances is their emphasis on the equality of all believers, thus taking the same line as 
the republican policy of erasing privilege through birthright. In addition, the regime 
propagated Shawkani’s work again, thereby popularizing his convergence of Zaydi and Sunni 
doctrine (or rather, the conflation of Zaydi to Sunni doctrine).633 
 These processes, however, unfolded under circumstances different from the war-dominated 
1960s, and it was these circumstances which induced more active Zaydi responses to their 
marginalization and discrimination.   
 
5.1.3. Organizing Opposition and Revival 
The post-war period not only brought a consolidation of state-building efforts, but also 
significant social change. The oil-boom in the Gulf states attracted huge numbers of (young) 
Yemeni migrant workers with a number of effects, some of which were previously noted: a 
tremendous influx of remittances that led to new consumption patterns and formed a main 
pillar of the YAR’s state income; cross-border trade of agrarian products as well as arms and 
qāt smuggling from the Sa’ada governorate into the KSA resulted in an additional economic 
ascent of the North, surpassing that of other regions; labor shortage in agriculture and land 
acquisition by sheikhs for cash crop production impacted rural livelihood patterns; in 
combination, these phenomena as signs of prosperity and employment opportunities also 
attracted internal migration to the North. Infrastructure expansion (roads, telephone lines, 
schools etc.) made for a better opening up of and access to the region. What lagged behind, 
however, was government representation: A permanent representation through officials in 
some areas was only established in 1980, once more emphasizing the fact that the North has 
historically remained peripheral to state control.  
 In sum, these changes brought with them an increased exposition to the outside world for 
both those who remained in the North, but much more so for those young males in their 20s 
and 30s, who left the country to seek their fortunes abroad. And, as Salmoni et al. stress, it 
changed the way in which people related to their environment, their qabila or qabili culture 
respectively, and their religious identity.634 The increased intermixing with others, be they 
                                                          
633 Cf. Laurent Bonnefoy, “Les identités religieuses contemporaines au Yémen. Convergence, résistances et 
instrumentalisations”, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, No. 121–122 (2008), pp. 201–215. It 
is worth noting that this policy of supporting Salafi/Wahhabi expansion not only concerned areas in which 
Zaydis formed the majority, but also Shafi’i regions. Vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 187.  
634 For the above paragraph see Salmoni et al., Regime, 81–84; here: 81.  
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foreigners, from other regions, social strata, or otherwise strangers, on the one hand created a 
stronger awareness of, or at least attention to, one’s own identity; besides, as noted above, 
social hierarchies were slowly penetrated by more and more mixed marriages. A similar effect 
was created due to the heightened economic competition with the resulting economic rise or 
downfall of individuals and families, dissociated from their traditional social position based 
on descent – remains of descent-based hierarchies became even more despised by many non-
Zaydis/non-sādah in this context. The generation of young Zaydis was exposed to different 
experiences: Better educated than preceding generations, yet frequently ignorant of their 
religious background, they were partly victims to discrimination by vehement forfeiters of 
Wahhabi/Salafi strands of Sunni Islam in the KSA, partly they were exposed to it and found it 
appalling635 (the latter, in fact, applied to many Shafi’i Yemeni migrants). In any case: Their 
religious identity became a central topic to many young Zaydis. Some deliberately 
commenced investigating their denominational legacy, and they were able to do so with less 
ballast than those who had living memories of the imamate period; some even developed a 
kind of nostalgia for the era in which the Zaydi creed had been the respected basis of their 
state. The Islamic revival that gripped the Muslim world in the wake of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1979 certainly contributed its share to this inert awakening, for it stirred 
religious activities generally and Wahhabi/Salafi expansion in particular. During the 1980s, a 
number of Zaydi revivalist scholars like the non-sādah scholar Muhammad Izzan636 and Al-
Murtada al-Mahatwari,637 prayer leader at the famous al-Badr Mosque in Sanaa, began to 
teach traditional Zaydi texts again. They also reproduced them in printed and audio media 
(cassette recordings) and developed curricula to be taught.638 Nevertheless, Zaydi-revivalism 
remained faint-hearted for another decade639 until perceived pressures had increased to a 
degree that made inactivity apparently intolerable. The family that was to play the leading role 
in the following revivalism was the one to give the later rebellion its name: the al-Houthi. It 
                                                          
635 Ibid., 89.  
636 For details on Izzan and his changing position during the conflict see: Dorlian, Mouvance, 200ff., Bernard 
Haykel, “Rebellion, Migration or Consultative Democracy? The Zaydis and Their Detractors in Yemen”, in Le 
Yémen Contemporain, ed. Rèmy Leveau, Franck Mermier and Udo Steinbach (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1999), 
193–201, here: 200.200. 
637 Killed in a suicide attack during Friday Prayer in al-Badr Mosque in Sana’a on March 20, 2015. 
638 Salmoni et al., Regime, 97. In the early 1990s they also spread pamphlets denouncing Wahhabi/Salafi 
intrusion supported by the KSA in the Zaydi heartland. Amin Abu Zayd, Al-wahhabiyya wa khataruha ala 
mustaqbal al-Yaman al-siyasi [The Wahabiyya and its Danger for the Political Future of Yemen] (Beirut, 1991), 
cited in: ICG, “Defusing”, 9.  
639 In fact, another Zaydi group had been active since the 1960s (with a long period of inactivity between the 
1970s and 1990). It is connected to the family of al-Wazir and the group’s name of ‘Ittihad al-Qiwa al-
Sha’biyya’ (‘Union of Popular Forces’). Its aims were rather intellectual. Today the main activities revolve 
around a Zaydi cultural research center. Cf. Dorlian, Mouvance, 52–60.  
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shall now be introduced in greater detail and with a special emphasis on how the family’s 
background and its structure were conducive to its enduring success.  
 
5.1.3.1. The al-Houthi Family 
From the 1970s onward, Wahhabi religious scholars in the KSA repeatedly attacked Zaydism 
in fatawa (sg. fatwah) they issued.640 Badr al-Din al-Houthi (ca. 1924–2010) was one Zaydi 
scholar who countered these religious rulings.641 Son and nephew of renowned Zaydi 
religious scholars, he himself studied among others alongside the famous cleric and member 
of the marjiʿyīah (Zaydi religious authority) Majd al-Din al-Mu’ayyidi and became a 
prominent and respected scholar in the late imamate period. From the late 1970s onwards, he 
took a stance against anti-Zaydi sermons and fatawa in speaking and writing. In 1979 for 
example, he published a text in response to a defamation by the prominent Saudi Sheikh 
Abdul Aziz Bin Baz in which he refutes the allegations he raised about allegedly 
inappropriate Zaydi religious practices. He specifically defends the issue of common prayer 
of Zaydis and Sunnis, emphasizing the legitimacy both ways: Zaydis can pray behind Sunnis 
and vice versa.642 This text would be reprinted more than a decade later and reach wide 
prominence among revivalists.643 Another famous example stems from a later period: In 1994 
he countered popular anti-Zaydi writings by Muqbil al-Wadi’i among others, accusing him of 
being corrupted by the KSA.644 
 Badr al-Din set up an extended, multi-generational family: He married four times between 
the 1950s and 1980s – both daughters of prominent sādah as well as qabili families, which 
created a large kinship network. From these marriages resulted numerous offspring, who – 
themselves members of the generation of young Zaydis with growing interest in their creed –
again assumed multiple roles in regard to revivalist activities and further enlarged their 
                                                          
640 One of the even wider examples (in the sense that it refers to all Shiʿa) was the ruling of Abdallah bin Jirbin 
in 1991 who declared that “Shiʿa might be lawfully killed by Muslims” (note the contradictoriness therein). 
Guido Steinberg, “Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi’is: remarks about the intellectual roots of anti-Shi’ism”, in: Roel 
Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), 115; vom Bruck, 
“Regimes”, 205. 
641 Birthdates are difficult to verify for the al-Houthi family. In case of doubt about the exact year, I add a “ca.”. 
Dorlian (Mouvance, 162), for example, provides 1926 as the year of birth of Badr al-Din. However, I found the 
more widely stated 1922 more convincing.  
642 Badr al-Din ibn Amir al-Din ibn al-Hussein al-Houthi, al-Ijaz fi al-Radd ‘ala Fatawa al-Hijaz [The Concise 
Response to the Fatwas from the Hijaz] (Sana’a: Maktabat al-Yaman al-Kubra, 1979). 
643 Salmoni et al., Regime, Appendix C, 297. 
644 The 1994 text was published as: Badr al-Din al-Houthi, Tahrir al-afkar an taqlid al-ashrar [Liberating the 
Thoughts of the Imitation of Evil] (Sana’a: Mu’assasat ahl al-bayt li-l-ri’aya al-ijtima’iyya, 1994). See Dorlian, 
Mouvance, 164ff. for a description of the lines of argumentation used by Badr al-Din in both this as well as the 
1979 writing cited above.  
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kinship as well as associational network through their own pattern of marriage as well as the 
skillful employment of their social and religious capital.645 These extensive networks would 
prove significant for mobilization as well as for the impact that regime repression (and 
attempts at cooptation) would have, for it many times affected or involved a much larger, 
more complex group than anticipated.646 
 The first age cohort, consisting of Hussein (b. 1959), Yahya (b. 1965), Ahmad, Abdul 
Qadir, Muhammad, Hamid, Ibrahim, and Amir al-Din attended state schools and the newer 
schools with an increasingly revivalist curriculum; the second cohort had then already been 
exposed to the activities of the ‘Believing Youth’ group (see below 5.1.3.3.) and their summer 
camps: Abdul Malik (b. 1980), Abdul Khaliq, Najm al-Din, Abdul Salam, and Ali; equally 
Abdullah Hussein, son of Hussein, and – thought the same age – a member of the subsequent 
generation.647 While all family members enjoyed a thorough religious education and were 
introduced to their Zaydi legacy and family networks early on, Salmoni et al. tried to assign 
the individuals to specific fields of activity, an attempt, which despite its potential limits, 
highlights some interesting aspects:  
 
Field of Activity Houthi Family Member 
Zaydi marjiʿyīah (religious authority) Badr al-Din 
Zaydi revivalism Badr al-Din*, Muhammad, Hamid, Hussein, 
Yahya* and others 
Politics Badr al-Din* (Hizb al-Haqq), Hussein (Hizb 
al-Haqq), Yahya (GPC) 
Armed Action Hussein, Badr al-Din*, Yahya, Abdul Malik  
 
Table 5.1.: Adapted from: Salmoni et al., Regime, 104; I added Badr al-Din and Yahya, respectively, 
and are marked with an * 
 
The fields of action have been constructed on the basis of the development which the process 
of Zaydi opposition and revivalism took: From the humble beginnings of Badr al-Din’s 
speaking (and writing) out against defamation and discrimination, revivalism in form of 
teaching and ‘ideational awakening’ were the next steps, followed by and interwoven with 
political engagement, and finally, the escalation into armed action. The most prominent faces 
                                                          
645 Salmoni et al., Regime, 102ff.  
646 Ibid.  
647 Ibid., 103f.  
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of the later movement would reflect this development; it would be Badr al-Din, Hussein, and 
Abdul Malik, each representing one of the phases and each adding another dimension of 
legitimacy the movement could rely on: legitimacy based on revered religious scholarship and 
the ‘wisdom of old age’; legitimacy based on religious scholarship that would be transformed 
into charismatic sociopolitical activism to tackle worldly problems and grievances, 
strengthened at a later point by martyrdom for the cause; and again religious scholarship, but 
this time in combination with youthful energy and strong leadership in the face of armed 
confrontation with the state.  
 
 
Figure 5.1.: Popular depiction of Badr al-Din al-Houthi (middle) with his sons Hussein (left, martyred 
in 2004) and Abdul Malik648 
 
How this core of protagonists shaped the course of institutionalization and mobilization shall 
be elucidated along the lines of the two organizations often mentioned as related in one way 
or the other to the later ‘Houthis’: the al-Haqq Party and the Shabab al-Mu’imeen or 
Believing Youth (BY).  
                                                          
648 Benjamin Wiacek, “In pictures: The Scars of North Yemen’s Wars”, Al Jazeera, July 2, 2012, accessed 
March 20, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2012/06/2012630195727807952.html. The 
iconography of this image fits well the typical depiction of religious and political leaders in the Middle East, be 
it e.g. figures like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hosni Mubarak, the kings of the Gulf monarchies, Yassir Arafat, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Hassan Nasrallah, or, equally in family trinity, Hafez al-Assad, Bassel al-Assad, and 
Bashar al-Assad. Reproductions of such images of personalized rule/leadership typically decorate homes, stores, 
public buildings, and the public space (in the form of large posters or else). Ali Abdullah Saleh had himself 
portrayed in the same fashion and as of spring 2015 the reproduction of images of his son Ahmed – who was 
rumored to have been some kind of designated successor long before 2011 – sees a dramatic increase. First 
(potentially staged) rallies to push for his candidacy for Presidency have taken place in early March 2015. 
“Supporters of Ahmed Saleh Call on Him to Run for President”, Yemen Times, March 11, 2015, accessed March 
12, 2015, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1867/photoessay/4958/Supporters-of-Ahmed-Saleh-call-on-him-to-
run-for-president.htm.  
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5.1.3.2. Hizb al-Haqq (‘Truth Party’) 
1990 saw not only Yemeni unification, but in its wake also a major opening of the political 
sphere. The floor was now opened for a competitive party system – a signal that quickly led to 
the founding of numerous parties. Prior to the establishment of the Republic of Yemen, the 
YAR had been dominated by the General People’s Congress (GPC), while the Yemeni 
Socialist Party (YSP) formed its equivalent in the equally one-party rule of the PDRY. 
Among the newly founded parties649 was the successful Sunni Islamist ‘Islah’ (‘Reform’) 
Party under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar (introduced in chapter 4.1.2.2.). In 
order to counter their adversaries’ move and in taking the next step towards a stronger 
(political) representation, Zaydi grandees likewise founded a party, the Hizb al-Haqq (‘Truth 
Party’). Among the founders were Majd al-Din al-Mu’ayyidi (Badr al-Din’s mentor), Badr al-
Din al-Houthi himself, Hassan Zayd, Saleh Falita, Muhammad al-Mansour, and Muhammad 
al-Maqalih, a noted qāḍī.650 
 A few statements in regard to the party's rationale, as well as its goals, can serve to 
illustrate the appraisal of central actors. The party’s general secretary, for example, sayyid 
Ahmad al-Shami, emphasized its defensive stance against the threat of Wahhabi intrusion: 
Wahhabism is a child of imperialism and it is spear-head in our country. Both are one and 
the same thing. How do we stand up to an enemy we don’t see? We are seeing 
imperialism in our country in its Islamic guise… Wahhabism is readying conditions in 
order to colonize us indirectly for [the] imperialist [cause].651 
 
Saudi Arabia is pouring lots and lots of money into Yemen to promote its own version of 
Wahhabi Islam. This is actually an irrational and uncompromising version of our religion, 
which we can do without. So, we need to counter these efforts… and to fight intellectual 
advances by Wahhabism into Yemen.652 
Muhammad Izzan, also one of the founding members, explained the following in regard to the 
aims of al-Haqq:653 
                                                          
649 Parties are negligible in regard to the research question and are consequently not treated as separate actors 
(except for al-Haqq and Islah). Worth noting is the coalition of leading opposition parties in the “Joint Meeting 
Parties (JMP)” in 2005 as a counterforce to Saleh’s ruling GPC. Founding members of the JMP included: Islah, 
the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), the Nasserite Unionist Party (NUP), the Socialist Arab Baath Party, al-Haqq 
Party, and the Public Forces Union. Worth noting on a different note: March 2012 saw the emergence of the first 
Yemeni Salafi party, the “Rashad Union Party”. On the role of political parties and the respective political space 
they were able to act in (in the face of increasingly authoritarian rule since the mid-1990s) see: Gamal Gasim, 
“Explaining Political Activism in Yemen”, in Taking to the Streets. The Transformation of Arab Activism, ed. 
Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 109–135.  
650 Salmoni et al., Regime, 94f.  
651 Muhammad Izzan (ed.), Al-‘Allama al-Shami: Ara’ wa mawaqif (Amman: Matabi’ Sharikat al-Mawrid al-
Sina’iyya al-Urduniyya, 1994) 89, cited in: Haykel, “Rebellion”, here: 198. 
652 Yemen Times, July 1, 1992, cited in: Dresch/Haykel, “Stereotypes”, 412. 
653 The way he put it, those aims are also applicable to his understanding of the later ‘Believing Youth’.  
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We wanted a political movement that respects the past [i.e. Zaydi tradition] rather than to 
return to it [the imamate]. The past is gone and all with it... The idea was that the party 
would work within the new political establishment such as democracy, pluralism and 
freedom of expression. We wanted to develop the Zaydi ideology so it would be 
compatible with the current era. We did not insist that the leader be an ‘alim (scholar) but 
was to be educated in shari’a law and knowledge of political affairs.654 
Based on an interview with Yahya al-Houthi in 2009, Pottek seeks to situate the founding of 
the party in a more general picture. In line with Yahya’s narration, she asserts that it should be 
interpreted as an affirmative move of traditional sādah leadership responsibilities. Yahya 
describes it as the duty of the sādah and of his family to disclose the Wahhabis’655 ‘true 
intentions’ to the population. Referring to the perceived threat by Salafi/Wahhabi scientific 
institutes, he stated:  
We [the sādah] were there from the beginning, because we understand the Wahhabiyya, 
we studied it (...) The ordinary people do not understand. We are the authority for the 
Zaydiyya. We are ‘ʿulamāʾ and a family of scholars, we know what they strive for. We 
told the people that they should not believe them and that it was a conspiracy.656 
The founding of al-Haqq, which he portrays as having resulted from the intellectual and 
political efforts of his family specifically, was a liberal-democratic act; its success quickly 
threatened the regime, Islah, and Saudis (all equalized with ‘the Wahhabis’ or their 
supporters, respectively) and allegedly resulted in attempts of intimidation through officially 
sanctioned propaganda and physical assaults (ascribed to Islah) against the property of 
members before the elections in 1993. In short, their legitimate, democratic engagement – 
which could be termed a ‘freedom and justice frame’ – was under attack by those adversaries 
whose influence, or rather dominance, they sought to counter. I agree with Pottek in her 
evaluation of Yahya’s account as another ‘defensive narrative’, akin to those affirmations of 
defensiveness in response to experienced aggression, which were later on so perpetually 
emphasized by the Houthi movement.657 
 One major concern that plagued the party from the beginning was the latent suspicions 
confronting a reentry of Zaydi actors onto the political floor. While Ayman Hamidi holds that 
exactly this fact was another rationale for founding al-Haqq to begin with, namely with the 
purpose of avoiding accusations of “clandestine anti-regime activities” they had so often 
                                                          
654 Cited in: Vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 202.  
655 Zaydis tend to subsume all strands of Salafism and similar Sunni fundamentalist strands under the term of 
“Wahhabism”. My presentation follows this practice, on the one hand due to my attempt to let the actors speak, 
while on the other hand it is almost impossible to reconstruct who exactly (a) was referred to and (b) to which 
strand this person or subgroup is to be counted.  
656 Adapted and translated from: Pottek, “Anfang”, 86.  
657 Ibid., 89ff.  
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faced since 1962,658 the issue was not resolved that easily. The party’s leadership needed to 
take more active means in order to dissolve such suspicion.659 First, they underlined the fact 
that they were not an exclusively Zaydi party, but pursued political goals which were also 
attractive to a range of Sunni and Sufi members and leaders.660 Second, they affirmed their 
distancing from any claims for a restoration of the imamate in the party’s founding manifesto, 
wherein they stated that although the imamate forms an ideal for government, it can no longer 
be appropriate under current social and political conditions.661 Instead, they asserted 
democratic elective principles and the programmatic goals of reinvigorating shari’a law and 
the moral principle of ‘commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong’.662 25,000 
members registered with al-Haqq soon after its establishment; its resonance among younger 
people, however, is put into doubt by Salmoni et al., who argue that it rather represented an 
elite and much less so those who strived for genuine political participation and change. There 
were no grassroots organizations connected to it that would have provided a more thorough 
pervasion of society.663 Despite this, they started with two of eight seats in Sa’ada governorate 
during the 1993 parliamentary elections. Those seats were allocated to younger 
representatives, namely Hussein al-Houthi and Abdullah al-Razzami – both of whom would 
later become leaders in the Believing Youth and be at the forefront of the conflict escalation 
in 2004. This brief height, however, was shortly thereafter followed by a number of 
drawbacks for the party. In 1994, it already had to close its party magazine ‘Al-Ummah’ due 
to financial problems; in the elections of 1997 it did not win any seats, it was, however, 
awarded the Ministry of Religious Endowments by the decision of Saleh, who wanted to 
balance Islah’s influence by taking the post from it;664 plus, the rather cordial relations al-
Haqq held with the YSP were considered inappropriate and the declaration of neutrality 
during the civil war was taken with suspicion as to which side they were supporting.665 
                                                          
658 Ayman Hamidi, “Inscriptions of Violence in Northern Yemen: Haunting Histories, Unstable Moral Spaces”, 
Middle Eastern Studies 45(2), March 2009, 165–187, here: 166.  
659 On the necessity for holders of political offices to divert a permanent distrust in this regard see an interview 
citation with a Zaydi scholar in: ICG, “Defusing”, 8, n. 41.  
660 Ibid., 167; Vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 201. 
661 Haykel referred to the step of declaring the imamate a “defunct institution” as a “rupture with Zaydi 
tradition”. Haykel, “Rebellion”, 193. See also: Pottek, “Anfang”, 87ff.; Dorlian, Mouvance, 29ff.  
662 Muhammad al-Mansour, one of the ‘ulama signatories of the manifesto, in an interview with Dorlian stated 
that: “The imamate was a means, not an end.” Cited in: Samy Dorlian, “Zaydisme et modernisation: émergence 
d’un nouvel universel politique?”, Chronique Yéménites 13 (2006): 1–22, here: 12 (translated by the author). 
663 Salmoni et al., Regime, 94.  
664 Vom Bruck, “Being a Zaydi”, 182. 
665 The anti-Houthi counterframing since the mid- to late-2000s held that the Houthis secretly supported the 
South in its secessionist strive. The actions of Al-Haqq – which was always considered in affiliation with the 
Houthis as some kind of ‘predecessor organization’ although it had more than once vehemently distanced itself 
from the movement – were therein used as evidence. Salmoni et al., Regime, 96.  
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Due to the above compromises on Zaydi traditions and the inclination of the party leadership 
to further give up on core issues of Zaydism in return for political inclusion, eminent scholars 
such as al-Mu’ayyidi and Badr al-Din over time distanced themselves from al-Haqq666 and 
finally left the party. The same applies for Hussein al-Houthi, who quit his affiliation even 
before ending his term in parliament in 1997. This was the moment in which he turned 
towards another mode of revivalist engagement: the ‘Believing Youth’.667 
 
5.1.3.3. The ‘Believing Youth’ 
Despite the previously presented attempts at teaching the young generation about their creed 
individual scholars had initiated in the 1980s, the Zaydis overall lacked an educational 
infrastructure that could come anywhere near the offensive and institutionalized Salafi 
instructional activities. After the liberalization in 1990, Muhammad Izzan took a chance and 
established ‘scientific schools’ (‘madāris ʿilmyīah’) in Sa’ada, al-Jawf, and Sana’a, mirroring 
the Salafi ‘scientific institutes’ in design and (almost) in name.668 In Sa’ada, he moreover 
opened a teacher training institute in order to qualify multipliers. Symbolically, it bore the 
name of a prominent 19th century Zaydi martyr and opponent to the ‘Sunnification’ attempts 
of Shawkani: Muhammad bin Saleh al-Samawi (executed 1825).669 
 One of those who received training at the teachers’ training institute in the early to mid-
1990s was Muhammad al-Houthi; first a student under Izzan, he soon opened his own 
institution in the hijra of Dahyan in Majz, the ancestral home of his family. The demand for 
Zaydi education was undeniably existent and students came from various regions to study and 
live in the schools. In how far they emerged organically or were initiated on purpose is 
beyond tracking, but after-school groups soon arose which were dedicated to cultural 
activities, sports, field trips to the vicinity etc. These activities were a source for strong 
bonding and the development of a collective identity, i.e. a positively perceived shared Zaydi 
identity. To enhance this reassuring trend, the teachers supported a slow formalization of the 
groups. From some time in the mid-decade onwards, they convened under the common name 
                                                          
666 In my opinion, Haykel’s (“Rebellion”, 199) interpretation of the distancing of al-Mu’ayyidi and Badr al-Din 
al-Houthi along the lines of ‘emigration from injustice’ according to Zaydi doctrine goes too far; the fact 
remains, however, that they even put a great geographical distance between themselves and party proceedings.  
667 ICG, “Defusing”, 6.  
668 Their curricula were also used by pro-traditionalist Zaydi teachers in local government schools. Salmoni et 
al., Regime, 97. 
669 Haykel, “Rebellion”, here: 200. Muhammad Izzan stated that in the beginning they wanted to name the 
institute after the founder of the Zaydiyya, Zayd bin Ali. After the ministry in charge prohibited this name due to 
its ‘political character’, they chose Samawi – a choice that could considered to be even more political, however, 
the official in charge occurs to have been unfamiliar with the historical personality and context. Dorlian, 
Mouvance, 110. See his work for more on the symbolic pitting of Samawi against Shawkani (pp. 109–112). 
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of “Muntada al-Shabab al-Mu’imeen” (‘Assembly of the Believing Youth’).670 They issued 
membership cards and sought to strengthen internal solidarity by any means possible, always 
in presumed “competition with Salafis for support from disgruntled youth and tribal members 
of Yemen’s periphery”671.  
 Based on the popularity of these activities and their potential for expansion beyond the 
immediate precincts of the schools and their pupils, the coordinators initiated summer camps 
around 1994: With a similar curriculum as the regular schools, they offered Qurʾanic and 
Zaydi religious teaching in the mornings, while the afternoons were dedicated to sports, 
cultural activities, and generally activities which reaffirmed internal solidarity and common 
Zaydi identity (like commemoration, rituals). The first camp was conducted in the well-
known hijra of Hamazat not far from Sa’ada. Word spread and soon it became prestigious 
among sādah and respected qabili families alike to send their children there, hence attracting 
more and more participants. Estimates speak of 10,000–15,000 students in 1994 and 1995 
alone. Given this demand, similar camps were set up in numerous other locations, reaching as 
far south as Ta’izz and Ibb. Not only the numbers of participants increased dramatically in 
comparison to those students reached only through schools; at the same time, the age cohorts 
expanded and, most importantly, barriers based on social strata were overcome: Sons of 
sādah, non-sādah, qabili, merchant- and other families were all sharing the same experiences. 
Besides, the camps served as sites for revivalist literature, records etc.,672 thus reaching out 
even beyond the audience present to their respective families and social networks.673 
 For some time, those instructional and youth activities were mainly the domain of 
Muhammad al-Houthi and some others who saw their field of action primarily in 
teaching.674With the BY steadily growing, however, a number of the ‘old guards’ and 
(frustrated) al-Haqq members became interested and started to get engaged as well. Among 
                                                          
670 Some sources contend that the origin of the later Believing Youth (BY) lay in study groups in the 1980s that 
studied the Iranian Revolution (Abdullah Lux, “Yemen's Last Zaydī Imām: The shabāb al-muʾmin, the Malāzim, 
and 'ḥizb allāh' in the Thought of Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī”, Contemporary Arab Affairs 2:3, 2009, 369–
434, here: 376) or, according to a GoY official’s allegation, were even trained in Iran in order to spread the 
revolution (ICG, “Defusing”, 11). While it appears possible that the BY built on a prior study group, and it might 
even be the case that they at a certain point in time studied the events in Iran (it was a popular theme among all 
Islamic revivalist strands), the regime’s suspicions seem far fetched and rather fit into the familiar pattern of 
counterframing by portraying those related to the later movement as ‘closet Iranian proxies’.  
671 Winter, “Ansar of Yemen”.  
672 There have been new writings as well as typed and printed reproductions of formerly only handwritten copies 
of Zaydi texts. Vom Bruck, “Being a Zaydi”, 182. 
673 For the paragraph see: Salmoni et al., Regime, 98ff.  
674 Like e.g. Al-Murtada al-Mahatwari. Haykel claims that in 1995 and 1998 the camps run by him were attacked 
and he was jailed twice. This is evidence of the ambivalent and contested context the camps took place in: 
Competing Salafis as well as the government must be considered in potential opposition towards their conduct. 
Haykel does not further specify the originator of the attacks, though. Bernard Haykel, “A Zaydi Revival?”, 
Yemen Update 36 (1995): 20, cited in: vom Bruck, “Being a Zaydi”, 182, n. 43. 
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those were Badr al-Din and Hussein al-Houthi (since 1997), and moreover Majd al-Din al-
Mu’ayyidi, Muhammad Izzan, Yahya al-Houthi, Abdullah al-Razzami, Abdul Karim Jadhban, 
and Salih Habra as guest lecturers.675 Particularly Hussein was revered by the students for his 
charismatic teaching.676 This popularity and reverence, and the associational networks that 
were created in general, would serve as a basis for mobilization after 2001; many of the above 
stated names – except for al-Mu’ayyidi and Izzan – would constitute significant nodes in 
these networks. An illustrative example for the high prestige in which Badr al-Din was held 
among those young Zaydis is provided by Hamidi677 who cites a zamil poem, which was 
recited in his honor during a summer camp in 2004 (i.e. after the height of the BY and already 
during the period of conflict escalation):  
Welcome to the full moon (badr) whose light has risen and dispelled the darkness of the 
impostors. They have narrated too many fake religious statements most of which were 
created by Juha678. And they ascribe those statements to the holy prophet and blaspheme 
his progeny. Oh deceived one, take off your nightclothes and wake up, the forenoon sun 
has already risen. And you, history, shout loudly, the millstone spun around you. And the 
Zaydi school restored its grandeur.  
While both al-Haqq and the BY should be viewed as institutions under the framework of 
Zaydi revivalism, the party and the youth movement differed profoundly in their constitution 
(formal, legal, national, political vs. informal, voluntary, regional, social), target groups (older 
elites vs. young generation), aims (political representation vs. sociocultural revivalism and 
identity affirmation), and emphasis on religious components (weak vs. strong). The overall 
goals were shared, as becomes clear in Yahya al-Houthi’s statement on the rationale for the 
initiation of the BY:  
Our main reason for action is to fight Wahhabism. There has been a cultural and 
intellectual war between Zaydism and Wahhabism since the revolution in the 1960s. The 
Yemeni government is looking for financial help from Saudi Arabia and so in exchange it 
has favoured the spread of Wahhabism.679 
The reasons he gave fit well for the establishment of al-Haqq (see above). In a similar vein to 
the party before, the Saleh regime in considered it useful, for some time, to support the BY in 
                                                          
675 Further personal overlapping between al-Haqq and BY concerned among others Ahmad al-Shami, Salah 
Falita, and Muhammad Izzan. Vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 202; Salmoni et al., Regime, 99; ICG, “Defusing”, 8, n. 
46.  
676 Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 167.  
677 Ibid., 171.  
678 Pseudohistorical character and most prominent protagonist of Islamic jocular prose narratives. Ulrich 
Malzorph, “Juha”, in Medieval Islamic Civilization. An Encyclopedia, Vol. 1: A–K, ed. Joseph W. Meri (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 426. 
679 Cited in: ICG, “Defusing”, 9. For additional statements by Yahya on the solely cultural role of the BY see: 
Pottek, “Anfang”, 100f.  
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an attempt to counterbalance Salafi/Wahhabi powers.680 Apart from the fact that it nurtured a 
movement it would have to struggle with later on, another effect resulting from this playing 
off of Salafi against Zaydi groups was a strengthening of latent tensions in the region and an 
additional loss of credibility, which its (Zaydi) critics could exploit.681 
 The overwhelming success of the BY ebbed after 1997. In 1999, Hussein left to Sudan to 
pursue further Qurʾanic studies; he returned in 2001. Around that time, a split occurred among 
the leadership of the BY: One group followed Muhammad Izzan while another sided with 
Hussein al-Houthi in what appears to have been a dispute on the prospective direction of the 
movement. Discussions on the extent to which activism should remain religious or in how far 
it should engage politically had been generally common among revivalists.682 While it cannot 
be established precisely what led to the division, according to Izzan it was due to a departure 
of Hussein towards a more radical “traditional” direction whereas he and those following him 
sought to continue with their “moderate academic” pathway.683 Izzan would later on become 
coopted by the regime684 and actively voice sharp criticism about the ‘Houthi movement’.  
 The BY can be said to have formed at the right time and under the right sociopolitical 
circumstances: With a pool of (mostly literate!) youths eagerly trying to (re)establish a 
collective identity, an older generation of eminent scholars engaged in teaching, technologies 
at their hands that made a dissemination of ideas easier (like cassettes), and enough political 
freedom to pursue their initiatives, they managed to overcome the obstacles prior generations 
had faced in the 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the regional trend of Islamic revival and 
Salafi/Wahhabi encroachment provided models as well as enough pressure, respectively, for 
action.685 How the way they would lead from their cultural revivalist activities to the 
‘Houthis’’ armed struggle and in how far there were overlaps or ruptures in the composition 
of the former and the latter movement will be treated in 7.1. In a nutshell, a speaker for the 
Houthi movement in 2013 summarized the development as follows:  
The precursor to the Huthi movement, the Believing Youth, was originally focused on 
correct religious practice. Hussein (...) shifted the focus to politics. Hussein argued that 
Zaydism is a revolutionary ideology that advocates removing an unjust ruler. For him, the 
main challenge in the Muslim world was not religious differences among Muslims but 
                                                          
680 Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 167, n. 8. Next to sources confirming these claims of GoY support, the ICG also cite 
an interview with Yahya al-Houthi in which he denies any such support. When considering various evidence, 
however, it seems appropriate to dismiss his denial. Cf. ICG, “Defusing”, 6, n. 30.  
681 Salmoni et al., Regime, 101.  
682 Vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 206ff.  
683 Lux, Last Imam, 377.  
684 After Izzan’s return from a trip to Iran and Lebanon in 2004 (before armed conflict commenced), he was 
imprisoned for nine months. Thereafter, he received a government position as the head of Saada radio station in 
2007. Ibid.; Salmoni et al., Regime, 108; Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 181. 
685 For an evaluation along similar lines: Ibid., 100f.  
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rather submission to foreign powers, especially the U.S. It was under Hussein that the 
movement began to use the slogan, ‘God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! 
Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!’ Some of the original founders of the Believing 
Youth disagreed with Hussein’s political focus.686 
Note that the BY was a “precursor” to the Houthis, not the same group.  
 
5.1.4. A Chronology of Escalation 
The following conflict description focuses on the events and developments relevant to the 
Houthi-regime conflict.687 It provides the essential information about the respective conflict 
item, the parties involved, and the violence involved; therein it neglects small skirmishes for 
the sake of focus, given that skirmishes are very frequent in the local context.  
 The chronology is divided into ten phases extending from the late 1970s until March 2015. 
The first and second phase provide brief summaries of the above sections, followed by the 
third or interim phase; the fourth to seventh phase are those of crucial relevance for the 
escalation from non-violent to violent conflict with the regime and will thus be depicted in 
detail to enable analysis; phases eight to ten, then, provide an overview on the events since the 
‘ Sa’ada wars’, adding certain features to it, and shedding some different light on several 
aspects. This is significant insofar as some of the sources in regard to frame resonance stem 
from later periods and need contextualization for an adequate source critique; besides, a 
number of framing pattern still persist, highlighting their centrality to the movement over 
time.  
 
(1) Zaydi Revivalist Phase I: Late 1970s – 1990 
Characterized by slowly growing interest in reviving their creed by young generation of 
Zaydis and by the re-initiation of religious teaching by some prominent older scholars. These 
efforts in effect led to an initial establishment of small study groups but without a permanent 
institutionalization. Tensions existed in regard to the increasing presence and expansion of 
Salafi/Wahhabi mosques and scientific institutes. Badr al-Din al-Houthi spoke out and 
published against defaming and ‘takfirī’ fatawa issued by prominent Saudi clerics against 
Zaydism. There is no manifest conflict with the regime.  
 
                                                          
686 Interview by ICG with Ali al-Bukhaiti, member of the Huthi delegation at the National Dialogue Conference 
in 2013/14, conducted in October 2013, cited in: ICG, “The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa”, Middle East Report 
154 (June 2014): 1. The retrospect perspective certainly raises the issue of idealization or later construction; 
nevertheless, it illustrates the official ‘story of political awakening’ from the perspective of the movement.  
687 It does not, however, include other conflicts and developments related to the South or else. 
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(2) Zaydi Revivalist Phase II: 1990 – 1997 
This phase was marked first by the attempt to achieve more representation and inclusion of 
Zaydi interests on a political level through the Hizb al-Haqq; Badr al-Din and Hussein al-
Houthi were among the protagonists here. The party split due to internal disagreements over 
the compromise of traditional Zaydi contents of faith in return for political 
inclusion/cooptation; after the 1997 parliamentary elections it lost its relevance.  
 In parallel, the younger generation around Muhammad Izzan and Muhammad al-Houthi 
establishes scientific schools. Beyond an intensification of Zaydi religious education, they 
institutionalize the ‘Believing Youth’ with a more recreational and cultural focus, thereby 
strengthening the positive identification with a Zaydi collective. The group comes to shape a 
number of subsequent cohorts of Zaydi youth, creating durable social networks, which would 
remain active and serve as a mobilizational base even after the demise of the original BY.  
 As a result of increased activities of both Salafi/Wahhabi and Zaydi religious activists, the 
early 1990s saw open conflict around their respective centers. Salafi firebrands like Muqbil 
al-Wadi’i (see chapter on Islamists) called for the destruction of Zaydi shrines, instigating 
violent responses from Zaydi activists. Additionally, the reinstitution in 1990688 of the 
prominent Zaydi celebration of ‘ʿEid al-Ghadīr’ – the commemoration of the Prophet’s 
appointment of Ali as his successor – witnessed attacks by adversaries.689 Salmoni et al. hold 
that this period in general saw more outbreaks of violence in the North,690 which they partly 
attribute to the economic pressures unleashed by the return of great numbers of migrant 
workers from the KSA. Furthermore, such fighting over resources might have coincided with 
or triggered skirmishes between qabila, creating multi-layered tensions with incidental 
outbreaks of fighting. Sources sympathetic to the Houthis also claim repeated incidents of 
intimidation and aggression during the 1993 electoral campaign as well as attacks on summer 
camps in 1995 and 1998. By the middle of the decade, the heightened level of violence had 
normalized again.  
  Saleh periodically provided limited financial support and occasional backing to both al-
Haqq and the BY, based on his rationale of playing out potentially strong oppositional forces 
(increasingly potent Islah or Salafi/Wahhabi respectively versus Zaydi political and 
religious/cultural organizations) against each other. For Zaydi activism, this ‘support’ was 
                                                          
688 The highly meaningful holiday had been prohibited between 1963 and 1989 and would again be prohibited 
from 2004 until 2008. Even in the very first years of its reinstitution, large crowds participated. Other Zaydi 
rituals were revived as well. See vom Bruck, “Being”, 186ff.  
689 For the description of escalations on this occasion in 1991 and 1992 in the Razih mountains see: Weir, 
“Clash”.  
690 Salmoni et al., Regime, 108.  
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insignificant. Overall, Saleh exacerbates his authoritarian rule, increasingly so in the second 
half of the decade. There is still no manifest conflict between Zaydi activists and the regime.  
 
(3) Interim: 1997 – 2001 
The period around the turn of the millennium saw a lot less activism. However, the situation 
in the northern governorates could not have been called stable; rather, it was still facing 
manifold challenges and home to competing interest groups that lay dormant.691 Two 
prominent figures from earlier years, Badr al-Din al-Houthi and Hussein, were absent for 
certain periods; the former spent a number of years in the KSA, Jordan, and Iran until 1999, 
the latter then left for study in Sudan from where he returned only in late 2000. He re-initiated 
educational activities and furthermore engaged in collecting funds for public services and 
welfare, again increasing his social prestige. The ‘Treaty of Jeddah’, signed in June 2000, 
strengthened KSA border enforcement and triggered a small uprising; beyond its ending, 
resentment in the region remained high. In 2001, Muqbil al-Wadi’i’s death led to a split of his 
movement, thus temporarily weakening it.692There are no manifest conflicts.  
 
(4) Houthi-Regime Conflict Phase I: September 2001 – June 2004 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent heralding of the US-led ‘global war on terrorism’ 
(WoT) also acted as a game changer in Yemen. Seriously concerned about being added to the 
‘states supporting terrorism’, Saleh quickly affirmed Yemen’s allegiance to the US and 
declared combat against potential terrorists and terrorist havens. At a meeting with central 
political actors only a few days after 9/11, he urged them “to maintain a low profile with 
respect to American policy in the region”.693 All except Hussein al-Houthi agreed. The 
consequence of Saleh’s decision was political, financial, and for material support, as well as 
facilitating the opening of a military training center in November 2001. The following year 
then saw the first US military operation on Yemeni soil in the WoT. The Yemeni President 
saw himself strengthened. 
 Hussein al-Houthi, on the other hand, was offended by the regime’s perceived submission 
to the US and commenced to openly and offensively speak out against his government’s 
stance. Between late 2001 and late 2003, he intensified his regular preaching and lecturing 
activities. Beyond the immediate audience present during the events (Friday sermons and 
                                                          
691 Cf. Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 179f.  
692 Wedeen contends that this weakening of the Salafi militants relieved the regime of the need to counter them 
by supporting or at least tolerating Zaydi activities, thus gaining room for maneuver against Zaydi opposition. 
Ibid., 166.  
693 Dorlian, “Sa’da War”, here: 193.  
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other occasions), his ‘lectures’ (‘malazim’)694 were first recorded and distributed as cassette 
tapes and digital recordings – a widespread practice for many religious as well as poetic oral 
presentations in Yemen – and later on transcribed and distributed as printed texts.695 Thus, 
they reached, and continue to reach, a wide audience beyond those originally present. In these 
lectures, he states a serious threat towards Muslim and Arab societies, emanating from US 
and Israeli cultural and military aggression; along the same line, he denounces Arab and 
particularly Yemeni regime complicity with these foreign aggressors, hence accusing them of 
ruling without legitimacy. Moreover, this argumentation is interwoven with reprehension of 
Zaydi discrimination and repression. A detailed analysis of the malazim as the core of Houthi 
framing is the content of chapter 7.1.  
 Given his prominence and prestige among certain sections of the Zaydi population in 
Yemen’s north and the existing networks from the height of the BY era, he soon gathered 
followers in droves. In a January 2002 lecture,696 he coined the one slogan that would become 
the distinctive mark of the developing Houthi movement. He called on his followers to shout: 
‘God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!’ 
Soon this slogan was regularly shouted by adherents to the nascent ‘Houthi movement’ after 
Friday prayers as well as on other significant religious and cultural occasions.  
 The message initially simply connects to the predominant anti-US and (corresponding) 
anti-Israel discourse. Its particular significance, however, emanates from the specific context 
and mode in which it was employed, the way it connected to meaning-laden narratives, and 
the symbolic value it gained when the Saleh regime tried to suppress movement followers 
from chanting it. Political events and developments that fell within this period, and potentially 
fostered the success of the oppositional movement, were the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
(both of which had triggered massive outrage among Muslims), Palestinian oppression in the 
West Bank and Gaza during the Second Intifada, and the publication of the massive human 
rights abuses by US soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison.697 They were fertile ground for anti-US 
sentiments.  
 In the meantime, the regime took notice of the movement and carried out some isolated 
repressive actions.698 However, it wasn’t until the American Ambassador Edmund Hull 
                                                          
694 The literal translation would be ‘lecture notes’ as noted by Lux (Last Imam, 377). 
695 Quite a number of those printed texts are available online for download on servers like http://www.4shared-
china.com (accessed January 9, 2015).  
696 Hussein al-Houthi, Al-Sarkhah fi Wajh al-Mustakbirin [A Scream/Slogan in the Face of the Arrogants], 
Sa’dah, January 17, 2002.  
697 Iris Glosemeyer, “Local Conflict, Global Spin. An Uprising in the Yemeni Highlands”, Middle East Report 
232, no. 34 (Fall 2004).  
698 Students who were chanting the slogan in public were arrested starting in 2002. Salmoni et al., Regime, 132.  
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complained to the government about the slogan being shouted in his presence at a mosque in 
Sa’ada city, 699 combined with a similar incident having occurred to Saleh himself, did 
attention to the matter increase. In January 2003 he was visiting a mosque in Sa’ada, a visit 
that was televised. When Saleh was about to give a brief speech, the slogan was emanated 
from a crowd of Houthi followers. He was outraged. 700 On the one hand, he seemed to have 
gotten the impression that the vociferous opposition began to be levelled against his person 
more directly, departing from his original interpretation of it being a peripheral concern. On 
the other hand, his position towards the US became more and more vulnerable as more 
incidents occurred – and they did in the following months. First, protests against the US 
invasion of Iraq in March were held outside the US embassy and were put down violently;701 
shortly thereafter, in early April, ten of the suspects arrested in relation to the 2000 USS Cole 
bombing escaped from a prison in Sanaa, equally leaving US officials disgruntled.702 Saleh 
needed to act.  
 As a reaction to the events at the mosque, around 600 people were arrested. During the 
following months, small incidents transpired against state representatives, government 
installations, or of similar institutions and, as these incidents were allegedly tied to Houthi 
followers, were retributed with an iron hand, many times indiscriminately. Resentment among 
the predominantly Zaydi population grew. Hussein al-Houthi meanwhile continued his 
preaching/lecturing activities, which fell on fertile ground, among other facts because he was 
able to rhetorically connect his denouncing of discrimination of the northern (Zaydi) 
population by the regime and its complicity with US agendas to their immediate experiences. 
Notwithstanding the increasing repression, he further encouraged people to keep shouting the 
slogan, defending it as their constitutional right to voice their opinion and – in his lectures – 
as their religious duty to denounce an illegitimate leadership (see analysis below).  
 The number of his supporters grew. While the core still certainly consisted of former BY 
members, many other aggrieved joined in. Among them were youth, but, on the whole, they 
formed a cross-cut of northern society (in analogy to the different strata the BY had already 
reached). The names they gave themselves and that were given to them differ and it is de 
facto impossible to trace back when each was initially introduced. Self-ascriptions include for 
example: ‘Al-Shaʿb al-Shiʿa r’ (‘people of the slogan’), ‘Ansar al-Haqq’ (‘Supporters of the 
                                                          
699 Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 169. Hull was a very controversial and unpopular figure among many Yemenis, 
“whose influence allegedly far exceeded the powers of his office,” as Glosemeyer (“Local Conflict”) notes.  
700 Dorlian, Mouvance, 134.  
701 CNN World, “Antiwar Demonstrations Turn Deadly”, March 22, 2003, accessed March 24, 2015, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/21/sprj.irq.protests/index.html?iref=mpstoryview.  
702 Lucas Winter, “Conflict in Yemen. Simple People, Complicated Circumstances”, Middle East Policy 18 (1), 
2011, 102–120, here: 107. 
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Truth’) or ‘Ansar Allah’ (‘Supporters/Partisans of God’); ascriptions by others are e.g. 
‘Haraka al-Huthiyya’ (‘Houthi movement’), ‘Ansar al-Huthi’ (‘Houthi Supporters’) or 
‘Huthiyyun’ (‘Houthis’).703 In later years, their preference would be ‘Ansar Allah’.  
 The situation continued in this mode until early 2004. By then, shouting of the slogan was 
endemic in more than one northern governorate. The GoY allegedly even suspended 60 
teachers for their participation in its spread.704 Hussein had been called upon a number of 
times to explain himself in front of officials and even Saleh, but had not appeared.705 The 
accusations against him held not only that he incited the offensive slogan shouting; 
furthermore, the regime held that he and his family were running private schools and prisons, 
naming their own mosque preachers, and collecting religious tax (zakāh) destined for the 
provincial government.706 Most probably they are accurate; what is interesting about the 
allegations, however, is less their exact content, but rather the fact that they were brought 
forward. In the peripheral northern areas of Yemen, it is common that qabili sheikhs and other 
local figures with high reputation ‘substitute’ the lacking government presence707 – to the 
great dislike of Sanaa, certainly, but there was for a long time little that could be done about it 
in view of the regime other than aim at cooptation and thus bind those individuals to its 
interests. That it now condemned the Houthis so vehemently for these practices indicates that 
Saleh considered himself in an optimum position to counter the ‘recalcitrant elements’ and at 
the same time reassert his claim to undisputed power in front of other potential contestants.708 
  
(5) Houthi-Regime Conflict Phase II: June 2004 – September 2004  
In June 2004 the situation escalated. On June 18, another 640 Houthis were arrested for 
shouting the slogan outside the Great Mosque in Sanaa. In addition, a warrant was issued for 
the arrest of Hussein. At that time, he was most probably in the Marran Mountains southwest 
of Sa’ada. When the governor of Sa’ada tried to visit the area on June 20, he found the roads 
blocked and himself denied entry. The qabila involved were reported to be Houthi followers. 
The same was said to be the case when government buildings in Sa’ada were occupied, police 
checkpoints in the Marran area were attacked, and strategic posts on mountain-tops were 
                                                          
703 Cf. Dorlian, Mouvance, 136. Throughout the dissertation, I refer to the group interchangeably with a variety 
of these terms; my preference for ‘Houthis’ or ‘Houthi movement’, respectively, does not implicate a positioning 
along the lines of external ascriptions, but it is rather on account of convenience.  
704 Salmoni et al., Regime, 123.  
705 He gave different excuses, some related to his personal security. Winter, “Conflict”, 103.  
706 Ibid., 109.  
707 Cf. Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, n. 17; Ludmila du Bouchet, “The State, Political Islam and Violence: The 
Reconfiguration of Yemeni Politics since 9/11”, in The Enigma of Islamist Violence, ed. Amélie Blom, Laetitia 
Bucaille, and Luis Martinez (London: Hurst, 2007), 137–191, here: 149.  
708 Cf. Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 180.  
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taken by force. In how far these events were directly linked to the repression against the 
Houthis two days earlier or in how far they were related to independent tensions between 
locals and the regional government cannot be established with any certainty. The retribution 
by the government, however, was the deployment of several army units to fight the armed 
disturbants.709 
 Fighting in the area ensued the same day. Within six days, the death toll according to GoY 
speakers accounted to nine soldiers and allegedly 46 Houthi supporters, with dozens wounded 
on each side, plus an additional 50 arrests.710 
 Parallel to that, mediation efforts were ongoing.711 The government had set up a mediation 
committee consisting among others of figures close to Hussein, such as his brother Yahya, 
Abdul Karim Jadhban, a co-founder of the BY, and Muhammad Mansour, member of al-
Haqq.712 Members of this committee, though, claim that their prearranged meeting with 
Hussein on June 26 could not take place due to army intervention. When they were about to 
leave by helicopter, army forces started bombing Houthi positions, with the result that the 
mediation was cancelled. The committee members and others closely involved in repeated 
mediation attempts considered their disruption as caused by disagreements between the 
president and army commanders. While the above incident seems to back the assumption that 
the army intentionally sought to obstruct endeavors for mediation, the fact that numerous 
Zaydi intellectuals, journalists, and mediators were detained and faced unfair trials with long 
sentences on the opposite indicates insincere motives on the president’s side as well.713 The 
core argument is that the regime’s position was not unified and that different interests came to 
interfere in the evolving process of manifest conflict action. Similar interferences and 
conflicts of interest of central parties and stakeholders will become visible during other 
phases as well. I will strive to integrate them into explanations as conclusively as possible, 
however, in some cases they can only merely be speculated for lack of further evidence.  
 The government spread numerous accusations against the Houthis, whom it refers to as 
“outlaws”, extremists”, and “trouble-makers”. Allegedly, Hussein had declared himself the 
“Amir al-Mu’mineen” (“Leader of the Believers”) and summoned an oath of allegiance; he 
had adopted his own flag, stockpiled “huge quantities of arms, ammunition, and anti-
                                                          
709 Glosemeyer, “Local Conflict”; Dumm, “Understanding”, 27f. 
710 Hammoud Mounasser, “Mediators Try to Persuade Yemeni Dissident Scholar to Surrender”, AFP, June 27, 
2004, accessed March 23, 2015, http://www.arabnews.com/node/251643.  
711 Since the beginning of that year (at the latest) there is mention of local mediation efforts as well, in line with 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. ICG, “Defusing”, 19.  
712 Ibid.  
713 Ibid., 20f.  
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personnel mines”, and mobilized the Jewish community of Yemen714 to support him – among 
others by sabotaging water projects, hence depriving civilians and the army of necessary 
water supplies.715 Especially the last point was very far-fetched and illustrates how far the 
GoY was prepared to go in order to delegitimize Hussein: In the face of massive anti-Jewish 
sentiment among the population they hoped to discredit him by connecting him to Jewish 
sabotage and alleged collaboration. However, its ephemerality as well as comments by 
journalists and analysts on the ground indicate that it did not attain the expected response 
among the target group.716 
 Hussein on the other hand made an opposite move: He wrote a letter to Saleh (published in 
translation in the Yemen Times on June 28) in which he appeals to him in a very polite and 
peace-seeking mode:  
To His Excellency, President of the Republic, Brother Ali Abdullah Saleh (...) I have met 
with [the mediation committee] and we talked about many issues, including your 
displeasure with me. This has astonished me since I am certain that I have done nothing 
that would have led to such a feeling. I do not work against you, I appreciate you and 
what you do tremendously, but what I do is my solemn national duty against the enemy 
of Islam and the community [ummah] ... America and Israel. I am by your side, so do not 
listen to hypocrites and provocateurs, and trust that I am more sincere and honest to you 
than they are. When we meet, if God is willing, I will talk to you about matters that are of 
great concern to you all. The brothers will explain to you about the details of my meeting 
with them.717 
This at a first glance surprising statement of loyalty needs to be interpreted in the context of 
mediation, which was officially still ongoing. He personally seeks to establish a contact with 
the other conflict party and assures his openness to settle the situation. It is thus not as unusual 
and contradictory as it appears at first, considering the prior onset of fighting. Disregardingly, 
he does not fail to assert his stance: That “hypocrites and provocateurs” are actively working 
to disunite them and equally repeats his main claim of defending the nation (i.e. political 
category) against the external enemies the US and Israel. Overall, he seeks to externalize the 
conflict from the two of them personally to other forces while emphasizing a threat to the 
religious community (on the comprehensive level of the Muslim ummah, not the Zaydis). The 
letter therefore mirrors his lectures, albeit in a very reduced form and without the blaming of 
rulers as illegitimate (see the detailed analysis of the lectures below).  
                                                          
714 After large emigration to Israel in the 1950s, around 1,000 members of the Jewish community, that had for 
centuries existed in the country, remained in (the north of) Yemen.  
715 Mounasser, “Mediators”.  
716 Ibid.  
717 Cited in: Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 155.  
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Saleh did not halt fighting. In fact, by the continuation of military aggression he broke qabili 
law, committing an outright offence against traditions. That could and would be held against 
him from the perspective of the local qabila, whose honor was equally at stake as their 
territorial sovereignty was undermined.718 Moreover, the president would repeatedly act in 
this mode, which indicated a permanent defiance of the existent rules of regime-periphery 
interaction. Externally, he declared the extended military campaign part of the WoT, which 
according to Yemeni media reports earned him praise by George W. Bush.719 
 Hussein was killed on September 10, 2004. In July, the GoY had offered a bounty of 10 
million Yemeni riyal (equal to US$ 55,000) on him;720 however, after more than two months 
of intense fighting with casualties reaching at least 480721, a huge army deployment of 3,000 
men722 tracked him and his family down in ‘Jurf Salman’, a cave in the Marran Mountains 
where he was hiding. While accounts of the events differ depending on the source,723 three 
aspects are confirmed: The cave was set on fire. Hussein was shot at close range. His family, 
too, came to death in this place. Today ‘Jurf Salman’ serves as a modest mausoleum of 
Hussein’s ‘martyrdom’.724 
 After Hussein’s death, the government published pictures of his corpse being dragged 
through the streets in state-affiliated newspapers; it furthermore hung posters with this graphic 
depiction all over  Sa’ada in order to demonstrate its alleged defeat of the movement and to 
symbolically tear down any claim to sādah superiority by tearing down a potential claimant to 
imamate succession.725 His body was refused to be handed to his family but brought to 
Sana’a. In addition to these symbolic actions, followers reported a ‘campaign of harassment’ 
against them in the wake of the killing, which retrospectively marked the end of the first 
round of fighting or the ‘First Sa’ada War’.  
 
 
                                                          
718 Glosemeyer (“Local Conflict”) notes that despite of this, up to that point local qabila supported the 
government troops. It can be speculated, however, that this breaking of the tradition showed long-term effects.  
719 Al-Shura, June 30, 2004, cited in: Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 170.  
720 Boucek, “War in Saada”, 50. 
721 Here and for the other rounds I will cite casualty numbers as provided by Salmoni et al., Regime. They are 
very conservative estimates and relate only to immediate casalties. Other sources state up to 1,000 casualties for 
this early period.  
722 Ibid., n. 32. 
723 In regard to intense fighting generally, GoY sources hold that they had attempted to prevent military 
escalation in all possible modes and only reacted when Hussein had refused to surrender, while the Houthis 
claim that the regime from the beginning aimed at eliminating Hussein and his followers and therefore acted 
aggressively and with the intention to kill. Cf. Salmoni et al., Regime, 132.  
724 BBC World News, Documentary “The Rise of the Huthis”, screened March 15, 2015, accessed March 24, 
2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3csxmk9.  
725 Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 176. He underlines the point that “[t]he display of photographic images of the dead 
man would have been regarded as both sacrilegious and a social insult in the eyes of his relatives and disciples.” 
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(6) Houthi-Regime Conflict Phase III: September 2004 – March 2005 
Although major fighting ceased, skirmishes never completely stopped. After the death of his 
son, Badr al-Din al-Houthi took over the leadership of the movement, together with Abdullah 
al-Razzami, who had become a leading pillar of the group.  
 At the invitation of Saleh, Badr al-Din went to Sana’a in early 2005 in order to enter into 
talks about the release of prisoners and for conflict settlement. When by mid-March Saleh had 
not yet received him, he left the capital, not without voicing his indignation in an incendiary 
interview with Al-Wasat newspaper. In this interview he denounced Saleh’s intentions and 
left his own and the one of the movement in the dark.  
 Since the first round of armed conflict commenced with the Houthis in a rather defensive 
position, it is only the initiation of the second round of war which forms the tipping point to a 
violent strategy of the Houthis. The shift, initiated by Badr al-Din, occurred in response to his 
ostentatious breaching of core cultural rules – a massive insult against the respected scholar. 
In his eyes, Saleh was now illegitimate; how he was blamed, in which regard the framing 
shifted, and how the situation escalated will be elucidated in detail in 7.1. 
 
(7) Houthi-Regime Conflict Phase 4: March 2005 – February 2010726 
The following description of the five subsequent rounds of armed conflict/war merely 
highlights the respective central characteristics or new developments of each phase. Note that 
all interim phases saw isolated incidents as well as casualties.  
 
03/2005–04/2005: Second Sa’ada War (casualties: 500) 
Fighting commences soon after Badr al-Din’s return to the North, this time initiated by the 
Houthis. The army concentrates on those areas in which it suspected the Houthi leadership. 
After (falsely) declaring the death of Abdullah al-Razzami, the GoY unilaterally declares the 
end of hostilities in mid-April.  
 
– Interim 2 –  
In May, Saleh pardons Badr al-Din, who in turn rejects the pardon. Clashes occur with 
followers of prominent qabili. In September Saleh announces amnesty for Houthi prisoners 
and supporters. Houthis target officials.  
 
 
                                                          
726 Based on: Salmoni et al., Regime, 134ff. See also for a more detailed description.  
162 
 
12/2005–02/2006: Third Sa’ada War (casualties: 270+) 
Abdul Malik al-Houthi takes over the leadership from the third war onwards. The group is in 
conflict with the governor of Sa’ada and assassinates government officials. Fighting dies 
down when a new governor is appointed in February.  
 
– Interim 3 –  
The conflict sees an increasing overlapping with qabili issues and conflict lines.  
 
02/2007–01/2008: Fourth Sa’ada War (casualties: 3,035) 
When the deadline for Houthi disarmament expires, fighting recommences. More and more 
qabila militias get involved, many of which are siding with the GoY. Destruction reaches a 
new height, which seriously affects local sentiments towards the regime in a negative way. A 
government-imposed media blackout severely limits the coverage of the war. The internet 
comes to play an increasing role in the communication of both the Houthis and the GoY. As 
the result of months of Qatari mediation, the ‘Doha Agreement’727 signed in February 1, 2008 
ends this round of conflict.728 
 
– Interim 4 –  
Qabili affiliations begin to shift away from the government, partly as a result of elaborate 
Houthi interventions. They capitalize on long-standing qabili feuds to strategically gain 
mounting support among moieties.729 
 
05/2008–07/2008: Fifth Sa’ada War (casualties: 200+) 
A new war ensues after a bomb explosion in front of a prominent mosque in Sa’ada city. 
Qabili fighters are strongly involved from now on. The GoY unilaterally declares the end of 
hostilities.  
 
– Interim 5 –  
Mutual accusations of undermining peace efforts shaped the first half of 2009; in March, 
Saleh unilaterally announced the official breakdown of the Doha Agreement. Interactions 
became more offensive, with the GoY sentencing seven Houthi followers to death. When nine 
                                                          
727 Salmoni et al., Regime, Appendix F, 315f.  
728 For a critical evaluation see: ICG, “Defusing”, 21f.  
729 For an excellent, detailed presentation of these processes see: Marieke Brandt, “Sufyan’s ’Hybrid’ War: 
Tribal Politics during the Huthi Conflict”, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no. 1 
(2013): 120–138. She furthermore elucidates the geographical relevance of the region in the wars.  
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Europeans were taken hostage, three of which were soon found dead, both parties blamed the 
other. The Houthis even held large rallies in which they refute any responsibility.  
 
08/2009–02/2010: Sixth Sa’ada War (casualties: unknown) 
In August 2009, Yemen’s High Security Council announced “Operation Scorched Earth” with 
the aim to finally defeat the Houthis.730 In November, the KSA entered the war after the 
Houthis had allegedly transgressed the border. Air bombardments caused severe destruction 
to Sa’ada city and other settlements. The group on the other hand claimed that it had warned 
the KSA to allow GoY troops to enter its territory and attack the Houthis from the North; they 
say they reacted solely to this situation. On ideational grounds, Saudi participation provided 
further support to the claim of a ‘Wahhabi attack against Zaydism’. The Houthis specifically 
videotaped their seizure of Saudi equipment and prisoners to demonstrate their capacity to 
counter KSA forces. In January 2010, Abdel Malik once more signaled his openness to 
negotiations. When the conditions had been met, a ceasefire agreement was signed on 
February 11, 2010. Neither side could claim victory.  
 
The six rounds of war caused between 20,000 and 30,000 casualties.731 Around 300,000 
people were displaced in the North and more than 3,000 detained.732 Severe damage to 
infrastructure and livelihoods in the already poor areas impeded the prospects for a quick 
recovery. 
 
(8) Post-Conflict Mobilization Phase: 2010 – 2012 
Even after the end of the wars, the Houthis dominated the governorates of Sa’ada, Hajjah, and 
parts of al-Jawf and Amran, i.e. government control remained low. During the spring 2011 
anti-regime protests, Ansar Allah – as the group propagated its address – early on joined the 
protesters. They erected tents on ‘Change Square’ in front of the University of Sana’a and 
were the main protest camp remained for months to come.733 With this presence, they aimed 
                                                          
730 Allegedly both sides were joined by additional fighters: The regime by Islamists, the Houthis by “a lot of 
people from different regions of Yemen and not just from Saada (...) supporters from several provinces (...) not 
necessarily convinced of their ideas, but [in] rejection of the regime at that time”. Nabila al-Zubayr, 
representative in the working group on Saada in the NDC, personal communication, April 2014.  
731 Barak Salmoni, “Yemen’s Forever War: The Huthi Rebellion”, The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 1681, 
July 20, 2010, accessed March 30, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/yemens-
forever-war-the-houthi-rebellion.  
732 IRIN News, “How To: Source and Deliver the Right Food to 300,000 IDPs in Northern Yemen”, July 29, 
2010, accessed March 31, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/report/90007/how-to-source-and-deliver-the-right-
food-to-300-000-idps-in-northern-yemen.  
733 Note that other, competing, groups and parties acted in a similar manner, e.g. Islah.  
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to position themselves among other anti-regime forces and boost their popularity in the 
capital. On March 18, 2011 a regime crackdown on protesters left 50 dead and more than 200 
wounded; it became known as the ‘Day of Dignity Massacre’. This regime brutality led to the 
defection of former regime allies such as the al-Ahmars, Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the Islamist 
al-Zindani, and others. Furthermore, the US distanced itself from its prior support of Saleh. 
Increasing anti-regime pressure and subsequent GCC mediation led to the signing of the so-
called ‘GCC Agreement’ in November 2011 (the whole process is known as the ‘GCC 
Initiative’) and the stepdown of Saleh in February 2012. Former Vice President Abd Rabbo 
Mansour Hadi followed him in office and the transitional process, as laid out in the 
agreement, was initiated. It had specified the roadmap and mechanisms for the formation of a 
government of national unity, a committee on military affairs, the National Dialogue 
Conference, a constitution commission, the settlement of disputes, and early elections among 
others.734 
 Within this phase, the Houthis consolidated their presence in the capital. From September 
2012 onwards – in the wake of Muslim anger over the controversial movie “Innocence of the 
Muslims” – their slogan was spread all over Sana’a: Followers sprayed it on houses, walls, 
and other public infrastructure, posters and banners appeared; hence, they symbolically laid 
claim to the city. Moreover, they initiated what they called the “Outcry Week”, in which they 
propagated intensive shouting of the slogan. Reactions differed, and some isolated incidents 
indicate that they also saw open opposition.735 
 
(9) Phase of Political Participation: 2013 – 07/2014 
During the National Dialogue Conference, which was held from March 18, 2013 to January 
25, 2014, the ‘Sa’ada Issue’ was given a high priority. Ansar Allah was represented with 35 
members out of a total of 565. As a result of the Sa’ada Working Group, the closing 
document decreed religious freedom in thought and practice, and prohibited any official or 
unofficial discrimination on these grounds. It also takes steps towards conflict resolution, 
among them the demand for a complete disarmament of non-state actors.736 While they took 
                                                          
734 Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition in Yemen Pursuant to the GCC Initiative, 21 
November 2011, accessed March 31, 2005, http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/ 
arabspring/yemen/Yemen_29_Agreement_Implementation_Mechanism.pdf. On this phase cf. also: ICG, 
“Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition”, July 3, 2012.  
735 Yemen Times, “Houthi Slogan Sweeps Sana’a”’, September 20, 2012, accessed March 31, 2015, 
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1609/news/1412/Houthi-slogans-sweep-Sana%E2%80%99a.htm.  
736 “Outcomes of Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference: A Step toward Conflict Resolution and State 
Building?”, Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, Doha, February 27, 2014, accessed March 31, 2015, 
http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/c5b3a33b-644d-47f8-9e03-85fcb852c899; ICG, “The Huthis: From Saada 
to Sanaa”, Middle East Report 154, June 10, 2014, 2.  
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part in the NDC, the group at the same time rejected the immunity that was granted to Saleh 
as well as the interim government of national unity or ‘consensus government’. As an ICG 
report asserts, “[t]heir continued opposition to the consensus government resonates with large 
parts of the population frustrated by the slow pace of change, entrenched corruption and the 
lack of security.”737 The assassination of two of their representatives738 during the conference 
period (the second of which was murdered on January 21, 2014, shortly before the end of the 
NDC) led to their withdrawal on one of the last days.  
 In parallel to the NDC, the Houthi's739 tensions with Salafis in the North rose. Around the 
originally set end of the NDC in mid-September 2013, violence broke out. It heightened in 
October, when fighting commenced around the prominent Salafi Dar al-Ḥadīth Institute in 
Dammaj. The Houthis accused the Salafis of recruiting foreign fighters in preparation for a 
war against them/the Zaydis, whereas Salafis denounced unprovoked and unjustified attacks 
by the Houthis against their students.740 The battle intensified to a peak in January 2014. 
Overall, the Houthis emerged victorious, and the period throughout spring 2014 again saw 
measures of conflict resolution. It is worth noting that the Houthis and their qabili allies 
defeated their adversaries, which consisted of an alliance of Salafis as well as others loyal to 
the al-Ahmar family, Islah, and Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar.741 This was very significant for the 
signal it sent: Until then, the latter were considered the most powerful and influential actors 
(apart from Saleh). The Houthis had thus demonstrated substantial strength within the 
political vacuum that was still left to be filled after Saleh’s deposition.  
 
(10) Phase of Military Expansion and Coup: 08/2014 – 03/2015 
When in July 2014 the government decided to significantly cut fuel subsidies in an attempt to 
tackle its financial misery, the group was able to capitalize on the resulting public anger. It 
organized large protests against the measure, thus mobilizing crowds in their favor. Camps 
were erected in and around Sana’a in August and thousands of supporters streamed into the 
city from other regions.742 Throughout fall, they exerted increasing pressure onto the 
                                                          
737 Ibid., 2.  
738 The first victim was Abdul Karim Jadhban in November 2013.  
739 At this point I specifically distinguish between the political wing under the self-attributed name of ‘Ansar 
Allah’ and the militant wing under the term of the ‘Houthis’.  
740 ICG, “Huthis”, 3. Another aspect which added momentum to the conflict was the fact that Islah “had gained a 
large number of portfolios and governships, especially in the northern region.” Gabriele vom Bruck, “The 
Houthi Advance on Yemen’s Capital”, Le Monde Diplomatique, October 23, 2014.  
741 ICG, “Huthis”, 3.  
742 Peter Salisbury, “What Do the Protesting Houthis Really Want in Yemen?”, VICE News, September 11, 2014, 
accessed September 15, 2014, http://www.news.vice.com/article/what-do-the-houthis-really-want-in-
yemen?utm_source=vicenewstwitter.  
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government. Besides the reimplementation of fuel subsidies, they demanded the identification 
of aberrations from the NDC agreement and the formation of a new government based on “a 
national partnership”.743 In September, the Houthis virtually seized the capital. The first 
places they looted were the al-Iman University, the houses of the al-Ahmar family and of Ali 
Muhsin al-Ahmar, as well as a military complex under the latter’s command. On September 
21, the so-called “Peace and National Partnership Agreement” was signed by Hadi, Ansar 
Allah, and other major political players. It stipulated an end of all violence, the formation of a 
new technocratic government, and economic and military reforms, all based on the prior NDC 
agreement. For a short period, the group enjoyed a positive reputation among the population, 
due to improvements in basic services like electricity and in security;744 moreover, the group 
had promised a crackdown on corruption, and its rigorous measures of control appeared 
effective, which in turn increased its credibility. Over time, however, repressive actions also 
triggered significant opposition and fear. The Houthis replaced many positions in media, 
certain government institutions, mosques and other religious institutions with their supporters; 
intimidation and attacks against opposition occurred as did reports of coercion745 to enforce 
compliance. At the same time, the Houthis themselves were faced with smaller attacks, 
killings, and bombings.746 
 In January 2015 tensions escalated once more when on the 17th the Houthis abducted 
Hadi’s chief of staff who had pushed forward with a draft constitution the Houthis rejected. 
Fighting between the army and the group ensued. Four days later, a settlement seemed close; 
on the 22nd, however, Hadi and his government resigned. It was the end of what had been 
perceived as a very slow coup. The Houthis were reluctant to take over ruling and rejected the 
resignation. After a few indeterminate weeks, Hadi escaped to Aden, withdrew his 
resignation, and positioned himself to fight. He called upon the international community, 
especially the GCC to support him in his struggle to restore his rule, and found support in the 
UN, which subsequently issued two resolutions.747 On March 26, the KSA, in alliance with 
nine other Arab states, commenced airstrikes against Houthi positions, among other locations 
in central Sana’a. As of April 1, the highly controversial intervention has caused numerous 
                                                          
743 Ibid.; vom Bruck, “Houthi Advance”.  
744 Ibid.  
745 Houthi spokespersons admit their occurrence but emphasize that they were isolated cases and not sanctioned 
by the leadership. Salisbury, “Protesting Houthis”.  
746 At least 47 people were killed and hundreds injured by a bombing at a demonstration on October 9, 2014 for 
which AQAP claims responsibility. Another suicide bombing on March 20, 2015 at the prominent Zaydi Badr 
Mosque in Sana’a left 137 dead and many more injured. The emerging Yemeni affiliate of the Islamic State (IS) 
lays claim to this incident.  
747 UN Security Council Resolution 2201 and 2205. Further statements condemning violence followed.  
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civilian casualties and is being regarded as the straw that broke the camel’s back, i.e. the 
ultimate push of the country into (civil) war.748 
 
5.2. The Peaceful Southern Movement 
The Yemeni ‘nation frame’ had failed sometime between 1990 and 1994. With the end of the 
war, the bitter defeat, and the subsequent period having been perceived by Northerners as a 
time of ‘looting’, Southerners reminisced about their independent state and over time formed 
more than one opposition group until finally, in 2006, the Peaceful Southern Movement 
emerged.   
 This section will – in analogy to the introduction of the Houthi case – present the history 
and background of the movement, as well as the chronology of protest over time.  
 
5.2.1. Southerners as Identity Group 
‘Southern identity’ is the product of British colonialism and shared experiences and memories 
of the PDRY.749As has been noted, the British, through various means, aimed to construct 
‘South Arabia’. In fact, it was the British who originally named as one coherent territory. 
Notwithstanding, we could also observe how the strategic port city of Aden, where the 
colonial subjects lived, was a completely different life than that of the hinterlands, let alone 
the remote areas of Hadhramawt. Despite this ample variance, the colonial period has led to 
overarching collective memories750 not only of that period, but also about what it meant to be 
a citizen of South Arabia. Today, many remember with nostalgia a period attributed as liberal, 
progressive, offering upward mobility and prosperity, and – importantly – as 
cosmopolitan.751Aden port had been a hub of international trade routes and related 
infrastructural projects. Job opportunities attracted workers from a wide variety of nations and 
backgrounds, who, during the prosperous years, were well integrated into society. Even those 
who had not been part of it, living far away, adopted these collective memories to a certain 
degree,752 and they are recalled today as a contrast to the negatively perceived presence – 
                                                          
748 This appraisal must be seen in connection with the events all over Yemen. See: ICG, “Yemen At War”, 
Middle East Briefing 45, March 27, 2015.  
749 Brehony, Yemen Divided, 203.  
750 For his seminal conceptualization of collective memories see: Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). [First published as: Maurice Halbwachs, La mémoire collective 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950.)] 
751 Davis, “Collective Memory”.  
752 Based on my interviews and correspondence with Southerners from Hadhramawt, Shabwa, Abyan, Dhaleh, 
and Yafa’e.  
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disregarding or at least downplaying the fact that the anti-colonial movement of the 1960s had 
voiced similar discontents as such put forth by activists nowadays. Memorabilia of the 
colonial period, among them photographs of Aden and other places, postal stamps, banknotes 
etc. are valued and shared again in hardcopy753 but equally on social media platforms.754 The 
physical appearance of places, saliently featuring a colonial style associated with prosperity, 
order, and structure, is very much appreciated therein; it is a style contraposed with the 
decaying port, buildings, and infrastructure today, the then-and-now sometimes put in direct 
comparison. For sure, many of these memories are highly romanticized and overemphasize 
dichotomies with the present, but nevertheless they are part of the shared identity attributes.755 
 The PDRY era is remembered with less nostalgia but contributed notable components to 
the feeling of a shared national identity. Pride in their own independent state, mixed with the 
memories of the struggle and the common (economic) sacrifices of the first decade of state 
building are collectively remembered, as are the living conditions (see 4.4.) – from varying 
perspectives, as Brehony poses:  
To those south Yemenis who remember the PDRY before 1986, these can seem like 
halcyon days compared with their current lives.756 Others remember the more brutal state 
of the 1970s and the fighting and instability of the 1980s.757 
Be it positive or negative memories, they form the basis for a shared identity. And even many 
of those who hold the latter still participate in the othering or exoticizing of Northerners as 
‘tribal’ and ‘backwards’, i.e. share the generalized we-they divide between the two former 
states as a cultural/identity-based we-they divide. Thereby they, too, affirm their belonging to 
‘the South’.  
 Symbols of the national identity are national achievements such as the successful airline 
Al-Yemda, the educational level, the status of women, the reverence for Aden as a 
cosmopolitan city (despite the massive decline of Aden port) and others (elaborated on in 
7.2.).  
                                                          
753 Observed by Davis, “Collective Memory”, 30. According to him, shops sell them, and old photographs are 
even carried around by many. He interprets this as an indicator of how constitutive they are for Southern 
identity.  
754 There are e.g. facebook groups where even former British colonial officers and Southerners exchange their 
memories of colonial Aden. See exemplarily: https://www.facebook.com/Www.AdenHistoryinphotos?fref=ts 
(accessed May 30, 2015).  
755 Cf. Dahlgren, Contesting Realities, 268f.  
756 This perception is frequently mirrored in my interviews with Hiraki activists/Southerners. While most admit 
the problematic aspects of political infighting, they tend to downplay it in favor of glorified depictions of 
everyday life.  
757 Brehony, Yemen Divided, 204. 
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Regional identity affiliations have their place, too. Aden, the ever-resistant regions of 
Dhaleh/Lahj/Radfan/Yafa’e (see 4.1.1.), and Hadhramawt are the most distinctive ‘subunits’ 
of the South, which cultivate their own respective regional identities.758Adenis have 
repeatedly made efforts to declare a special status for their city; there has even been an 
initiative by one of the early Hirak members. These attempts have met little resonance among 
the population, though, and died away. The large eastern territory of Hadhramawt, with its 
long history of emigration and, based thereon, commercial ties to the Gulf countries, India, 
and Southeast Asia, is probably the most distinct unit, and has similarly voiced a desire for 
independence more than once. Until now, however, there has been little effort to realize such 
a step. Notwithstanding, there is an awareness in Sana’a and Aden of the need to approach 
potential secessionist endeavors of the economically strong region, either by cooptation or 
dialogue. 
 How their ‘Southern’ or ‘South Arabian’ identity is invoked by Southerners is reflected in 
numerous statements, interviews, and depictions/recordings of events and situations and will 
be extensively elucidated in the framing analysis. Before that, the following sections trace the 
steps towards a conscious dissociation from a unified Yemeni state and finally opposition.  
 
5.2.2. Post-Unification Discontent 
Yemen’s unification was badly managed, with bureaucratic gridlock, economic crisis, 
rising social tensions, and increasing incidents of political violence mainly against 
members of the ruling southern Socialist Party.759 
Stephen Day’s assessment of the unification process is, at the bottom-line, shared by many 
observers and analysts.760 The whole proceeding had been much hastier than anticipated and 
desired by many Southern leaders, and it had taken another form – immediate merger – than 
had been repeatedly discussed in the preceding decades, which tended towards federation with 
subsequent referendum and unification in steps.761 Despite the initial euphoria on side of the 
population, specifically Southerners, and the opening of democratic and civil society areas of 
participation, relations on the political level went sour within the first year. The fundamental 
problem was that both sides had fundamentally different agendas, held wrong expectations, 
                                                          
758 Among other cultural activities and social identification, qāt chews, for instance, are organized in groups 
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759 Day, “Updating”, 421. 
760 See Carapico, Civil Society, 172; Brehony, Yemen Divided, 183–198; Beuming, “Merger”, 47ff.  
761 Cf. ICG, “Breaking Point”, 3.  
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and miscalculated: Both Saleh and the old YSP leadership at that point in time suffered from 
political and financial weaknesses they hoped to overcome though merging. However, while 
Saleh regarded unification as a means to stabilize and expand his regime through the pretense 
of democratic steps, the YSP leaders saw it as a step to regain their legitimacy (having 
suffered immensely through the continuous infighting) and to imprint their ideas of ‘law and 
order’ on the Northern system, which they perceived as ‘fawḍah’, ‘chaos’.762 To their 
detriment, the YSP overestimated its power to influence, lest restructure, the Northern 
political regime, while at the same time underestimating Saleh’s will to power, his power 
position, and his skills of managing the complex patrimonial regime in the North.763 
 Two interrelated aspects formed the core of the practical obstacles responsible for 
hindering a more equal, and hence potentially more successful, unification: power sharing and 
the integration of sectors and institutions.  
 Initially, before the parliamentary elections in 1993, the two sides had agreed on a 50/50 
power sharing between the GPC and the YSP in spite of the 80/20 relation (N-S) in 
population. The most powerful body, the presidential council with its five members, however, 
was still aligned in favor of Saleh. Although the cabinet was balanced, its procedures were 
partly obscure due to a lack of decision in favor of best practices, not to mention a rigorous 
implementation. An integration of the military and security forces did not transcend a mutual 
stationing of troops on the territory of the formerly other state; the command remained in the 
hands of each partner. In the civil service, more officials took over positions in the South than 
vice versa.764 A sector that was centralized was finance: All revenues flowed to Sana’a and 
the GPC held the Ministry of Finance. This was a factor that significantly strengthened 
Saleh’s power position (he could easily allocate funds for his patronage system) and 
additionally, as Day points out, insulted Southern pride in its autonomy and self-rule.765 
 While the above aspects by 1991 had resulted in disillusionment among Southern 
politicians, the massive economic downfall that hit the ROY would be the force to 
successfully disenchant the population. It spawned from the combined effects of remittance 
drops after the Gulf War, returning migrants, meagre oil revenues (which were often pocketed 
by Northern businessmen), lacking donor support after the end of the Cold War, suspended 
subsidies, spreading corruption, and a drought in 1990/91.766 In the South specifically, land 
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disputes made things worse. The reversal of the nationalization of the 1960s led to an intricate 
situation in which multiple parties frequently made claims; tensions, costly disputes, and 
political exploitation were but few of the consequences.767 Unemployment and inflation 
reached heights and from 1991 onwards, people – middle-class, as Carapico stresses – took to 
the streets. In December the following year, after the Yemeni currency had collapsed, 
accumulated frustrations even caused riots which left 60 dead and hundreds injured.768 
 Insult and threats entered the political stage in late 1991 when Southern discontent became 
visible. Within two years, between 100 and 150 (numbers differ depending on the source) 
members of the YSP or related southern political cadre fell victim to assassinations. 
Suspicions were quickly voiced against Northern tribal soldiers, i.e. implicitly against Saleh 
and his followers. Though not fully proven, most evidence hints at the role of hundreds of 
Afghan Arab mujāhidīn, who, after their return, had been absorbed into the Yemeni Islamist 
scene (close to Islah, Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and others). Having fought against ‘Soviet 
socialist unbelievers’ they saw their fight against ‘Southern socialist unbelievers’ as a 
continuation of their mission, so the assumption made in the literature. In this situation, many 
Southern politicians and officials returned to the South out of fear for their safety. Ali Salim 
al-Beidh did so as well, however, he returned to the capital.  
 The parliamentary elections in April 1993 were the last blow to the misconceptions the 
YSP had held. While they had hoped to expand their share or at least hold the 50/50 division 
under more advantageous conditions, and then be able to play a strengthened role in the 
government, election results cemented their role as an underdog. Of the 301 seats in 
parliament, the GPC won a total of 122 seats (41%), in comparison to a mere 56 seats (19%) 
won by the YSP. The great winner of the elections was the Islah Party with 63 seats (21%) – 
more than the YSP. What had happened in the highly competitive, winner-take-all elections, 
was that the North had voted overall for Northern candidates, the South for Southern 
candidates. What is less discernible from the sole numbers is that the GPC had won only 
slight majorities, while the YSP had sweeping victories in the South, i.e. the socialist party 
had much more backing in the population than its Northern competitor. Islah garnered 
majorities mainly in the western midlands, which neither the rather weak performance of the 
GPC was able to gain, nor the YSP managed to convince for its program. The religious party 
thus became a new strong player – and allied with the GPC, consolidating its dominating 
position to the great disadvantage of the YSP. A central question remained unsolved over 
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time and led to escalating tensions between the two opponents is the distribution of seats in 
the presidential council: While the GPC insisted on a 3-1-1 apportionment with itself in the 
leading position, the YSP equally insisted on a 2-2-1 distribution, with Islah in the minor 
position. A stalemate ensued.769 In this situation, al-Beidh furthermore aggravated the 
tensions when he returned to Aden and issued an 18-point list of his demands.770 Negotiations 
took place but were shattered after an attack on al-Beidh’s relatives led to his refusal to take 
his oath of office.771 
 Attempts to solve the dispute and save unity were made on a number of levels,772 the most 
prominent of these was an independent committee of mediators that worked out a ‘Document 
of Pledge and Accord’. It contained a comprehensive reform plan with the guiding aims of an 
improved merger and administrative and financial decentralization. Under pressure, Saleh and 
al-Beidh finally signed the agreement on February 20, 1994 in Amman in the presence of 
King Hussein, who hosted the signing ceremony. Tellingly, the same day skirmishes escalated 
between Northern and Southern army brigades on Southern territory and tensions continued to 
heighten. Southerner politician were by then accused of being secessionists by high Northern 
officials, including Saleh and Abdullah al-Ahmar.773 This can be interpreted as the crossing of 
an ideational threshold with little room to step back. And so it was. Despite numerous 
mediation attempts from various sides, including international actors,774 none succeeded. On 
April 27, 1994, Saleh finally de facto declared the state of war.775 
 It was a brief war. The Northern army, in cooperation with Ali Nasser Muhamed’s 
followers, and Islamist Afghan Arab fighters within a short period got the upper hand. They 
seized Shabwa and Abyan, while the Southern troops stationed in the North had been 
neutralized immediately.776 On May 21 Ali Salim al-Beidh proclaimed the creation of the 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) in the former South, with the capital Aden. It was not 
meant to be an act of secession, but rather the “nucleus for a unified Yemen” on the basis of 
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776 ICG, “Breaking Point?”, 4. 
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the Document of Pledge and Accord.777After the fall of Mukalla and Aden, however, the 
South was defeated, and the war officially ended on July 7, 1994. 
 The death toll of these two months of fighting ranged between 5,000-10,000778 and the 
physical damage to Aden alone was estimated to reach US$200 million.779 Much worse than 
this immediate material damage, however, were the mediate material and the immaterial 
damages caused by the war. After their victory, Aden was looted by the Northern forces, 
notably tribal and Islamist groups, for ten days.780 Carapico provides a vivid description of 
what would become a central part of Adeni collective memory later recalled by activists:  
Water stations outside the city were deliberately disabled by close-range gunfire. 
Establishments from the infamous Sira Beer factory [the only one in the country] to the 
nationalized colonial-legacy domestic trading corporation were torched. Files from the 
former PDRY ministries of planning, housing, and justice, the YSP, and dozens of other 
agencies were deliberately destroyed. Employment rolls were shredded. Foreign 
consulates, UN and Red Cross facilities, oil company offices, hotels, museums, prisons, 
factories, port warehouses, NGO offices, and selected private homes were looted 
extensively and then occupied by the Northern army and its allies, including the faction 
of the YSP ousted in 1986.781 
When the smoke of war had settled, private and commercial property was (re)privatized in 
obscure procedures in which Northern army officers and Northern businessmen profited of 
highly deflated prices. In the overdue merging of the armies, the regime in Sana’a took its 
chance to disarm extensive parts of the former Southern army: tens of thousands of Southern 
military were forced into ‘early retirement’ (sometimes only shortly after graduation). Army, 
police, and security in the South was to large parts taken over by Northern forces, which not 
only gave Southerners the impression of being occupied, but which also caused repeated 
incidents of mistreatment and rape of women, disrespectfully alleged of ‘loose morals’ for not 
veiling as their Northern counterparts.782 The role of women who in the (urban) PDRY not 
only had much wider freedoms, but had had positions in academia, as journalists, pilots, and 
judges, was severely and painfully cut; In line with Northern gender roles, which are strongly 
influenced by tribal and – increasingly – Islamist norms, they were ousted from their 
                                                          
777 Brehony, Yemen Divided, 196. 
778 Both sides exaggerated numbers: Saleh lowered them, Southern sources held much higher ones. The stated 
5,000–10,000, though dissatisfying for its lack of inaccuracy, appear most likely. For a smaller range of 5,000–
7,000 see: Hudson, “Bipolarity”, 21; a higher range is presented by AFP: “Saleh downplays Yemeni war death 
toll”, AFP, July 12, 1994.  
779 UN estimate. ICG, “Breaking Point”, 4.  
780 Especially the Islamists raged against what they considered “symbols of secularism and idolatry”, which 
besides alcohol included e.g. the tombs of saints etc. Beuming, “Merger”, 66.  
781 Carapico, Civil Society, 188. Ali Nasser Mohamed and his followers, whose forces had supported the north, 
were subsequently rewarded with high government positions (e.g. ministries) until Saleh managed to replace his 
former ally in the early 2000s. Cf. Beuming, “Merger”, 59–101. 
782 Ibid., 61–63. She furthermore highlights the considerable and lasting power of the military (p.64). The tight 
grip they had on the South was only loosened after the 2011 Arab Spring protests. 
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positions, pressured to veil, and their movements became more limited.783 The 1990 
constitution underwent comprehensive alteration in favor of centralization and a strengthening 
of the position of the president; a highly contested amendment concerned the change of the 
shari’a from “the main source of law” to “the source of law” – clearly a concession to Saleh’s 
Islamist supporters. The freedoms that had briefly existed between 1990 and 1994 were 
limited again. On the political level, Saleh successfully found ways to dominate the cabinet 
and parliament ever further without excluding Southern representatives; he employed his old 
strategy of cooptation and allotted offices to candidates who posed little danger and/or were 
given little power. He furthermore connected with Southern sheikhs, whose positions were 
bolstered again,784 and aimed to integrate them, too, into his patronage apparatus. His GPC 
yielded a landslide victory in the 1997 elections, which the YSP boycotted, and in the early 
2000s expanded the term of parliament from four to six years and the term of presidency from 
five to seven.  
 When in the late 1990s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
formulated decentralization and other structural adjustments – among them the elimination of 
massive overemployment in the state sector – as clear conditions for its assistance, the regime 
grudgingly implemented the long-planned decentralization (which had been a demand of 
Southern representatives since 1990), however, shaped it in a way that de facto allocated only 
very little power to the local and regional level. The second condition resulted in a very 
painful cut of civil service employment in the South: Where Saleh had already ‘cleared’ the 
civil service of ‘secessionists’, i.e. those who wanted to remain members of the YSP after 
1994, now immensely large numbers of civil service employees lost their jobs, with little 
prospectives for alternative employment. While Beuming makes the crucial point of showing 
that the South was not excluded from development and investment, as framed by the Southern 
opposition, but received rather more than its ‘fair share’ in relation to its population,785 she 
also underscores how this did not account for job distribution.786 Numerous Northerners had 
taken over administrative positions in the South, supported by the regime, which sought 
control over Southern matters. Besides, many institutions had been relocated to the capital 
Sana’a, decreasing Aden and the South per se of government jobs. The same accounted for 
industrial and third sector employment, which both offered significantly lower employment. 
                                                          
783 For an insightful presentation of the change in gender roles and family law mainly in Aden see the 
ethnographic work of Susanne Dahlgren: Dahlgren, Contesting Realities.H  
784 There had been a comprehensive detribalization project in the socialist South; however, as Beuming claims, 
from the early 1980s onwards they had regained large parts of their social prestige at least, thus exerting indirect 
imfluence. See Beuming, “Merger”, 94ff.  
785 Ibid., 85ff. 
786 Ibid., 89ff. 
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Adding to that, Southerners were discriminated in public job allocation. Unemployment was 
felt even more intensely in comparison to the former socialist state who had supposedly 
created employment for all (realities, of course, differed). Another deterioration, which very 
much affected Southerners, concerned the health and educational services where the PDRY 
had ranked much better than the YAR. These two domains, in addition to a system of free 
public services, could no longer be supported by the government. Hence, the related 
infrastructure declined drastically.  
 Lastly, 16 of the leaders of 1994, who had sought exile, were convicted in absentia; five of 
them, among them al-Beidh, received the death penalty. For all others an amnesty was 
declared soon after the end of fighting.787 
 The early 2000s failed to bring significant positive change, rather the contrary. 
 
Some aspects of the above situation are similar to the situation of many formerly socialist 
countries that go through a transitional period. Southerners were used to expecting a wide 
range of services from the state they were not receiving from the newly created entity. The 
economic crises of the 1990s and 2000s then did their rest. This is the core of the dominant 
Northern narrative, that is, holding that the problem is economic, that Southerners are merely 
suffering the same conditions as in the North, and that a more prosperous economy and 
development will solve the problem. While parts of this argument are certainly accurate, the 
Southern narrative equally has its justification and reasons for when it describes the 
perception of Southerners as marginalized, discriminated, and under ‘occupation’.788 Their 
self-conception and pride had a prominent part therein. The latter perspective will be 
discussed in detail in the analysis of Southern frames; the former should not be completely 
forgotten.  
 
5.2.3. Southern Opposition 
Opposition against the perceived occupation set in immediately after the war and continued 
almost unintermittently in form of various groups and organizations. Leadership, goals, and 
strategies varied as well; what they had in common was that none gained momentum before 
the Hirak entered upon the stage. The following section briefly introduces the precursor 
organizations in order to sketch the development of opposition over time, note changes in 
strategies, failures, and – for subsequent elaborations – introduce prior engagements of later 
                                                          
787 For the overall section on the post-war consequences see: Beuming, “Merger”, 59–101. 
788 ICG, “Breaking Point”, 5f. 
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Hirak leaders, if applicable. Their legacy, not only during the PDRY and post-unification 
period between 1990 and 1994 but also in organizations during the following decade, 
contribute to how they are perceived by the population, i.e. the credibility attributed to them.  
 Section 5.2.5. reconstructs the founding phase of the Hirak and presents its early 
development until the accession of former leaders in spring 2009. It is what I consider as the 
first two of eight phases within the existence of the movement (until March 2015). I therein 
give extensive room to the account of a prominent Hirak member who describes the early 
events from his point of view, a narration which throws an interesting light on a number of 
aspects, among them, for instance, is the importance of networks, of historical continuities, 
and of contingent events. They are taken up in detail following the narration and are 
integrated into first analytical steps. Two consecutive subsections then introduce in detail the 
widespread ‘leadership’ of the Hirak – which, as I will argue, poses a major obstacle to the 
success of the movement’s development – and its broad-based membership. The issue of 
movement structures will be tackled in relation to this.  
 At the end of this section, the basis for a critical analysis of the pathways and repertoires of 
factions and actors in subsequent sections will have been laid.  
 
5.2.4. Early Opposition Movements789 
The first opposition movement was founded only a few months after the end of the war, in 
October 1994: The ‘National Front for Southern Opposition’ or ‘MOWJ’ (alternatively 
spelled ‘MOJ’).790 Its base was in abroad, in London, and it was mainly financed by the KSA, 
where exiled former leaders had been rallying for support, at the forefront Abdulrahman al-
Jifri. Other names related to MOWJ were Ali Salim al-Beidh, Haydar al-Attas, Salem Saleh, 
and Abdullah al-Asnaj. The stated goal of the movement was to reestablish the Southern state 
as it had existed before 1990 by peaceful means. It did not last long, hardly more than a year 
or two at a maximum. The supportive base inside the country was weak and after the KSA 
suspended funding, it could not continue its operations.791As a Hirak member explains: 
                                                          
789 For a rough orientation cf. “Introduction to the Southern Movement and its Development Stages”, April 16, 
2014, accessed April 16, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-13278.html. 
790 Cf. Hamdani, “Threatened Unity”.  
791 This information has been cross-checked in interviews with Hirak activists in the UK (April 27–28, 2013), 
Germany (March 10, 2014), and the Netherlands (March 11, 2014).  
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It was too early. (...) The Southern population haven’t (sic!) become convinced then that 
the only way was separation. There was still the feeling that there may be a way around it, 
may be a way of putting things right under the unity state.792 
1997 then saw the emergence of HATAM, the ‘Ḥarakat Taqrīr al-Maṣīr’ or ‘Self-
Determination Movement’. It was a secretive movement based in the mountains of Dhaleh 
and probably consisted mainly of former military personnel who had been forcefully retired. 
Their allegiance was reported to be with al-Beidh.793 The group carried out a number of 
attacks and called for armed resistance, however, like MOWJ, they were never able to 
mobilize a more extensive range of followers and died down after few years. Again, in 
retrospective they were evaluated as having failed to match their potential audience:  
(...) it was too militant, and I don’t think Southerners were ready for another way or for 
another bloodshed of their life (sic!). Again, the time wasn’t right, the people weren’t 
ready for such a radical move and, again it died away really. But they played a part in 
raising awareness and getting people to think as Southerners and kept the issue alive if 
you like, and that’s the big role I think they played.794 
Some voices speak of remains of HATAM which are supposedly still active in Dhaleh and 
northern Lahj or that they today have become part of the militant Hirak factions there.795 This 
information cannot reliably be confirmed, however, the area does harbor armed groups.  
 From within the YSP stemmed the attempt to mend the relationship between North and 
South.796 For this purpose, Hassan Ba’oum and others in 1998 founded the so-called 
‘Movement of Reforming the Course of Unity’.797 It was unsuccessful and even more short-
lived than the other groups.  
 At around the same time, individuals and some Southern media (e.g. Al-Ayyam 
newspaper) started to take up the ‘Southern cause’ again. The very first websites were set up 
and deliberate exchange and reporting began. A few people’s committees were set up in mid-
1999 along the same path. Overall, however, nothing really set off a sustainable movement.798 
 In 2004,799 the ‘Southern Democratic Assembly’, better known as ‘TAJ’, was launched. 
According to one of its leaders in the UK, they had first striven to found a party inside 
                                                          
792 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
793 Hamdani, “Threatened Unity”.  
794 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013. Similar statements by two other activists, UK, 
April 26+28, 2013. 
795 Another name mentioned in relation to HATAM is Qassim Askar Jubran, a former ambassador, and 
important figure among the early organizers of the Southern Movement. He is considered to be close to al-Beidh.  
796 Interview with Hirak activist and former MP of the YSP living in the UK, April 28, 2013.  
797 Hamdani, “Threatened Unity”. 
798 “Introduction to the Southern Movement and its Development Stages.” 
799 For completeness: In 2002, the so-called “Forum of the People of the Southern and Eastern Provinces” was 
initiated inside the ocuntry. Among its leaders was Faisal Bin Shamlan, who ran for president in 2006. Its goals 
of overcoming marginalization and restoring Southern rights remained unfulfilled. Hamdani, “Threatened 
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Yemen, then popular committees to deal with the very practical aspect of public service 
provision (water, electricity), which was insufficient. When they found themselves blocked by 
the government over and again, they decided to engage from abroad.800 They established 
themselves in the UK where a large diaspora community of Yemenis existed, and approached 
the media to spread criticism of the situation in the South and make themselves heard. Their 
position was very critical of the treatment of the South by the North, they highlighted the 
alleged differences in identity that existed between ‘Yemenis’ and ‘Southern Arabians’, and 
they openly demanded secession. TAJ aimed to bring together an audience from as wide a 
spectrum as possible: 
They called the staff a democratic assembly as an assembly to get as many people as 
possible from different political and professional backgrounds etc. to get together in order 
to raise the cause of South Yemen. (...) They had their members here [in the UK], and 
also in the US, Yemen, South Yemen, Saudi-Arabia (...)801 
The group approached various governments, international organizations, and the 
‘international community’802 as a whole with letters, petitions, and calls for support and 
intervention in Yemen: the British government,803 the G8 summit,804 the KSA,805 Kuwait,806 
the Arab League807 and others. Demonstrations were held as were gatherings.  
 Notwithstanding some success in awareness rising abroad, a significant impact on the 
ground in the South failed to appear. Its headquarters in England was far from the South and 
its population, communication was thus necessarily limited as were resources, and after a 
while, leadership808 disputes fragmented the group. 
 After the establishment of the Hirak, TAJ continued its activities under the umbrella of the 
Peaceful Southern Movement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Unity”. She furthermore claims the founding of TAJ the same year, however, according to its website, TAJ was 
only launched on the anniversary of the end of the war in 1994, i.e. on July 7, 2004. 
http://www.tajaden.org/abouttaj.html (accessed May 25, 2015).  
800 Interview with TAJ leader in the UK, April 29, 2013.  
801 Interview with a Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013. 
802 See: www.soutalgnoub.com/data29.htm (accessed May 25, 2015). 
803 See: www.soutalgnoub.com/data10.htm (accessed May 25, 2015). 
804 See: www.soutalgnoub.com/data19.htm (accessed May 25, 2015). 
805 See: www.soutalgnoub.com/data23.htm (accessed May 25, 2015). 
806 See: www.soutalgnoub.com/data34.htm (accessed May 25, 2015). 
807 See: www.soutalgnoub.com/data40.htm (accessed May 25, 2015). 
808 Central leaders were: Ahmed Abdullah al-Hassani, Mohamed al-Obadi, Abdo Naqeeb, and Awad Karama. 
Hamdani, “Threatened Unity”; interviews conducted with Hirak activists and TAJ members living in the UK, 
April 26–29, 2013.  
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5.2.5. The Roots of al-Hirak 
In an interview, Ahmed Bin Fareed, a prominent activist and former communication director 
of al-Beidh, recounts the events around the founding of the Southern Peaceful Movement in 
early 2006.809 
Around 2005/06 things went up and people began talking only about that [the situation in 
the South]. Then there was an incident in Radfan: There was a land issue. The farmer 
concerned went on his land because he expected soldiers. They came and killed his 17-
year old son. Their names were known but nothing happened. The Charitable Association 
of Radfan in Mansoura [a district of Aden] discussed the event and someone wrote about 
it in Al-Ayyam newspaper. Nasser al-Nouba [a prominent retired military officer] called 
me and told me to come to the Association. The father of the killed had said: ‘It is not my 
case. It is your case.’ He meant to say that it is not a case of Radfan, but a case of the 
Southern people. These were the events on January 12, 2006.  
 On the next day, Friday January 13, 2006 [the anniversary of the 1986 Politburo 
massacre and subsequent civil war], people met at the Association for the initiation of the 
‘Tasāmuḥ wa Tasāluḥ’ [‘Tolerance and Reconciliation’], the planned reconciliation 
between the two factions who had fought each other in 1986. When I arrived, the building 
was already crowded; shows went up from the 2nd to the 4th floor. There were many 
speeches, among them Nasser al-Nouba and the popular Ahmed Abdullah Al-Hasani 
(now in TAJ). People listened eagerly.  
 In reporting about what had happened, Al-Mustaqala channel three or four times talked 
about ‘occupation’. This was received as something astonishing! 
 The authorities then closed the Association. I started writing for Al-Ayyam; Hisham 
Basharaheel, the editor, received my pieces in the ‘Opinion’ section. However, the 
authorities also tried to buy Basharaheel’s silence. They offered to pay him the same sum 
as he made from the whole newspaper in return for him not writing about the Hirak. He 
refused. You have to understand the importance of the newspaper for the movement: Al-
Ayyam cost 20 riyal; in Radfan, however, it sometimes sold for 200 riyal! 
 Although the authorities continued to disturb the process of tasāmuḥ wa tasāluḥ, we 
continued over and again. We also started meeting with the aim to identify the lootings 
during the war in the house of Qassim Askar Jubran (member of HATAM). Among 
others Tamah, Saadi, Jubran participated. Our plan was to gather proof for everything that 
had happened. So Qassim Askar Jubran gathered the information. In regard to the 
solution we strove for, it was too hard to see at that time that it was separation. Nasser al-
Nouba and Ali Mohamed al-Saadi were in favor of independence; the rest was for a 
federal solution between the North and the South. The conclusion was that the decision 
must be with the people.  
 The crucial thing now was to go to the street. The question was how. For us, the most 
important strategy was to use the Association of Retired Military for that purpose. They 
were 80.000 people, they were disciplined, and they knew each other. There was no 
opposition to that. In 2007, they started meetings outside of government buildings in Al-
Mualla [Aden]. They asked for their rights; there were no political demands made. 50-70 
people met about six to seven times for around 30 minutes each time. A Northern army 
officer passing by started laughing when he saw the group; when they entered the 
building to talk to the authorities, the officers just left. Since the government officials did 
not want to listen, as a consequence they needed to go to the EU in Khormaksar [other 
district of Aden] to voice their demands. They went twice, in uniform [the retired 
military].  
                                                          
809 Interview conducted by the author, Bonn (Germany), March 10, 2014. In as far as possible, I cross-checked 
the information provided with other reports for verification.  
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For July 7, 2007 [the anniversary of the end of the 1994 war and for Southerners the 
begin of the perceived ‘occupation’] we started to use the internet. We contacted TAJ 
[UK], the US, the KSA...everyone was very eager, and the phones did not stop ringing. 
We started to occupy the square [in Aden] at 4am. There were so many civilians, many 
from Radfan – we had expected only soldiers! The square was surrounded by the military 
each 10meters. I was stopped by a soldier. ‘Are you Bin Fareed?’, he asked me. ‘Yes.’ He 
looked at me. ‘I am from Abyan [the Bin Fareed family home]. You can go.’ Al-Nouba 
had been arrested before that but was released at 11am. He immediately went and gave a 
speech; however, he did not declare the aim to be independence. It would have been too 
early. The journalists started to call it ‘Al-hirak al-ganoubi’ and people started to gather.  
 On October 14, 2007 [the anniversary of the commencement of the independence 
struggle against the British] we planned an event in Radfan. I asked Ali Haitham ‘How 
many will come?’ He did not know. With some others I was on the way to Radfan on 
October 13th when we heard that 7 had been killed and 9 others injured. We were told to 
better return, but we decided to go on. There was a lot of blood. On the 14ththen it was 
unbelievable: There were around 70.000 people! After that we felt for the first time that 
we were strong.  
This extensive account not only traces the early steps towards the Southern Movement; in 
doing so, it furthermore discloses numerous important aspects that play significant roles in the 
trajectory of the movement and its analysis.  
 Bin Fareed speaks of how Southern discontent began to smolder more intensely starting 
around 2005/06 and from there on continues his narration to the founding of Hirak. Fact is 
that in 2005 there was a civil service reform in Yemen, in the course of which salaries were 
raised for active civil servants. Those retired were left out or had to pass through complicated 
procedures of being re-hired in order to then be re-retired again to be eligible. This raised the 
resentment of those forcibly retired even higher than before, which might contribute to the 
explanation of timing.810 Furthermore, the strong support during the presidential elections for 
the Southern candidate Faisal Bin Shamlan was interpreted as a sign of encouragement that 
change was widely aspired and that its realization would generate communal backing.811 
 The incident of the shot boy is only one of the many incidents movement members tell 
about that period, however, it further fueled anger and had some impact on the importance of 
the meeting at the Radfan Association in particular, thus providing a starting point at that 
specific place and that specific timing. It moreover serves as an illustration of how individual 
grievances were discussed within a wider social range and how also those involved (here: the 
father) handed over their concerns to ‘society’. That they were land claims in this precise case 
is accidental, yet representative for one of the core grievances: loss of territory/land/their 
homeland.  
                                                          
810 ICG, “Breaking Point”, 7, n. 38. It is unclear how many off those retired were able to go through the process 
of becoming eligible ex post as described. Probably very few; it appears to be more of a theoretically thinkable 
than a practicle and practiced legal loophole.  
811 Day, Regionalism and Rebellion, 228.  
181 
 
Radfan, an area in the north of the governorate of Lahj, until today is a critical area in the 
Southern struggle, together with the governorate of Dhaleh. Both mountainous regions have a 
historical legacy of being difficult to control and potential centers of upheaval. Located at the 
main route from the North to the South, however, and – at least Dhaleh812 – positioned in the 
border region highly staffed with military,813 they pose a clear focal point. In the anti-colonial 
armed struggle against the British, this zone had already played a significant role.814 
 By the mid-2000s, the weakness of Southern factionalization had become obvious, and – 
as we learn from the above account and various other sources – intensive efforts have been 
made to overcome the division lines between the two factions of the 1986 civil war: The so-
called ‘Zumrah’ around former PDRY president Ali Nasser Mohamed and the opposing 
‘Tughmah’, who had supported the group of the Politburo whom he had assassinated.815 At 
the danger of a reductionist perspective one can say that the Zumrah originated/s in Abyan 
(Ali Nasser Mohamed’s home district) and Shabwa governorates, whereas the Tughmah 
were/are based in Dhaleh and Lahj. There are differing accounts on how much the respective 
belonging still has an impact today. The point I want to stress here, however, is the awareness 
that existed for this weakness and the active attempts to overcome it. In fact, the tasāmuḥ wa 
tasāluḥ of 2006816 is considered a success by the Hirak. This notwithstanding, factionalization 
would become the number one challenge for the movement, as will be elaborated below.  
 Regime reaction to the forming opposition consisted of the closing-down their assembly 
place, disregard, attempts at cooptation and media blackout, interference, arrests817, and lastly 
violent repression. To a certain extent, opposition was permitted by the regime; only from a 
certain degree onwards did stronger repression set in. Furthermore, it was not coherent and 
destructive to the degree that it would have crushed the emerging movement, but rather 
                                                          
812 The governorate of Dhaleh was newly created after unification. The northern part had formerly been part of 
the YAR, while the southern part had belonged to the PDRY.  
813 In part due to the high military presence (specifically the unfamous 33rd Armored Brigade and its 
commander), clashes erupted time in again in that area between adherents of the Hirak and the army. A height 
was the attack of a funeral tent in December 2013 which sparked ‘self-defensive’ violence by the local 
population.  
814 Cf. Dresch, History; Brehony, Yemen Divided. 
815 The later was the faction around his predecessor Abdul Fattah Ismail, who was killed during the events. After 
his defeat, Ali Nasser Muhamed and some tens of thousands of his supporters fled to the North and allied with 
Saleh. In 1994 he fought with the North.  
816 The initiative could not have appeared as suddenly as it does in Bin Fareed’s narrative. An article by the 
faction of Al-Beidh, which gives an own account of the steps towards the Southern Movement, mentions the 
foundation of a number of smaller “reconciliation and tolerance forums” for that purpose in the southern 
governorates since July 2004. This period of prepation seems reasonable, especially when compared to later 
events and the periods of planning and preparation they needed. “Introduction to the Southern Movement and its 
Development Stages”. 
817 In summer 2007, for instance, al-Noubah and Ba’oum were detained. They were apparently perceived by the 
regime as powerful symbolic heads of the new movement and thus as a threat. Day, Regionalism and Rebellion, 
229.  
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punctual and unable to inhibit its advance. Intermittent repression, also violent repression with 
numerous victims, would remain the pattern of state intervention over time, however, it would 
ultimately neither result in a defeat of the Hirak nor in triggering strategic counterviolence. It 
did time and again lead to isolated violent responses, but not in a policy change of the 
movement – the central puzzle and it shows as early as 2007.  
 What is revealing furthermore, are the small steps818 in which the movement articulated its 
demands and pushed them further: As Bin Fareed describes the process, after a primary 
gathering to overcome longstanding frictions and for the sake of gathering people in the first 
place, the group-to-be-a-movement first sought to collect sound proof of their material 
grievances, i.e. the material loss encountered after the war. The documentation’s purpose for 
those presented remains obscure to us, but we can suspect that it first served to clarify the 
situation for those involved, and then, much more importantly, provide quantified data to 
those at whom the protests were to be directed, i.e. the government, representatives of foreign 
states etc. Damage and loss developed a legal, enforceable dimension.  
 On the goal, though, the organizers of the protests could not agree: whether to seek 
independence or two-state federalism was an unresolved issue right from the beginning. In the 
account, Bin Fareed presents a very smooth, consensual agreement to leave it “up to the 
people”; which appears hardly credible considering the controversial character of this 
prognostic dimension within the movement at later stages, nor does it do justice to the weight 
and the range of the implication each pathway has. Overall, however, we can hold that there 
was no clearly developed goal at this point in time. Early protests accordingly remained 
within a limited, rights-based domain (i.e. the goal was restricted to compensation and 
equality within the unity state and a lot less rigorous than any of the two suggestions made 
above) and were directed to the government and then – possibly for reasons of spatial 
proximity of the representation – the European Union as an international body who might 
support them.  
 We also learn about the people involved and their way of connecting with each other. The 
first aspect is that those who got together had partly been involved in earlier or parallel 
oppositional endeavors or organizations, i.e. there were (and are) personnel overlaps and 
resulting networks which could be drawn on to mobilize early followers. Through various 
figures, the international TAJ network could be connected to, as well as the one of HATAM, 
and, most importantly, the huge bulk of retired officers, whose grievances were at the core of 
the developing movement. Besides, regional ties built reliable connections: the Radfan 
                                                          
818 Mirrored also in the speeches as Bin Fareed describes them.  
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Charitable Association provided a gathering space, and with this, consequently, a certain core 
constituency. But regional solidarity potentially even transcends the sides people are on, as is 
shown by the incident of Bin Fareed being let pass by a soldier from his region. Additionally, 
international networks of the large Southern diaspora communities in the Gulf countries, 
Europe, the US etc. multiplied the communication effects, i.e. the numbers of people reached 
and the density of the network. All of these diverse and overlapping networks are a 
continuous characteristic of the Hirak and are employed in its mobilizational efforts and 
actions. It also contributes to the explanation of how the seemingly ‘spontaneous’ massive 
expansion occurred.  
 The role of Al-Ayyam newspaper, a traditional Southern news outlet with a high reputation 
for objective reporting (which in this was clearly perceived as pro-South), equally becomes 
evident. In addition to developments of the outlet having been reported upon by Bin Fareed 
and other relevant parties, the outlet’s impact is more so exemplified by regime’s attempts to 
silence its operations having acknowledged the outlet’s oppositional potential. At a later 
point, the newspaper (together with others) would be closed down by the government.  
 Furthermore noteworthy is the conscious usage of symbolic historical dates from the first 
day onwards. This practice ties the current contention closely with perceived historical 
precursors. Thereby it creates legitimacy and narrative fidelity, hence strengthening the 
movement in its claim of being the continuation of an identity group’s established struggle 
against hostile intruders (the British and Northerners) and internal threats (factionalization 
and the resulting conflicts). The latter also serves as a constant warning and impact on the 
movement’s strategic choices as I will show below. These notable anniversaries comprise of 
the following dates:  
 
 
 
January 13 Politburo Massacre 1986  
February 21 Day of Dignity 2013 
April 27 Initiation of Civil War 1994 
May 21 Call for Secession by Al-Beidh 1994 
July 7 End of Civil War 1994 (Southern Defeat)819 
                                                          
819 What the ROY celebrates as the day of national unity – and forces the South to celebrate – activists have 
renamed the “day of rage”. Dahlgren, “Snake with a Thousand Heads”.  
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October 14 Initiation of Anti-Colonial Struggle 1963 
November 30 Independence Day South 1967 
 
Table 5.2: Commemoration Days invoked by the Hirak 
 
Lastly, the sense of agency and empowerment Bin Fareed expresses in his final words 
concerning the October 14 event hint at the emotions involved and at the notion of the ‘power 
of the many’, which in turn can attract others to join in. 
  
Where Bin Fareed leaves us in the dark is at detailing the steps taken between early 2006 and 
fall 2007. Without a doubt, this period encompassed not only some fact gathering about the 
post-1994 looting, but rather also certain formation and mobilization activities on the side of 
the core organizers. And ‘organizers’ they were, not leaders; this point is vital to note. The 
early movement did not have figures that could account as strong leading personalities but 
was much more genuinely grassroots. Certainly, Nasser al-Nouba was a respected personality 
with social prestige as a merited army veteran, however, his person was not in the focus and 
his influence and stance were more symbolical than directing. 
 Despite a lack of concrete information, it can be assumed that 2006 served to consolidate, 
to a certain degree, the reconciliation process for bringing together potential opponents, and 
creating some consensus among them. ‘Injustice’, ‘occupation’, and ‘discrimination’ were the 
core frames summing up Southern grievances as perceived by the activists, which should be 
overcome, so their demands. State jobs and benefits, increased local autonomy, a stronger 
enforcement of law and order, land rights, and a just share in natural resource income were on 
the list, at this stage still within the framework of more equality for the South within the 
existing state.820 Over time, various social groups began to join, few at first, but slowly 
increasing numbers: civil servants, retired diplomats, academics, students, teachers, lawyers, 
(unemployed) youths from all regions.821 March 2007 allegedly saw the founding of 
associations based on specific social groups, while in July the same year councils were 
formed which served the coordination of “political events”.822 Hence, steps towards an 
                                                          
820 ICG, “Breaking Point”, 6. 
821 Ibid.  
822 “Introduction to the Southern Movement and its Development Stages”. In regards to the foundation of the 
associations I am in doubt if they had not existed before for the grievances of forced retirement etc. which were 
shared by the social groups had existed since 1994; a foundation of sectoral associations only in 2007 thus 
appears unlikely. It might be that either their numbers increased or their degree of formalization, or that certain 
social groups followed only then.  
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organizational formalization were taken; however, they were not directed towards one 
overarching social movement organization, but rather numerous small organizations of 
varying kinds: professional, regional, etc. This initial decentralization could be regarded as 
contributing to the root causes of the later challenging state of factionalization: Without one 
organization and one leader (or one distinct group of leaders), cohesion was more difficult to 
achieve; at the same time, the fact that already many organizations existed made it appear 
more self-evident to split in case of differing opinions or varying ascriptions of 
belonging/social identity. In other words, the threshold for doing so was low and many 
followed the existing examples, ultimately to the disadvantage of the movement as a whole, 
as we shall see.  
 Regime response during this early stage, beyond the mentioned repression and cooptation 
attempts, furthermore included some concessions, albeit limited, selective, and often 
misplaced, so that the overall impact was rather fueling than appeasing. Some retired officers, 
for instance, were taken back on the payroll for them to benefit from increases, however, they 
were few, these measures were late, and many individuals felt excluded. Even those who 
profited felt it was too little too late. An overall strategic effort on the side of the government 
with a dedicated, convincing plan and intention to realize genuine improvement and inclusion 
of the South was felt lacking. As with the above measures, this initiative likewise failed.823 
 
The October 2007 Radfan event was the one that kicked off the movement. Participant 
numbers skyrocketed from a few hundred to thousands and from a strong retired military base 
to an overarching one.824 Smaller protests and demonstrations continued thereafter as did the 
slow process of movement development. The regime’s interventions on the other hand 
continued to make the perceived situation worse. In March 2008 the government invited a 
couple of hundred Southern youth to an army recruiting event, implicitly signaling assistance 
in the search of employment opportunities. At this event, however, the Southern participants 
found themselves offended and insulted: They were labelled as lacking the “strength and 
loyalty necessary to serve in the Yemeni Armed Service”.825 Many of the youth were from 
Dhaleh and Lahj, regions in which forced military retirement had already taken a high toll in 
                                                          
823 ICG, “Breaking Point”, 7.  
824 The families of those killed in Radfan demanded an investigation into the case to prove that it had been the 
military who killed their relatives. They did not succeed, but when the burial finally took place in December (it 
had been postponed for the bodies to serve as evidence), an estimated hundreds of thousands of people streamed 
to attend in solidarity. Al Jazeera broadcasted powerful images, giving proof of the strength of people’s 
discontent and rage. Day, Regionalism and Rebellion, 231.  
825 Stephen Day, “Updating Yemeni National Unity”.  
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1994 and where related grievances were high. This further affront resulted in strong feelings 
of indignation and ensuing riots.826 
 In October 2008,827 a number of supposedly more encompassing social movement 
organizations were formed under the umbrella of the Hirak:828 the ‘Supreme National Council 
for the Liberation and Independence of the South and the Restoration of the State’, the 
‘National Body for the Liberation of the South’, and the ‘National Body for Peaceful 
Struggle’; in May 2009 they were joined also by the ‘Southern Peaceful Struggle’ or ‘Najāh’. 
Soon thereafter, efforts for a stronger centralization and for the establishment of a central 
leadership (as spurred especially by some of those who saw themselves fit for it) resulted of 
the unification of the above groups to form the ‘Peaceful Revolution Leadership Council for 
the Liberation of the South’. It can be accounted to the supporters of Ali Salim al-Beidh and 
led by Hassan Ba’oum.  
In January 2010 it was renamed again to the ‘Supreme Council for the Southern Peaceful 
Movement’ and remained one of the largest and most influential movement organizations 
within the Hirak.829 
 
2009 was the year in which a number of former leaders (partly living in exile) jumped on the 
bandwagon of the Southern Movement. Until then, it had been rather acephalous and there are 
reasons to argue that those trying to install themselves at the head of the Hirak – while 
successful among certain parts – never fully succeeded in doing so but that horizontal, 
decentralized networks and ties remained pivotal. However, it is worth introducing a number 
                                                          
826 ICG, “Breaking Point”, 7, n. 41. 
827 According to the YOHR, 623 protests had taken place between January and mid-November 2008 alone – a 
telling proof of widespread engagement. “Facts about the Peaceful Rallies” (in Arabic), YOHR, November 2008, 
cited in: “Facts about the Peaceful Rallies” (in Arabic), YOHR, November 2008, cited in: Day, Regionalism and 
Rebellion, 238.  
828 There is a confusing number of ever splitting and fusing, sometimes also short-lived groups. Nicole Stracke 
and Saif Haidar e.g. identified seven main groups in their research, which provide a snapshot of early 2010. They 
list: ‘The Higher National Forum for the Independence of the South’ (leader: Nasser al-Noubah); ‘The Higher 
National Council for the Liberation of the South’ (leaders: Hassan Ba’oum/Mohamed Saleh Tammah); 
‘Movement of the Southern Peaceful Struggle – Success’ (leaders: Salah al-Shanfara/Nasser al-Khubaji); ‘Union 
of the Southern Youth’ (leader: Fadi Ba’oum); ‘The National Forum for the Southern Peaceful Struggle’ (leader: 
Saleh Yahya Said); ‘Council for Leading the Peaceful Revolution’ (leader: Tariq al-Fadhli); and ‘Council of the 
Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South’ (umbrella). [Note: Some are mentioned in the running text above, 
however, translations vary.] Nicole Stracke/Mohammed Saif Haidar, “The Southern Movement in Yemen”, Gulf 
Research Center/Sheba Center for Strategic Studies, April 2010, 2f. In order to reduce unnecessary confusion 
which is sometimes aggravated in sources by mistranslation, I will not introduce all the separate organizations, 
but rather mention their names in the specific cases if relevant. Notable among the plentitude of similar names is 
the emphasis on ‘peaceful’.  
829 In fact, it claimed to be “the legitimate representative of the Southern People”. “Introduction to the Southern 
Movement and its Development Stages”. 
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of the wide range of leading or presumably leading figures in order to understand the process 
of contestation within the movement and in regard to its external networks.  
 
 
5.2.5.1. Leadership 
Brigadier Nasser al-Noubah (b. ?) from Shabwa, one of those former military suffering from 
early retirement, was among the early organizers and initiators of the movement. The respect 
that was shown to him based on his military background, age, and his dedicated engagement 
for the developing movement: More than once he was arrested for his activism and detained 
over periods of time. Soon after the expansion of the Hirak in fall 2007, however, Noubah’s 
position became strained by evolving conflicts within the council of the Association of 
Retired Military and he was removed as their chairman. From then onwards, he slowly 
isolated himself and – though still respected and a symbolical figure – lost de facto 
influence.830 His stance was pro-independence and anti-NDC.831 
 Equally among the highly prominent leaders from the very beginning was Hassan Ahmed 
Ba’oum (b. 1943) from Hadhramawt. Ba’oum, a leading YSP member associated with the 
‘Zumrah’,832 had before been active in the Movement of Reforming the Course of Unity in the 
late 1990s833. With the Hirak he took a pro-independence position and became a symbol of 
continued peaceful resistance due to his frequent detentions; some even referred to him as ‘the 
Yemeni Mandela’. His prominence inside the country brought him into an antagonist role 
towards Ali Salim al-Beidh,834 who for years became the most visible and prominent leader 
abroad. Allegiance to the one or the other created factions within the movement which 
resulted in internal conflict in fall 2013; throughout 2014, however, efforts to unite central 
figures outwardly proved successful and open conflict was subdued. 
 Where Ba’oum’s leadership is based on being “on the ground” and “with the people”, Ali 
Salim al-Beidh (b. 1939) gained his reputation from his status of having been president of the 
                                                          
830 Some interviewees regard his advanced age as one of the factors conducive to a slow withdrawal from 
intensive activism; Amnesty International, however, in 2007 set his age at merely “in his 50s”. 
http://www.amnestyinternational.be/doc/IMG/article_PDF/article11505.pdf (accessed May 22, 2015).  
831 Information based on interviews with Hirak activists living in the UK, April 2013, and verified with media 
reports from a variety of sources.  
832 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Intifada”, Foreign Policy, March 13, 2013, accessed May 22, 2015, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/13/yemens-southern-intifada/.  
833 Sama’a al-Hamdani, “Threatened Unity: Understanding the Southern Hirak, Part 1”, Table: Southern Hirak 
1994–2006, February 25, 2013, accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.yemeniaty.com/threatened-unity-the-
southern-hirak/.  
834 Ba’oum’s sons Fadi and Fawaz are also very active in the Hirak; Fadi e.g. is a leading figure in the youth 
movement. Conflicts between them and Ahmed Ba’muallim, for instance, led to further factionalization or – as 
in that specific case – for changes on allegiance (Ba’muallim, who was first aligned with Ba’oum, then joined al-
Beidh). Based on interviews with Hirak activists in UK, April 2013. 
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South. He is still frequently referred to as “President” and personally prefers this title to be 
used, he has, however, more than once emphasized that he was not aiming to regain his earlier 
status. Despite the fact that his role in the unification was a ‘black mark’ criticized by many, 
al-Beidh succeeded in convincing the majority of followers that he had intended well and the 
later abuse was the fault of the Northern regime. His picture is widely depicted during rallies 
and demonstrations, though it needs elucidation to what extent it has turned into a symbol for 
independence and thereby transcended factual support for his person. Al-Beidh’s visibility 
and his presence first in Germany and then in Lebanon (Beirut),835 which made him more 
easily accessible, have both guided international media attention towards him as a central 
representative and spokesperson for the movement, thus strengthening his influence and 
international standing. Much more significant for his position inside the Hirak and his 
mobilizational capacity, however, is the fact that he dominates the movement-affiliated TV 
channel ‘Aden Live TV’. As this satellite channel is received by almost every household in 
the South and – according to interviewees and other activists – frequently (albeit critically) 
watched by activists, the reach of his messages appears extensive. Although he 
overwhelmingly took a non-violent position, there is evidence that he was not coherent 
therein: Aden Live repeatedly broadcasted calls for armed struggle, some of which, however, 
were not one hundred per cent explicit; furthermore, al-Beidh has documented contacts to 
more militant factions in Dhaleh and Lahj/Radfan. He also has a history of pro-secessionist 
activism. Immediately after the lost 1994 war, he was a member of MOWJ and in 1997 
allegedly led the pro-violence movement HATAM.836 I will argue that al-Beidh aimed to test 
the resonance of a call for armed struggle and when he found it lacking again resorted to his 
prior, non-violent stance.  
 Al-Beidh’s rivalry with Ba’oum has been highlighted above; besides, there was a genuine 
and hostile animosity between him and another exiled leader, who was to become popular 
among the Southern Movement: Mohamed Ali Ahmed (b. ca. 1941). Their conflict originated 
in the brief 1986 Southern civil war in which they were on opposing sides.837 Ali Ahmed 
returned from exile in London in 2012 and joined the controversial NDC as a representative 
for the Southern issue. His position is ostensibly more moderate than al-Beidh’s and open to a 
federalist solution. While his person is highly contentious (one interviewee referred to him as 
“murderer” of 1986, others as “very confrontational”), he is still able to gather followers 
                                                          
835 After 1994, we first spent many years in exile in Oman. In 2008, he left for Germany and after the 2011 
uprising set himself up in the Lebanese capital.  
836 Hamdani, “Threatened Unity”. 
837 Both Ali Ahmed and Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi had been working under then-PDRY president Ali Nasser 
Mohamed.  
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around him and represents another influential personality. His advantage in comparison to al-
Beidh is that he can be inside the country and thus much closer to the protesters and relevant 
networks; on the other hand, however, he is being described as a rather seclusive personality 
and certainly lacks the successful appearance of his adversary. Though without proof, the 
number of a rough 70% to 30% split between the two figures around 2012/2013 circulated 
among analysts,838 based on intimate albeit unsystematic knowledge of and contacts with the 
movement. Regional allegiance of activists in Ali Ahmed’s home province of Abyan play one 
role in here (al-Beidh is from Hadhramawt). In any case, Ali Ahmed is another player to be 
accounted for in the framing arena of the Hirak. Concerning the question of the adoption of 
violence, he, on the one hand, claims non-violent protest to be the strategy of choice for the 
movement, however – in the words of the interviewing journalist – “did not forswear 
returning to violence to achieve his goals”: The conditions would tell if violence was 
necessary when non-violence fails.839 
 Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas (b. 1939) had held ministerial positions in the PDRY from 
1971–1986, been president from 1986–1990, and the first prime minister in the united 
Republic of Yemen between 1990 and 1994. Stemming from a prestigious sayyid family in 
Hadhramawt, he is repeatedly described as a technocrat with a good sense for politics.840 
According to one interviewee, this holds equally true for his activism within the Hirak, where 
he could be highly valuable to the movement, however, he gambles away the trust people 
could have in him by negotiating and acting in secret, which discredits him.841After 1994, he 
has been a member of MOWJ together with al-Beidh, Abdullah al-Asnaj, and Abdulrahman 
al-Jifri, among others. The latter, a longtime member of the ‘Rābiṭat Abnāʾ al-Yaman’ 
[‘League of the Sons of Yemen’] or simply ‘Rabata’ opposition party, has remained much 
more in the background, however, he has been named as a prospective future leader in the 
South by interviewees and other activists. In early November 2014 he returned to Aden in the 
context of the declared deadline to Northern engagement in the South842 and was among the 
most prominent heads mediating between the various organizations under the umbrella of 
Hirak in the committees set up. He is regarded as a moderate.  
                                                          
838 Cf. Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Intifada”.  
839 Farea al-Muslimi, “Returned South Yemen Leader: ‘Peaceful Struggle’ May Yet Win”, Al-Monitor, 
September 11, 2012, accessed May 23, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-
monitor/mohammed-ali-ahmed-former-south.html#.  
840 “Al-Attas, Haidar Abu Bakr”, in Historical Dictionary of Yemen, ed. Robert D. Burrowes (Lanham et al.: 
Scarecrow Press, 2010), 42; articulated as well in my interviews with Hirak activists in the UK, April 2013.  
841 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
842 He had returned to Yemen from his KSA exile on other occasions since 2006.  
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From the same age cohort as the above leaders, Ali Nasser Mohamed (b. 1939 in Abyan) 
served as president (or, more correctly: General Secretary of the YSP) of the South from 
1980–1986 and then fled north. He is currently living in exile in Cairo. His influence today 
partly still feeds on his prestige as former head of state. In regard to the goals of the 
movement he advocates for a two-state federal solution with a subsequent referendum, as he 
and al-Attas suggested during the November 2011 Cairo Conference in which they strove to 
unite Southerners on that. In a June 2014 interview, he still articulated his strong belief in the 
power of conferences to overcome Southern friction, which he regards as their major 
weakness:  
For decades, we have tried and are still trying to hold a unified southern conference that 
would produce a unified strategic vision and single reference that reflects the hopes and 
aspirations of the people in the south, out of our conviction that the strength of the 
southerners lies in their unity, and their weakness in their division and fragmentation.843 
So far, despite some underlying dissonances, the dominant stance has been non-violent. There 
are, however, more militant voices as well. The most vocal, though certainly not most 
influential, was Tariq al-Fadhli (b. 1967), a sheikh from Abyan with a history of fighting as a 
mujāhid in Afghanistan. After his return to Yemen, he was coopted by Saleh to fight (with the 
other ‘Arab Afghan’ veteran mujāhideen) against the South in the 1994 war – an important 
role they took over with great enthusiasm and ‘resounding success’. When al-Fadhli grew 
frustrated with Saleh’s trade-off for his loyalty, which did not meet his expectations,844 he 
declared his joining of – and even leadership role in – the Southern Movement in 2009 and 
called for a violent pathway.845 Neither his person nor his call to arms met with approval and 
resonance within the movement; he was regarded with suspicion or outright despise for his 
perceived opportunist change of sides, his jihadist stance and connections, and his historical 
role in fighting the South. Some activists openly called him a “terrorist”846. Armed struggle as 
proposed solution did not resonate, either, as will be shown in more detail below. Overall, al-
                                                          
843 Mustafa Amara, “Former South Yemen president Says Situation Worsening Every Day”, Al-Monitor, June 
13, 2014, accessed May 23, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/south-yemen-former-
president-independence-calls-frustration.html#ixzz3azKl6SHs.  
844 Tariq al-Fadhli is a son of the last Sultan of al-Fadhli who has been exiled in 1967. He strove for a full return 
of his family’s former holding, which covered large parts of the governorate of Abyan. The dispossession by the 
socialist Southern regime and his related deep-seated enmity towards the Southern state significantly reduced his 
credibility when joining the Hirak.  
845 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “The Jihadis and the Cause of South Yemen: A Profile of Tariq al-Fadhli”, Terrorism 
Monitor 7(35), November 19, 2009, accessed May 24, 2015, http://www.jamestown.org/single/ 
?tx_ttnews[tt_news] =35757&no_cache=1#.VWGg0UYxASQ.  
846 Exemplarily, interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
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Fadhli could not take over the role he had striven for and after a while abandoned the Hirak 
again.847 
 Of a stronger impact on the ground are less conspicuous figures. Taher Tamah and his 
cousin (retired) General Mohamed Saleh Tamah from the area of Yafa’e848 joined the Hirak 
early on and have openly advocated armed struggle. Around 2010 they set up a small militia 
under the name of the ‘Himyar Brigades’849; it never gained a foothold within the movement 
as a whole, though, and many activists have never heard of it. The two men, however, are 
known and respected. To what extent there are congruencies with the militant groups in 
Dhaleh and Radfan is impossible to say; it might be well possible for reasons of common 
strategies and geographical proximity. 
 Shallal Ali Shaia (b. ca. 1972) is the most influential leader in the mountains of Dhaleh. 
Shaia has a lot of prestige, partly inherited from his father, Ali Shaia, who had been a member 
of the Politburo and had been killed in 1986. He had been an active military officer for only a 
few years when he was forcefully retired and thus stands for the generation of young 
pensioners without perspective after 1994; many stem from Dhaleh, for not only has it a 
strong military tradition; besides, it has been “a key battleground” during the war.850 Rumors 
hold that among the militants in the area, who have basically taken over control of the 
mountains since around 2012, are the remains of the earlier armed movement HATAM, 
which has equally had its stronghold in Dhaleh in the last 1990s. In an interview, Shaia 
explains the reasons for the location as follows:  
We started here, in Dhale and in Radfan, because we were safe here. Here, all the people 
are active with Hirak. Most of our army who were kicked out of their jobs came from 
here. Most of the military forces who were retired came from here. Here, the community 
helped us to start our activities. They were ready. The occupation forces were here – there 
was action and there was reaction.851 
For the last years this militant Hirak faction frequently clashed with nearby stationed 
Northern military units and controls the territory; this is marked not least by the 
overwhelming presence of the former Southern flag in the area and the checkpoints, which 
                                                          
847 In mid-2014 he declared to have joined AQAP and taken up arms to fight against the government in Sana’a – 
a fact which supports evidence for his alleged opportunist actions. News Yemen, June 17, 2014, accessed May 
24, 2015, http://www.newsyemen.net/news7298.html.  
848 East of resistive Dhaleh and Radfan.  
849 Hamdani, “Threatened Unity”. “Himyar” refers to an ancient Yemeni kingdom in conflict with its northern 
neighbor, i.e. a conflict mirroring the current situation.  
850 Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Intifada”. 
851 Ibid.  
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Northerners fear not to be allowed to pass. “The free South”852 is loyal to al-Beidh.853What 
they did not, however, is expand their militant activities beyond their heartland; I will discuss 
this aspect below. In regard to Lahj, which to a large extent is also under the control of 
Hirakis, the local leader Nasser al-Khubaji (b. unknown) insists that the provision of a 
working administration, in parallel to dysfunctional state structures and the delivery of public 
services, was the reason for the movement’s success – not force.854 
 
The list of (partly self-proclaimed) ‘leaders’ could be expanded to include many more names; 
those selected above, however, include the most visible and influential on the one hand, and 
those with the highest potential for violent escalation on the other. Partly those two criteria 
overlap, partly they do not. What should have become clear is the sheer number of figures 
involved on a strategic level or struggling to be involved – to the detriment of a clear and 
unified stance of the movement as a whole. One major obstacle, which has also been 
identified by the Hirak itself, is the lack of communication and coordination between the 
various leaders, some of who are involved in long-standing personal conflicts and distrust. 
 The ‘ordinary’ members, on the other hand, have proven open and integrative to a wide 
spectrum of followers from all strata of society and regions,855 pointing out the potential 
usefulness of taking a more decentralized perspective on framing processes instead of 
focusing on elites, as Steinberg has suggested earlier.856 
 How this constitutes a strength of the movement is well expressed in the words of one 
Adeni: “It is a snake with a thousand heads. The authorities cannot stop it, as when local 
leaders are detained or go undercover, new ones replace them. It is the strength of the 
movement that it does not have a national leadership that can be liquidated.”857 
 
 
                                                          
852 The “free South” is also invoked in graffiti around Aden which state: “The free South lives”. Adam Baron, 
“In some Parts of Yemen ‘The Free South Lives’”, Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 2013, accessed March 
6, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0306/In-some-parts-of-Yemen-the-free-south-
lives.  
853 Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Intifada”.  
854 Ibid. Another name associated with his and often related also to Shaia is Salah al-Shanfara. He is located in 
Dhaleh and used to be a follower of Ba’oum.  
855 The movement is built on the idea of fairly autonomous local units, each of whose leaders arises organically. 
856 Steinberg, “Tilting the Frame”.  
857 Susanne Dahlgren, “A Snake with A Thousand Heads. The Southern Cause in Yemen”, Middle East Report 
256 (Fall 2010), accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer256/snake-thousand-heads.  
193 
 
5.2.6. A Chronology of Protest 
Corresponding to the chronology presented for the Houthis, this section provides a brief 
chronology of the conflict. There are eight distinguishable phases between the origins of the 
Hirak in January 2006 until mid-March 2015, when the Houthi takeover and subsequent open 
fighting led to a halt of movement activities and the observation period ends. The first two 
phases, the founding phase and early movement period, have for the most part already been 
covered. Only minor details will be added to this picture. The third phase is characterized by 
movement expansion, the accession of old leaders, and the adoption of 
secession/independence as movement goal, followed by phase four in which the Hirak’s 
activities overlap with the Arab Spring or ‘Youth Revolution’ protests in spring 2011. After 
its rapid disillusionment and estrangement with what is conceived of as Northern protest 
movement, the fifth, post-Arab Spring period is impacted by a larger space for action due to 
regime weakness and, hence, a more visible taking over of the ‘Southern street’. The period of 
the NDC, the sixth phase, continues to give space to Southern activism as a sign of goodwill 
during the negotiations, despite the overwhelming rejection of the dialogue by activists; 
however, at the same time tensions within the alleged leadership increase and two unrelated 
incidents of military violence led to increased unrest and a stronger involvement of 
Hadhramis in the struggle. The post-NDC period, phase seven, saw both increased repression 
and aims to unify the movement leadership. With the commemoration of the anti-colonial 
struggle, the Hirak issued a deadline for the withdrawal of all Northern ‘occupying forces’ 
until November 30, 2014; however, the date came and passed without any occurrence. The 
eighth and last phase covers the period of and after the Houthi takeover in Sana’a and Hadi’s 
escape to Aden in February 2015. It saw the positioning of the Hirak in favor of Hadi and 
ends shortly before the commencement of Saudi air strikes in operation ‘Decisive Storm’.  
 
(1) Founding Phase January 2006–July 2007 
In addition to the prior description of events, it can be noted that in the initial period there was 
little regime attention and repression. This space was used by activists to gather some 
founding members, mainly from preexisting networks of earlier opponents and the large pool 
of discontent retired military. 
 
(2) Early Phase August 2007–April 2009 
The declaration of the Southern Peaceful Movement triggered some regime repression beyond 
the incident in Habilain on October 14. Prominent figures, for instance, such as Ba’oum, 
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Ahmed Bin Fareed and others are repeatedly arrested and released. Parliamentary elections, 
which were scheduled for April 2009, are postponed for two years. During this period the 
movement is a genuine grassroot movement without prominent leadership.  
 
(3) Expansionist Phase/Secessionist Phase May 2009–February 2011 
May 2009 sees a number of changes: First, increased regime repression against the media. On 
May 4, the regime suspends eight independent newspapers from publication, charging them 
with violations of press law by publicizing articles “against national unity and the country’s 
highest interests”. Furthermore, they are accused of “inciting violations of law and order, 
spreading hatred and enmity among the united people of Yemen”. Among them is the well-
known ‘Al-Ayyam’ newspaper, founded under the British, which has regularly reported in 
Hirak activities.858 In a speech on May 6, Saleh relates to this:  
If there is room to talk in the press then you have to publish kindness, love, and 
brotherhood. If there were mistakes in development or security or the judiciary, criticize 
those mistakes and there would be no objection, there is room for that. But the unity, 
freedom, democracy, revolution, the republic, and the constitution are national constants 
that cannot be crossed.859 
He frames the independent media as transgressors of democratic values and national harmony 
while implying that state institutions were open to democratic criticism. Along these lines, 
only a few days later a new court is created solely to try journalists.860 
 Second, the accession of former Southern leaders. The most renowned figure of the old 
guard who jumps on the bandwagon of the Hirak in May is Ali Salim al-Beidh. On the 
anniversary of his declaration of secession in 1994, May 21, he broadcasts a speech from his 
exile in Germany in which he apologizes to the Southern population and declares himself a 
major proponent of the new movement. Another, yet, highly ambiguous figure to announce 
his allegiance to the Hirak is Tariq al-Fadhli, the (former) jihadi. And, lastly, the leader of 
AQAP at that time equally declares the group’s support, however, he emphasizes their 
rejection of Marxism and underlines the importance of jihad.861 As a response, the Southern 
Movement emphatically distances itself from the terrorist group; some voices even hold that 
the AQAP declaration was influenced by the government in a conspiracy to discredit them.  
                                                          
858 The others are: Al-Masadar, Al-Watani, Al-Diyar, Al-Mustaqilla, Al-Nida, Al-Shari’a, and Al-Ahali. HRW, 
“In the Name of Unity. The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests”, December 
2009, 3f. 
859 Ibid., 56f.  
860 Ibid., 51. 
861 Andrew W. Terrill, The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security (Carlisle: PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 32; HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, 24. 
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Third, increased repression against protesters in form of arbitrary arrests, mistreatment, and  
unfair trials, especially in relation to the July 7 protests that year.862 Furthermore, the regime 
created pro-unity militias, the so-called ‘Committees to Protect Unity’ (CPU), who became 
infamous among activists who called them the “janjawīd”.863 On numerous occasions they 
acted like vigilante groups and provoked isolated violent clashes.  
 Lastly, there are two specific occasions on which Southerners attacked Northern 
shopkeepers; during one of the incidents, two Northerners were killed.864 I agree with the 
assessment of HRW, which argues that with these attacks and the CPUs, there was a clear 
potential for an outbreak of violence at that time – which, however, did not occur. 
 Generally, this phase is characterized by an expansion of the movement into all strata of 
society and by a change of demands: Prior to mid-2009 and the accession of the old 
leadership, demands were made within the unity framework and were based on equal rights 
and compensation. Now it changed to secession or independence, respectively.865 
 One last notable incident before the Arab Spring protests occurred in January 2011: In 
response to hostilities, troops deploy to the area of Radfan, block access roads, prevent the 
delivery of oil, and cut the telephone lines. This was perceived as a provocation by locals and 
might have triggered most intense clashes; however, Hassan Ba’oum, who had just been 
released from detention, travelled to the region and used his influence to calm down the 
atmosphere. He called for the unity of the movement – i.e. against a splintering into violent 
and non-violent branches – and in the spirit of ‘Reconciliation and Tolerance’ encouraged an 
overcoming of old differences.866 Again, one might speculate about the potential for further 
escalation which could have emanated from this situation without his calming impact.  
 
 
                                                          
862 Ibid., 42ff. 
863 Ibid., 36f. Some activists emphasize that these thugs dominantly belong to the low social class (almost a 
caste) of ‘khaddam’ (‘servants’/’slaves’), believed to be of African origin. Interview with Hirak activist living in 
Germany, July 22, 2014.  
864 HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, 2. Nasser al-Khubaji in the name of the movement distanced himself from 
what he called “heinous crimes”. Ibid., 23. 
865 Some Southern activists clearly distinguish between ‘secession’ as ‘act of separation from a legitimate state’ 
and ‘independence’ as ‘gaining political freedom from outside control’. The latter contains an element of 
delegitimization of the unified state in its current form. The vast majority of adherents, however, does not make 
this fine, almost legal distinction, and I will correspondingly use the terms interchangeably with the exception of 
cases in which the speakers are making this distinct delineation.  
866 “Army Deploys to Radfan to Face Southern Militants”, National Yemen, January 17, 2011, accessed May 7, 
2015, http://www.nationalyemen.com/2011/01/17/army-deploys-to-radfan-to-face-southern-militants/. Besides, 
calls for regular civil disobedience to occur on every first Monday of the month are issued by the Hirak; reports 
state that this was mainly implemented in Dhaleh, Radfan, and Habilain. “Civil Disobedience Paralyzes Life in 
Some Southern Cities”, Yemen Post, January 4, 2011, accessed June 27, 2012, 
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=2948&MainCat=3.  
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(4) Overlap with Arab Spring February–April 2011 
Soon after the initiation of anti-regime protests in Sana’a in February 2011, the Hirak decided 
to lay down their own protest campaigns and join the Northern protesters.867After a few 
weeks, however, they found their own issues and grievances underrepresented and 
disregarded by Northern activists – now a wide spectrum of groups ranging from independent 
youth via Islah to the Houthis. They disassociated again and continued to pursue their 
pathway independently. What came to their favor was the withdrawal of most of the security 
forces to the North to contain the protests. This provided them with far more space for 
actions, which, among others, activists used to symbolically reclaim territory by raising 
and/or painting the former Southern/PDRY flag and graffiti.  
 
(5) Post-Arab Spring May 2011–March 2013 
The Southern flag continues to be a dominant motive. 2011 sees three conferences of 
Southern activists in Cairo (May, July, November), which aim at the unification of the 
movement and its leadership and try to develop a clear vision and roadmap. Ali Nasser 
Mohamed and Haydar al-Attas are the main drivers here, al-Beidh and others do not attend. 
The November Cairo Conference lays out a roadmap for two-state federalism with subsequent 
referendum.  
 In the midst of the power vacuum resulting from the Arab Spring, AQAP (or ‘Ansar al-
Sharia’, how they rebranded themselves for popular appeal) takes control of large parts of 
Abyan and declares an emirate. They are driven out in mid-2012, after they have left marks of 
horrifying rule on much of the local population.  
 In November 2011, Saleh finally steps down as a result of the GCC Initiative and the 
initiation of the transitional phase. Part of this phase is the NDC as an attempt to 
comprehensively settle the major contentious issues and conflicts in the country. It is agreed 
that Saleh shall hand his power to the Vice President Hadi, who is elected President in a 
single-candidate election on February 21, 2012. The Hirak opposes this election for its 
transfer of power merely within the dominant regime circle. 2012 is defined by extensive 
protests and campaigns of civil disobedience in the South and on a national level by the 
preparations for the NDC. In March 2012, Mohamed Ali Ahmed returns from exile and 
declares his participation as a Southern representative to the NDC. A participation of al-Attas 
                                                          
867 On February 19, 2011, Ali Nasser Mohamed called on the Hirak to unite with the Northern protesters. “Exiled 
Politicians Urge People to Unite against the Regime”, Yemen Post, February 19, 2011, accessed June 27, 2012, 
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=3159&MainCat=3. Regime repression 
followed suit; see: HRW, “Days of Bloodshed in Aden”, March 2011.  
197 
 
appears probable for quite some time as well. The overwhelming majority of the Southern 
movement and population, however, reject the dealing with the so-called ‘Southern Issue’ 
within the framework of the NDC. They hold that the issue is the most important for the 
country, by far outweighing the others to be dealt with. On this basis, they demand an 
immediate, prioritized negotiation with the Northern government with a 50/50 parity. This 
demand remains disregarded.  
 
(6) NDC-Phase March 2013–January 2014 
On March 18, 2013, the anniversary of the Arab Spring ‘Day of Dignity’, the NDC is 
inaugurated. The Hirak still predominantly denies its legitimacy; only few known figures take 
part and they lack the legitimacy of being acknowledged representatives.868 Correspondingly, 
the Southern Issue Working Group has a tough position and lacks support from Southern 
organizations. The non-implementation of a 20-point-list of conditions that had been 
developed by a preparatory technical committee causes a further loss of confidence during the 
process in the eyes of many Southerners and leads to a withdrawal of more acknowledged 
participants. Mohamed Ali Ahmed, too, finally withdraws in November 2013, claiming that 
the condition for his participation, the discussion of secession, was not brought up either. By 
then, the NDC, which should have ended mid-September, had already been prolonged for a 
lack of solutions. As a consequence, in the fall a subcommittee is formed to discuss the issue 
in a smaller, more efficient circle. It consists of 16 representatives in a 50/50 share from the 
North and the South, but the lack of legitimacy remains. The final NDC document signed on 
January 24, 2014 contains the so-called ‘Just Solution’ proposition which had been presented 
by the committee earlier that month: It advances a six-state federal model for Yemen, with the 
North containing four and the South containing two federal states. The ‘Aden Region’ shall 
comprise Aden, Lahj, Dhaleh, and Abyan, and the ‘Hadhramaut Region’ shall consist of 
                                                          
868 The regulations on seat distribution were complex. 85 of the 565 seats were officially dedicated to Hirak 
representatives – whose legitimacy, however, was highly contested from within. Furthermore, the roughly 40% 
of seats allocated for parties had to be filled with 50% of Southerners; yet, the definition of whom that included 
precisely was contested as well. The movement criticized that this regulation was covering up the fact that many 
of those who were counted as Southerners were actually well integrated in the Northern regime and thus 
illegitimate in their eyes. On the challenges for the Southern Issue Working Group and the general setup of the 
NDC see: Ali Saif Hassan, “Yemen. National Dialogue Conference: Managing Peaceful Change?”, Accord 25 
(2014): 50–54. On the structure see: ibid. 52. On seat distribution regulations, including youth and women’s 
shares therein: Sama’a al-Hamdani, “Yemen’s National Dialogue: The Country’s Critical Test for Stability”, 
January 17, 2013, accessed March 2, 2013, http://www.yemeniaty.com/2013/01/yemens-national-dialogue-
country.html.  
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Shabwa, Hadhramaut, and al-Mahra.869 Following their stance of rejecting a continued unity 
state, the proposal is not accepted by the Hirak leadership and the movement.870 
 As a sign of goodwill, and in combination with an apology for the 1994 war damage, the 
government in September 2013 created 800 new jobs for those Southerners who had lost their 
jobs in the aftermath of the war. This gesture, however, missed its purpose for it was taken as 
merely a drop in the ocean; furthermore, al-Beidh announced his rejection of the apology. 
Considering the massive financial burden and the corresponding budget hole of the state, it is 
clear that a restatement of tens of thousands into government positions is impossible. This 
plus the fact that in Yemen many decrees are made, yet never implemented, leaves people 
without faith in the provision.871 It is too little, too late to placate grievances.  
 During the course of the year, the rift between al-Beidh and Ba’oum supporters widens and 
among other incidences872 clashes occur between two groups when Ba’oum speaks on a 
commemoration event on October 14. The movement perceives the danger of increased 
internal tensions and leads to mediation and appeasement attempts in early 2014. 
 Other violent incidents with the involvement of Northern army forces catalyze events in 
December. When a prominent local Hadhrami sheikh is killed in a clash at an army 
checkpoint on December 2, the outrage leads the ‘Hadramaout Tribes Confederacy’ (HTC) to 
issue an ultimatum on December 10: December 20 is to be the deadline for the withdrawal of 
all security forces; in addition they demand that only tribes provide security for oil companies 
in the area, thus regain the control over security on ‘their’ territory (plus jobs).873 They gain 
the support of the Hirak and join hands with the movement. At the bottom line, the incident 
triggers what had been lying dormant for a long time: The population of Hadhramawt seeks 
more autonomy or even independence for the region, based on its shared identity. The 
                                                          
869 “Yemen Celebrates New Map of Six Regions”, Yemen Times, February 11, 2014, accessed June 12, 2015, 
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1754/news/3462/Yemen-celebrates-new-map-of-six-regions.htm.  
870 Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen’s Pivotal Moment”, American Enterprise Institute, Critical Threats Project, 
February 2014, 7. Qassim Askar Jubran, for instance, proclaimed: “The people of the south will thwart this 
attempt to divide the south and [the new structure] will not be implemented no matter the price.” Nasser al-
Taweel similarly affirmed his continued support for a two-state (N-S) federal solution. “Federal Region Defining 
Committee: Yemen Will Have Six Regions”, Yemen Times, February 4, 2014, accessed February 9, 2014, 
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1752/news/3426/Federal-region-defining-committee-Yemen-will-have-six-
regions.htm. On the (negative) perception of the NDC generally see the poll results of a Yemeni polling center 
Percent: “People in Southern Provinces Not Satisfied with National Dialogue Conference”, May 30, 2013, 
accessed June 27, 2015, http://percent-yemen.com/py.mits-ye.com/index4d46.html?it_id=51. About two-thirds 
of Southerners were found to hold a “negative perception”.  
871 Cf. interview with the journalist Iona Craig in Mafraj Radio, Episode 8, November 10, 2013, accessed June 
12, 2015, http://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/podcast/episode-8/.  
872 Other incidents have been reported already for early July that year. “Warning of an Armed Conflict in 
Southern Yemen”, Al Jazeera, July 5, 2013, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.net/ 
news/pages/bf4a5d95-3b43-4e90-8028-e9359688fcb4.  
873 The fact that a number of Yemeni generals have made fortunes from oil companies resulted in an increase of 
violence in the region since 2012 and a shuffle of leading military positions by Hadi’s regime.  
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following months see a sequence of clashes with the military874– it is even labelled as a ‘tribal 
upraising’. Since that time, Hadhramawt is much more strongly integrated into the activities 
of the Hirak, whose center has for a long time been in Aden and the surrounding regions. The 
developments help to overcome tensions between the Aden and Hadramawt factions, which 
reflect the historical factionalism of former socialist regime. 
 The second consequential incident occurs on December 27, when the infamous 33rd 
Armored Brigade shells a funeral tent of a Southern Movement martyr in al-Dhale, killing at 
least 19 mourners. Massive protests against the “massacre” take place the following day, 
when again the army fires into the crowd, killing two. An escalation with this specific unit 
had been predictable since it had already been responsible for violence against civilians in 
Taiz in 2011.875 As a reaction, al-Beidh condemns the action and calls on international 
community:  
We appeal to all international organizations concerned with human rights and all the 
international community around the world to raise their voice against the ongoing 
genocide against the people of the occupied south.876 
As will become clear with the detailed frame analysis, his statement contains some typical 
elements of Hirak framing: a drastic description of the Southerners victimization, the 
allegation of ‘occupation’, a rights-rhetoric, and a call for support by international actors. 
 
(7) Post-NDC Phase January 2014–November 30, 2014 
The NDC officially ends on January 24 with the signing of the final document. With the 
conclusion of the event, which has marked some kind of emphatic ‘peace phase’, repression 
in the South increases again. Specifically the governor of Aden makes it his mission to 
eradicate the spatial claim-making of the Southern Movement in his city by rigorous and 
partly violent elimination of their symbols, especially the flags, from public space. 
Interference with movement-affiliated media increases in a similar vein. In February, for 
instance, the government stops the printing of Aden al-Ghad, a popular newspaper at a public 
printing press.877 
 On the other side, some Hadhrami faction equally pushes for further escalation in what 
should be understood as a continuation of the December agitation. On February 15, 2014, a 
                                                          
874 Zimmerman, “Pivotal Moment”, 9.  
875 Ibid., 8.  
876 “President Ali Salem Al-Beidh Realeased a Statement”, Aden Live TV, December 28, 2013, accessed 
February 24, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-9761.html. 
877 “Government Stops Printing Aden Al-Ghad Southern Opposition Newspaper”, National Yemen, February 23, 
2014, accessed February 24, 2014, http://nationalyemen.com/2014/02/23/government-stops-printing-aden-al-
ghad-southern-opposition-newspaper/.  
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prior unknown militant organization with the name of ‘Liberation Brigades of the South’ 
(LBS) issues a statement claiming some attacks at government installations. It warns that all 
checkpoints, barracks, and camps of the “Yemeni enemy in Hadhramaut” were now strategic 
targets for attacks by its fighters and that it “believes in the right of the Southern people for 
liberation and independence and to adopt all options to attain their freedom and 
independence”.878 The founding of another militant organization, the ‘National Front for 
Liberation and Independence of the South’, is announced in Aden the same day. Among its 
interim leadership is Ahmed Ba’muallim, a close ally of al-Beidh. While this fact hints at al-
Beidh’s support for a more militant approach, he at the same time openly advocates for a 
continuation of the peaceful struggle: Also in mid-February, briefly before the Southern 
‘Karama Day’ on the 21st of the month, Ba’oum, al-Beidh and some minor figures met in 
Beirut in an attempt to overcome internal cleavages.879 They ostentatively spread pictures of 
their talks, suggesting their harmonic and united stance. In statements they refer to the NDC 
six-state federal solution as “division project”.880 They proclaim their aim to hold a 
conference in the South and to establish a unified ‘revolutionary command’. The struggle 
shall remain peaceful, yet at the same time they explicitly call on activists to “defend their 
revolution” and protect themselves through self-defense.881 
 This contradictory picture between isolated escalation and an overall continuation of 
peaceful means pervades other spheres as well. The Karama Day demonstrations in Aden 
remain peaceful on the side of the protesters, yet the security forces kill two. In Shabwa, 
however, the Southern Resistance launches a military campaign against the army in retaliation 
for the execution of three of its members a few days before.882 The focus of the ‘great name’ 
leadership meanwhile officially continues to lie on unification of the movement and on 
international attention. The extensive international coverage of the February 21 protests, for 
                                                          
878 Haykal Bayfana, “Hadhramaut: Rebellion, Federalism, or Independence in Yemen?”, April 22, 2014, 
accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.muftah.org/hadhramaut-rebellion-federalism-independence/ 
#.U14PK3dpeTU.  
879 “President Ali Salem Al-Beidh Received at his Office in the Lebanese Capital Beirut Leader Hassan Ahmad 
Ba’oom”, Aden Live TV, February 20, 2014, accessed February 24, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-
11574.html.  
880 “The Head of the Supreme Council for the Southern Peaceful Movement Leader Hassan Ba’oum”, Aden Live 
TV, February 19, 2014, accessed February 24, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-11531.html.  
881 “President Ali Salem al-Baid and Leader Hassan Ahmad Ba’oom Issued a Political Statement”, Aden Live 
TV, February 23, 2014, accessed February 24, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-11684.html.  
882 “The Southern Resistance Launched a Military Campaign on the Occupation Forces”, Aden Live TV, 
February 21, 2014, accesses February 24, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-11612.html. 882 “Yemeni 
Occupation Forces Executed Three Members of the Southern Resistance”, Aden Live TV, February 19, 2014, 
accessed February 24, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-11534.html.  
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example, are evaluated as a success.883 The same accounts for the first large mass 
demonstration (milyūnyīah) in Hadhramawt’s Mukalla; it further strengthened the integration 
of the Hirak into an all-Southern movement by a stronger activism in this large region in the 
wake of increased involvement after uprising of HTC and rapprochement between the two 
Hadhramis Ba’oum and al-Beidh.884 
 After these events, the summer passes with little progress, yet continuous street activism. 
This can partly be related to leaders’ concern about the UN Security Council Resolution 2140, 
adopted in late February. Its aim was to deter or, if necessary, take action against potential 
spoilers of the transition process. It was understood to be directed against Saleh, al-Beidh, and 
possibly Houthi figures. The resolution furthermore reaffirmed its pro-unity stance.885 
 In June, the defection of some prominent figures, including Nasser al-Noubah, takes a toll 
on the movement. The defectors denounce their calls for independence and instead publicly 
announce their support for Hadi.886 Furthermore, the July 7 commemoration remains 
unrecognized in many areas.887 
 In fall, then, mass activism reaches a new climax: In the wake of the October 14 
commemoration, a permanent protest camp is set up on Al-Arood Square in Aden with the 
protesters demanding the complete withdrawal of all Northern forces and civil servants until 
November 30 (anniversary of independence from Britain). Otherwise, an ‘escalation’ would 
occur – with the concrete meaning of ‘escalation’ being left obscure, but commonly 
understood as a declaration of secession. The weeks up to the set deadline see numerous 
events and extensive writing and communication activity. Besides, some prominent figures 
such as Abdulrahman al-Jifri and Yahya Ghalib al-Shuaibi (head of al-Beidh’s office in 
Beirut) return to Aden and join talks and debates. Notwithstanding the general mood of 
                                                          
883 “Regional and International Media Outlets Covered the Events of the Twentieth and Twenty-First of 
February”, Aden Live TV, February 23, 2014, accessed February 24, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-
11682.html.  
884 Popular activists, however, begin to voice scepticism about the de facto impact of large mass demonstrations. 
Huda al-Attas, for instance, asked: “Will such gatherings solve the problem of world indifference to southerners’ 
rightful demands?” Susanne Dahlgren, “Southern Yemeni Activists Prepare for Nationwide Rally”, April 24, 
2014, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.merip.org/southern-yemeni-activists-prepare-nationwide-
rally?ip_login_no_cache= 6febc7e54abaf997a862ba60cd178cec.  
885 The incention of violence through media is moreover denounced as threatening the transition; it responds to 
the intense frame distribution via the respective faction-affiliated media. 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11296.doc.htm. My own research was hindered by the fear of 
potential interviewees (Hirak leadership) to be targeted on the basis of this resolution; they reffrained from 
talking to me.  
886 “Divided South Yemen Separatists Vow to Achieve Independence”, Middle East Eye, September 30, 2014, 
accessed October 6, 2014, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/divided-south-yemen-separatists-vow-achieve-
independence-830553601.  
887 Ibid.  
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advancement and the high expectations of large numbers of movement members,888 the date 
comes and passes without anything happening. Apparently, the division lines between al-
Beidh and Ba’oum have inhibited the Hirak’s leadership from taking the step of declaring 
independence. The movement has lacked a ‘united front’ to push forward on November 30,889 
a point in time when the regime in Sana’a is occupied with attempts to counter the threat 
posed by the Houthi’s seizing of the capital. A missed opportunity? 
 
(8) Phase of Houthi-Takeover December 1, 2014–March 15, 2015 
Similar to the period of the Arab Spring, when security forces concentrated on the capital and 
other areas of high protest, the situation in Sana’a at the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015 
open up space for the Hirak.890 In addition, chances are that the calculus of the Gulf states 
would change in the face of the ‘Houthi threat’: For the KSA, for instance, seeing the Houthis 
rise is considered equivalent to seeing their archenemy Iran rise and thus of high urgency to 
be inhibited. Southerners are therefore hopeful to eventually receive support from the 
kingdom. Remaining obstacles, however, are again the lacking unified leadership as a serious 
counterpart for negotiations and certain fears that the Southern leadership might be supported 
by Iran after all – an aspect which has been strengthened by al-Beidh’s obscure comments in 
this regard.891 
 
                                                          
888 Ordinary Northerners living in the South were rather concerned for their security during this period, despite 
official statements by the Hirak that they should not worry for they were not the target, but merely government 
representatives were. “Nov. 30 Deadline Looms Over Northerners in the South”, Yemen Times, November 6, 
2014, accessed November 7, 2014, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1831/report/4550.  
889 “Divisions Within Yemen’s Al-Hirak Delay Announcement of Southern Independence: Sources”, Asharq Al-
Awsat, December 1, 2014, accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/12/article 55339051. Some 
spokespersons on the ground, however, proceed with what they say they consider the “escalation” at a point in 
time when many feel insecure and rumors prevail: A peaceful, albeit intensified campaign of civil disobedience 
with more demonstrations, more frequent closing down of public life, a blockade of port and oil facilities, and 
the closing of the border with the North for long hours. “Tensions Soar at Southern Yemen Protest Camp”, 
November 29, 2014, accessed December 1, 2014, Al Jazeera, http://www.en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/tensions-
soar-southern-yemen-protest-camp-151251483.html; see similarly: “Strike in Hadramout Meant to Expand 
Secessionist Pressure”, Yemen Times, December 4, 2014, accessed December 4, 2014, 
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1839/news/4646/Strike-in-Hadramout-meant-to-expand-secessionist-
pressure.htm. 
890 “Tensions Soar”. One major exception is the brutal killing of the prominent activist Khaled al-Junaydi in 
custody of the Special Security Forces on December 15, 2014. See: HRW, “Yemen: No Action in Southern 
Activist’s Killing”, January 11, 2015, accessed June 15, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/10/yemen-no-
action-southern-activist-s-killing.  
891 Others try to dismiss such fear, e.g. Saleh bin Farid al-Awlaki, who instead emphasizes the importance 
Southerners attribute to the Gulf and European powers: “We in the south are Sunnis, there is noch chance for us 
to be connected with Iran. Our future is with the European countries and our neighbours.” Ibid. 
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Hadi’s resignation in late January892 and escape to Aden a month later act as a gamechanger. 
Despite their prior rejection of Hadi, the movement welcomes him to the South and refrains 
from general critique, giving him the opportunity to act and uncover his intentions. He calls 
on the youth to sign up for an army of 20,000 that he aims to create within a week to counter 
the Houthis, a call which is enthusiastically met by many fighters-to-be.  
 The spokesperson of the youth in the protest camp on Al-Arood Square, Radfan al-Dubais, 
gives a more differentiated outlook on the situation:  
Civil disobedience works when there is a government, but it doesn’t make sense to 
continue our campaign at the moment. The situation is turning violent and large numbers 
of arms are pouring in from surrounding governorates and there are armed men all over 
the streets. (...) all disputes and tensions have also moved from Sana’a to Aden, which is 
what brought Aden governorate into violence and removed it from its peaceful course.893 
Another protester holds that there were two options: “We either keep silent and see what Hadi 
does or we go to war. We preferred to wait and see what will happen.”894 There are still hopes 
that both the international community and Hadi might change their thoughts and support the 
cause of Southern independence, given the choice between Houthi violence and Southern 
peacefulness as option for the South of Yemen.895 
 As a result, the Hirak stepped into the back in March 2015, when the struggle between the 
Houthis and the South more generally entered a more intensive stage; the period under 
analysis correspondingly ends at this point. 
  
  
                                                          
892 During the following night amidst widespread anxiety about the developments, Nasser al-Noubah in an Al 
Jazeera interview actually announced independence of the South, an act that, however, remained without impact. 
“Southern Yemen separatist leaders call for secession as clashes reported in Aden”, Middle East Eye, January 22, 
2015, accessed June 15, 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/southern-yemen-government-orders-officials-
ignore-orders-capital-1348555751.  
893 “Southern Movement Suspends Protests Amid Growing Turmoil”, Yemen Times, March 11, 2015. 
894 Ibid.  
895 Cf. Susanne Dahlgren, “Four Weddings and a Funeral in Yemen”, MERIP, March 20, 2015, accessed March 
22, 2015, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032015?ip_login_no_cache=d60a30d7b10c3f1b907946989cff0ffb.  
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6. TESTING EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR ARMED CONFLICT 
In this chapter I test the explanatory power of established approaches for the two cases. The 
theoretical model I propose acknowledges the role of structural factors; therefore, I will 
investigate to what extent each structural factor impacts escalation, and later connect the 
framing back to these factors.  
 The testing proceeds according to the test design developed in 3.2. and is comparative: It 
will both seek to explain each case individually and, subsequently, the relative probability of 
escalation in comparison between the Houthis and the Hirak, for numerous telling insights 
merely result from the variations here. My reference years (if data is available) are 2004 for 
the Houthi conflict and 2007 for the Hirak; if data is lacking for the respective years, I take 
the closest year available. Spikes and outliers will be noted. In addition, under ‘opportunity’ I 
will briefly consider political opportunity structures (according to social movement studies), 
the availability of arms, and external support, all factors which I believe to be highly relevant.  
 
6.1. Opportunity 
(1) Population size: size increases risk 
Yemen had a population of ca. 20 million in 2004.896 With a conservative estimate of 35% of 
the population being Zaydi, their number should be around seven million. Southerners on the 
contrary make up about four million; in addition, it needs to be taken into account that 
Hadhramis are included in this number and their self-ascription as Southerners remained 
volatile until recently.  
 In absolute terms there is a risk due to population size; in comparison, however, it should 
be greater for the Zaydi case than for the South. Yet, population size alone tells us solely very 
little. 
 
(2) GDP/capita: the higher, the lesser the risk 
Yemen is a low income country with a GDP/capita in current US$ in 2004 of only US$ 707, 
in 2007 of 1.210 US$.   
 High risk, despite the increase between 2004 and 2007. 
 
 
 
                                                          
896 Unless noted otherwise: World Bank data.  
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(3) economic growth: the higher, the less risk (disputed) 
The annual GDP/capita growth rate in 2004 was 1%, the same as in 2006 and 2007, with only 
2005 seeing a 3% growth rate.  
 High risk.  
 
(4) political instability: instability increases risk 
Both the YAR and the PDRY were ruled as autocracies according to Polity IV, with the YAR 
crossing the threshold to anocratic rule in 1988 while the PDRY remaining on a -7 score, i.e. 
autocratic, until unification. After a transitional period until the first elections in 1993, the 
ROY entered ‘stable anocracy’ at a constant -2 score.  
 Though anocratic (see below), the regime was stable over the period under analysis. 
 
(5) military strength: size lowers risk 
Military expenditure in 2005 reached 5% of the GDP, in 2007 slightly below with 4%. With 
around the same percentage in 2012, Yemen ranks 12th worldwide in military spending/GDP.
 The level is thus high and provides evidence for a strong military which should lower the 
risk of armed conflict. 
 
(6) rough terrain: the more, the higher the risk 
There are no precise numbers, yet the Zaydi heartland is located in the midst of the Yemeni 
highlands with very rough mountain landscape. Parts of the South, namely Lahj, Dhaleh, 
Radfan etc. are equally located in the mountains; additionally, there are the vast stretches of 
desert in the South, which currently serve as hideouts for AQAP.  
 Rough terrain increased risks in both cases; while the North is even more strongly 
dominated by mountains, the South equally offers mountain as well as desert sanctuaries.  
 
(7) war-prone neighbors: the more, the higher the risk 
Yemen is bordered by Oman in the East and the KSA in the North. The last (internal) war 
Oman witnessed ended in 1975. The last (international) war the KSA participated in was the 
Second Gulf War in 1991.  
 Neither of the state qualifies as war-prone. 
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(8) level of democracy of neighbors: the more democratic, the lesser the risk 
Oman is an absolute monarchy. The authoritarian regime is frequently criticized for human 
rights violations. The same applies to the KSA to even graver effect.  
 Both states qualify as ‘bad neighbors’ in regard to their level of democracy.  
 
(9) oil exports: the larger, the higher the risk 
Yemen belongs to the category of low income countries. It highly depends on its declining oil 
resources for revenue. Oil and gas revenues account for roughly 25% of the GDP and 65% of 
total government revenue.  
 Despite moderate amounts of oil exports, there is a high dependency (which is also related 
to risk, even closer than exports generally by some authors), i.e. increased overall risk.  
 
(10) peace years: the more, the lower the risk 
The last war specifically involving the Zaydi population ended in 1970, while the South 
suffered from the civil war in 1994.  
 The risk is hence higher in the South. 
 
(11) males’ secondary school education: the more, the lower or higher (!) the risk 
47% secondary school enrollment (with 62% completion quota) in 2005, with a girl to boy 
ratio of 65%. In comparison, for the MENA region it was 74% enrollment and a 93% girl to 
boy ratio.) What should be added here, though, is that schooling rates are higher in the South, 
where education has traditionally been given high value since it was introduced under British 
rule, and where it had been among the priorities of socialist rule. Hence, the level of education 
is still higher in the South. 
 The indicator is low and the risk high(er), with a cleavage between the North, where this is 
more rampant, and the South, where this is less so, i.e. risk is comparatively higher in the 
North.897  
 
(12) soil degradation: the more, the higher the risk 
According to Yemeni officials,898 around 95% of the country’s agricultural land was at risk of 
deterioration in 2007 due to water shortages, partly caused by water-intensive qāt cultivation 
                                                          
897 Despite the disputed indicator direction, I pose that an enrollment as low as this cannot possibly lower the risk 
for the limits it sets to many kinds of employment, thus excluding the option.  
898 “YEMEN: Land degradation threatening farmers, says senior official”, IRIN, October 18, 2007, accessed July 
22, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/report/74843/yemen-land-degradation-threatening-farmers-says-senior-
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and desertification. Since merely 13.6% of all Yemeni land is fertile and of that as little as 
20% (1.2–1.6 million hectares) is used for agricultural purposes, food sovereignty cannot be 
reached and the 80% of Yemenis living in rural areas (with 54.1% working in agriculture), the 
numbers of those affected are very high and conflicts involving land rights are frequent and 
oftentimes turn violent.  
 While the severity of soil degradation increases risk, the instability of the country on the 
other hand contradicts this assertion.  
 
(13) consistency of democratic institutions: the higher, the lower the risk 
As has been noted under ‘political instability’, Yemen has been stable at an anocratic level, 
thus heightening the risk. From 2012 onward (i.e. in the wake of the GCC Initiative and the 
NDC) it reached +3, yet the Houthi coup and subsequent war eliminated this positive scale 
change.  
 Risk is high. 
 
When assessing merely the above indicators, the overall risk for armed conflict onset in 
Yemen as a whole is high: Of 13 indicators total, nine indicate (high) risk, three indicate no 
risk, and one (soil degradation) remains inconclusive. Population size and male secondary 
school enrollment predict a higher probability for the North, whereas peace years do so for the 
South.  
 
Political opportunity structures, availability of arms, and external support provide a mixed 
picture as well. When the Houthis started to intensify their shouting and protests, Saleh 
perceived himself at a height of power, the more so as he was supported by the US. 
Nevertheless, the group equally believed itself to be at a height and capable of challenging the 
regime – at least verbally. With the great outrage also in Yemen against the US after the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, they must have perceived their mobilization successful and the 
general timing as an opportunity. The killing of Hussein lent them additional credibility. What 
is important to point out, however, is that they did not use what might be interpreted as an 
opportunity. As I pointed out earlier, only the later frame change had effect in escalation.  
 For the Hirak, the power vacuum after the downfall of Saleh might have posed an 
opportunity, but while the movement still might have been too dispersed to confront the army, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
official. See also: “Desertification a threat to millions of Yemenis”, Yemen Times, July 1, 2014, accessed July 
22, 2015, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1794/health/4049/Desertification-a-threat-to-millions-of-
Yemenis.htm.  
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the situation in fall 2014, i.e. with Sana’a seized by the Houthis and the government in a 
volatile position, certainly presented an opportunity to declare secession. It was either not 
perceived as such – against which interview statements of both leading and regular activists 
speak (see framing analysis) – or opted not to use them in that direction.  
 As for the availability of arms: Arms of all sizes are widely available in Yemen and to both 
groups, with an advantage for the Houthis since the infamous Souq al-Talh, a huge arms 
market, is located in their area and cross-border smuggling enables additional flows.899 
Notwithstanding, Southerners are a highly armed population, too, and great amounts of arms 
were left in the South after the 1994 war. While large weapons such as tanks etc. would be 
unlikely to find, the general availability of arms to start an insurgency is more than 
guaranteed.  
 There is no proven external support for the Houthis, neither assistance (such as training or 
else), nor financial resources. Southerners generate modest sums from the diaspora, yet, 
neither is there any proven strong external support. 
 
In sum, considering the presumed high risks, the Houthi rebellion seems to match the 
expectations of the model, while nonviolence in the South is rather contradicting it.  
  
6.2. Grievances 
Inequalities 
As has been introduced before, horizontal inequalities (HIs) can be distinguished into 
economic, social, political and cultural status HIs. Any measurement900 of HIs is complicated 
by the fact that mere perceptions of HIs have been found to be equally effective. In 
consequence, while I concentrate on factual HIs, I nevertheless include perceptions in the 
assessment when they are articulated in a mode that indicates a great relevance. 
  
Economic HIs subsume inequalities in income, employment opportunities, and assets of all 
kinds (financial, natural resource-based, social, human).  
                                                          
899 After years of fighting, a foreign military expert in Sana’a made the following statement about the Houthis’ 
arms supplies: “While other non-state actors are well-armed, the Huthis possess greater stockpiles of heavy 
armaments, especially tanks.” ICG, “Huthis”, 20. 
900 Quantitative measurement as suggested by Mancini, Stewart, and Brown appears to be not feasible due to a 
lack of reliable disaggregated data. As has been pointed out in the literature, especially in state in which regions 
or other groups might perceive marginialization, states are often reluctant to publish disaggregated data. Luca 
Mancini, Frances Stewart, and Graham K. Brown, “Approaches to the Measurement of Horizontal Inequalities”, 
in Horizontal Inequalities, 85–105.  
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While the economic situation is tense in the whole of Yemen and specifically so in regard to 
land and natural resource access, the is no evidence that Zaydis are suffering from economic 
HIs based on their identity. Their territorial heartland has accommodated much of the influx 
of returning migrants in the 1990s, which has severed the situation, yet, this was based on 
geographical proximity to the KSA and a history of migration from the region. Apart from 
this, the region’s economy tends to be de facto remote and, hence, semi-independent 
economically as it is geographically and politically. It offers sources of income due to the 
flourishing cross border trade and smuggling activities, an opportunity other regions lack.  
 In the South we need to distinguish between the Western parts, around Aden and the 
adjacent governorates, and Hadhramawt. In the latter, trade has traditionally been strong and 
extensive global networks offer opportunities which the South generally lacks. However, in 
regard to the Hirak, its heartland, and the self-ascription as ‘Southerners’ I concentrate on the 
Western part of the former PDRY territory as reference. The widespread early retirement of 
former state employees and army personnel in the South still has significant impact on 
incomes. Retirement benefits are small, paid irregularly, and lack appropriate adaptation to 
rises (as in 2005). Employment opportunities show the same pattern, with Southern youth 
having a hard time being accepted e.g. into military or civil service. Privatization in the wake 
of unification and after 1994 has released many former state employees in state-owned 
industries, port facilities and else. Few productive industries remained, and many large 
businesses are owned by Northern entrepreneurs and companies. The distribution of resource 
wealth, i.e. oil and gas resources mostly located in the South, is another major grievance. 
Employment in the facilities is often given to Northerners901 and partnerships with foreign 
companies are dominated by Northern businesses as well, further accentuating HIs. Besides 
their real extent, Southerners moreover perceive great economic HIs and feel very strongly 
about them.  
 In conclusion, economic HIs indicate a higher risk in the South.  
 
Social HIs refer to disparities in access to social services such as housing, education, and 
health, as well as life expectancy.  
 Measurements of life expectancy at birth from 2005 onwards is ranged at a low 62 years.902 
Access to all the noted social services is limited in remote rural areas, to which much of the 
                                                          
901 Foreign companies are obligated to hire a certain percentage of local staff. Since the majority, however, has 
their central representation in Sana’a, Northerners are given preference, particularly when influential patrons use 
these employment opportunities for their clients.  
902 World Bank data.  
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Zaydi heartland outside of Sa’ada and several towns belongs. In the South, Aden, Mukalla 
and few other cities provide relatively better access, yet, since Southerners tend to compare 
specifically social service provision with the former socialist state provision, the relative 
deprivation since that era creates strong grievances. Particularly, access to sufficient water 
and power supplies in urban areas has become an issue over the last decade, with parts of 
major cities and towns lacking permanent and/or reliable services. Subsidies for basic 
commodities (like flour, gas/petrol etc.) weigh heavy on the government budget, yet any 
attempts to cut them trigger intensive protests for large parts of the population rely on them.  
 Risk is higher in the South, particularly when perceptions are taken into consideration. 
  
Political HIs include inequalities in political freedoms and access to political offices and 
power (e.g. seats in parliament, positions in the army, the cabinet, local government etc.) and 
loss of power due to recent regime change.  
 Political HIs are rather rooted in perceptions than in facts. There are no official limitations 
to political offices. However, both identity groups regularly voice their discontent about and 
resistance against local/regional offices which shall be filled with regime-close/‘Northern’ 
figures. On the national level, many offices that are filled with Southerners are equally 
perceived to be held by Southerners who are close to the regime or who have ‘turned into 
Northerners’. Positions in the military have already been treated under economic HIs. Loss of 
power due to regime change plays a role for both groups, yet in different regards and to 
varying degrees. In the North, the loss of power for Zaydis occurred through violent means 
and against extensive resistance, yet, a long time ago in 1962 (to 1970). In the South, on the 
other hand, it at first happened consensually in 1990, but then created violent resistance a few 
years later, i.e. relatively recently. 
 At the bottom line, risk again should be higher for the South.  
 
Cultural status HIs take the dimensions of the recognition of religion and religious 
observances, language rights and language recognition, and the recognition of ethnocultural 
practices903; furthermore, discrimination in these spheres must be acknowledged as well. It is 
the one dimension of HIs in which perception probably plays the strongest role, for it is 
challenging to pin down many of the aspects involved.  
 Language is no issue in either of the cases. Religion, on the other hand, is: For Zaydis, the 
marginalization and discrimination of their religion, the defamation by Salafi religious 
                                                          
903 Langer/Brown, “Cultural Status Inequalities”, 50.  
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authorities, the suppression of religious dress markers, religious holidays like ʿEid al-Ghadīr, 
the decline of religious teaching institutions, and other measures of denegation serve as 
primary grievances. Southerners on the contrary deplore what they perceive as overtly 
religious influence after 1994, which manifests itself in religious dress rules (unofficial, yet 
markable), the exclusion of women from professional life and the public etc. While this is no 
HI in a strict sense – for the same applies for the rest of the country – it again poses a relative 
‘decline’ to the more liberal religious life they led before.  
 Regarding cultural ‘practices’, what is notable is mostly the non-recognition of each of the 
identity group’s specific history and achievements. Southerners are e.g. forced to celebrate the 
date of their defeat in 1994 as a holiday commemorating the ‘victory of unity’, which they 
perceive to be humiliating. For traditional Zaydis the renunciation of imamic rule, equally 
political as religious and cultural (with all the cultural and religious context it involves), is a 
cut into their self-determination about the kind of rule they prefer; yet, many Zaydis today 
articulate their support for a democratic republican state. 
 In regard to cultural status HIs, both identity groups have significant risks. 
 
Repression  
Repression needs to be assessed in respect to form, intensity, and duration. Long-term 
marginalization of Zaydis has already been treated in detail; it can serve as a background 
against which to interpret the more recent repressive measures. Between 2002 and 2004, the 
group which should become ‘the Houthis’ suffered from large numbers of arrests and 
arbitrary detention in response to their public protests and repression against Zaydi teaching 
institutions; the months before the unilateral declaration of hostilities by the regime saw a 
range of these measures. The commencement of aggression can equally be interpreted in line 
with them: as an offensive initiative against Hussein al-Houthi, the charismatic head of the 
group. Regime calculations apparently held that once he was deposed from leadership, the 
opposition would collapse or at least suffer significant decline. However, the brutal killing 
and subsequent public display and humiliation increase this dimension of grievances; 
nevertheless, merely after the renewed insult by Saleh against Badr al-Din al-Houthi in spring 
did the framing change.  
 Southern opposition suffered from detention and arrests since the mid-1990s. However, the 
early phase of the Hirak saw merely restricted repression: detention and attempted cooptation 
of prominent figures were among these measures. From 2009 onwards, however, repression 
increased to a crackdown on newspapers, more widespread detention, and regular violent 
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interventions during protests. The situation improved due to the power vacuum after the fall 
of Saleh and because during the NDC the regime also refrained from demonstrative 
counteraction against protesters and activists. Yet, in a number of events security force 
violence escalated, causing numerous civil victims. With the end of the NDC, repression 
increased again, e.g. in form of the ‘cleaning’ of Aden from depictions of the Southern flag.  
 It is challenging to weigh repressive measures against each other. Both identity groups 
suffered from regime repression; due to the high numbers of civil deaths, however, the 
strength and perdurance of repression against Southerners seem more intensive and 
consequential. Yet, the Hirak still refrains from violent escalation. 
  
6.3. Identity 
Cultural status HIs have already touched upon some identity issues, such as the rights given to 
different identity groups, their inclusion, and everyday discrimination.  
 The axiom of primordialism can be refuted in both cases, based on the fact that the Yemeni 
government does not constitute an identity group. The Hirak claims that it is Northern-
dominated, and Southerners have already fought a secessionist war in 1994. However, the 
decisive point is that this is their claim, making the interpretation, not identity per se pivotal.  
 The same holds true for ‘ancient hatreds’, which are assumed to erupt if an opportunity 
presents itself. For it to be put forward, time periods of only half a decade would also prove 
far too recent.904 
 This leaves us with symbolic politics. A good example from the cases would be the 
understanding of the Houthi slogan as a strong symbol. It combines a threatened identity, 
which necessarily evokes fears, with a hostile symbol/symbolic message and its strategic 
usage for mobilization. The opportunity was given, and alternate non-violent avenues linked 
to sociocultural revivalism and political participation had by then been exhausted – all 
conditions in line with Kaufman’s propositions. Without the distinct and continuous framing 
efforts, however, the symbol would not have been significant, i.e. merely framing makes it 
decisive in that regard.905 Symbols of the independent PDRY in parallel have become 
                                                          
904 If ever the argument would be put forward despite these counter arguments, it also rather hinted at a 
probability that Southerners (“South Arabians”) violently fought the historical Northern “Other” – but hate or, 
less severe, resentment has only substantiated in recent times. 
905 One more, if weaker, line of argument along the identity approach suggests that the mobilization capacity of 
insurgent movements varies on the basis of its “costs”; the costs again vary depending on the strength of group 
identity, its cohesion, and demographical factors (Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World 
Politics [Boulder: Westview Press, 1994]). In the Houthi case, we can identify a rather strong group identity, 
which could be reactivated by the movement. Southern Yemeni identity on the other hand was based on a 
common history, but loose and cut by other identity lines; it was thus more complex to generate. It could hence 
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powerful in the South after 2011, especially the flag. This has not been the fact from the 
beginning of the movement, though, but only after the demands have more strongly turned 
towards secession/independence, i.e. the prognostic framing had changed. Then the symbols 
were employed in manifold ways to spread the demand, pose the demand, claim territory and 
else (see framing analysis).  
 Identity factors are certainly involved and lay at the basis of collective demands. However, 
they are neither primordial nor ancient, nor does the simple existence of hostile myths and 
symbols explain them. Collective identity needs to be made salient, and in order to trigger 
collective action, the salience of identity becomes one part in the framing process aiming at 
collective action, namely the part of ‘who are we’, ‘who is it that is threatened?’, and, based 
on that, ‘who needs to act?’. 
 
6.4. Summary 
The assessed indicators provide ample evidence for a heightened risk of escalation for both 
Zaydis and Southerners. Opportunity indicators generally point to increased risk for all of 
Yemen; population size and male secondary school enrollment allude to a higher risk in the 
North, whereas peace years imply the same for the South. Under the category of grievances, 
economic, social, and political HIs weigh towards a higher risk for the South (while also the 
North is not without positive results here), and cultural status HIs impact on both groups. In a 
much similar vein, repression affects both, yet is graver for Southerners. Symbols are 
available for both identity groups, however, as I highlighted jointly, they need to be 
embedded into frames in order to develop mobilizational effects.  
 At this point we can deliberately contend that established approaches would predict a 
heightened risk for the escalation of armed conflict for both the Zaydis as well as Southerners. 
Whereas this proves correct retrospectively for the Houthis, it makes a false prediction for 
Southerners, who never took the escalatory step into violence. Besides, certain questions 
remain unacknowledged for the Houthi case as well: Most indicators are not time-bound, they 
remained stable over a period. Why did the group escalate when it did? Why not before or 
later? Furthermore, how exactly did the relevant indicators work in the cases? Which 
mechanisms operated? The approaches do not provide satisfying answers to these questions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
be argued that the relating argument supports the observation of variation among the cases; nevertheless, I want 
to make the point that Zaydi cohesion suffered a lot along the status division between Hashemites and non-
Hashemites, for the latter of which tribal affiliation or even conversion were possible alternatives which had to 
be overcome by movement recruiting processes. It might have positively contributed but will never have been a 
central factor.  
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However, once we consider the identified indicators as part of the structural context within 
which then framing processes occur – as suggested in the model – we can approach the 
overall mechanisms much better: If we perceive, for instance, cultural status HIs as one 
structural component that both identity groups suffer from, but react on differently, 
elucidating how each collective perceives them and if/how they counter them, then we can use 
this understanding to bring us closer to the ultimate answer of why we see variation in action 
in spite of very similar structural conditions. Chapter Seven will serve this purpose.  
 
 
 
 
  
215 
 
7. FRAME ANALYSIS IN THE CASES 
7.1. Houthi Frame Development 
Since we see a shift in Houthi framing from an earlier, nonviolent framing prior to spring 
2005 and the opposite, violent framing, thereafter, the analysis of the framing is subdivided 
into these two periods.  
 
7.1.1. Framing Prior to Violent Escalation 
In line with the central hypothesis of the thesis, the pivotal questions to ask on the basis of 
this text corpus are: Does Hussein al-Houthi construct the Zaydis as an identity group under 
threat? If yes, how does he do so? Which are the discourses and myths he taps, the rhetoric he 
uses, and the scenarios he creates? To whom does he attribute the responsibility for the 
situation? Which consequences, i.e. which actions, does he call for to avert the threat 
scenarios? How does he convince his audience of the feasibility of his proposed solutions? 
How does he motivate them to join the endeavor of collective action to counter the threat? 
 Based on the model of collective action as developed by framing theory, the analysis is 
structured according to the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational components of Hussein’s 
framing.906 Beyond that, I will highlight the various corresponding steps of action he himself 
takes in the direction of fulfilling the demands he raises for they provide further backing for 
the frames. Since it is not adjuvant to reduce citation to isolated sentences and thereby destroy 
the logical contextualization of the sources, the following excerpts will be cited in units which 
often reach beyond the immediate focus; the further implications will subsequently be taken 
up in upcoming paragraphs and steps of analysis.   
 
7.1.1.1. Diagnostic Framing  
Hussein states a problem of collective weakness and related external threat to groups on 
various levels: to the Muslim ummah, Arabs, Yemenis, and Zaydis.  
 In one of the earlier lectures in January 2002, he generally takes Muslims as the reference 
group he regards under pressure by the other Abrahamic religious groups. The weakness of 
the ummah is causally related to a lack of religious knowledge, closeness to God and religion 
                                                          
906 For all these points it is important to keep in mind that we cannot know if Hussein himself was convinced of 
what he propagated or if he was not but employed it strategically. It is merely possible to state what he said, 
contextualize it, and point at possible advantages and disadvantages of his proceeding from the one or another 
perspective.  
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in the sense of value orientation, and social cohesion as a group. The antagonists, Jews,907 and 
Christians, are intentionally contributing to an intensification of this situation by 
“penetrating”, “strik[ing]” and “infiltrat[ing]”908 them in a comprehensive manner with 
ideologically and morally corrupt thought. The threat is directed towards Islamic culture, 
morals, economy, environment, and “all areas of life”909. It is thus comprehensive, though 
with an emphasis on the ideational dimension, which takes chronological precedence over 
more economic and physical areas. The suggested counteraction aims at the ideational as 
well; this aspect will be elaborated on in more detail below. The imminence and intensity of 
the threat is expressed by the degree of intrusion it has reached “into your insides and the 
deepest parts of your houses and the deepest depths of yourselves”910.  
1 They [the Jews and Christians] are at a stage where they strike the ummah and infiltrate 
by their various despicable means ‘and they endeavor to spread corruption in the earth’ 
(surat al-ma’idah, 5:33): cultural corruption, moral corruption, economic corruption, 
corruption of the environment and in all areas of life. If so, then it is imperative that you 
(…) at the level of this ummah or a society within it – move in the sphere of commanding 
what is right and forbidding what is wrong in all the areas of life and calling for what is 
good, as if not, then what?911 
This intrusion becomes of even graver significance considering the stark separation of 
private/family spaces (“houses”) and public space in Arab culture and Muslim societies more 
generally: the protected space ‘home’, associated mainly with the women (who do not cover) 
and children of a family, is the target of the ingression.912  
 While the above passage refers to the Muslim ummah without constraints, another seems to 
address only Shiʿa Muslims, for it refers to the events of Karbala913 and compares the 
                                                          
907 Dorlian underlines that Hussein was not only anti-Zionist (in denouncing Israel), but also taking a very strict, 
essentialist anti-Jewish position. For him, Jews in Yemen are not Yemeni but always merely part of the Jewish 
community. He backs this claim by analyzing the lecture “Neither the Jews Nor the Christians Will Be Satisfied 
with You” (p.1). Dorlian, “Sa’da War”, here: 197f.  
908 The malazim (‘Lectures’) will be cited in reference to the complete list in the appendices A and B; the letter 
in the reference thereby refers to either appendix A (A) or B (B). – Lecture A6, January 14, 2002, 5 [translated 
and cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 389; some citations of the malazim taken from Lux have been abridged and/or 
some additional mentions of specific Arabic terms have been omitted if they did not seem relevant]. 
909 Ibid.  
910 Ibid. 
911 Ibid. 
912 An anecdote of one of my interviews (with a Hirak activist living in the Netherlands, March 2014) illustrates 
this special significance of ‘home’: One interview partner asked me whether another, more prestigious one had 
invited me to his home for the interview (as he himself had done). When I negated, he critically, almost 
derogatorily commented that this person never did. The way he put it made it apparent that the situation – the 
honor of hosting a scholar for an interview or even of hosting another activist with the same goal – culturally 
demanded the opening of one’s home (read: protected space for trusted individuals) to that person.  
913 Karbala in Iraq is the holiest city of Shiʿa Muslims. It is the site of martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the son of 
Ali Ibn Abi Talib, son-in-law of the Prophet Mohamed. This matyrdom is commemorated with mourning rituals 
on the day of Ashura, the tenth day in the Islamic month of Muharram, the occasion on which this lecture was 
given.  
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described contemporary situation with the historical situation that led to the downfall of the 
first Shiʿia mams: 
2 We – the Muslim ummah – (...) experience the [same] state, the psychological state and 
the identical causes that led to the conditions that would bring down the like of Imam Ali, 
Imam Hasan, Imam Husayn, Imam Zayd, Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Nafs al-
Zakiyah, and others among the greats of the ahl al-bayt. (...) If you are not concerned, 
then some day you will find yourself not only a victim of your neglect, but you will find 
yourself in a worse position than that; you will find yourself in the ranks of what is false 
standing against the truth, driven towards the position of all that is false. (...) We, I 
believe, if we do not go forward to confront all that is false in this day and age, then we 
will see ourselves driven to become soldiers for America in the battlefields of falsehood 
against what is true. (…) You blame them [the people of Kufah] for killing Imam 
Husayn, but why did they do it? What led them to kill him? You live the same 
psychological state that led them to go out and confront Husayn, so blame yourself when 
you blame them for their neglect (…) and take care to not be of those who are negligent. 
(…) Isn’t the Qurʾan still alive among us? Don’t we read it? Don’t we evaluate all events 
according to the noble Qurʾan in order that we might draw from the Qurʾan what is the 
position which is demanded of us – in order that we might attain to consciousness and 
insight and so that we might understand what is going on around us? Whoever turns 
away, whoever is negligent, whoever is unconcerned and does not care lives state of mind 
identical to those of the people he castigates who lived more than a thousand years ago.914 
Again, Hussein emphasizes the distance of the current ummah (implying the community of 
Shiʿa Muslims) from religious truth with the consequence of weakness and (ideational) 
suffering. Here, however, he blames the Shiʿa Muslims themselves for neglect – although 
they might know better for the truth and guidance could be found in the Qurʾan – and hands 
over the responsibility to act to them. As antagonist he implicitly identifies Sunnis and draws 
a connection line from them (who represent “all that is false”, i.e. a deviation from ‘true’ 
Islamic/Qurʾanic teaching) and the US, which leads to the creation of an ‘alliance of evil’ 
directed against the audience.  
 In line with the occasion on which this lecture or speech was given, Ashura Day, Hussein’s 
frames are culturally embedded in the highly traumatic and resonant historical narrative of the 
martyrdom of Imam Hussein and his companions in Karbala which is commemorated on that 
day. It is thus aligned with this highly identity forming, painful narrative providing a solid 
ground for cultural resonance of the frame and strengthens its vigor against the designated 
opponents.915 The fact that he blames the Shiʿa themselves and hands over to them the 
                                                          
914 Lecture A66, March 23, 2002, 7f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 423f.]. 
915 On the significance of Ashura in Shiʿa Islam cf. Farhang Mehrvash, and Matthew Melvin-Koushki, 
“ʿĀshūrāʾ”, Encyclopaedia Islamica, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Farhad Daftary (Brill Online, 2015), accessed 
January 20, 2015, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-islamica/a-shu-ra-COM_0306. 
According to the article, the outrageousness of the death stemmed from what the perceived “desecrating the 
inviolability of the Ahl al-bayt”, the family of the Prophet – to whom the Zaydis ascribe their lineage, which 
highlights the imminent connection between the historical events and their personal closeness to it. “The 
injustice done to [Imam Hussein] was compounded by the fact that his killers rejoiced in the act, claiming divine 
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responsibility to act carries with it urgency and facilitates an increase in motivation to act, in 
other words, it works as a push-factor. Although he predominantly argues along these push-
factors in this specific lecture, he simultaneously employs a more pull-factor rhetoric:  
 The responsibility they have also contains power, the power to break through (negative) 
lines of continuity, to change the bad condition, and to prevent the occurrence of an even 
greater (moral and potentially physical) disaster. Feasibility is secure, for the Qurʾan serves as 
central and all-encompassing, thus, sufficient guidance for right conduct, thereby precluding a 
lack of orientation. How Hussein employs push- and (psychologically more effective) pull 
strategies in detail will be further elaborated in the sections on prognostic and motivational 
framing where more explicit examples will be provided.   
 In a much sharper tone and very explicit mode, another passage denounces (concealed) US 
aggression directed against Shiʿa, implying that the attacks of September 11, 2001 might have 
been a conspiracy. In this prime example of frame alignment, he takes up a widespread 
conspiracy theory in the Muslim world and ties it to his threat frame: 
3 Osama and the Taliban are not the ones being targeted. The event that occurred in New 
York is not what motivated America. Who knows, the American intelligence could be the 
ones who carried out that event, to create justifications and clear the air for them to strike 
those who really form a danger to them, and they are the Shiʿa, they are the Shiʿa.916  
On a more reconciliatory stance and referring again to the Muslim ummah as a whole, he 
diagnoses its weakness as the result of inner fragmentation and the mutual endeavors to 
convert the respective other. These attempts, however, were wrong. They are the consequence 
of an evolving distancing from the Qurʾan and its teachings, only the return to which can 
resolve this dire state of denominational animosity:  
4 The Muslims themselves have come to have internal issues, isn’t that so? The Sunni 
wants to convert the Shi’ite into a Sunni and vice versa; and on the inside, the Shafi’i 
wants to convert the Hanafi and vice versa; and the Twelver Shi’ite wants to convert the 
Zaydi, isn’t this happening? These endeavors are not correct. (...) In our view, we must go 
back to the noble Qurʾan and inculcate ourselves with its values. All of us, we all have 
mistakes, there are mistakes with every one of us, all of us are mistaken – the Shiʿa, the       
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sanction for it.” In practice, the rituals of Ashura among others consist of the “remembrance of the other 
members of the Ahl al-bayt; [and] the cursing of Ḥusayn’s murderers and disassociation of oneself from their 
actions”. The importance is highlighted as well by vom Bruck when contextualizing the memories (and their 
interpretation) of a sayyid in the 1940s. She shows how a personal trauma connects to a collective trauma. Vom 
Bruck, Islam, 90. 
916 Lecture A62, January 17, 2002 [cited in: Salmoni et al., Regime, 118].  
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Zaydis, the Twelver Shi’ites, the Sunnis in all their sects – all of us have mistakes 
originating in the fact that we have become distanced from the Qurʾan, and we must 
return to it.917  
 
Hussein anchors his appeal in the established and salient discourse of religious competition 
and alleged proselytizing intentions by Salafi groups in the Zaydi heartlands, what can be 
called the “Salafization” or “Wahhabization discourse”. He strongly advocates the need to 
overcome division lines between the different denominations in favor of a return to the 
Qurʾan – by which he does not mean a return to a literal exegesis (which would go along the 
lines of Salafi intentions), but a return to its values and – as can be inferred from other 
passages – a return to a presumably ‘correct’ interpretation.918 
 While the topic of a ‘return to the Qurʾan’ is ever present in basically all of his lectures and 
he repeatedly creates urgency and threat scenarios in case of non-action (“we will be 
victims”), the fact that he seems to contradict himself in his attribution of blame, sometimes 
openly against Sunni/Salafi/Wahhabi, at other times not, shall be explained below, following 
the analysis of his addressing of other audience groups.    
 The danger to Arabs equally emanates from America (which naturally includes Israel919):  
5 The distressing thing is that the Arab psychological state – or the Arabs altogether do 
not take into account the imminent danger to them. (…) Don’t we hear about the threats 
of America? They might hit Saudi Arabia or take over the two holy mosques as they did 
with Jerusalem. Are we going to wait until they do their work and only then proffer 
advice or say something?920  
The threat scenario – despite its at first glance far-fetched picture of the US attacking the KSA 
– gains significant credibility from its historical context: The lecture was given in March 
2002, five months after the commencement of the US-led war in Afghanistan, which was very 
unpopular in Yemen (as in the whole Arab world) and which took place in a climate of 
suspicion and aggression in which Muslim rulers of more than one country feared they might 
be the next state the US could enter war with. As already noted for prior passages, Hussein 
sees the problem on an internal and ideational level; he depicts the potential aggression as 
geared towards a ‘sacred’ part of religion and links it with the historical ‘loss’ of Jerusalem, 
                                                          
917 Lecture A3, January 11, 2002, 12–13 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 426]. The sura ‘al-Imran’ is of specific 
importance for Muslims generally and Zaydis specifically for it is in this sura, verse 104, where the instruction to 
“command what is right and forbid what is wrong” is formulated. It is mentioned in this phrasing in seven 
further suras, underlining its centrality. For a comprehensive interpretation, contextualization, and historical 
account of its exegesis in all major Islamic schools and denominations see: Michael Cook, Commanding Right 
and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
918 Lecture A32, August 4, 2002, 20 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 415]. 
919 The connection is drawn one sentence later, however, since it is in a very explicit passage on what shall be 
done against this threat, the text will be cited and analyzed in the section on ‘prognostic framing’. 
920 Lectures A35 and A36, February 1–2, 2002, 11f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 390; he misdates them March 9]. 
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something Muslims mourn even today. He thereby rhetorically creates a line of continuity of 
continuous threat by non-Muslim intruders and of harsh losses for Muslims.  
6 What freedom remains for the Arabs in circumstances like these? Who is the Arab – 
whether leader or ordinary citizen – who is able to say that the Arabs enjoy an atom of 
freedom? What particle of freedom remains for any Arab, whether leader or ordinary 
citizen, when they are under the feet of everyone, under the feet of those who heap upon 
them humiliation and despair and who court the wrath of Allah? Is there freedom? 
Freedom does not come through expressions, freedom is represented in our absolute 
devotion to Allah (…) freedom which makes us strike America and Israel with an iron 
hand.921 
Lack of freedom, humiliation, despair – the state of all Arabs is miserable in comparison to all 
others. The sole solution to overcome this situation is “absolute devotion” to God and 
offensive action against the identified antagonists – Hussein emphasizes it again and again. 
 The following passage of the influential lecture “Yawm al-Quds al-Alami” (“International 
Jerusalem Day”) well illustrates the deep rooting and the great dimensions of the threat he 
identifies, as well as the significant linkages of his diagnosis, prognosis, and motivational 
component; it shall therefore be cited more extensively:  
7 The Jews know well those who pose a danger to them. (...) Now, as for Yemenis 
themselves (...) is it possible for them to withstand one week of a war with Israel? No. I 
say that Yemenis could not withstand even one week because all foodstuffs, all of our 
food, all of our clothes, all of our staples, everything among necessities and 
accoutrements is subject to the hegemony of America, and through a decision from 
America, it is possible for it to cut off everything so Yemenis will surrender. (…) The 
Arabs are absolutely not able to stand up before the Jews unless they reconstitute their 
life anew; but, they will not be able to reconstitute their life anew under the leadership 
that rules them now because they are the ones who have neglected all the agricultural 
lands. You will find that the ministry of agriculture in any Arab country is the lowest in 
status, and the ministry with the least activity. In Yemen itself, how many lands are there 
suitable for agriculture? Yet, we import even lentils, even fusuliyah beans, flour and corn 
from Australia, China and others. Yemen is sufficient to its needs and those of others if 
only things were planted. Why does Yemen import everything from that which is subject 
to the hegemony of America and Israel? Is it possible for the Arabs to fight when their 
leaders have brought them to humiliation and to this deplorable state? The military 
confrontation was fifty years ago. As for now, it has become a civilizational 
confrontation, it has become the confrontation of civilizations.922 
Hussein here ties together groups of actors in a ‘we-they-divide’ and – in a Huntington-like 
manner – claims a “civilizational struggle”. The threat generally emanates from “Westerners”, 
more specifically from the hegemonic powers “America and Israel” or “the Jews” 
respectively. It is on the other hand generally directed against Muslims (including Iran), 
Arabs, and Yemenis. Rather than making it blurry and too unspecific, this wide range 
                                                          
921 Lecture A66, March 23, 2002, 15 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 422]. 
922 Lecture A61, December 14, 2001, 19 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 416f.; he misdates it December 13]. 
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increases the weight of the menace: Yes, it is an enormous “civilizational confrontation”, It 
has a strong economic component which can ultimately endanger survival in case of a 
negative decision by the enemies, at the moment there is no capacity to withstand this peril, 
plus the blame is to be attributed to Arab leaders themselves. This desolate state, however, 
needs to lead to desperation, paralysis, or resignation. The threat scenario can be inferred: 
Arabs are able to “reconstitute their life anew” and thereby gain the strength to counter 
America and Israel, the physical basis for economic stability in Yemen is existent needing 
only to be used, the clearly developed strategy is available only needing to be employed, and, 
lastly, there is a prominent and successful example of all that Hussein describes and proposes: 
the Iran of Ayatollah Khomeini.923  
 The distinction between a threat to the Arabs and to Yemenis is merely weak. This rather 
harshly toned paragraph924 inflicts the impression that while Hussein never explicitly 
mentions Saleh, it is him whom he means to criticize and to blame for allying with the US in 
its counterterrorism schemes:  
8 Hasn’t the ummah suffered up to this day from these types of rulers, which we see 
before us far and wide in the Islamic countries? (...) There is no value in the state that 
rules in the name of Islam where its ruler rides on the necks of Muslims and sits on the 
throne in an Islamic country if it does not promote the truth and do away with what is 
false. (…) When we hear, dear brothers, that the leaders of the Arabs and the Muslims are 
all rushing to agree that America should form an alliance for the war against what it calls 
‘terrorism’; then when we all see them standing with America in the fight against what 
they call terrorism because they all covet power, they all are vigilant about staying in 
their positions whatever the cost. Of course, they will never admit this so they say this is 
for the sake of preserving security and stability – preserving the welfare of the nation, or 
they say they are ‘afraid of the stick’ – this new expression that we hear from some of 
them – ‘afraid of the stick’; but what ‘stick’ is more harsh than that of Allah or the 
hellfire or humiliation in the life of this world? Is there any ‘stick’ harsher than that?925  
 
Imam Ali is the ideal leader figure to which Arab and Muslim rulers are contrasted for their 
(willful) ignorance of their religious duties, their “selling out” of their people to keep their 
own position, their lies to their people, and finally for being more afraid of the US than of 
God. In short: They fail, and thus their rule is illegitimate. What feeds the assumption that 
Hussein alludes to Saleh are the detailed descriptions of the precise steps taken and the 
argumentation given for these steps; they are congruent with Saleh’s actions to a degree that 
                                                          
923 In an earlier paragraph Hussein highlights how “Imam Khomeini (...) revived the correct view, realized that 
this ummah had come to be, in its struggle with the Jews, involved in a cultural civilizational struggle” and that 
self-sufficiency was a necessary ingredient for this confrontation. Ibid.  
924 Taken from the lecture given on Ashura 2002, which as a whole uses quite an aggressive language.  
925 Lecture A66, March 23, 2002, 3 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 422]. 
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leaves little space to plead otherwise: He joined the US War on Terrorism and allowed the US 
to enter Yemeni territory and to conduct missions.  
 The most sensitive aspect in regard to Zaydi interpretation can be deduced from the 
accusation that the accused “do not engage in the truth and extirpate what is false”. According 
to Zaydi doctrine this means that they do not fulfill their duty as rulers and hence lose their 
legitimacy; on the side of his subjects this implies their right or even duty to khurūj, i.e. to rise 
and oust this ruler. Forestalling the section on the prognostic frame, I want to highlight here 
that although he does not explicitly call for khurūj in any of his speeches, Hussein very 
clearly does refer to it and – being the well-educated Zaydi scholar, experienced politician, 
and capable rhetorician – he chose and constructed his speech very carefully and 
purposefully. It was not accidental and the fact that Northern Yemenis are very well 
acquainted with deciphering and interpreting the meaning of highly complex and 
metaphorical tribal poetry leaves no doubt that he was understood.   
 In regard to Yemeni weakness specifically, he adds a material, economic dimension to the 
ideational one:  
9 Whenever they put forth an initiative for growth for particular years, see how much 
they will demand in loans from other countries. And for these loans, see how much they 
will add to them in usurious interest (riba)926; then, see what will happen in the end. 
Nothing. Growth is not undertaken except on a basis of the guidance of Allah. (...) We 
hear the term ‘growth’ every year, every week, every day – ‘growth…growth’, but what 
we see is the growth of prices, isn’t that so? What is happening? Is there growth in what 
pertains to economic infrastructure? Or is there growth in costs? Isn’t there inflation? 
Isn’t there depression in both people and value? There is no growth in the reality of 
people of the reality of life. And moreover, if there is ‘growth’ then it is exchange for 
bearing heavy burdens that render us slaves to others and colonizers who are much more 
fierce than the colonizers and colonialism from which people suffered in decades past. 
‘Growth’ in the view of these others is nothing more than the transformation of us into a 
driving force for their products and in their factories, a transformation of the ummah into 
a consumer market for their products so that no one among the people sees himself as 
being able to do without them: his power, his clothes, all his needs are in their hands. Is 
this ‘growth’?927 
The dependency on a capitalist doctrine of growth Hussein diagnoses is first denounced as un-
Islamic and immoral, then as ineffective or even counterproductive and costly in terms of 
pressure on the population, and subsequently as a form of neocolonialism, i.e. as a form of 
being subdued by the external other (which again is the US as the representative of capitalist 
market economy). Given the volatile Yemeni economy, he rhetorically skillfully asks his 
audience about their daily experience of the economic situation, which accounts for one of the 
                                                          
926 The Qurʾan forbids earning from money only (i.e. interest rates based on lending). So-called ‘Islamic banks’ 
circumvent this prohibition by obtaining an equity, a non-monetary asset.  
927 Lecture A63, January 24, 2002, 8 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 388]. 
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central grievances: lack of infrastructure and inflation. When evaluated in terms of framing 
terminology, he thereby harnesses the experiential commensurability of this already very 
central topic in the lives of ordinary Northerners928. Who, then, is responsible? First, Saleh: 
10 We see that, in the end, it is nothing more than fish bait; not a single promise has been 
kept as Ali Abdullah Salih said when he visited: ‘God willing, in 1986 Sa’dah will be on 
a single power grid’; then came 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 and nothing happened 
– we remained applying for electricity for seven years for a single region.929 
 
Saleh did not keep his promises and the North remained very weak infrastructurally, lacking 
such basic provisions as electricity. The term “fish bait” alludes to Saleh’s behavior not as 
incapacity or just accidental ‘bad luck’ for the project, but as intentional duping of the people. 
Saleh is presented as a liar.  
 Second, more widely, political and social elites. The topic of agricultural self-sufficiency is 
very central in a number of Hussein’s lectures930 and he relates it to the (mis)behavior of 
elites. His stance is one of an agrarian reformer,931 and his analysis of the opportunities 
inherent in agricultural lands and the loss of those opportunities in a society, which is still 
predominantly rural, must be considered adequate. Especially, but not exclusively, to those 
who returned from the KSA since 1991 and could not be absorbed into the agricultural sector 
anymore – many of whom belong to the age cohort as Hussein himself – the issue can be 
assumed to have been very salient. The political elites are portrayed as corrupt, opportunistic, 
and misleading to their voters; they are securing their own profits whereas there is no 
improvement on the issues they claim to pursue for their constituents. In regard to the farming 
population on the other hand Hussein repeatedly relates to “dignity” and “pride”, core values 
in qabalyīah. What he suggests to counter these circumstances is (very limited) political 
action: That the people seize an active role as voters and demand a sincere engagement of 
their candidates instead of the prevalent corruption and opportunism. Remaining passive must 
not be an option for it is overshadowed by the threat a thinkable embargo declared by the US 
(and potentially followed by numerous other states) poses on this very local level he 
addresses. It would result in a further decline of agriculture and possibly immediate hunger. 
The danger is imminent.  
 Third, he binds together the issues of lacking development and blaming the US and Israel 
in a very open and unspecific accusation: 
                                                          
928 Note that it refers to all Northerners, not only Zaydis. The targeted audience is regionally specified.  
929 Lecture A6, January 14, 2002, 12 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 389]. 
930 Exemplarily see: Lecture A65, February 7, 2002, 7f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 389]. 
931 Cf. Lux, Last Imam, 387ff. 
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11 Why did America come to Yemen? Under the pretext of spreading democracy and 
fighting terror? Did they come to be briefed on the situation in Yemen, and then decide 
what kinds of projects were needed for Yemen’s development? Or did they come to 
plough and sow the lands or make beehives? Did they come to work with us or for 
something else? America is the greatest devil and lies behind every evil in the world. The 
ones who rule America are Jews and they are described in our Quran as those who 
mislead people.932 
This excerpt complements the framing of Yemen’s economic dependency with the accusation 
that the US and Israel never intended to assist Yemen in its development, but only intervened 
with malignant intentions. Although he begins with a focus on the economy, Hussein once 
more emphasizes the Qurʾanic stance on this issue and thus assures his statement with 
religious legitimacy.  
 The discourse of terrorism allegations and the complicit role of the regime in joining in to 
the war on terrorism are taken up in depth.933 Terrorism, according to Hussein, is the excuse 
given by the US to destroy and rebuild the world according to its own interests. He, on the 
other hand, doubts the existence of terrorism cells in Yemen, hence, the factual basis of their 
legitimization for pressuring the country. In his eyes, “America” has great might: It is able to 
steer the Yemenis’ “attention”, implying ‘perception’. This is very dangerous for – as he has 
elaborated in other lectures – the threat Muslims/Arabs/Yemenis/Zaydis face is partly 
ideational. Consequently, this influence is to be taken very seriously as it is part of the ‘arena 
of contestation’. Guilty of treason in the sense of cooperation with, or at least of buckling to 
the adversary, is the regime, which is “selling out” the nation, religion, and future generations. 
Guilty for not opposing this, however, is also the ʿulamāʾ, i.e. the religious elites who remain 
passive. They are hence complicit with the regime which positions them on the ‘they’ side of 
the ‘we-they-divide’.   
 How the regime is doing wrong is furthermore explicated in the last, yet, in regard to the 
argument, the most important group of text excerpts under analysis here: those diagnosing the 
weakness of the Zaydis.  
12 We used to say that we hope the State will just leave us to [deal with] the Wahhabis 
when they first entered into Yemen. But then, we saw that they were paving the way for 
these Wahhabis to enter and ensconcing them in the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministries of Awqaf (charitable endowments) and mosques and other places. They put 
them into positions and then if anyone says anything against them, if a khatib gives a 
khutbah (sermon) against them, or if there is a disturbance in a mosque, they go out and 
arrest the Zaydis and let the Wahhabis go free. The Wahhabi can call [governor of the 
                                                          
932 Lecture A29, February 3, 2002 (cited in: Yemen Times, “Who was Hussein al-Houthi?”, June 17, 2013, 
accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.yementimes.com/ en/1686/report/2495/Who-was-Hussein-Al-
Houthi.htm. 
933 Lecture A63, January 24, 2002, 6f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 407f.]. 
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province of al-Muhwayt] Ali Muhsin934 directly, but the Zaydi can’t call anybody and 
nobody answers, not even the provincial office. Then after they filled the population with 
these people and made us stand there helpless in front of them, they started calling them 
terrorists so they could take them out and bring in an even better type – bring in the 
Americans. They took out the Wahhabis, and they brought in the Americans. So, we say 
again, let the people of Yemen deal with America and the Americans – it will not reflect 
badly upon you – but to impose upon the people of Yemen, that you should impose upon 
others among the people of Saudi Arabia and Egypt or of any people your positions and 
your weakness, this is the worst crime of all in the view of Allah, and the greatest 
deception of people, religion and the ummah.935 
The initial threat emanates from the influx of Wahhabis (the generalized term used widely to 
denote Salafi streams of Islam), since the 1970s the well-established religious adversaries. 
Blame lies with the regime, for it assisted them, placed them in high-ranking political 
positions with lots of influence on education and religion (i.e. a great impact on the ideational 
sphere), supports them, and protects them when necessary. Zaydis, on the other hand, get the 
short end of the stick: When tensions between them and Wahhabis lead to incidents (what 
Hussein downplays to “disturbances”), they lack such protection due – that this is due to 
active discrimination can be presumed from the implicit subtext – but instead face repression 
and are “helpless”. When pointing to incidents and arrests, Hussein most probably alludes to 
concrete, salient events; unfortunately, I was not able to establish this connection but still 
consider it relevant to note the point for it once more emphasizes the anchoring of his framing 
in the immediate experiences and discourses of his audience. When the regime changed its 
strategy, allied with the US, and exposed the formerly supported Wahhabis to terrorism 
allegations, the situation became equal to the first one: Zaydis wanted to deal with the 
adversary (as the US is understood), but the regime would not let them. Hence, there is a 
historical continuity of deception of the people and religion by the regime, the regime is 
guilty, the more so in the eyes of God – i.e. their guilt is religiously framed which further 
augments it. It remains open what “deal with” implies in this context.   
 Indirectly, Hussein furthermore delegitimizes Saleh’s rule by accusing those who follow 
him of shirk, idolatry, the worst sin there is in Islam:  
13 When we accord the hakimiyah of Allah to someone not operating on the basis of the 
guidance of Allah, then we are like those who orient their worship towards other than 
Allah; and in fact, I remember some of the ‘ʿulamāʾ’ believe that this is actually shirk – 
that we should believe in a hakimiyah of other than that of Allah – who does not possess 
the legitimacy which persists on this basis; in that case you have committed shirk with 
your god, committed idolatry against Allah.936 
                                                          
934 The second most important figure in the state at that time (see chapter 4.1.4.).  
935 Lecture A66, 2002, 16 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 403f.]. 
936 Lecture A13, January 22, 2002, 15 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 384].  
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Pleading allegiance to Saleh is thus turned into a more than existential threat: condemnation 
by God in the afterlife for this unforgivable sin.937  
 The frame of the wronged Zaydis is very clearly explicated in the following passage, which 
he introduces with hinting at the acuteness of the matter:  
14 We Zaydis have kept silent for centuries – not just for generations – and among later 
Zaydis were those who saw it possible to stop and remain silent about the matter of Abu 
Bakr and Umar in order to preserve unity with the others and to mind the feelings of 
others. (...) [T]he silence on this matter was not on the basis of attributing legitimacy to 
their khilafah or these two (…) but it was for the sake of creating an atmosphere of unity 
for the Muslims together with one another, and to respect the feelings of others among the 
Sunnis, whether they were inside Yemen or outside of it. We were silent despite our 
belief that they – that is the two sheikhs, Abu Bakr and Umar, were in error, rebellious 
and astray (…) We were silent out of respect (…) but they mobilized with the change of 
the times and when the state became theirs, they presented them to us with big names: 
‘al-Sadiq’ and ‘al-Faruq’. We were silent about them (…) and then they began foisting 
Mu’awiyah and Yazid upon us as well (…) the Shiʿa h throughout history have been the 
sect most vigilant about attempting to provide an atmosphere for unity with the others, 
but the others don’t have a single atom of concern to unite with the Shiʿa h or to bear an 
atom of respect for them. (…) When the Imams of the Zaydiyah were the ones who ruled 
Yemen they did not impose upon them a muadhin or a khatib or an imam of a mosque or 
a qāḍī or a mufti; they appointed qāḍīs and muftis from among the Shafa’is for them, and 
even when some of these were Zaydis they gave fatāwa for the Shafa’is in accordance 
with their madhab, and they made the call to prayer in their regions according to their 
adhan, and prayed according to their style of prayer. They did not oppose them. What 
happened when the situation changed? They worked for what one of them termed 
‘conquests’ (fatuhat) – one of them actually termed it ‘conquests’ (…)938 
In the beginning, he creates acuteness (“at a stage”, “imperative”) and claims factuality of his 
depiction. He also speaks in the inclusive first person plural, “we Zaydis”, thus creating an 
immediate bond aiming to enhance the community feeling and affectional connection. The 
roots of the weakness of and injustice or wrongdoing against Zaydis are centuries old;939 they 
go back to the founding era of Islam and the original question of succession of the Prophet 
Mohamed. Although they were aware that Sunnis “were in error, rebellious and astray”, they 
remained silent. They remained silent because they are peace-loving, respectful, and 
considerate towards the feelings of the Sunnis; they acted “for the sake (...) of unity”. Sunnis 
on the other hand are characterized as the opposite, as inconsiderate and aggressive. Hussein 
asserts that during the Imamate Sunnis were given all religious freedom they might have 
wanted. After the revolution in 1962, however, Zaydis did not get any of this freedom. 
                                                          
937 On shirk see: Daniel Gimaret, “S̲h̲irk”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. P. Bearman et al. (Brill Online, 
2015). accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
2/s-h-irk-SIM_6965.  
938 Lecture A66, March 23, 2002, 1f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 403].  
939 Similarly pointed out by vom Bruck in regard to the traumatic experiences of 1962 for sadah and their 
interpretation/remembrances against the background of “harassment suffered by the ahl al-bayt since the days of 
Umayyad rule”. Vom Bruck, Islam, 90. 
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Instead, they were confronted with open aggression, termed “conquests” as Hussein cites his 
source. Beyond these bad intentions and character flaws, he furthermore accuses them for 
their allegedly wrong interpretation of the Qurʾan and the resulting contemporary political 
consequences.940 The central theme of his speeches is the question of preordainment by God. 
Sunni and Shiʿa exegesis differ here. Without specifying the range of variation between 
diverse groups, the very general difference is that Sunnis madhabs assume some degree of 
divine preordainment while Shiʿa denominations reject it and emphasize the free human will 
and agency in shaping one’s life and social conditions.941 Hussein is vehemently arguing 
against the assumption of preordination. Even further, he does not contend the issue in sole 
theological terms, but denounces the Sunni interpretation as a “lie”,942 thus framing it as an 
active action (in contrast to a mere misunderstanding or mistake). Its intentionality can hence 
be blamed. The ‘lie’ holds that God is the source of injustice as well. In the eyes of Hussein 
this is a vicious revilement of God, and on the level of social order it carries the seed of the 
justification of unjust rule in it. The submission of the ʿulamāʾ to such rulers is identified as a 
cause of the weakness of the ummah in the face of “the most despicable creatures of Allah”. 
What results from this dire state is far-reaching: If the ruler is unjust and religiously in the 
wrong and the ʿulamāʾ is acquiescent to this and legitimizes such acquiescence for all 
believers/citizens, then the situation will continue of erroneous belief and resulting religious 
erroneous behavior – the most condemnable of all. The solution he proposes to the problem of 
misguided leadership will be discussion below.   
 Lastly, Hussein criticizes material excesses and related ostentatively religious behavior he 
regards as false: In the beginning he points out how the need to confront the enemies of Islam 
cannot be ignored in favor of sole supplicating to God. “If this were the case, then all we 
would need to do is to say – like those Wahhabis and Sunnis when they are so pious in their 
                                                          
940 Lecture A61, December 14, 2001, 22, 26 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 381–382; he misdates it December 13]; 
Lecture A6, January 14, 2002, 14 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 396]. 
941 The Shiʿa concept that takes the place of the ‘qada wa qadr’ (predestination) is ‘bada’’. 
942 What needs to be considered at this point is that this is no unique allegation; rather, it is an established 
discursive tool, as Gerald Hawting points out: “The typical allusiveness of the qurʾānic style (...) combines with 
its use of polemic to make identification of the groups concerned, specification of their characteristics and even 
confirmation of their existence, difficult. Polemic involves distortion and exaggeration of the opponents' 
positions and standard polemical accusations, such as idolatry, following error, distortion of scripture (...), and 
inventing lies about God (...), are transferable between different opponents.” Thus, Hussein’s allegations should 
be evaluated once more in light of their high narrative fidelity. Gerald R. Hawting, “Parties and Factions”, 
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Washington D.C.: Brill Online, 2015), accessed 
January 20, 2015, http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-the-quran/parties-and-
factions-EQSIM_00316. 
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prayers at noon, afternoon, evening, night and dawn (...)”.943 Instead of acting along the 
religious commands, many Muslims stick to mere ostentation:  
15 Rather we go back to supplications (du’a). The mutawwa gets out of the luxury car at 
the Masjid al-Haram (in Mecca) with soldiers on the right and the left of him, and they 
make supplications – just as in any other country where this is the modus operandi – then 
he gets back into the luxury car, goes back to the apartment or the huge air-conditioned 
estate equipped with every type of amenity, and the mission is over.944 
According to Lux, the term “mutawwa” is used derisively for a religiously observant person 
who ‘follows’ the laws – but, according to the subtext, remains empty spiritually. It is used 
predominantly for Saudis, i.e. it alludes to Wahhabis.945 The overly generous donations of 
those Yemenis who made their fortunes abroad in the Gulf States are evaluated along the 
same lines of acts empty of significant impact:  
16 We saw a mosque in San’a built through donations by a merchant, and the minaret 
alone cost seven million riyals – I have no idea how much the mosque itself cost, but the 
minaret was seven million! That amount could do a lot of good work in the area of 
orienting people towards the religion of Allah, towards the noble Qurʾan and in educating 
them according to it, or in confronting the enemy or providing the means to do so. We see 
that even a small contribution in the area in which we are working can go a long way; 
how would it be if there were a contribution of seven million riyals? This minaret, what 
will it do? (…) however, when you build a human being on the basis of the Qurʾan, isn’t 
he someone who is capable of shooting at America? Is it possible for the minaret to some 
day turn into a rocket that will be launched and destroy a city among the cities of 
unbelief? No (…) you did not build a human being, you did not build ‘minarets’ – the 
true minaret is the human being whom you build on the basis of the Qurʾan and who 
builds and constructs himself according to the guidance of Allah where his success is on 
the basis of the Qurʾan.946 
In addition to his criticism, the passage also mirrors once more his conviction that the Qurʾan 
is the source of guidance for all action, his ideational orientation, – “build a human being” – 
and his offensive stance against the US, which here is articulated in a more militant tone than 
on other occasions cited about.  
 This subchapter had the purpose of presenting the diagnostic framing of the later Houthi 
movement as it was developed in the text corpus of Hussein al-Houthi’s lectures. A number of 
notable aspects could be observed: First, Hussein did not restrict his diagnosis of collective 
weakness and related external threat to merely one group; instead, he switches between the 
Muslim ummah, Arabs, Yemenis, and Zaydis. This openness or inclusiveness in regard to his 
audience has the advantage that it allowed for a wider recruitment base beyond an exclusively 
                                                          
943 Lecture A2, January 9, 2002, 4 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 386].  
944 Lecture A2, January 9, 2002, 5 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 386]. 
945 Lux, Last Imam, 386, n. 17.  
946 Lecture B5, November 1, 2003, 4 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 420].  
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Zaydi constituency, e.g. qabāʾil and the general non-Zaydi population in the North. While 
they certainly would not have been responsive to exclusively Zaydi address, up to this point 
some other frame elements (such as, for example, the agrarian neglect or the related 
neocolonialist critique) might resonate with them, too. This should specifically become 
important at later stages of the conflict, when these other groups entered into the armed 
conflict as well and had to choose their sides.947 In addition, it abrogated the counterframe 
spread by the regime to a certain degree, which claimed that the Houthis were striving to 
reestablish the imamate. This would have implied a Hashemite exclusivism, a potentially 
inciting issue for non-Hashemites given the negative discourse surrounding the imamate era, 
which could be thwarted by these inclusive components. Second, I consider Hussein’s 
reasoned argumentation and elaborate rhetoric worth noting. Far from being blatantly 
inflaming, he rather leads his audience through a complex, multi-layered line of 
argumentation that connects theological debates, Qurʾan quotations, the audience’s life 
environment, social discourses, current events, political developments, and appeals for 
personal and collective engagement in an intricate yet accessible manner. He succeeds in 
creating coherence, irrespective of the numerous strands he takes up, and his speech does not 
drift into scholarly spheres but remains grounded and apprehensible. His extensive experience 
– and talent – in teaching, preaching, and political debate becomes obvious. In framing 
terminology, he masters the establishment of both credibility and salience.948  
 Beyond their multifaceted diagnostic framing, some of the passages already contain 
indications of the measures Hussein suggests in order to deal with the problems he identifies. 
At the core of his prescriptions, as they have been presented so far, lies a return to the Qurʾan 
as sole source of belief and acceptable action and the initiation of some kind of counteraction 
against the perceived antagonist US. That is, some kind of intervention is required in regard 
to the dominance of unjust rule, which form this ought to take precisely requires additional 
elucidation. A detailed analysis of his prognostic framing will be the content of the following 
subchapter.   
 
                                                          
947 To prevent misapprehension: At these stages Hussein had already been dead. The framing authority passed 
over to his successors, from 2005/06 on mainly his younger brother Abdul Malik, who could then employ the 
already established ‘direction of impact’.  
948 Strictly taken, these are measures for resonance. However, the degree to which they – theoretically – have 
been realized already in frame development can serve as a measure for the quality of the frame and the rhetoric 
quality which supports its distribution.  
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7.1.1.2. Prognostic Framing 
Hussein al-Houthi’s thought should not be treated in isolation, but as deeply embedded in 
theological discourse and tradition. Especially in regard to his prognostic framing, it proves 
consequential and helps to further contextualize his argumentation thereby making it more 
intelligible. Lux, who explicitly analyzes the malazim from this angle, cogently reveals the 
significant traces of Mu’tazilite influence to be detected in them.949 From the 8th to the 10th 
century, the Mu’tazila950 was one of the most important schools of Islamic theology in 
contemporary Iraq951. It was subsequently suppressed and only pockets survived in Zaydi and 
Twelver Shiʿa theology as well as some schools of Jewish theology.952 Its main characteristic 
is its strong emphasis on reason and rational thought, rooted, among other sources, in Greek 
philosophy. It developed as a reaction to political tyranny and sought to provide answers to 
pressing political questions – one aspect that could be viewed as an albeit distant parallel to 
Hussein’s diagnosis to a degree, since he considers Yemen’s ruler(s) as unjust. Five principles 
form the core of Mu’tazilite theology: (1) The absolute unity of God (tawhid). Mu’tazilites 
deduce from this principle that nothing can be co-eternal with God, not even the Qurʾan. For 
them, the holy book is therefore created – a belief that sets them in opposition to modern 
mainstream Islam and is one of the reasons why the Mu’tazila is often viewed as heretical. (2) 
Divine justice (al-‘adl). In order to explain the existence of evil, Mu’tazilites highlight the 
free will of human beings, which can lead to errors and hence evil. Again, this stands in 
contrast to the belief in divine predestination in mainstream interpretation953 (as has already 
been stated in regard to Hussein’s diagnostic framing). (3) The (divine) promise and threat 
(al-wa’ad wa al wa’id). For one’s innate submission to God, knowledge of God, truth, and 
corresponding choices, He promises His followers compensation; a lack thereof, on the other 
hand, leads to punishment. (4) The intermediate position (al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn) 
                                                          
949 Lux, Last Imam, 379ff. At the same time, however, he emphasizes how vehemently Hussein himself 
distanced himself from their procedure, the ilm al-kalam, equivalent to a ‘science of discourse’ on which 
theological questions were debated rationally (ibid., 380–381). Nevertheless, Hussein was well-versed in their 
theology and the influence on his argumentation and core assumptions can hardly be refuted.  
950 An excellent overview of the Mu’tazila is provided by Sabine Schmidtke, “Muʿtazila”, Encyclopaedia of the 
Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Washington D.C.: Brill Online), 2015, accessed January 20, 2015, 
http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-the-quran/mu-tazila-EQCOM_00127. For 
more details see the extensive work of Schmidtke on the topic of Medieval Islamic theology generally and the 
Mu’tazila in Yemen specifically.  
951 In the cities of Basra and Baghdad, to be precise.  
952 Concerning the relation between Mu’tazila and Zaydiyya see: “Zaydiyya”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, accessed 
January 20, 2015, http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/zaydiyya-
COM_1385.  
953 Cf. Dmitry V. Frolov, “Freedom and Predestination”, Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen 
McAuliffe (Washington D.C.: Brill Online), 2015, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.referenceworks. 
brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-the-quran/freedom-and-predestination-EQSIM _00163.  
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of Muslims who commit sins and die without repentance. They are positioned in between 
believers and non-believers. (5) Commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong (al-
amr bi-‘l ma’ruf wa an-nahy ‘an al-munkar).954 This last point specifically appears repeatedly 
in Hussein’s lectures. It connects well with the Zaydi command of al-khurūj ʿalā l-ḥākim 
(shortened to: khurūj), rebellion against an unjust ruler.955 One of the crucial questions in 
analyzing the malazim is if Hussein called for khurūj, i.e. if he called for rebellion.  
 Three interlinked aspects of Hussein’s basis of argumentation in – or, rather, the 
preconditions he creates with – his prognostic framing relegates to Mu’tazilite thought: the 
relevance of this world (i.e. before the afterlife), the free will of human beings, and individual 
responsibility.  
17 [W]e are ignorant of the fact that there is a threat for every [evil] deed that we commit, 
for every insufficiently fulfilled obligation, for every obligation we neglect and for every 
divine command that we do not answer – that there is a threat (…) We must know that 
this of which we are now in the midst is a punishment for neglect that transpired from us, 
for a neglect that is ours in what pertains to the commands of Allah.956 
What emerges from this text passage is the urgent need to overcome the prevalent neglect of 
the audience in fulfilling God’s commands. In the wake of worldly retribution, there can be 
no delay in action. As a framing strategy, Hussein thus creates urgency for action by 
highlighting the threat of continuing the bad situation in addition to punishing the negligent 
individuals in the afterlife (a punishment which might seem far-fetched and thus do little to 
motivate). His stance against predestination and concomitant affirmation of human free will 
has already been treated.957 Lastly, the issue of individual responsibility is added. After an 
accusation of Sunnis for the dire state of the Muslim ummah, Hussein continues:  
18 ‘You are the best ummah brought forth for people, you command what is just and you 
forbid what is wrong and you believe in Allah’ (surat al-‘Imran, 3:100), isn’t this the 
responsibility that was placed upon them? 
 
                                                          
954 Cf. Ahmad Pakatchi and Matthew Melvin-Koushki, “al-Amr bi al-maʿrūf wa al-nahy ʿan al-munkar”, 
Encyclopaedia Islamica, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/ 
entries/encyclopaedia-islamica/al-amr-bi-al-ma-ru-f-wa-al-nahy-an-al-munkar-COM_0278; Cook, Commanding, 
on the importance and exegesis of this obligation in both the Mu’tazila and Zaydiyya, including the parallels and 
connections between the two (p. 237). 
955 On the legitimacy of rebellion against a ruler, “khurūj”, see: Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Rebellion”, 
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, accessed January 20, 2015, http://www.referenceworks. 
brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-the-quran/rebellion-EQSIM_00352. 
956 Lecture A17, January 28, 2002, 9 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 383]. For a very similar line of argument see 
also: Lecture A39, March 3, 2002, 1–4 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 382].  
957 See also: Lecture B15, November 12, 2003, 2f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 384f.]. 
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19 Did not Allah say to Muhammad: ‘Fight in the way of Allah, no other is charged [with 
responsibility] other than you’ (surat al-nisa, 4:84)? In the end, if you do not find anyone 
to fight in the way of Allah, then you – yourself – fight.958 
 
20 The Zaydiyah (…) ought to be the most concerned Muslims, the first to go out in 
confrontation of the enemies, and to be the most conscious and faithful because their 
beliefs are very dangerous to them; and it is not something that they borrowed or imposed 
upon themselves, but it is simply the logic of the Qurʾan itself that threatens with eternity 
in hellfire if they transgress its bounds.959 
Sunnis have failed to uphold the command of “command[ing] what is right and (...) 
forbid[ding] what is wrong”. The Zaydis, on the other hand, have a special status and hence a 
special responsibility; i.e. the honor such a special status brings comes with a burden – carrot 
and stick are rhetorically combined in this assertion. By handing them the responsibility, 
Hussein first of all creates the precondition, or at least a solid basis, for his subsequent 
prognostic framing: He emphasizes, possibly strengthens, agency by invoking religious duty 
and thereby establishing a certain pressure to take action. It is close to the ‘common identity 
frame’ of ‘being Zaydi’: ‘We are Zaydi, Zaydis have received from God the responsibility to 
secure proper social and religious conditions, thus, we have received it, thus, we need to act 
accordingly.’ In combination with free will, they have at the same time the freedom and the 
duty to do so. But what is there that they can do? Here, Hussein’s prognostic frame enters the 
picture.  
 The differentiation we have seen in the diagnostic framing between the weakness of the 
Muslim ummah, Arabs, Yemenis, and finally Zaydis is dissolved in the prognostic framing. 
Where in the former it could serve to extend the audience and thus the circle of potentially 
mobilizable people, in the latter it would solely diminish the coherence of the plan of action, 
thereby lead to confusion, and ultimately (in the case of successful mobilization and action) to 
reduced impact. Hence, Hussein does well in transmitting less differentiated messages. Some 
of which, however, do set restrictions in regard to the audience that can be reached (e.g. calls 
to follow an imam, which would only target Shiʿa /Zaydis).   
 The ‘Qurʾanic guidance frame’ forms the core. “We depend on the Qurʾan”960 and “The 
readily apparent meaning (zahir) of the Qurʾan suffices you”961 are complemented by the 
assignation to study and internalize the holy book:  
21 The Qurʾan is strength entirely, entirely correct views and correct solutions; it confers 
upon everyone who proceeds according its method the capability of attaining to a 
                                                          
958 Lecture A33, December 21, 2002, 11 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 387; he misdates it March 5].  
959 Lectures A35 and A36, February 1–2, 2002, 2 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 424; he misdates them March 9]. 
960 Lecture B15, November 12, 2003, 15 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 418]. 
961 Lecture A32, August 4, 2002, 16 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 418].  
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requisite level to strike the enemies of Allah, whoever they are and whatever their 
strength may be. The one who is ignorant of the noble Qurʾan and who is not educated 
according to its culture – even if he recites verses night and day – he will be, in reality, 
among those who thrust the Book of Allah behind their backs; (...) At the time when the 
noble Qurʾan encourages people in jihad; urges them towards unity and brotherhood and 
spending in the way of Allah, to pledge themselves completely to Allah and to command 
what is just and forbid what is wrong; it commands them to fight the enemies of Allah – 
at the same time you find someone saying – with prayer beads in his hand: ‘We don’t 
have any need of this, and it’s better for people if they are silent. It might make people go 
crazy.’ Talk of this sort cannot possibly be compatible with the Qurʾan. We will become 
victims in great number of those who [supposedly] have knowledge if we do not avail 
ourselves – as students seeking knowledge, as Muslim people – of Qurʾanic criteria by 
which we are able to know what the correct positions are and as well as the person 
positions and actions are considered to be correct according to the Qurʾan. (…) We must 
return to the Qurʾan and we will benefit by knowing how to be wise in our opinions and 
in evaluating ourselves first, and then in evaluating others around us, and in our 
knowledge about what it mentions of our enemies, and in knowing the solution for 
confronting them. Whenever did the noble Qurʾan ever commend absolute silence as a 
wise position in the confrontation of the enemies of Allah? (…) Those who go forth as 
commentators on the Qurʾan do not present it in a correct fashion (...) they are completely 
oblivious and forget to talk about certain pivotal verses which we are most in need of 
understanding today as they are connected to the reality of people, connected to the life of 
people.962  
 
In this passage, he does a number of things: He emphasizes the exclusive correctness of the 
Qurʾan and his function in guiding the ummah, he summons his audience to educate 
themselves according to its principles the Believing Youth saw as its core task among others, 
urges for a united stance that he equally attempts through his lectures, pushes them to 
confront the “enemies of Allah”, delegitimizes those who are acquiescent and do not follow 
the right Islamic/Qurʾanic path, and lastly asserts the relevance of the holy book for the 
audience’s daily life. In sum, he ties together his diagnostic and prognostic frames. For the 
latter, he/the group he coined along his ideas already provides the means to take action with a 
very low threshold: Listening to him or joining other educational activities is a first step to 
overcome the diagnosed status quo. Thus, the audience is already ensuing the solutions 
Hussein suggests to a certain degree. This comports the message that it is feasible for all of 
them and that they already form a collective of ‘those on the correct path’. In regard to a 
leadership for the rightly guided, he mentions the Iranian example as a model and stresses:  
22 We find these verses bearing witness that it is not possible for the ummah, or any other 
group, to be guided except at the hands of the learned in order to attain the level where 
they can be hizb allah (...)963 
                                                          
962 Ibid., 8 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 419].  
963 The hizb allah (party of God) finds its adversary in the hizb al-shaytan (party of the Devil). The former refers 
to the religiously rightly-guided, whereas the latter to the religiously misguided. Cf. Hawting, “Parties and 
Factions”.  
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From the ‘Qurʾanic guidance frame’ as described above, Hussein proceeds to the question of 
leadership by reference to an acknowledged religious authority, Imam Hadi. He asserted the 
leadership of Ali and the learned who follow in his line, i.e. the learned ahl al-bayt. The 
passage is thus worth noting: Although Hussein nowhere in his malazim explicitly calls for a 
restoration of the imamate, his statements and line of argumentation throughout the whole 
corpus provides the option for such a reading and interpretation. The opposite assumption and 
reading, on the other hand, would solely emphasize that the criterion of perfection is 
requested for the imam – in an exclusively theological disputation without any reference and 
relevance for the prognostic framing. This seems, however, an all-too anemic reading of an 
otherwise clearly politically and action-oriented corpus and speaker. He even states it himself: 
“No, you find faith in Allah in practice (‘amaliyan) (…) the matter in Islam is not only 
daʿwahh, it is an active method of operation – a method of movement (manhaj haraki).”964
  
As a whole, I suggest to call this aspect the ‘Hashemite leadership frame’, with an implicit 
‘learned Hashemite’ specification.  
 Based on the two dimensions of normative guidance and leadership, which answer does 
Hussein provide to the central question of ‘what exactly is it that shall be done?’ What does 
the already highlighted duty to ‘command what is right and forbid what is wrong’ imply in his 
interpretation? Another citation lays open his line of argumentation in regard to jihad. After 
giving the example of the Prophet, who didn't merely pray when he arrived in Medina, but 
“built [a] mosque as a military base, a base for jihad” he continues:  
23 Did not Allah say to His Prophet: ‘Fight in the way of Allah’ (surat al-nisa, 4:84)? 
What does ‘fight’ (qatil)965 mean? Isn’t the word explicit? Even more explicit than the 
word ‘jihad’966 which our era explains as ‘jihad of the word’ or ‘jihad of the pen’ or 
‘jihadal-nafs’ [the struggle against the self and its base desires through self-discipline]. 
We describe ourselves as mujāhidun but we mean by the pen as this is easy. Isn’t it easy? 
                                                          
964 Lecture B9, November 5, 2003, 14 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 383; he misdates it November 11].   
965 On the meaning and Qurʾanic use of the root q-t-l cf.: Elsaid M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, 
“ل/ت/ق  q–t–l”, Dictionary of Qurʾanic Usage, ed. Elsaid M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem (Brill 
Online, 2015), accessed January 28, 2015, http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/dictionary-of-
quranic-usage/q-t-l-SIM_001340. They list the following connotations: to kill, killing, slaughter; to fight; to put 
into hardship; to curse; to inquire, to look deeply; to quench a thirst; to be experienced; (of an animal) to be 
trained; to be worldly wise; to work very hard.  
966 For a detailed elaboration of the concept of ‘jihad’ in the Qurʾan cf.: Ella Landau-Tasseron, “Jihād”, 
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, accessed January 28, 2015, http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/ 
entries/encyclopaedia-of-the-quran/jiha-d-EQCOM_00101. The author provides a definition of jihad as: 
“Struggle, or striving, but often understood both within the Muslim tradition and beyond it as warfare against 
infidels (…). The term jihād derives from the root j-h-d, denoting effort, exhaustion, exertion, strain.” Among 
other aspects, Landau-Tasseron stresses that the concept of ‘greater jihad’ (as opposed to the ‘lesser jihad’, i.e. 
military struggle) in the sense of becoming a better Muslim by struggling with one’s self and with the Devil has 
no immediate reference in the Qurʾan. 
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The pen, however, is considered a form of jihad when what it produces are lines that lead 
people to fight – then it is jihad. If it produces lines that cause the ummah to remain 
frozen and to stagnate, if it deceives the ummah then what is it considered? It negates 
jihad and is considered a war against everything that the word jihad implies… it is not 
permissible for mosques to be transformed into minibars that freeze up the Muslims as 
they used to be centers for mobilization and military bases – the voice from the minbar967 
used to cause unbelief and idolatrous excess and injustice to tremble (…) we clever 
people, however, in the Islamic world both far and wide, don’t do that. (…) We call upon 
Allah and then behave like Bani Israel did when they said [to Moses]: ‘You and your 
Lord go fight; we will sit here’ (al-ma’idah 5:24).968 
This lecture excerpt contains a call for action in form of (military) jihad – what I want to call 
the ‘jihad frame’. The responsible believers are supposed to follow the Prophet Mohamed in 
fighting “injustice” and “idolatrous excess”, in line with the duty of ‘commanding what is 
right and forbidding what is wrong’. He again emphasizes that the Sunnis and Wahhabis are 
too passive and thus in the wrong, and are even supporting the enemies US and Israel. On the 
basis of the ‘Qurʾanic guidance’ the audience (i.e. Zaydis) is provided with its identity and 
values, and it is summoned to “Fight in the way of Allah”. Importantly, Hussein then 
explicitly elaborates how this does not imply peaceful means and self-improvement in the 
sense of ‘greater jihad’969, but military fighting. The mosques are to be used as “centers for 
mobilization and military bases”; considering his intensive religious lecturing and preaching, 
this might hint at the fact that he was consciously acting according to his demands. In the end, 
he warns against non-action by comparing those who do not act as he has delineated to the 
“Bani Israel”, i.e. the Jews, the enemies with whom nobody would want to be equated. In 
another passage he inverts the argument: From a push (‘do not be as our enemies’), he turns it 
into a pull-argument by connecting jihad not only with a necessary and God-commanded act, 
but also with wisdom and honor, thus tying it to the culturally prevalent complex of honor:  
24 Notice, we almost do not trust Allah when He addresses the Muslims (…) about jihad, 
when He guides them to jihad and that it is a trade that will save them from a painful 
torment and so forth when He says: ‘That is best for you if you but knew’ (surat al-
tawbah, 9:41). How is this good – that which leads you to throw yourself in the path of a 
bullet? Is this wisdom? Yes, this is wisdom, the wisdom of wise commands in which 
there is mercy and goodness and honor unto you.970 
 
The concrete steps he prescribes, then, are more contained again:  
                                                          
967 The raised structure or pulpit from which solemn announcements to the Muslim community were made and 
from which sermons were preached. “Minbar”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, accessed January 28, 2015, 
http://www.referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/minbar-COM_0744.  
968 Lecture A2, January 9, 2002, 4f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 385f.].  
969 Cf. Landau-Tasseron, “Jihād”.  
970 Lectures A14–16, January 23+25–26, 2002, 7 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 424; he misdates it January 28]. 
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25 Perhaps, if Muslims about from now (...) raise slogans of indignation, which will 
convey their anger to America and Israel, then America and Israel will stop carrying out 
the plans that they want whether they are against the two holy mosques or against any 
other people. This shout itself which we want to raise and spread in every other region – 
it, by itself, expresses profound outrage – and whoever raises it is able to strike America 
and to strike it economically before you strike it militarily. This is because the American 
economy is crucial, and they make a thousand calculations for every single dollar. It is 
possible for people to boycott American products or the products of companies that have 
a relation to America and the Jews or to the American government itself; and it is at that 
time that they will know how much they stand to lose because whoever becomes filled 
with rage against America and against Israel is someone who will respond to an economic 
boycott and an economic embargo. It is within our ability, for example, to find an 
alternative for these cigarettes and to replace them with locally-produced tobacco (…) or 
to quit smoking altogether. And how much will they lose if people just quit smoking? 
Calculate, yourselves, how much the people of this region spend of their money on 
smoking in a single month and you’ll realize how much their losses would be for a single 
region. (…) They make a thousand calculations so if people raise this cry in every land, 
then America and Israel will, in fact, stop doing what they want to do.971 
Raising a slogan of outrage, spreading it, boycotting US and Israeli products and thereby 
exerting economic pressure on these states to make them stop their policies (of intervention in 
Arab/Muslim states) – the measures Hussein formulates in this lecture, the ‘slogan frame’ or 
‘ṣarkhah frame’972, are the most concrete of his prognostic framing. The logic connects to his 
diagnosis of economic dependency on the two adversaries laid out above; it once more 
demonstrates his strong focus on economic factors, and, in addition, the topic can very well be 
connected to the everyday lives of his audience. Everyone can act; the threshold for action 
remains low. To present a metaphor, he is not asking to quit smoking, but simply to change 
brands of tobacco. As shouting slogans is as easily feasible, there is an increased probability 
that his audience follows him. Nevertheless, military action remains present among the 
suggested repertoire as well.   
 Hussein had actually coined the slogan he wanted to hear two months before, on January 
17, 2002, in his lecture ‘A Scream/Slogan in the Face of the Arrogants’. Therein, he asks his 
audience:  
26 For how long more should we keep doing nothing in response to the American 
arrogance? I say to you, my brothers, shout! Don’t you have the ability to shout: God is 
the Greatest... Death to America and Israel... Victory for Islam and Muslims? Don’t you 
think that it is possible for every one of you to make this shout? This shout is a great 
honor for us to have, right here in this school [al-Imam al-Hadi school in Marran, Sa’dah 
province] (...) By making this shout now, we will be the first who made this shout, which, 
that is sure, will be made not only in this hall but also in other places. With God's’will, 
                                                          
971 Lectures A35 and A 36, February 1–2, 2002, 11 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 390f.; he misdates it March 9]. 
972 ‘sarkha’ means ‘slogan’, ‘sarkhat al-harb’ means ‘battle-cry’.  
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you shall find those who will make the shout with you in other places. Make this shout 
with me: Death to America and Israel!973 
 
‘God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam’ – 
from thereon this slogan has become iconographic for the movement.  
 
 
Figure 7.1.: The Houthi slogan at a stall selling Houthi memorabilia. This graphic depiction – in 
green, the color of Islam, and red, here used for the aggressive lines – has gained iconographic value 
over time. Photo: Luke Somers, January 2013. 
 
The creation and use of such a slogan mirrors Hussein’s orientation on the Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini as a role model or, rather, his method as guiding principle.974 The Iranian 
revolutionary leader was convinced of the power of (religious) slogans and their shouting:  
27 Our armed forces, police, army and our Revolutionary Guards, are equipped with the 
force of Providence, and their weapon is ‘Allahu akbar!’ and there is no weapon in the 
world which can match this weapon.975 
 
The parallels in rhetoric are noticeable, and both leaders speak of the expansion of the number 
of people shouting the respective slogan or invocation. Hussein describes as one of his goals 
                                                          
973 Lecture A62, January 17, 2002, 8, [cited in: Khaled Fattah, “One slogan and six wars”, Asia Times, October 
9, 2009, accessed December 12, 2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KJ09Ak03.html.  
974 On his procedural thinking and epistemology cf. Hussein himself in one of his lectures: “A particular plan 
springs from a particular concept; when you know the concept and the orientation, you will know the relation 
between mode and idea.” Lecture A3, January 11, 2002, 15 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 381].  
975 Ruhollah Al-Khomeini, Mukhtarat min Awqal al-Imam al-Khomeini (Tehran: Wizarat al-Irshad al-Islamiyah, 
1982), 184; see also: Ibid., 106 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 391]. 
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the creation of consciousness among the Zaydis in the way Iran and Hizbullah have done so 
by making use of various media. During his lifetime he had focused his attention on tapping 
locally appropriate media early (e.g. cassette tape recordings), which were available at low 
cost to spread his frames; later on, the movement largely expanded the range of media they 
employed (the Houthi’s media use will be discussed in the chapter on frame distribution). He 
thus actively broached the importance of media use for the distribution of his ideas/the 
creation of consciousness, while at the same time acting accordingly – a move which certainly 
served his credibility and the apparent coherence of his message and actions.  
28 Iran and Hizb Allah are the strongest enemies of America and Israel, and they have the 
best media apparatuses and these create consciousness among the Muslims. We Zaydi 
Shiʿa h should be more conscious than the Iranian and more conscious than Hizb Allah.976 
 
The emphasis he places on this topic justifies a separate notion as ‘media use frame’. In 
regard to a prognostic prescription it contains the message of expansion among Muslims. 
Although all frames need distribution and it is in any case important to achieve a high degree 
of dissemination, Hussein aims at a continuous and lasting creation of consciousness, a 
permanent ‘return to the correct path’ that goes beyond sole mobilization and thus warrants a 
frame status.   
 So far, when his audience follows the pathway of action Hussein develops in his 
prognostic framing – ‘common identity frame’, ‘Qurʾanic guidance frame’, ‘Hashemite 
leadership frame’, ‘jihad frame’, ‘ṣarkhah frame’, and ‘media use frame’ – they become a 
member of a group with ‘guidelines’ and a leadership and aim at spreading a message and 
military jihad against a foreign threat. Yet in his diagnostic frame, Hussein not only depicts a 
foreign threat, but moreover a genuinely national one: the regime. What, then, is to be done in 
order to counter this threat? With the research question in mind: Does he or does he not call 
for an uprising against Saleh? In the malazim, the closest Hussein gets to such a call for an 
uprising is the following passage that talks about the Zaydi duty of khurūj and which I 
therefore want to refer to as the ‘khurūj frame’:  
29 In the long history of the ahl al-bayt there was always a precedent for the imam who 
was governing and the necessity of a revolution against him if he were to be unjust or if 
he deviated from proceeding according to justice. Imam al-Hadi (the peace of Allah be 
upon him) said when he asked the allegiance of the people: ‘Follow me if I obey Allah, 
but if I rebel against Allah, then you are not obliged to follow me; but rather, you are 
obligated to fight [to kill] me (tuqatiluni).’ The well-known source principle of the Zaydi 
madhab is ‘going out against the wrongdoer’.977 
                                                          
976 Lecture A61, December 14, 2001 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 396; he misdates it December 13]. 
977 Lecture A1, January 8, 2002, 3 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 400]. 
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How is this frame to be judged? In a first step, Hussein establishes a long tradition for that 
which he refers to, a rhetorical strategy he frequently employs. By pointing out the 
“necessity” he stresses that there is no other solution; and with “revolution” he calls for a 
complete overthrow of the political entity. In his diagnosis, he has already framed the regime 
as “unjust”, which supports the argument that he is hinting at. Then he bases his message on a 
great religious authority, Imam al-Hadi, thereby providing it with even more legitimacy and 
prestige than if he himself would have interpreted the Zaydi religious principle: When a 
leader “rebels[s] against Allah”, a Zaydi is “obligated” to (fight and) kill him. With this 
prominently supported statement alone, Hussein merely asserts the principle of khurūj once 
more. There is no explicit reference to the Yemeni president. However, this would have been 
a very bold move. When we consider the diagnostic frames, though, there is convincing 
evidence that he implicitly referred to Saleh in a very clear way: Hussein has invested quite 
extensive parts of his lectures into establishing Saleh’s rule as unjust. Now he is stressing the 
obligation to (and not just permission of) khurūj – the connection to rise against Saleh’s rule 
on this basis appears undeniable and was certainly apparent to his audience. As I argued 
before: Yemenis are generally well versed in the interpretation of political speech and poetry. 
At the bottom line and in response to the question raised at the beginning of this subchapter: 
The above prognostic ‘khurūj frame’ does contain a call to rise up against Saleh; however, it 
does so with a low intensity and without urgency, which contains its impact for the time 
being.  
 
7.1.1.3. Motivational Framing 
The last dimension of Hussein’s frame development, the motivational framing, has in part 
already been adumbrated in the sources on the diagnostic and prognostic dimension; in many 
instances, the motivational framing is so inherently connected to these other dimensions in the 
following ways that it cannot stand alone: Push-factors, which thrust the audience towards 
action, are included in the diagnostic frames, namely the imminent threat specifically directed 
towards their ‘homes’; that Zaydis are to be blamed; the humiliation they suffer or the threat 
to their dignity and pride; and divine condemnation in the afterlife; pull-factors in the 
prognostic frames include a feeling of a ‘Zaydi community’ and the connected endeavor to act 
in accordance and together with this community; responsibility; free human will with the 
option to choose which side to belong to: the good side of God or the ‘bad’ side; the power to 
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act; the connection to everyday life, which means that the impacts of action will be noticeable 
on a personal level; and immediate calls to ‘fight in the way of Allah’ and to shout the slogan. 
While these already contain a strong call for action, Hussein furthermore devotes specific 
attention to the feasibility and effectiveness of his plan of action. On the one hand, he 
repeatedly makes the point that the Qurʾan provides all needed guidance; therefore, the 
movement, or rather all Zaydis/Muslims, cannot go astray as long as they follow its message 
(in a correct interpretation). Another aspect he stresses over and over again is the example of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini978 in the Iranian Revolution and of Hassan Nasrallah and 
Hizbullah:979 They are an example for strong Shiʿa leaders, they got their followers to shout 
anti-US and anti-Israel slogans, created an Islamic ‘consciousness’, Iran became a 
(successful) Islamic state, and both established highly effective media apparatus for a 
continuous spread of their ideas and messages.980 
 
Both Nasrallah and Khomeini have found effective means to confront Israel, the ever-present 
enemy.981 The power of shouting Khomeini believes in has already been referred to. Hussein 
takes the same line when he discusses the relationship with the US:  
30 Notice that when people go out with these slogans, which appear to be an easy task, it 
irritates them [i.e. the Americans] greatly because it is religious work in the path of Allah. 
The American ambassador said his country ‘does not want enemies among the Arab 
people to be transformed into religious enemies’. What are religious enemies? What he is 
saying is that they don’t want you to be transformed in your confrontation with us under 
the rubric of ‘in the path of Allah’ because they know that they will be defeated in the end 
if this is the case. (…) Muslims are in a state of perpetual confrontation (...) they know 
that no other mottos can ever liberate their nations unless they go out ‘in the path of 
Allah’. (...) Is there a country which has been liberated [of colonialism] in the sense of all 
that the term implies and become independent? No. After the original colonialism the 
occupiers left, but their presence remained – their agents remained – and after that? Then 
came American pressure and an American occupation and execution of plans in every 
sphere and those governing the people who represent people working with the American 
ambassador. What I mean is that during this entire period, people have never been 
liberated from the occupier because they have not raised up this important slogan and 
have not oriented their confrontation ‘in the path of Allah’. (…) What I mean is that they 
understand. It is very easy to curse them. Notice, if you start cursing them in the mosque, 
they won’t say anything; religious slogans, however, are dangerous and in the mosque 
                                                          
978 In regards to the function of Khomeini as an example, but also as someone from whom Hussein’s seeks to 
distance himself see: Pottek, “Anfang”, 111. 
979 Hussein also states how he studied the books of other leaders affiliated with these Shiʿa groups, for example 
Mohamed Hussein Fadhlallah: “I was flipping through the pages of a book by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and 
I greatly benefited from his important insight into this matter.” Lecture A6, January 14, 2002, 9 [cited in: Lux, 
Last Imam, 425]. 
980 For an excellent presentation of the trajectory of Hizbullah’s public communication see: Lina Khatib, Dina 
Matar, and Atef Alashaer, The Hizbullah Phenomenon. Politics and Communication (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
981 Lecture A61, December 14, 2001, 19 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 416f.; he misdates it December 13]. 
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they have an effect even more than in the street because it is a religious act. (...) Do you 
want to raise other slogans? To curse them? Go ahead. Aren’t there people who curse 
them in demonstrations – Bush and Sharon? They don’t care about this. Or, if you raise a 
nationalist slogan they won’t be bothered by you either – it doesn’t irritate them when 
you shout nationalist slogans such as ‘such and such a movement for the liberation of the 
nation’ or ‘for the defense of the nation’. These they know will fail and they consider 
them failures.982 
In Hussein’s view, the power of slogans (and therefore the rationale to use them) lies in their 
significance as “religious act[s]”: He considers religion as more powerful than nationalist 
discourses in what he describes as the continuation of an anti-colonial struggle against the US, 
the de facto successors of earlier colonial rulers. In the “state of perpetual confrontation” of 
Muslims against colonizers, religion is a dangerous weapon – and the opponent is aware of 
this and thus fears it; proof can be found in the statements of the American ambassador. This 
attribution of power to (public) religious acts, which crystalizes in shouting the religiously 
connoted slogan he proposed, hence forms the most effective means for the struggle for 
liberation. Motivation can thus be gained from knowledge of these facts: That they have not 
only the just legitimation for their struggle, but also the most effective instrument, and that 
their enemies are in fear.  
31 Imam Khomeini paid attention (…) [and] filled Iran with initiatives in diverse fields to 
the point where Iran was on the verge of becoming an industrial producer-nation, 
manufacturing many products for various countries including cars; you see that the streets 
of Tehran are all filled with locally-manufactured cars; you only see Japanese or Korean 
cars rarely (…) [N]otice that when the leadership is of this type, they know how to build 
the ummah to be strong in reality. But, what happens in the Arab countries? (...) We do 
not find in our reality anything that will educate us in order to be a strong ummah in the 
confrontation of others. That is, we do not find one who will build us up strong that we 
might be hizb allah because (...) the members of the hizb of Satan cannot possibly build 
up members in hizb allah, none builds hizb allah except those who hold the first numbers 
in the cards of hizb allah.983 
Here again the central topic is the exemplary and effective provisions implemented by 
Khomeini in Iran, which led to a strong and independent Muslim nation in the face of US-
Israeli domination of the region – the victims of which are still the Arab countries that do not 
have such strong leaders. Being strong and focusing on building the economy, education, and 
the ummah thus constitutes a feasible path to the same ideal state. The only element that is 
lacking for Yemenis/Arabs are equally good leaders. To change this, the audience can and 
should take action. Once more, the fact that it has been done and the goal has been reached by 
others serves to support the empirical credibility and feasibility of taking the proposed action, 
thereby pulling the audience to do so, i.e. making an implicit call to action. 
                                                          
982 Lecture B8, November 4, 2003, 16f. [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 391f.]. 
983 Lecture A6, January 14, 2002, 14 [cited in: Lux, Last Imam, 395]. 
242 
 
In a nutshell, Hussein’s motivational framing consists of both push- and pull-factors: 
Necessity for action due to threats is combined with feasibility claims and supporting 
examples. His most immediate and strongest call for action remains the famous lecture in 
which he established the ṣarkhah: “For how long more should we keep doing nothing in 
response to the American arrogance? I say to you, my brothers, shout! Don’t you have the 
ability to shout: God is the Greatest... Death to America and Israel... Victory for Islam and 
Muslims?”  
 Beyond the frame content and his rhetorically skilled way of presenting it to his audience, 
it can be assumed that his charismatic personality and high social, religious, and cultural 
prestige further enhanced the impact of his framing, specifically the motivational component. 
This aspect, while worth noting here, will be explicated in more detail in the section of frame 
resonance. Lastly, the fact that his lectures were presented in a regular mode and with a high 
temporal density increased the effect they had on the audience, for the central messages were 
emphasized over and over again.  
 The three tables below summarize the respective content of Hussein al-Houthi’s frames as 
he developed them in his malazim, i.e. prior to the escalation of the tensions between the 
Houthi movement and the regime in 2004. These frames form a solid basis for all later frame 
shifts and are frequently referred to up to the point of writing (2015). The content of the 
prognostic and motivational frame dimensions has been arranged according to a ‘main frame’ 
and its ‘sub-frames’, whereas this systematization has not been necessary and feasible for the 
less differentiated prognostic dimension.  
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MAIN FRAME  SUB-FRAME CORE CONTENT 
WEAKNESS FRAME  a specific identity group is suffering from 
internal weakness  
 Muslim Weakness Muslims are internally too weak to confront the 
external antagonists (Jews and Christians); part 
of the problem are fragmentation and mutual 
attempts to convert other 
denominations/schools  
 Shiʿa Weakness Shiʿa are distant from religious truth and 
therefore suffer ideationally 
 Arab Weakness weakness in the face of American and Israeli 
aggression; due to corrupt and weak leadership 
and distance from religion 
 Yemeni Weakness corrupt leadership and (related) economic 
weakness leads to a state in which Yemen could 
not defend itself against US or Israeli attacks  
 Zaydi Weakness distant from Qurʾanic teachings; facing 
Wahhabi intrusion and aggression and being 
left without protection or freedom by the 
regime 
NEOCOLONIALISM  
FRAME 
 Arab countries are/Yemen is in a state of 
neocolonial suppression and dependency 
 Economic Dependency dependency on capitalist doctrine of growth 
instead of genuine development of Yemen’s 
agriculture; reasons linked to opportunistic 
leaders 
 Political Dependency regime is dependent on US (and Israeli) 
goodwill and therefore serves as ally in US War 
on Terrorism; Yemen might become the next 
target of US terrorism allegations and military 
aggression if the regime does not follow US 
wishes 
INJUSTICE FRAME  defined group suffers from unjust actions 
directed against them 
 Zaydi Marginalization Zaydis have been wronged by Sunnis since the 
origins of Islam despite their own good will and 
striving for harmony and unity; marginalized in 
Northern Yemen since 1962, as can be seen e.g. 
in infrastructure projects; regime supported 
influx of Wahhabi adversaries in the North and 
protected them 
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Table 7.1.: Summary of Hussein al-Houthi’s diagnostic frames 
  
 Zaydi Repression since the end of the Imamate, Zadyis lack 
freedom and are confronted with open 
aggression by Sunnis who term it ‘conquest’; 
they furthermore lack protection against 
Wahhabi aggression 
THREAT FRAME  there is an existential (cultural and/or military) 
threat emanating from a specific ‘other’ 
 Wahhabization/ 
Salafization 
Wahhabis/Salafis have intruded Northern 
Yemen; they try to convert Zaydis to their 
wrong interpretation of Islam; there spread has 
been supported by the Yemeni regime  
 US/Israel Ideational, 
Cultural, and Military 
Infiltration and 
Aggression 
all spheres of Islamic life (culture, morals, 
economy, environment, politics) are threatened 
by these enemies in a civilizational 
confrontation; these threats are political, 
economic, and ideational 
ATTRIBUTION  
OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 responsibility must be attributed for the various 
diagnoses on various levels: ingroup, religious 
outgroup, leadership, and external 
 Own Neglect Muslims/Shiʿa /Zaydis have distanced 
themselves from Qurʾanic guidance and 
religious truths 
 Sunnis they represent ‘all that is false’ religiously and 
have continuously been suppressing Shiʿa since 
early Muslim times 
 Illegitimate Political 
Leaders 
Arab/Muslim/Yemeni leaders are ignoring their 
religious duties, corrupt, opportunistically 
‘selling out’ their people, and afraid of the US; 
they ‘fail’ and are thus illegitimate 
 Illegitimate Religious 
Leaders 
lack of opposition against and complicity of 
‘ʿulamāʾ with corrupt and illegitimate rulers 
 US/Israel  ‘civilizational others’; they pose terrorism 
allegations in order to act aggressively against 
Muslims/ Arab countries; continue to dominate 
the region in neocolonial fashion; threaten 
Muslims with ‘crusader intentions’ 
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Table 7.2.: Summary of Hussein al-Houthi’s prognostic frames 
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MAIN FRAME  CORE CONTENT 
QURʾANIC GUIDANCE 
FRAME 
the Qurʾan provides guidance on all relevant questions; when you 
follow the Qurʾan you cannot go wrong; there is a need for everyone 
to overcome his/her individual neglect and educate himself/herself 
according to its teachings 
HASHEMITE 
LEADERSHIP FRAME 
the learned ahl al-bayt who have understood and are able to convey 
the correct interpretation of the Qurʾan are the only ones who can lead 
the ummah along the right path, therefore they form the natural 
leadership (for Zaydis) 
JIHAD FRAME there is a need to use military jihad against injustice and idolatrous 
excesses, in line with the Zaydi duty to ‘command what is right and 
forbid what is wrong’; jihad is not only necessary and God-
commanded, but furthermore is a sign of wisdom and brings honor 
MEDIA USE FRAME media shall be used to spread the ideas articulated in the frames, to 
create consciousness among Muslims and expand the range of the 
audience reached by them 
SLOGAN FRAME raising the slogan ‘God is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to 
Israel, Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam’ and spreading it is an 
effective means to act against the US and Israel because they fear 
religious acts; this and a parallel boycott of their products will hurt 
them and make them stop their policies of intervention in 
Arab/Muslim states 
KHURŪJ FRAME Zaydis have a religious duty to rise against an unjust ruler; since Saleh 
has been framed as unjust ruler, it implicitly calls for khurūj against 
him, however, with low intensity and without urgency  
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MAIN FRAME  SUB-FRAME CORE CONTENT 
WEAKNESS FRAME  act against Zaydi weakness! 
 Overcoming  there is a need to overcome the current state 
of weakness to prevent it from getting worse 
 Humiliation  Zaydis are humiliated by and in the 
situation; in order to protect their honor it is 
thus necessary to act 
THREAT FRAME  counter the threat! 
 Necessity for Action without action the (culturally) existential 
threat will continue and intensify 
RELIGIOUS DUTY 
FRAME 
 it is your religious duty to act! 
 Blame  Zaydis are to blame for their own neglect 
and passivity 
 Divine 
Condemnation  
in case of non-action there will be divine 
punishment in the afterlife for the neglect 
and passivity described 
 Responsibility  Muslims/Zaydis bear the responsibility to 
act for they have been provided with 
Qurʾanic guidance according to which to act 
and they have not obliged 
FEASIBILITY FRAME  it is feasible to act in the prescribed way and 
be successful!  
 Free Will  humans have a free will to act (independent 
of divine predestination); it is thus possible 
for everybody to choose one’s actions  
 Power  free will and responsibility to act at the 
same time bring with them the power to 
change the situation, i.e. agency 
 Slogan  the slogan is a powerful and effective means 
to counter the US and Israeli threats 
 Example  Khomeini and Hizbullah have already 
successfully employed the same means 
against the US and Israel; with his strategy 
Khomeini has formed Iran into a strong and 
independent Islamic state; khurūj has 
repeatedly been necessary and occurred in 
the past and has been successful 
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Table 7.3.: Summary of Hussein al-Houthi’s motivational frames 
 
 
7.1.2. Framing Shifts During and After Violent Escalation 
There are no sources for the framing that occurred during the first war and in the interim until 
March 2005. The next important source is an interview of the Yemeni newspaper Al-Wasat 
with Badr al-Din al-Houthi in mid-March. It was published under the heading: “The President 
was afraid that (Hussein) would take the state [rule] from him and the imamate is particular 
for [belongs to] the ahl al-bayt”.984 At the beginning of that year, Saleh had asked Hussein’s 
father, who had officially taken over leadership after the death of his son, to meet him in 
Sana’a in order to negotiate the settlement of the conflict. Specifically, the issue of the large 
numbers of still arrested members and the question of the return of Hussein’s corpse were to 
be discussed. Badr al-Din went to Sana’a, however, although he remained there for more than 
two months, Saleh did not receive him – a treatment he vocally denounces in the interview 
and a cultural breach of the traditional rules of good conduct in mediation.  
 Over large parts, the interviews mirror Hussein’s frames: He decries US and Israeli 
actions, particularly interventionism after 9/11, and considers it in line with the general 
accusation of aiming to suppress Muslims. He emphasizes that “to protect Islam is more 
important than everything” and calls on Muslims to “unite against the infidels, against the 
enemies of religion”. Hussein was only fulfilling this duty and the crying of the slogan was 
part of it. He denies that he called for the imamate, but immediately adds that it would be the 
duty of the president “to protect Islam and thwart the wiles of American and Israel”. Rule 
should be based upon the constitution, but this needs to contain justice. A few lines on the 
links it back to the principle of ‘commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong’. 
                                                          
984 Republished on the occasion of Badr al-Din’s death in Al-Wasat, 8 December 2010, accessed 16 September 
2013, http://www.alwasat-ye.net/index.php?ac=3&no=32290&d_f=21&t_f=0&t=5&lang_ in=. Badr al-Din 
furthermore asserts that they do not receive any support from Iran.  
 Effectiveness  the means are appropriate and will show 
their effects on the level of everyday life – 
for everyone to enjoy them  
‘ZAYDI COMMUNITY’ 
FRAME 
 unite! together we are strong! 
 Right path Zaydi doctrine is the correct one and united 
we will thus be successful because God is 
with us 
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When asked about his opinion on proper rule, he acknowledges democracy as one way but 
points out that the imamate is superior to it. “We are with justice, we do not know this 
democracy”, Badr al-Din states, then again referring to the misbehavior of Saleh in not 
receiving him and blaming him for the events in Sa’ada (i.e. the war). Hussein has become a 
martyr for a just cause, which he sets in opposition to the “nepotism of the state” that “did not 
give us any demand from what was promised before”. Besides, in regard to the point of arms 
among the followers, he underlines that all the people have weapons and that “these men are 
strong and heroes”. On the question if they intended to normalize the situation in Sa’ada and 
return to peace and security, he replies that it was “something not on our side, they are the 
ones who attacked us.”  
 The interview was conducted one day after Badr al-Din’s return to the North. Shortly 
thereafter, fighting recommenced when Houthi supporters allegedly attempted to assassinate a 
leading member of a local council and when other followers where seeking to buy weapons in 
the Suq al-Talh985, the largest arms market in the country with huge supplies of weapons of all 
calibers and sizes.986 These steps can be considered an offensive re-initiation of combat or as 
strong evidence for the preparation of such, respectively: Targeting a member of a local 
council implies a targeting of a representative of the system of government, which would 
provoke a response and thus an occasion to commence battle with the army. That – despite 
their already extensive supplies of weapons that had been used in the first war – that Houthis 
now strove to purchase even more or larger arms allows speculation that either they had 
mobilized new adherents who needed fighting equipment beyond what was available 
(implying larger numbers) and/or the group was re-equipping, possibly with heavier weapons. 
In any case: It alludes to intentions to fight.  
 Government retaliation and offensive followed suit. Attacks in this second round of war 
again concentrated on Houthi leadership, namely on Badr al-Din, Abdullah al-Razzami and 
Yusuf al-Madani; raids centered around their alleged whereabouts. The army offensive, and 
with it the war, was concluded in mid-April when – incorrectly – they believed to have killed 
Abdullah al-Razzami.987 
 We are now facing the central questions in regard to the case study: To what extent does 
the interview with Badr al-Din elucidate a shift in the framing of the movement, which would 
                                                          
985 The GoY tried to close the Suq al-Talh (located in the northwest of Saada city) after the first round of war, 
which limited success since arms trade subsequently evaded the official market in favor of unofficial channels. 
Small Arms Survey, “Under Pressure. Social Violence Over Land and Water in Yemen”, Issue Brief, no. 22 
(2010): 6. 
986 Salmoni et al., Regime, 134ff. 
987 An official moreover deplored that they had not been able to arrest or kill Badr al-Din. Ibid., 136.  
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support the relevance of framing for the initiation of violence? How can we without further 
information about the internal processes that occurred reconstruct possible dynamics in the 
shift from defense in the first war to an, albeit restrained, initiation of violence in the second 
round? 
 Badr al Din does one important thing: He delegitimizes Saleh. As I previously pointed out, 
Hussein had not directly criticized Saleh; he had merely denounced ‘Arab leaders’. Badr al-
Din now openly blames Saleh for illegitimate behavior, unjust rule, and for failing to counter 
the US and Israeli threat (on the contrary he supported their plans). As Dorlian holds, on this 
basis “the government interpreted the elderly scholar’s return to Sa’ada as the first step in 
carrying out the supposed Zaydi principle of necessary revolt against an unjust and corrupt 
government (khurūj).”988 Certainly, Badr al-Din was by then 81 years of age and was not the 
one to take up arms himself. But based on his high religious, cultural, and social prestige, 
(plus it was his son who was martyred) his words weighed heavy. The fact that he shifted the 
focus must not be underestimated; it was programmatic: Saleh was now among those to 
blame, and from there on it was just a small step towards violent opposition.  
 The figure to take up this shift and transform it into an immediate appeal to the fighters 
was probably Abdullah al-Razzami, at that time member of the innermost operational 
leadership. There have been repeated reports that he took a more militant stance (than e.g. 
Abdul Malik,989 who would nevertheless take over leadership from the third war onwards, i.e. 
in the long run was not an opponent to violence, either).990 A foreigner living in  Sa’ada at 
that time professed: “We trusted Hussein al-Houthi and knew that he would not attack 
foreigners, but we now feel less confident with the new, more ideological militants.”991 While 
I would like to underline the fact that division lines existed and continue to exist between 
more and less militant factions of the group.  
 Apart from this major shift in the attribution of responsibility, other shifts occurred in all 
three dimensions (diagnostic, prognostic, motivational). In the following, I will present the 
main shifts I identified within each dimension. Due to the imbalance of sources (with the 
                                                          
988 Dorlian, “Saada War”, 186.  
989 “Abdul Malik al-Houthi’s response to his father’s interview and his letter to the President”, Al-Wasat, 
December 15, 2010, accessed April 8, 2015. The original response stems from mid-October 2005. Therein Abdul 
Malik aims to soften his father’s message and affirms his personal allegiance to the republic and to Saleh. He 
comments that “if the power continues to adopt the military option as we imagine, it does not solve the problem 
but deepens the wounds of the nation” and asserts his willingness for dialogue. At this point in time, his stance 
can thus be considered moderate, at least officially – which will change over time.  
990 Cf. an Al Jazeera talk cited in: Salmoni et al., Regime, 193; a civil society activist interviewed by the ICG in 
January 2009 made a similar statement: He asserted that “Hussein al-Houthi’s death in September 2004 
reportedly led to the ascent of a less compromising generation of rebel leaders and militants” (ICG, “Defusing”, 
13).  
991 Ibid., 14. Interview conducted on January 18, 2009. 
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majority stemming from the period after 2007, when the Houthis significantly enlarged their 
communication), I divided the periods of analysis along the phases of conflict escalation that 
were distinguished in chapter 5.1.4.: I begin with and mainly focus on the phase of the second 
to sixth war (corresponding to Houthi-Regime Conflict Phase 4) and continue with pointed 
summaries for each through the Post-Conflict Mobilization Phase 2010–2012, the Phase of 
Political Participation 2013–07/2014, and lastly the Phase of Military Expansion and Coup 
08/2014–03/2015. Sources stem from personal correspondence, printed interviews and 
citations as well as general reference in reports, research, newspapers, and movement as well 
as government material in form of leaflets, posters, banners etc.; the analysis of selected 
movement and government-related websites, social media profiles in Facebook, around 400+ 
videos posted on the platform YouTube;992 the analysis of the Houthi magazine ‘Al-Haqiqa’ 
(‘The Truth’),993 of political cartoons published in various of these media, and of the art 
exhibition ‘Jerāḥ ʿAmīqah’ (‘Deep Wounds’) by Houthi-affiliated youth as documented in 
244 photos994. Since the tone of the framing is adapted to different audiences, with a much 
more moderate stance for instance in interviews with international media than in internal 
media, I will seek to provide enough context to situate the source along the spectrum. 
 
7.1.2.1. Diagnostic Framing 
Hussein’s malazim had contained five main diagnostic frames: the ‘weakness frame’, the 
neocolonialism frame’, ‘the injustice frame’ the ‘threat frame’, and the ‘attribution of 
responsibility’. The first two now took a backseat. Highlighting one’s weakness would seem 
an odd strategy when in combat, and the dependency component of the neocolonialism frame 
became somewhat fused with the denunciation of regime complicity with the US and Israel as 
we shall see. The other three frames, however, became much more central and focused and 
complemented by a new one: the ‘honorable leadership frame’.  
 
Houthi-Regime Conflict Phase 4: March 2005–February 2010  
The following citations have been taken from an interview with Yahya al-Houthi with a 
German magazine in early 2010.995 After the first war and Yahya’s exile in Germany, he had 
                                                          
992 Many of these are cross-referencing. 
993 Issues 1–22, 24–27, 31–32, 50, 76, 82–86, 88–123 (69 issues total). Issue 1 was published late 
November/early December 2007, issue 123 on March 12, 2014.  
994 These photos have been retrieved from the exhibition’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/ 
jerah.amygh?fref=ts (accessed May 5, 2015).  
995 Maximilian Felsch, “Die Quelle des Terrors”, Zenith Online, April 30, 2010, accessed May 5, 2015, 
http://www.zenithonline.de/deutsch/politik/a/artikel/die-quelle-des-terrors-001150/.  
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become the international spokesperson of the group. In the interview he provides his 
interpretation of the conflict, which elucidates the shift on the moderate side of the spectrum: 
Me and my family have been fighting for the preservation of our faith, our identity, our 
history, our heritage, our rights, and our home for 30 years. (...) We defend ourselves 
against oppression and hope that our people will be able to live equally in freedom, peace, 
and security.(...) We accuse Saleh and his aides of aiming to destroy the Zaydi as well as 
the Shafi’i madhab in favor of the Salafi-Wahhabi one. They have been working on this 
since he came into office. All this is happening according to the wishes of the Saudis who 
finance this mission with billions of riyals. They have built hundreds of religious schools 
and filled them with radical Wahhabi curricula. (...) and the army [is] full of criminals and 
takfirīs. (...) I believe that the wars against us are at the root Saudi wars whose aim is to 
extinguish Zaydism which has been in the way of Wahhabi mission for years. This is the 
truth about the conflict. It all happened to convert Yemen to Wahhabism and make it a 
base for terror and mission. 
 
He highlights the role that family has played over a long period (implying legitimacy), points 
out that they are acting in defense, and formulates a clear existential threat emanating from 
Salafis/Wahhabis/the KSA – and Saleh.996 Since he is talking to an international (Western) 
audience, he refrains from the anti-US/anti-Israel stance.  
There is no conflict between us and something you might call “state”. In Yemen there is a 
conflict between us and an authoritarian dictator who follows Saudi princes and Wahhabi 
agents and who collaborates with terrorists in order to realize their plans against the 
Yemeni people – in the social, religious and cultural field. (...) Saleh cooperated with 
Saudi Arabia and agreed to bomb our people and occupy a part of our homeland. (...) 
Because of this aggression our brothers were forced to defend themselves. We demand to 
be able to live in equal freedom and security. (...) We aim at just rule with justice for the 
oppressed and care for the people. (...) The resistance of my brothers for six years full of 
war and sieges is clear proof that the people are with us. 
Here his tone turns fiercer. Saleh is portrayed as illegitimate ruler who acts in the interest of a 
foreign power, therefore attacking his own people and country.997 Saleh himself is thus 
equaled with a foreigner. The Houthis on the other hand aim at justice and defend land and 
people, with the result of being the actual legitimate representatives.  
 In response to the continuous accusations by the regime that the Houthis are supported by 
Iran and hence represent a foreign proxy (in fact, the reverse allegation to the ‘being foreign’ 
charge against Saleh above), Yahya replied:  
                                                          
996 Yahya had made similar statements in earlier interviews. He claimed, for instance, that Saleh had received 
US-$25 billion from the KSA to fight the Zaydis. “The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which used to occupy our 
country, is paying a lot of money to the state in order to eradicate our doctrine from schools, institutes and 
mosques.” Al-Quda Press, July 10, 2008, cited in: Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, n. 39.  
997 Cf. Pottek, “Anfang”, 104ff. She also notes that starting from the second war onwards, army actions were 
described as ‘ibada’ (‘extermination’, ‘genocide’). 
252 
 
First, with this allegation they cover the Saudi interference in Yemeni affairs and their 
participation in the war against our people, they do it to justify the Saudi intervention.998 
Second, they want to incite the fire of sectarianism. Third, they want to request Western 
support against the Houthis.999 (...) Our supporters have not repeated Iranian slogans; they 
have created similar slogans.  
All three points he makes are consistent with the messages that have been spread over time 
and appear credible under the given circumstances of longstanding Saudi-Iranian enmity and 
struggle for regional hegemony; Saleh’s often-used strategy of outplaying different groups 
against each other; and his alliance with the US, another adversary of Iran.1000   
 And, again, he makes the point of aggression by Saleh who aims at depicting the ‘righteous 
Houthis’ in a bad light:  
Before each war Saleh created occasions to justify his attacks. Before the fourth war it 
was the issue of the Jews. He used the secret service for [their] intimidation: They had 
their faces covered and nobody could recognize them. They threatened the Jewish family 
and claimed to be Houthi members. So Saleh had a justification for the fourth war and 
could hope for American and Israeli support. Before the fifth war a motorbike exploded 
in front of a mosque in Saada in which were army members, Wahhabis and other terrorist 
groups. Saleh accused the Houthis as culprits and commenced the fifth war, ignoring the 
Doha agreement. (...) And what was said now about the enmity with the Jews is rumors 
and political provocations in order to pull the friends of the Jews on Saleh’s side and 
against us.  
According to this narration, the initiation of the wars has to be blamed on Saleh, who is keen 
on reigniting armed conflict.1001 He is the one ignoring even the praised Doha agreement and 
construct justifications to render his actions legitimate in the eyes of his foreign allies. The 
Houthis on the contrary are falsely vilified.   
 The image of the defamed Houthis keeps appearing in the communication with official and 
international representatives. A US-embassy report of late 2009 mentions a letter of Houthi 
spokesman Mohamed Abdulsalam to President Saleh in which he writes: “We hope that you 
do not (believe) the propaganda presented to you that we want to restore the imamate or that 
we have anything against the republican system.” He furthermore attributes a claimed 
‘misunderstanding and marginalization of the Houthis’ to “the persistence of the official 
                                                          
998 Abdul Malik al-Houthi claimed in an interview that the government’s “repeated talk about our foreign 
affiliations with the Iranians is aimed at provoking the fears of the Saudis in order to gain generous Saudi 
support against us.” Al Akhbar, July 4, 2008, cited in: Hamidi, ‘Inscriptions’, 172. 
999 “Accusing us of having relations with Iran aims at diverting the attention of the West away from the human 
rights violations in Sa’da. The Yemeni government is exploiting Western and Saudi fears to get their support.” 
Al-Quda Press, July 10, 2008, cited in: Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, n. 39.  
1000 Muhammad al-Houthi adds a doctrinal argument to it, based in the differences between Zaydis and Twelver 
Shiʿa . Muhammad al-Houthi, “Who are the Houthis? And Other Questions”, Yemen Press, September 6, 2007, 
accessed April 7, 2015, http://www.yemen-press.com/news1053.html. 
1001 In another interview Yahya extended his accusations against the regime even further in stating that “we have, 
actually, been in an undeclared war ever since we formed the al-Haqq party in 1991” (he implies being attacked 
by the government). Pottek, “Anfang”, 108f. 
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media to deal with us as if we are from another planet.”1002 The report goes on citing Hassan 
Zayd, the chair of al-Haqq:  
[He] told [an] US official on November 21, 2009, that the Houthis are fighting in self-
defense and will stop as soon as the ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] ceases to 
attack them. He explained that the Houthis’ political goal is to ‘benefit from the 
protection of the Constitution and the laws’, including equal citizenship and freedom of 
expression and religion.1003 
 
Beyond the emphasis of their defensive stance, the mentioning of the Houthis adherence to 
the constitution1004 serves to repudiate the charge of wanting to reestablish the imamate – the 
great bogey the regime created. Taking the same line, Hamidi cites a TV interview with 
Yahya on Al-Arabiyya in 2006 in which he “argued that their fight was against ‘corruption’ 
rather than against either the republic or democracy”, “A rhetoric”, as Hamidi poses, “which 
rendered more difficult the government’s attempt to denounce them as adherents of the 
imamate”.1005 I want to add that it goes beyond that in that it furthermore depicts the Houthis 
as righteous and law-observing – when they took Sana’a in fall 2014, one of the facts that 
made them popular concerned what was perceived as their rigorous actions against 
corruption. Despite or because of its rampant prevalence on all levels of life, Yemenis 
overwhelmingly state their opposition to corruption, which they consider among the greatest 
evils hindering the development of their country. It therefore makes a good theme to argue 
with in order to gain support for one’s cause. The image of righteousness, on the internal level 
is part of the ‘honorable leadership frame’ mentioned earlier, is conveyed once more in a 
letter to Human Rights Watch (i.e. communication to the international public) by Abdul 
Malik in June 2009:  
[W]e are very careful with the treatment of civilians, and we treat them humanely in a 
manner that protects their rights mentioned in international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.... We also confirm being keen to keep civilians neutral 
                                                          
1002 Wikileaks, “Yemen – Who are the Houthis?”, posted May 9, 2011: Cable from US Embassy Sanaa, 
December 12, 2009, http://www.crethiplethi.com/wikileaks-yemen-who-are-the-houthis/islamic-
countries/yemen-islamic-countries/2011/, accessed December 12, 2014. The letter arrived on November 22, 
2009.  
1003 Ibid.  
1004 Similar Abdul Malik after the ceasefire was implemented after the Qatari mediation: “[W]e commit 
ourselves to the republican system, constitution, and laws of the country. This is in addition to the 
implementation of the conditions we agreed to with the state of Qatar.” Al-Ahram, 
http://www.weekly.ahram.org. eg/print/2007/850/re11.htm, cited in: Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 179 (without 
publication date).  
1005 Ibid., 178.  
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and spare them conflict. We also work laboriously towards supporting their protection 
and saving their lives, possessions, and dignity.1006 
This assertion should be evaluated against the background of the heavy toll the wars have 
taken on the region’s population and infrastructure. The Houthis have been eager to distribute 
pictures of civilian victims (in very drastic pictures) and destruction in their various media 
channels,1007 proclaiming it was the government which was causing them. Muhammad al-
Houthi vividly described the situation from the perspective of the returnees after detention to 
a Yemeni media outlet:  
For detainees who were released were heading from prison directly to brother Abdul 
Malik, and stayed two or three days during which [he] urged them to return to their areas, 
and to remain calm and avoid what would stir up trouble with authority. But a lot of them 
went to their areas even longer and disappointment was visible on their faces. They were 
complaining about the situation in their areas which robbed them of all hope of a decent 
living in security and stability. Homes were destroyed, and farmland and property looted, 
and in the way of compensation were thousand barriers. And the Wahhabis controlled the 
mosques and spread their ideas by force, supported by the authorities there, and the 
military in villages and between farms was acting with brutality and repression (...) [This 
and] the occupation of a number of houses in many of those areas pushed them to go to 
the mountains forcibly (...) This dominates the life (...) of the returnees, they have no 
choice but to return to the mountains (...) and wasteland, neighboring scorpions and 
snakes (...)1008 
This depiction stresses the reputation of Abdul Malik, his promotion of peace, the 
transgressions of the ‘Wahhabis’ and government forces, and above all the displacement of 
Houthi supporters from their lands – making for a pool of angry followers that can in all 
probability be persuaded more easily to take up arms. ‘Land’ is culturally important for the 
self-definition of the people living on it; its value is often presented as under threat in Houthi 
framing as well. They also held that the government had no will to end the wars, rather they 
claimed during the first half of 2009 that it had been preparing for a sixth round.1009 In March, 
for instance, during the large celebration they held on the occasion of the Prophet’s birthday, 
                                                          
1006 HRW, “All Quiet on the Northern Front. Uninvestigated Laws of War Violations in Yemen’s War with 
Huthi Rebels’, March 2010, 34. As HRW asserts, “however, Houthis appear to have committed serious 
violations of the laws of war during the sixth round of fighting: summary executions, using non-combatants as 
‘human shields’, and recruiting children as combatants”. The issue of child soldiers has repeatedly been raised in 
regard to all parties involved in the conflict. It is a rampant problem in Yemen, aggravated by the fact that in 
many cases the age of children cannot be determined with any certainty.  
1007 My own findings are supported by the HRW report “Invisible Civilians”. The ICG furthermore reported that 
Abdul Malik and Salih Habra in 2009 (at the latest) sent assessments and casualty reports to journalists in 
Sana’a, thus circumventing the news blackout by the government. ICG, “Defusing”, 25. 
1008 Muhammad al-Houthi, “Who are the Houthis?”. Own translation. I tried to preserve his mode of expression.  
1009 See interviews with Yahya, February 3, 2009; with an opposition figure on January 9, 2009; and the 
statement published by rebel spokesman Salih Habra in March 2009 on the website of the YSP (ishtiraki.net): 
ICG, “Defusing”, 24f.  
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Abdul Malik in front of tens of thousands supporters again denounced the government’s 
alliance with the US and warned “it would lose if it were to launch an attack”.1010 
 Muhammad moreover speaks out against the US and Israel: “Our problem is not with the 
power (...) but with America and Israel.” They manifest themselves, however, in the actions 
of the regime. Drawing a line of continuity from early Muslim times in which the Shiʿa 
already faced “injustice and oppression” until today, he holds that: 
[T]he crimes against the ahl al-bayt and the Shiites (...) was among the motives and 
reasons to ignite sedition (fitna) and fan the flames of war in Saada province (...) in 
addition to those of other hidden motives, which emerged from the growing relations with 
the US administration, which are all reasons that fall under the colonial scheme 
implemented by the US administration and its allies under the label of ‘anti-terrorism’.1011 
He carries on against Saleh, saying: “This deception (...) Is it not enough to say that the 
President of the Republic, a Zaydi, slaughtered Zaydis in Saada?! (...) this president errors 
(...)”.1012 There could hardly be a clearer way of delegitimizing the president.  
 Mohammad answers the question of the incendiary slogan by making three interrelated 
points:  
1 –The atmosphere was ready to accept the idea after the events of September 11 and the 
resulting US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. [Hussein] saw (...) the brutality and 
injustice, crime and tragedies and massacres carried out by the Americans, which 
generated significant disturbance among all Muslims (...). 
 
2–The idea was created a safe outlet to express their rejection and resentment towards 
what was happening [and] not to depart from the right of expression constitutionally 
guaranteed to all citizens. 
 
3 –The power position in the beginning, the strong rejection of the US occupation and its 
actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the speeches of the President of the Republic on the 
issue inflamed the youth.1013 
In brief: The Houthis – or rather: Hussein – tried to canalize the rage of Muslims/the youth in 
the wake of the post-September 11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq into a safe and 
constitutionally legitimized mode.   
 Notwithstanding, verbal escalation took its course and even towards international audience 
Yahya in 2008 stated as their goal “to demise Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime”.1014 
 
                                                          
1010 Marib Press, March 10, 2009, cited in: ibid., 25. 
1011 Muhammad al-Houthi, “Who are the Houthis?”. 
1012 Ibid.  
1013 Ibid.  
1014 Interview with Yahya, February 3, 2009, cited in: ICG, “Defusing”, 5. Pottek, “Anfang”, mentions an online 
reference on a Houthi-website where they allegedly called for khurūj against Saleh. She does not provide a 
concise reference for that, however.  
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A ‘moderate’ constituency or those sympathetic to the group, yet not actively following it 
were reached out to with more offensive, but not radical messages. The main media here were 
the recorded and transcribed malazim spread as audiocassettes, CDs, MP3, or in print, 
respectively; the Al-Haqiqa magazine, and the Al-Masirah TV channel.1015 The following 
figures stem from the magazine:  
  
                                                          
1015 It is well possible that there were others. 
257 
 
 
Fig. 7.2. Issue 1 – Saleh butchering his people,  Fig. 7.3.: Issue 2 – ‘Two-faced leader’ is 
aided by George W. Bush and ‘the Jews’  enslaved by US and battering his people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.4.: Issue 5 – Bush and King   Fig. 7.5.: Issue 1 – Saleh and Bush shaking  
Abdullah are killing children    hands (popular picture also in videos) 
 
Fig. 7.6.: Issue 7 – Saleh sacrificing his   Fig. 7.7.: Issue 31 – King Abdullah and  
people to US idol     Saleh watching US and Israeli theater  
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All of the cartoons highlight the connection between the regime and the alleged foreign 
enemies US, Israel, and KSA, as well as the (existential) aggression against the people that 
emanates from this axis. Saleh features prominent in all of them, again stressing the blame 
attributed to him, combining the before independent threats posed by the US/Israel and the 
KSA/Wahhabis. The threat has become manifest in his person; it is at the same time stronger 
and closer, which, however, also implies that it can be countered more directly – by fighting 
the regime.  
 The injustice frame in Hussein’s malazim before consisted of the two sub-frames of Zaydi 
marginalization and repression. Now, it is extended and becomes more central. The wars 
against the population come into focus, the destruction, and civil victims; suffering is framed 
as the result of regime aggression against its own populace. Equally, regime corruption is 
linked to the poverty of the majority of the people, while few, profit; among them are the 
foreign enemies. Saleh is portrayed as deceptive and treacherous; he has, so the image 
presents, over and over again broken his word in mediation and peace negotiations (with 
Hussein and with Badr al-Din in regard to the Doha agreement). His actions are presented as 
dishonorable, his rule consequentially unjust and illegitimate. In this image, having to live 
under his ‘dictatorship’ is hence the injustice people have to suffer.  
 Hussein’s malazim are recontextualized and perpetually referred to. Overall, they are 
distributed in order to reach an extended audience. Short citations are published in the 
magazine,1016 on TV, on posters, leaflets etc. Video recordings are shown on TV, at 
gatherings, and are posted online.1017 The publications are either standalone or rather inserted 
into more complex messages to support their legitimacy. Hussein himself is likewise 
venerated: He is the religious and spiritual leader, the first and greatest martyr of the group, 
the wise scholar, the ideal, and the proof of his own claims. His framing claims that he was 
right and therefore he was killed by the regime. His death is connected to the killing of Imam 
Husayn in Karbala, thereby providing even more religious legitimacy. The Houthis created a 
documentary on the last days of Hussein, which they prominently broadcasted on Al-
Masirah.1018 Posters with his portrait and the designation “the martyr leader” (“al-shahīd al-
qāʾid”) have been erected in the landscape of the Marran Mountains, in Sa’ada city, and in 
other towns. The place of his death has been converted into a mausoleum. Pictures show how 
                                                          
1016 Each newer issue of Al-Haqiqa e.g. shows the picture of Hussein with a citation from one of the malazim 
immediately below the heading. In addition, there is advertisement for CDs with the malazim, video CDs etc.  
1017 See: Digital Appendix B, #67–68, 110–112, 114–115. 
1018 Video “The last moments of the martyrdom of the martyr leader Hussein Badr Eddin al-Huthi”, posted on 
YouTube June 9, 2013, accessed April 3, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FetPFWinULg. When 
accessed, the video had been viewed 25,119 times.  
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on special occasions long queues of visitors have come. His Facebook profile, albeit only 
having had existed from 2011 to the time of writing, contains photos of his life, showing him 
with his family and during study, making him appear very approachable. The printed malazim 
can be downloaded and videos from his lectures are available. His slogan is repeatedly 
highlighted, even in a logo that was created solely for this purpose. In sum, Hussein and ‘his 
mission’ blur into one.  
 The ‘honorable leadership frame’ consists of affirmations about the Zaydis’ righteous 
intentions (as previously underlined), their honorable conduct, and the religious, social, and 
cultural prestige, continuity of which is asserted and invoked over multiple generations. Badr 
al-Din, Hussein, and Abdul Malik are often depicted together, while the malazim and the 
picture of Hussein frequently precede speeches of Abdul Malik, thereby affirming their 
likeness. A documentary about Badr al-Din has been produced and broadcasted in a similar 
fashion as Hussein’s.1019 Instead of his martyrdom, however, Badr al-Din’s scholarly virtues 
and the eminence of wisdom and age are conveyed. The reverence this creates is passed on to 
Abdul Malik by the described linkage of the generations. The younger son is hence equipped 
and legitimized by the prestige of both his predecessors in leadership. This frame is new and 
serves the needs of the movement-turned-rebel group for a designated leadership.  
 
The threat frame and the attribution of responsibility frame both play a more prominent role 
in the framing for the more militant audience. The main channels here are videos and audio, 
the latter often in form of recited zamil or qasida poetry or anashid (‘anthems’, sg. nashid).  
 The injustice frame is extended into a more violent dimension. It has been noted for its 
moderate audience and picks out the killing of children, as well as mistreatment/torture 
committed by the armed forces, as central themes. Attacks against ‘al-ard al-yamani’ 
(‘Yemeni soil’) become powerful symbolical images, as do pictures of American aircraft 
carriers and other military allegedly approaching the Yemeni coast with the approval of the 
Yemeni government. 
 This element already links to the threat frame. While it connects to the narrative of 
persecution since earlier Muslim times, the main emphasis of the threat frame is, in turn, on 
the US and Israel: They aim to control Yemen and destroy it, as they do with other Arab 
countries and people. The aggression against Gaza is conceived as an example.1020 AQAP is 
                                                          
1019 See: Digital Appendix B, #159–163.  
1020 The issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the suffering of the Palestinian people – presumably among the 
original triggers of Hussein’s strong emotions against Israel – was again incorporated into the Houthi’s framing 
during the Gaza War in January 2009. They organized large pro-Gazan demonstrations and used the opportunity 
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an US invention and 9/11 a US conspiracy, all employed to enter the Middle East in the name 
of anti-terrorism. In the months before the outbreak of the sixth war, Saleh is moreover 
depicted as supreme commander of the armed forces with his troops in training, interpreted by 
the Houthis as the preparation for a new round of war that will be initiated by the regime. The 
threat frame is complemented by warnings of the lies spread by enemies and hidden 
opportunists, as well as those within their own ranks.  
 Even stronger, though, is the blame attribution. What is in focus particularly is the 
connection between Saleh and the US and Israel. Saleh is portrayed as evil. He is depicted to 
be ‘drinking the blood of his people’ and linked (through cuts) to dead children. The sequence 
of him shaking hands with George W. Bush is repeated many times, as are similar pictures 
with him and Barack Obama, him and Benjamin Netanyahu, and him and King Abdullah. 
Saleh, according to the frame, is implementing the US/Israeli agenda in the region, which is 
financed by the KSA. The KSA itself is also performing the US order in the region. It is 
attacking the Houthis (in 2009) and allegedly fighting with superior yet internationally 
banished and cruel weapons, namely phosphorus bombs, against civilians. The Saudis, then, 
will also be a party against which the Houthis fight in the sixth war.  
 
Post-Conflict Mobilization Phase 2010–2012 
During the Arab Spring protests, the Houthis joined in and connected some of their prior 
frames with those of the protesters. They stuck to blaming Saleh, however, adapting the frame 
more strongly along corruption, adding both a rights/freedoms frame (freedom of speech etc.) 
and an injustice frame, picking up the brutal repression of the regime against protesters in the 
so-called ‘Day of Dignity’ (‘Youm Al-Karāmah’) massacre on March 18, 2011. The frames 
were furthermore connected to those of other Arab states seeing protests and the parallels 
between the states were highlighted. Other opponents were the external powers that supported 
the unjust Arab regimes, while these regimes themselves – Saleh at the forefront – were 
considered in complicity with foreign interference.  
 In fall 2012, the protests against the defamation of Muslims by the West reached another 
height in the wake of the movie ‘Innocence of Muslims’1021 in which the Prophet Muhammad 
was, among others, denigrated as a pedophile. The Houthis used the occasion for a concerted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to again denounce Israel and the US. The narrative link established between ‘Gazans suffering from Israeli 
aggression’ and themselves was the equation of the formers state under siege with a perceived blockade of the 
Northern population by their own government (“which adheres to the same evil foreign powers’). Al-Diyar, 
January 18, 2009, cited in: ICG, “Defusing”, 13, n. 82. 
1021 Two 14-minute movie trailers were posted on YouTube in July 2012, an Arabic version in early September 
2012. It has caused massive outrage of Muslims worldwide and led to large demonstration and violent protests. 
YouTube was ordered to remove the trailer from its platform by a US court ruling in February 2014.  
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spreading of their slogan all over the capital Sana’a,1022 thus emphasizing their anti-Western 
stance in a highly visible, yet not undisputed, manner.  
 
Phase of Political Participation 2013–07/2014 
During the period of the NDC, the Houthis vested their position in ‘rights rhetoric’. 
Representatives of the group, which now officially adopted the name ‘Ansar Allah’,1023 
emphasized the destruction and victims the wars brought about as main concerns. As Nabila 
al-Zubayr put it after referring to displacement, the slow reconstruction process, lack of 
resources, and the consequences for the educational system, “[t]he barbarism of the war did 
not target Houthi elements alone but all the inhabitants, leaving the problems of security 
between the citizen and the state.”1024 Ahlaq al-Shami, another representative, moreover 
stressed that  
[t]he war did not stop (...) [It] was caused by the corruption and the political process (...) 
it randomly created crises and conflicts, not only in Saada but in all of Yemen (...) 
[W]hatever comes, we will continue towards peaceful and political solutions until our last 
chance.1025 
Along the lines of “we have been wronged by others” and the rights rhetoric, he also 
externalizes the conflict. Negating tensions between Zaydis and Sunnis in the North, he 
claims that, “the conflict is between the people of Saada and a group of extremists who were 
brought from all countries to the area, called the Salafis”.1026 The core strife was thereby 
deflected from within the population to ‘population versus unjust regime’ (at that moment 
referring to the past regime of Saleh) and ‘population versus foreign extremists’.  
 The second aspect that was strongly accentuated throughout this phase was the injustice 
frame/suffering of the population during the wars. They issued and distributed two issues of a 
magazine called ‘Fingerprints of Aggression’ (‘Bismat al-Aduan’) with very drastic pictures 
of victims and destruction;1027 and, similarly, a youth branch organized a large ‘art exhibition’ 
                                                          
1022 See digital appendix D. 
1023 Nabila al-Zubayr, representative in the working group on Saada at the NDC (not a Houthi member herself), 
considered the official adaption and “synchronization” of the name a “step in the ‘evolutionary’ path of the 
Houthis in the direction of forming a political entity”. Personal correspondence with Nabila al-Zubayr, April 
2014.  
1024 Ibid. Similar statements were made by another representative in the working group, Ahlaq al-Shami, 
personal correspondence, January 2014.  
1025 Ibid.  
1026 The above citations: ibid. He also refers to these ‘extremists’ as ‘takfiris’. 
1027 ‘Fingerprints of Aggression’, Volume 1 [‘Bismat al-Aduan’], Ansar Allah, September 25, 2012; 
‘Fingerprints of Aggression’, Volume 2 [‘Bismat al-Aduan’], Ansar Allah, September 25, 2013. Both were 
available for download on the ansaruallah.net website (currently unavailable after is has been hacked in summer 
2014). Name and logo of the magazine (a fingerprint) suggest criminological elucidation of events, in line with 
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which was first shown in Sa’ada in the fall of 2013 for a few weeks on the central Tahrir 
Square in Sana’a. It was entitled ‘Deep Wounds’ (‘Jerāḥ ʿAmīqah’).1028 Drawings, photos, 
sculptures and other installations, video and audio documents, cartoons, texts, official 
documents,1029 and other exhibits gave a comprehensive account of government aggression, 
illegitimate intimidation and practices like torture, civil victims (and the high numbers of 
children among them), and the violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights, as well as the 
complex of the posed 9/11 conspiracy and regime complicity with foreign agendas. In this, 
statistics are presented as ‘proof’ or support, and connections are drawn between the terrorism 
allegations against Palestine, Lebanon, Syria etc. and the killings by US troops in 
Afghanistan, Iraq – and Yemen. Citations of Hussein are interspersed. In sum, the exhibition 
serves to reclaim sovereignty over the story that, when originally was told by the officially 
televised images, had obliterated items central to the events in the North from the perspective 
of the Houthis. 
 During this phase the Houthis also joined the general protest against US drone strikes in 
the country, help voiced by victims in public discourse and by human rights activists up to the 
level of the US senate.1030 It fit well into the frame of threats by the US.  
 In parallel to all the repudiations and accusations, the corpse of Hussein was finally 
released by the authorities and the Houthis took the opportunity to host a spectacular funeral 
celebration on June 5, 2013. The event resembled a state funeral with a large parade and was 
attended by hundreds of thousands of people, according to an observing journalist.1031 Two 
citations1032 bring the purpose of the funeral to the point: First, a younger Houthi leader notes: 
“They thought that people would forget Hussein al-Houthi because there was no body. 
Imagine if we buried him nine years ago. Maybe 100 people would have attended.” The 
second, Abdulkareem Jadhban, reminisces the ‘martyr leader’: “Hussein al-Houthi had a 
leadership personality. Everyone that knew him loved him. He urged people to face the 
American hegemony after 9/11.” Hussein’s legacy is meant to shine far beyond his grave.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Houthis’ assertion of bringing to light crimes against them. Advertisements for the magazine have been 
posted e.g. in Al-Haqiqa (issue 94).  
1028 The exhibition was accompanied by a Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/jerah.amygh (accessed 
April 14, 2015=. The analysis is based on 244 photos of the Sana’a exhibition, downloaded from the Facebook 
page. See digital appendix E. 
1029 Among these documents is for instance the written guarantee by Saleh to release those attested in return for 
an end of shouting the slogan (in the very beginning). It shall serve as proof of agreements broken by Saleh. 
Digital appendix E, photo 64.  
1030 “Drone Strikes Turn Allies into Enemies, Yemeni Says”, New York Times, April 23, 2013, accessed April 
14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/middleeast/judiciary-panel-hears-testimony-on-use-of-
drones.html?r=0.  
1031 Tik Root, “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Defy Years of War and Repression”, BBC World News, June 18, 2013, 
accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22933234.  
1032 Both adapted from: ibid.  
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Phase of Military Expansion and Coup 08/2014–03/2015 
When the Houthis had positioned themselves as ‘leaders’ of the protests in the summer of 
2014 and taken Sana’a in the fall, they raised three demands: First, they demanded the 
establishment of a new government and their share in national decision-making; second, they 
wanted to “carve out a local sphere of influence that is economically and politically viable”; 
third, while they accepted federalism in principle, they rejected the six-state solution in the 
form it had been passed.1033 The first demand again circled around an alleged lack of 
legitimacy and was aligned with their anti-corruption stance and actions against it. The other 
two were more embedded into the anti-injustice strand. Fadhl Abu Talib, the speaker of the 
political council of Ansar Allah, declared in a 2015 interview: “It is not a coup. It is the result 
of the blockage of the political process.”1034 
 What can already be made noticeable are the appearance of a harsher tone and a fiercer 
action against Hadi’s government, which both led to his (surprising) resignation in late 
January and the following disturbances that, in turn, led to KSA and others’ military 
intervention. Hence, the legitimacy of the regime has been disputed. Both this chain of events 
and the attacks by the KSA, which have been asked for by Hadi and are supported by the US, 
fit all too well into the established threat and regime complicity frames.  
 
7.1.2.2. Prognostic Framing 
As with the prognostic dimension in Hussein’s framing, it is much more limited in 
comparison to the diagnostic dimension. And once more this seems appropriate in order to 
focus action and not weaken it with too many instructions. Hussein’s malazim contained six 
prognostic frames, namely the ‘Qurʾanic guidance frame’, the ‘Hashemite leadership frame’, 
the ‘jihad frame’, the ‘media use frame’, the ‘slogan frame’, and the ‘khurūj frame’. The 
‘Hashemite leadership frame’ and the ‘media use frame’ lose their prominence, for both have 
been ‘realized’ by the leadership. The heads of the al-Houthi family are the de facto leaders of 
the group and thus manifest what has before been prognostic. A complex use of media is their 
main mobilizational tool, it taking a central role and allowing for a more instrumental use by 
the leadership. ‘Qurʾanic guidance’ remains at the basis, asserted by the ubiquity of (excerpts 
of) Hussein’s malazim and the general emphasis of religious legitimacy. ‘Khurūj’ continues to 
be a problematic frame under the given circumstances. Since the regime, in its 
                                                          
1033 Saada governorate should be tied together with poor and landlocked Dhamar; they strove to be fused with 
Hajja and al-Jawf instead. See: ICG, “Huthis”, 14f.  
1034 “We Strive to Achieve a Reform of Muslims in the Face of Their Enemies”, The.What? 2015, no. 4, 
Mouminoun without Borders Association (Morocco), 62ff.  
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counterframing, accuses the Houthis to strive for a reinstatement of the hated imamate, the 
use of concepts, which are tightly bound to Zaydi concepts of rule, could serve to strengthen 
this counterframe. Probably as a consequence, the use if the term ‘khurūj’ is generally 
omitted. Nevertheless, I pose that subliminally it resonates all the same.1035 
 The two core prognostic frames are the ‘slogan frame’ and the ‘jihad frame’. The former, 
however, differs from its specification in the malazim in that it is no longer substantiated by 
its deterring impact on the US and Israel, but by the insistence on the freedom of speech 
(perceived as violated by the regime). It is thus defined as an act of opposition. The ‘jihad 
frame’ is basically a specification of a more general ‘defense frame’. Except for a cursory 
notion of ‘educate ourselves to match the enemy’ there is no other specification of defense. 
Military jihad is thus the instruction provided to the militant adherents, while the moderates 
are rather advised to hold high the slogan and the Qurʾan.  
 Central sources for the prognostic frames are videos, anashid (anthems; sg. nashid), 
printed interviews, and some printed material.  
 
Houthi-Regime Conflict Phase 4: March 2005–February 2010 
Tunes from the intro of Star Wars while a Qurʾan sura flies in. A brief Qurʾan recitation. A 
sequence of a historical portrayal of Arabs fighting foreign (non-Muslim) intruders in early 
Muslim times, accompanied by the heroic (Western) sounds of ‘Conquest of Paradise’ by 
Vangelis. A videotaped passage of Hussein’s malazim (“we are under the Jews”) with a cut 
and subsequent speech(es) of Abdul Malik, who occasionally imitates the gestures of his 
martyred brother. Mistreatment of Arabs by US soldiers and of Yemenis by the Yemeni army. 
Then (Houthi) fighters depicted with divine legitimation (sun imagery) who pray and fight. 
Successes in battle. Testimonials of fighters. Martyrs, who are extensively celebrated and 
honored by their society and families. Fighters preparing for battle, heavy weapons, fighters 
on tanks commandeered from the army. Large numbers of fighters in full gear in parade. 
Crowds of Houthi supporters, large demonstrations, all shouting the slogan, the flag with its 
depiction flying in the wind.1036 This, in a nutshell, is the core content of the many videos 
posted by the Houthis in one or another form on Internet platforms, mainly YouTube.1037 
                                                          
1035 Pottek makes a similar argument in regard to the omission of reference to their status as sadah by the Houthi 
leadership. Instead they highlight their responsibility on the basis of constitutional rights, democracy, and 
religious freedom, circumventing the accusation of propagating an elitist social order. Pottek, “Anfang”, 103.  
1036 The slogan is repeated in all forms, many times as last image at the end of videos.  
1037 This exact sequence stems from: Digital Appendix B, #45. This specific video with more than 34 minutes is 
rather long. The majority have less than 10 minutes, with the notable exception of speeches and Houthi 
documentaries. The contents existed in this form and variety from early videos onwards (see examples in the 
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The overwhelming majority of the videos focuses on only one or a few of the elements noted 
above, however, the compilation makes the mechanisms more visible:   
 Emotional music, sometimes Western, many times Arab/Yemeni, aims to move the 
audience. Concerning recited/sung poems that are compiled with similar images, the graphic 
designer and freelance film editor for many Houthi videos Malik al-Shami states, “they are 
“carefully chosen to evoke feelings of pride, anger, and commitment to the movement’s 
struggle”.1038 Qurʾan citations provide religious justifications and legitimacy, as does the 
portrayal of fighters with the sun (i.e. the divine) in the background, a typical jihadi 
iconograph.1039 Taking the same line, the fighters praying and reading the Qurʾan also stress 
how agreeable they are to God. The depiction of early Muslim fighters connects the rebels of 
today to a glorious tradition,1040 providing them, too, with honor and glory. While this is more 
for their own self-esteem and pride, the honor of martyrs is divine (i.e. esteemed by god), 
eternal (the martyr will enter paradise), and social (in that the families and communities are 
proud of their martyred members and grateful for their sacrifice for the common good). 
Hussein, Abdul Malik and the pictures of mistreatment and else re-evoke the necessity for 
‘defense’, while the positive, heroic, and successful fighter motivates to join his ranks. 
Successes in battle are depicted either in form of exploding targets,1041 captured enemies (who 
are sometimes forced to give testimonials about their strategies1042) or captured vehicles and 
weapons1043. The large numbers of fighters and supporters of the cause generate a feeling of 
being part of a strong community with common goal, manifested in the shouting and the flag 
of the slogan, which has become the symbol of collective identity. In sum, the framing 
conveys: You need to fight, to defend your community. It is legitimate. it is honorable. It is 
feasible.1044 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
digital appendix); the fact that this one (potentially a compilation) was only posted in 2011 can hence be 
dismissed.  
1038 “Houthi Poetry and Songs: Propaganda, Art or Both?”, Yemen Times, December 4, 2014, accessed December 
4, 2014, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1839/report/4657.  
1039 Salmoni et al., Regime, 225.  
1040 Alternatively, the movie ‘Lion of the Desert’ (1981) is used as a mine for fighting scenes. It shows the life of 
a Libyan jihadist who fought Italian occupation in the 1930s. See ‘Houthi Poetry and Songs’.  
1041 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #3. 
1042 Likewise presented was the strategic military information they carried with them:  Digital Appendix B, #23. 
1043 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #26. The video was viewed 11.898 times. Salmoni et al., Regime, 226, 
provide the picture of a pamphlet which was distributed by the Houthis, depicting destroyed and conquered GoY 
tanks and trucks.  
1044 For a praise of Jihad see also Al-Haqiqa, issue 32 (April 19, 2009). It holds that: “A person should take 
responsibility for his religion. He should care and exert efforts to protect it and defend it anywhere and against 
anybody.” 
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Figure 7.8.: Photo collage taken from a Houthi video, a rare image of Hussein in connection with a 
weapon, visually providing legitimacy to armed struggle (through his prestige and Qurʾanic 
legitimacy); the writing is a part of the slogan (‘Death to America, Death to Israel, Victory to Islam’) 
1045 
 
Some videos are positioned more directly against Saleh.1046 One example, posted in 
November 2009, shows civil victims, mainly children, followed by accusations and mourning 
of locals in interviews. Guilt is attributed, and anger is voiced against the US, Obama, and Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, followed by one man’s utterance: “Al-jihad al-wajib” (“jihad is the 
duty”).1047 
 Anthems or anashid are another widely employed genre for prognostic framing.1048 In an 
interview with a Yemeni newspaper, one of the members of the not so old ‘Firqa Ansar 
Allah’ (‘Band Ansar Allah’), the Houthis’ official musical group, emphasizes how his poetry 
was his way of supporting the rebels during the six wars. He claims to have written the 
following poem-turned-anthem after he had visited the mausoleum of Hussein:1049 
Oh Master of the weak, you have surrounded them [the enemy],  
Smugness and arrogance reign no more,  
If they attack you, your arms are like lightning bolts,  
Shedding their blood, turning it into rain for the soil,  
                                                          
1045 Digital Appendix B, #4. 
1046 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #1. It depicts Saleh repeatedly with Bush (with inciting writings in the 
color of fire) and with Abdul Majid al-Zindani. His guilt and his evilness are strongly emphasized. It ends with 
the images of Houthi fighters inserting grenades into their mortars.  
1047 Digital Appendix B, #18. 
1048 They have been studied mainly in the context of (Salafi) jihadist culture; however, I found the results to 
accord in large parts with what I found for the anashid I screened. Behnam Said, for instance, distinguishes four 
major categories: battle hymns (by far the majority), martyr hymns, mourning hymns, and praising hymns. 
Behnam Said, “Hymns (Nasheeds): A Contribution to the Study of the Jihadist Culture”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 35 (2012): 863–879.  
1049 “Houthi Poetry and Songs”.  
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You[r] grandeur is too complex for them to understand.  
The image given of Hussein is – while defensive – one of a fighter for his country (watering 
“the soil”) and people (the “weak”). Another of his anthems has become very popular. It is 
called “Ma Nabali” (“We don’t care”):1050 
We don’t care 
We don’t mind launching a new world war 
We ask for rifles 
It’s a shame to continue living like this 
Struggling in the path of God, we’ve experienced the taste of bittersweet [sic!] 
We welcome death 
Hello, oh demise1051 
The text is self-explaining, however, the mentioning of “shame” is worth noting, connecting 
the otherwise religious theme with the issue of honor.  
 Lines of other poetry recited in videos contain the term ‘junud allah’ (‘soldiers of God’) 
and ‘harb jihadi’ (‘jihadi war’).1052 The content ranges between praise of Hussein and Abdul 
Malik via threats uttered by Saleh against Abdul Malik1053, to rebels running with large 
mortar grenades who are (through a scene cut) paralleled with Arab horsemen with sabers 
riding into battle, to US troops in combat, and burning US and Israeli flags. In sum, the ‘jihad 
frame’ could not be any clearer.  
 
Post-Conflict Mobilization Phase 2010–2012 
Saleh, a US aircraft carrier (probably close to the Yemeni coast), a (Yemeni) oil refinery, the 
Israeli President, Saudi attacks in  Sa’ada, destruction, an attack on a mosque, Saleh (shaking 
hands) with Bush (repeated), dead children, Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, hunger, corpses, the army, 
Saleh shaking hands with Netanyahu, Saleh with Gaddhafi and Mubarak, Houthi banner, 
Houthi protesters among Arab spring protesters – banner: ‘irhal!’ (‘leave!’)1054 
 The highly offensive tone remains, nevertheless, for the wider audience now including 
potentially new adherents or the circle of anti-regime Arab Spring protesters, the openly jihadi 
imagery is softened towards militant calls for protests and the fall of the regime. Firqa Ansar’s 
anashid join in along these lines:  
                                                          
1050 Its popularity has led to numerous remixes and videos with it sung in the background, e.g. one in the 
‘classical’ manner of pictures of Hussein, Abdul Malik, fighting etc., with the remixed nashid accompanying the 
video: Digital Appendix B, #82.  
1051 “Houthi Poetry and Songs”.  
1052 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #78.  
1053 Ibid.  
1054 Digital Appendix B, # 51. Irhal!’ was the famous imperative protesters confronted their respective 
authoritarian leaders with during the Arab Spring protests.  
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They are a few young men, who held a sit-in to support the uprising,  
They are a few young men who believed in God and so they united,  
They’re no longer cave men. They’ve awakened from their slumber... 
Shocked by what they saw in caves filled with silence.... 
Oh, how long have they been asleep!! 
...We have wasted years being silent in the face of injustice...we were lost...our country 
was lost 
But they woke up!! Rejecting submission, they flounced, and launched an uprising 
supported by God...1055 
Throughout their presence in the 2011 protests, the Houthis took care to display the slogan as 
their identity marker in any way possible For instance, it was glorified by the Anashid, and 
was posed to be a ‘Qurʾanic duty’. In one video, ‘conversion’ to the Houthi cause gets its own 
storyline centered around the slogan: When the slogan is painted on a rock by an adherent, the 
protagonist – at that point still an opponent – paints it over. At home, he on TV sees the US 
and Israeli crimes against Yemenis and other Arabs (Gaza), which emotionally upset him and 
trigger his ‘conversion’. He goes back to the rock and repaints the slogan, during which 
divine blessing the form of the sun blazes down on him.1056 
 Besides, a return to the Qurʾan is propagated (and vaguely linked to jihad), the call is to not 
believe in rumors and news spread by the regime or opposing sources, but to inform oneself 
properly, and furthermore to educate oneself to match the enemy. After the ousting of Saleh, 
the enemy image is again shifted back to the US and Israel. A boycott of their products – a 
demand already raised by Hussein – is called for because they are reasoned to be a co-
financer US drone attacks on Yemeni ground.1057 Against Jews, they held the general points 
of Palestine – Gaza in particular (early 2012 war) – and the ‘occupation’ of the holy sites 
(among them the Al-Aqsa Mosque) in Jerusalem.1058 For the above, see also the Al-Haqiqa 
issues of that period.1059 
 Cultural components, with a revival of northern traditions such as dances and songs, took 
more space in videos after the immediate Arab Spring events as well.1060 Similarly, they 
invoke the beauty of Sa’ada, having been damaged by destruction, and the will towards 
reconstruction is underlined.1061 
 
                                                          
1055 “Houthi Poetry and Songs”. The motive of the young men sleeping in a cave alludes to the Qurʾanic story of 
the seven sleepers (Sura ‘Al Kahf’ [‘The Cave’]).  
1056 Digital Appendix B, #143.  
1057 Digital Appendix B, #157. The word ‘al-muqataa’ [‘boycott’] in the video has the same writing as the 
‘Death to America....’ lines in the slogan, thus providing a visual linkage to the well-established prognostic 
framing.  
1058 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #152. 
1059 See digital appendix C.  
1060 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #177. 
1061 Digital Appendix B, #108. 
269 
 
Phase of Political Participation 2013–07/2014 
The moderate strands from before are continued. In addition, political demands and plans are 
presented. Ali al-Bukhaiti, spokesman of the group throughout the NDC, for instance, 
forestalled (or potentially responded to) doubts about the guarantee of religious freedoms that 
a stronger position of the Houthis might raise by underlining:  
We understand that the majority of Yemenis are not Zaydi and that religious ideas cannot 
be forced on them. We are dealing with reality. Elections and a civil state are sufficient 
for us because we believe that religious groups will have greater freedom under a civil 
rather than a religious state. Many say that this is not really our goal, but it is.1062 
On the political level they hence assert their distance from the demand of a religious state. 
They had rarely (and then only internally) articulated the idea, however, their strong religious 
rhetoric and the historical legacy had to be countervailed to appease their political 
counterparts.  
 On another level, i.e. in videos targeting their followers, they continue a more militant – 
yet non-jihadi – path. Imam Husayn’s death in Karbala (with a depiction of the battle) is 
equaled with current protests. The enemies now are Netanyahu and Obama, and action against 
them is demanded (in order not to continue the passive stance that from early times on has 
been so devastating for the Shiʿa).1063 
 
Phase of Military Expansion and Coup 08/2014–03/2015 
From summer 2014 onwards, main motives have been the provision of security by the 
Houthis after their seizure of Sana’a and a continuation of the previously commenced claims 
about the defense and re-conquest of Jerusalem.1064Anashid, with their typical content1065 and 
cultural elements, remain highly popular.  
 Regarding the current goals, Fadhl Abu Talib says:  
We want a civil modern state as laid out in the NDC. We believe that we do God’s will in 
protecting people and property. We aim at rights, stability, fighting corruption, the result 
of the youth revolution 2011, and a share in natural resource wealth. We need a leader 
                                                          
1062 ICG, “Huthis”, 12. The interview is dated November 11, 2013.  
1063 Digital Appendix B, #224. 
1064 Digital Appendix B, #128.  
1065 Aoud Al-Qisi analyzed more Houthi anashid, namely the titles: ‘We don’t care’, ‘Alive due to his death’, 
‘Alive due to jihad’, ‘I caught fire’, ‘God did not pause’, ‘But, oh God, oh world, in which state [are you?]’, 
‘Increase Zayd[iyya]’, ‘Takfiri’, ‘Oh God kept saying’, ‘War drum’, ‘Medal of honor’, ‘Invasion of infidels, 
fight for God’s sake’, ‘For God’s sake death is welcome’, ‘Soldiers of God’, and ‘We are the weapon of Ibn 
Badr al Din [i.e. Hussein] and we are the trigger’. He holds that on the whole they are expansionist, express a 
strong loyalty to Abdul Malik (whose status as member of the ahl al-bayt is emphasized!), and assert their 
loyalty and obedience to God. Aoud Al-Qisi, “Houthi Political Messages in Tactical Anthems”, The.What, 32ff.  
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with a systematic mind, which reflects in policies, positions, and orientations, [qualities 
which] are absolutely given in Sayyid Abdulmalik al-Houthi.1066 
It is to be seen how this framing – Abdul Malik as (national?) leader – evolves over time.  
 
7.1.2.3. Motivational Framing 
The motivational framing revolves around four main themes: the necessity for defense in the 
face of threat, own strength (or, more abstract, ‘feasibility’), legitimacy, and the glory of 
martyrdom. It therewith differs from Hussein’s motivational framing in a number of aspects 
that all circle around agency: Hussein’s frames (‘weakness frame’, ‘threat frame’, ‘religious 
duty frame’, ‘feasibility frame’, ‘Zaydi community frame’) contain a lot more attributions of 
guilt and duty towards the audience, while the modified framing emphasizes positive 
components like righteousness and fortitude. The latter support the feeling of agency, a 
necessary or at least expedient component for a jihadi warrior. Overall, the shift appears 
rational and constructive when related to the shift of the prognosis to violence. There are no 
significant variations between 2005 and 2015, apart from a lack of ‘success stories in battle’ 
during the non-violent period, which is why I do not differentiate phases.  
 The ‘threat frame’ and corresponding ‘defense frame’ or ‘jihad frame’ have been discussed 
in detail. They contain the same call for action as the (potentially less pressing) threat frame 
formulated by Hussein before and form the only push-factor within the motivational framing.  
 Strength in the face of the enemies is obviously a central motivational frame. It is 
conveyed in the forms of ‘we are strong’ and ‘we are stronger than our enemies’, which both 
articulate important components of self-perception and self-efficacy. ‘We are many’ is 
another stressed aspect. These messages are predominantly mediated by more emotional 
channels, i.e. through music/audio, videos, and physically, for instance at gatherings. The 
pictures show victorious fighters, arms, destroyed/captured aircrafts, vehicles, general 
equipment,1067 captive enemies, and, above all, masses of followers1068 and fighters at 
protests, gatherings, celebrations,1069 and military training. Masculinity, status, and virtue are 
                                                          
1066 Muhammad Murshid al-Kamim, “We Strive to Achieve a Reform of Muslims in the Face of Their Enemies”, 
The.What, 62ff.  
1067 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #32. Salmoni et al., Regime, 217, 225, furthermore note the existence 
of a “battle report series” under the name of ‘Basha’ir al-Nasr’ (‘Prophecies of Victory’] with such depictions.  
1068 See also the (recent) claims about the large numbers of followers “everywhere” by Fadhl Abu Talib, 
“Reform of Muslims”.  
1069 See digital appendix: D. 
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categories that feature prominently in these scenes.1070 Lastly, their fighters’ preparedness for 
new combat and wars is highlighted.  
 Legitimacy is overwhelmingly realized through religion, e.g. through Qurʾan citations, sun 
symbolism, the slogan (to a limited degree), and through statements about practicing and 
representing ‘true Islam’. Besides, social and traditional legitimacy are framed by drawing 
connections with historical figures, the continuity of social values and of social order. 
 A similar reasoning reflects in the portrayal of martyrdom: It is honorable on a religious as 
well as a social level. The martyr follows in the steps of Hussein al-Houthi, who again 
followed Imam Husayn, and they are incentivized by the Qurʾan’s promised immediate ascent 
into paradise. Families (especially manifest in the images of children) are proud of their 
martyred relatives, and communities; people revere and commemorate them. The Houthis 
have introduced grand commemorative celebrations for martyrs with e.g. a week-long event 
in 2009. The leadership visits the families of martyrs, photos are taken, and support is given. 
Crowds visit tombs and a decorated hall, each name is mentioned, each picture displayed, 
similarly on Al-Masirah TV and during other large gatherings.1071 Music is composed 
specifically to honor the martyrs and to motive others to join the ranks of these glorious 
fighters.1072 Hussein is constantly invoked as the ‘original Houthi martyr’ and together with 
his father lends additional credibility and prestige to Abdul Malik, who is (though only in 
restricted contexts) equally portrayed as a warrior.1073 The message clearly is: We take care of 
your families. This targets especially potential new recruits. 
 In sum, the dominant pull-factors are based on an idealized vision of ‘the glorious and just 
fighter in the name of Islam and in the defense of his family and people’.  It is worth noting 
that in none of the three framing dimensions Zaydism plays a significant role. 
 
7.1.3. Frame Distribution 
In the Yemeni context, there are two ‘natural’ settings in communicating a message to a 
certain collective: Friday sermons (khuṭab) and Qāt chews, which provide an ideal and 
institutionalized occasion for political discussion. Furthermore, statements by religious and 
social personalities of prestige have a high local impact. All these can be assumed to have 
played a role in spreading first Zaydi revivalist ideas (as initiated by Badr al-Din al-Houthi) 
and later on the Houthis’ frames. Music and poetry (with its specific persuasive function) as 
                                                          
1070 Mohamed Faid Albakri, “The Houthis in Their Media – Focus: Al-Masirah TV”, The.What, 40ff.  
1071 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #94.  
1072 See exemplarily: Digital Appendix B, #247.  
1073 Digital Appendix B, #41.  
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central cultural techniques in the North are also omnipresent and statements confirm their 
vital role in Houthi framing from the beginning.  
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Book/Text1075 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Sermon x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Talk/Discussion1076 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Music  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Poetry  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Teaching  x x x            x x x 
Speech  x x x ? ? ? ? ? x x x x x x x x x 
Holiday/Memorial  x x x          x x x x x 
Lectures1077    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Slogan    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Body Practice    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Audio Recording    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Poster/Banner    x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Rally    x            x x x 
Interview     x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
                                                          
1074 ‘Mode’ encompasses ‘medium’, ‘genre’, and ‘practice’. A strict separation and differentiation between them 
provides no additional insight in regard to Houthi frame distribution and has thus been omitted.  
1075 This category refers to early publications of Badr al-Din as well as later print material of various kinds, 
including the printed transcriptions of the malazim, and leaflets distributed during the wars. Besides, Salmoni et 
al. mention the battle report series ‘Nashirat al-Haqiqa’; they are equally subsumed here. Cf. Salmoni et al., 
Regime, 217.  
1076 Typically in the setting of a qāt chew. 
1077 The malazim are a special category due to their great importance: In this line I refer to their contents, which 
spread ever since Hussein actually gave the lectures. They also, however, fall under the categories of ‘Text’ and 
‘Audio Recording’, though each of those contain a lot of other material beyond the malazim. 
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Graffiti     x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Photo/Image      x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Website          x x x x x x x x x 
Film/Video           x x x x x x x x 
Magazine           x x x x x x x x 
Cartoon           x x x x x x x x 
Testimonial           x x x x x x x x 
Radio           ? ? ? ? ? ? x x 
Badge/Token1078              x x x x x 
Sites              x x x x x 
Web forum               x x x x 
Documentary               x x x x 
Social Media                x x x 
TV                x x x 
Exhibition1079                ? x x 
 
Table 7.4.: Media of Houthi frame distribution throughout the previously defined periods (see 5.1.4.), 
including early activities of the al-Houthi family; conservative marking, only in case of evidence or 
probability close to evidence (like e.g. use of sermons or talk, i.e. qat chews); question marks imply the 
strong assumption of use without evidence 
 
To the extent that teaching occurred during the periods of armed conflict and the respective 
interim phases cannot be validated. While I assume it did, I left it open on the table and only 
marked the post-conflict period, in which teaching institutions are confirmed open. Speeches 
as prime medium to address followers will most probably have constituted a continuous mean 
for the Houthis. There is strong evidence that they were employed solely by al-Houthi family 
members, as they were the central leadership. This medium, and its use by the group, thus 
represents the pure form of a hierarchical frame distribution. Similar to varying degrees are 
books/texts, sermons and teaching (when conducted by family members), the malazim, and 
audio recordings (again when the spoken word stems from al-Houthis). Music and poetry, for 
                                                          
1078 The category includes all kind of tokens or ‘merchandise’, such as stickers (popular on rifles), clothing etc. 
1079 The ‘Deep Wounds’ Art Exhibition. I was not able to ascertain if the exhibition in Saada was also in 2013 or 
already in 2012.  
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instance, would originate with other persons and tend to be more democratic or multivocal. 
Talks and discussions during qat chews, but also web forums, and social media finally are 
based on interaction, thereby positioning them on the other end of the stratum from strongly 
and centrally controlled to less controlled, decentralized frame distribution. Overall, Houthi 
frame distribution is characterized by a high degree of centralization and control, as well as a 
high degree of intertextuality1080. At the distribution’s core lies Hussein’s malazim, the – in 
itself complex – condensations of the sociocultural and political identities, as well as the 
positioning of the Zaydi revivalist movement the group claims to be. The pervasive ‘citation’ 
of malazim passages, and the ubiquitousness of the slogan as the symbolic abstraction of their 
message, provides clear evidence thereof. At the same time, it asserts the cohesion of the 
various frames’ content, hence posing a criterion of the overall framing’s quality.  
 The celebrations of Zaydi holidays such as ʿEid al-Ghadīr, including the introduction of 
their own holidays such as ‘Martyrs’ Week’ have been harnessed for gathering up to tens of 
thousands (some sources even speak of hundreds of thousands) of followers and others. With 
their strong collective character, the option to evoke intense emotions, and convey frames in a 
number of ways, they feature an excellent occasion and method of frame distribution.1081 In a 
similar vein, this applies to rallies, though they are more focused on performing adherence, 
less on the absorption of messages. ‘Body techniques’ such as the raising of a fist when 
chanting the slogan, support the performance element while engraining the slogan (as identity 
marker) physically in the body of the follower.  
 Audio recordings have a large market in Yemen, specifically in the North, as has been 
previously noted. While the formats change with technical advances, they remain highly 
popular and have a number of advantages from the perspective of frame distributers: They are 
easy to produce and distribute due to the existing markets and distribution mechanisms; they 
reach remote locations without extra efforts; listeners can be individuals or groups, thus 
potentially reaching a multitude of people who may previously have been completely ignorant 
of the group and might turn towards it by chance; audio content is emotional and potentially 
reaches the audience more intensely and in a longer lasting mode; and most importantly, 
audio recordings (as all audio and purely visual content) reach the large numbers of illiterate 
audiences in Yemen. This consideration is of utmost importance for the frame distribution in 
this setting and principally explains the high prevalence of audio and visual media. The level 
                                                          
1080 While the concept of ‘intertextuality’ refers to the uses of allusion, citation, loan translation, translation, 
plagiarism, pastiche (imitation of another’s style), and parody in literature, I use it in regard to the output of 
Houthi communication. Therein it is rather reduced to the use of citation.  
1081 The recreational activities in Zaydi revivalist schools and BY youth camps had similar effects, with the 
additional component of a teacher-student relationship, potentially adding even more authority to the teachers. 
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of education generally needs to be of concern when targeting a specific audience. Core themes 
are kept simple and are highly repetitive (also between various media and modes of 
transmission) in order to be easily comprehensible to everybody. On another level contrary to 
that are e.g. religious scholarly texts (as published by Badr al-Din) or interviews with 
international newspapers, when more complex messages are conveyed, and a distinct 
educational background is necessary for comprehension and contextualization.  
 Posters, banners, graffiti, and transient or permanent ‘sites’ such as the physical presence 
of Houthi tents on Tahrir Square 2011 or the mausoleum of Hussein, claim public space and 
speak of the presence of the group at certain locations. They symbolically lay claim to 
territory and create a physical perceptibility as structures.  
 With the advance of technology and infrastructure, an increased awareness for the 
centrality of communication, and the media blackout issued by the government during the 
fourth war in Sa’ada in 2007, the Houthis expanded their means of communication to new 
media. Their first website was almenpar.net (mid-2007), later on followed by sadaonline.net 
(mid-2009), ansaruallah.net (late 2010, including a forum) and ansaruallah.com (late 2011, 
equally including a forum).1082 The websites served the “information office”1083 to spread 
information on the wars, articles, photos, audio and video files of the malazim, speeches, 
official statements, opinion pieces, and digital versions of the Al-Haqiqa magazine and other 
print publications. While it might have helped to reach out to new groups,1084 and it certainly 
did support the dispersion of news during blockades (as did mobile phones and satellite 
phones through which the Houthi leadership communicated with international media)1085, the 
limitations need to be acknowledged: limited availability of internet connections, (again) 
illiteracy, and frequent blocking of sites by the regime, at least during phases of open conflict. 
Notwithstanding, they continued to cultivate their web presence1086 to the displeasure of the 
regime, which took note of alleged support the Houthis were able to rally this way.1087 
                                                          
1082 almenpar.net went offline when its successor was launched. The subsequent two existed in parallel for quite 
some time. They were hacked some time in the second half of 2014 and since then can no longer be reached.  
1083 See Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, n. 76 for the earliest mentioning of this still existing Houthi institution.  
1084 Lucas Winter makes the argument in regard to remote areas. Winter, “Ansar of Yemen”.  
1085 Ibid., 178. 
1086 The ICG holds in their 2009 report that with the availability of the internet people in the Marran mountains 
changed from situating their grievances against the government in terms of the religious “commanding what is 
right and forbidding what is wrong” to a terminology based on human rights discourse, democracy and else. In 
how far this is simple correlation or causally due to exposition to external discourses through internet access 
remains open. ICG, “Defusing”, 5. For a similar argument on how locals use information obtained from the 
internet in their portrayal of their situation to officials and activists see Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 178. 
1087 See Saleh in an interview with the New York Times, explaining the checkpoints he had set up: “As for the 
checkpoints you see around Sana, they are there because of elements supporting rebels in Saada – (...) with 
money, media, internet statements etc.” “An Interview with President Ali Abdullah Saleh”, New York Times, 
June 28, 2008.  
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From the last war onwards at least, the group set up their own social media profiles, namely 
on Facebook and YouTube; Twitter1088 played a minor role and was rather operated at a later 
point and in a decentralized fashion by spokespeople with their personal accounts (e.g. Ali al-
Bukhaiti). They did not concentrate on one profile for each platform but created a number in 
succession and in parallel.1089 On YouTube, this was partly due to various subgroups/organs 
stemming from the movement.1090 For Facebook, however, it appears unnecessary and rather 
counterproductive. A couple of thousand users joined groups and liked content on Facebook, 
while view-numbers for the videos posted on YouTube range from a few hundred to six-
figure sums1091; thousands to tens of thousands are most common. YouTube can thus be 
assumed to reach a much larger audience, unless the vast majority of visitors on Facebook 
pages do not leave any observable traces. The former assumption seems much more likely, 
especially when considering the permitted accessibility without a personal profile and its sole 
focus on video/audio.  
 With the utilization of the Internet, cross-referencing between the various media greatly 
increased: photos, recordings, texts etc. were now also posted online, linked with other 
material, shared and else. Even when excluding genuine productions for online presentation, 
‘the net’ vigorously catalyzed frame distribution.  
 Films/Videos, as previously highlighted, were very popular among the media used by the 
Houthis; numerous examples have been cited above. Within the category, testimonials and 
documentaries as special genres rank among the most popular. The wide distribution of the 
Al-Haqiqa magazine is probably due to its digital version.1092 As with the professionalization 
of the other media, the magazine became ever more complex and extensive over time. While 
the earlier volumes contained rather bold cartoons and related texts, it over time commenced 
integrating topics of general interest such as health, computer tips, and the like, as well as the 
standard issues of Arab mainstream media such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. The moderate 
strand of Houthi framing, however, was preserved. Besides, the magazine served to advertise 
CDs, DVDs, and publications stemming from the movement (in addition to commercial 
advertisement underlining my claim to its characteristic as ‘mainstream’).  
                                                          
1088 The official account is: www.twitter.com/ansaruallah. They signed up in November 2011, however, there 
was no activity after September 2014 (accessed March 6, 2015).  
1089 For instance, for Hussein (at least two subsequent accounts), for Abdul Malik, the group under the name of 
the Houthis, for the group under the name of Ansar Allah and else.  
1090 Videos about Houthi battles and the situation in the war region have been posted earlier by individual 
members of the movement and others. The earliest posts I found stemmed from early 2007; isolated older 
uploads can be presumed.  
1091 Particularly prominent with more than 100,000 views are selected videos of Saudi attacks or victories over 
Saudi units and video tributes to Badr al-Din after his death.  
1092 Its introduction in late 2007 falls together with the early ‘online era’ of Houthi communication.  
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I have not been able to trace the appearance of Houthi-centered radio broadcasting.1093 
Reliable evidence refers back only to recent years, however, I strongly assume that it has been 
established quite some time earlier, at least in the wake of internet presence. Radio is a 
favorite means for the distribution of the music by Firqa Ansar Allah. It admittedly appeals to 
some otherwise unaffiliated audience solely for aesthetic reasons.1094 
 The most costly and laborious channel to run is the Houthi-owned TV channel Al-Masirah 
(‘The March’) that went on air on March 23, 2012.1095 It is carried on the Egyptian satellite 
Nile Sat and can thus be received throughout the region. Among its program (which can also 
be streamed online) are news broadcasts, political talk shows, religious programs,1096 
documentaries, cultural programs and else – in any case no Houthi-critical voices. Like the 
radio station, it makes the reception of Houthi programing low-threshold, hence reaches out to 
the so-far ambivalent audience and occupies a space in between other interest groups (such as 
Islah1097, the regime, and others) with their respective framing.  
 
One more dimension of frame distribution is worth noting: the aspect of frequency and 
duration of distribution to the audience.1098 The frequency can vary between once, repeatedly, 
and permanent; duration ranges from short-term to long-term (while it has to be specified how 
this is defined for each mode). The Houthis have opted to reach out to their audience in 
manifold ways and varying duration. While it is possible that a single, short-term exposure 
already mobilizes a dedicated movement member, I generally hold that most adherents were 
probably exposed to various media/channels over time.  
 The overall strategy, for the diversification it offers in regard to potential audience tastes 
and channels (audio/visual/physical), for the development in quality and openness to 
innovation, as well as for the employment of emotional vs. ‘rational’ address, deserves 
acknowledgement as highly (culturally and technically) appropriate in the given context and 
as coherently employed (despite certain gaps and contradictions in the frames themselves).  
                                                          
1093 The frequency is 99.1 Sam FM, “a local station affiliated with the movement”. “Houthi Poetry and Songs”.  
1094 Ibid.  
1095 The flanking Facebook Page https://www.facebook.com/AlmasirahTV (accessed April 26, 2014) has 
received 217,544 likes since its initiation in late 2013.  
1096 Winter, “Ansar of Yemen”.  
1097 The TV channel ‘Al-Suhail’ is affiliated with Islah.  
1098 ‘Occasion’ could be added, for instance in a celebratory context, in everyday life, in highly emotional 
contexts or else. However, while it exerts an influence upon frequency and duration, I assume it to be less 
important than these two aspects and thus exclude it from immediate consideration.  
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After the detailed presentation of the actors, their background, the conflict development, 
framing, and frame distribution it is time to come to the heart of the matter: How did the 
frames resonate among the audience? 
 
7.1.4. Frame Resonance 
Houthi Leadership 
It doesn’t matter if he is alive or dead. What matters is that he is the leader. That is, in 
terms of ideology and the Houthis’ philosophy, Hussein is the leader (…) Even Abd al-
Malik says this. He says “everything we have comes from my brother, Hussein”.1099 
Hussein was revered among followers and his leadership role survived his death. His 
Facebook page1100 contains numerous blessings and hundreds of ‘likes’ when photos of him, 
citations, or blessings are posted. His father was praised among others in the zamil and videos 
about his life and scholarly work reach six-figure sums on YouTube, equally with blessings in 
the comments. Abdul Malik was able to profit from his descent and the legitimacy stemming 
from it, in addition to the resonance of his position. Among the 43 comments on an interview 
he gave to the newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in September 2009, during the early phase of 
the sixth war, his denunciation of government aggression and defence of Houthi actions along 
the well-known lines received several praises for his “logical and reasonable words”1101. 
Another one stated:  
Victory to you, our Lord Abdulmalik. (...) Your victory is divine and so is your 
grandfather Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Confidence in God above everything. We are the sons 
waiting for your order to open [up] the front. Our destination is at issuance [of] your 
orders. (...) They will be held accountable for their crimes in history. (...) Victory to God 
and death to the enemies!1102 
The commentator refers to the status of Abdul Malik as a sayyid, which provides him with 
religious legitimacy. His leadership is acknowledged and support for battle assured. 
Additionally, historical crimes (by the regime) are given as a reason for the situation. On the 
whole, the comment reflects that the diagnostic frame of injustice (by the regime), the 
                                                          
1099 A Houthi supporter on Hussein’s leadership role. ‘“Yemeni Shi’ite Cleric and Houthi Disciple ‘Issam Al-
‘Imad: Our Leader Houthi is Close to Khamenei; We Are Influenced Religiously and ideologically By Iran”, 
Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch No. 2627, 2009, http://www.memri.org/ 
report/en/print3757.htm, accessed August 19, 2013. 
1100 See: https://www.facebook.com/hualsayeed (accessed April 21, 2015). The page received 7,340 ‘likes’ as 
page itself, implying that at utmost minimum that number of people visited the page at least once, potentially 
regularly, and receives automatic updates on new posts, i.e. some kind of information flow occurs.  
1101 “Abdul Malik Al-Houthi: Do Not Bet on Any Regional Power”, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, September 20, 2009, 
accessed May 5, 2015, http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=536701&issueno= 
11254#.VUjQO5MxASQ, comments 1, 5, 8, 19 on the article.  
1102 Ibid., comment 3.  
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prognostic frame calling for armed struggle, the religiously based ‘honorable leadership 
frame’ (linked with high credibility of the framers), and the motivational component 
resonated – with this individual. Others assert that they “are with [the] Huthis”1103 as well. 
However, there are also neutral (questioning), critical, and hostile voices among the 
commentators. Questions take up issues like “why did Yahya Huthi visit Iran in 
Ramadan?”1104 and the interaction of the Houthis with the local inhabitants of the areas in 
which they operate1105. A critical commentator, a sheikh from Sanhan tribe, remarks that “we 
are not satisfied with the government’s actions against the Houthis. [They] are brothers of the 
people. But we (...) wonder [if] they did not exacerbate the situation. (...)”. Later, though, his 
positive perception of the group seems to get the upper hand over his criticism of their 
strategy when he accuses “the state [who] authorized to kill Muslims who are only defenders 
(...)”.1106 The hostile voices defame the Houthis as, “the devil in Saada”1107, aiming at “fitna” 
(sedition)1108, ignorant1109, liars1110, “infidels”1111, and “magi”1112. Defamation is thus phrased 
in religious terms and in an accusation of their motives and morals, i.e. it contains an element 
of general repudiation. Allegations of an Iranian agenda behind the Houthis are furthermore 
prominent, expressed e.g. in another comment which calls the group “traitors to the nation 
and agents of Iran”1113. On the whole, slightly more than half of the comments are positive, 
some are neutral, maybe 35–40% are negative.  
 While in this example I also specifically draw attention to contesting voices, I will now 
continue with a focus on the positive resonance and return to negative perceptions in the 
following chapter on counterframing.  
  
 
 
 
                                                          
1103 Ibid., comment 17, 35.  
1104 Ibid., comment 18. Yahya’s visit to Iran remains an unconfirmed accusation.  
1105 Ibid., comment 6. 
1106 Ibid., comment 21. 
1107 Ibid., comment 31. 
1108 Ibid., comments 36, 41.  
1109 Ibid., comment 36. 
1110 Ibid., comment 20.  
1111 Ibid., comment 39.  
1112 Ibid., comments 32, 34, 41. The term ‘magi’ alludes to the ancient labelling of Zoroastrians. Later it was 
used to denote ‘magicians’ in the sense of practitioners of alchemy, astrology, and similar esoteric arts. The 
current use in Yemen implies a denigrating allusion to religious connections to Iran.  
1113 Ibid., comment 9. It also insults them as “dogs of Iran” (dogs are considered impure animals in Islam) and 
claims they strove for the imamate. Dogs are considered impure animals in Islam.  
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The threat: Systematic oppression of Zaydis 
According to the perception of a Zaydi scholar in 2009,  
[a]s people, as a community, as a tradition, we1114 have been targeted in a very violent 
way. We have been prevented from exercising our rights. We have been deprived of jobs 
and education. Our schools and institutes were shut down. Such oppression has convinced 
many to defend themselves.1115 
The statement reflects a strongly felt collective identity. The threat towards this identity group 
emanates from the state who deposed it from its rights in a violent and oppressive, i.e. ‘unjust’ 
way and thereby triggers (legitimate) defense. Again the perception mirrors the Houthis’ 
frames.  
 Interviews conducted by the ICG uncover how even those (Zaydis) who are critical of the 
Houthis and their violent path nevertheless generally share the threat perception towards 
Zaydis as an identity group. Hassan Zayd, for instance, stated his view that “the Houthis are 
just a label. The government’s true targets are Zaydis.”1116 How strong the ties are on which 
the group partly relies is emphasized by Ali al-Bukhaiti (from the perspective of the Houthis): 
“It is easy for Ansar Allah to spread in traditionally Zaydi areas because our religious ideas 
appeal to the population. The culture of Zaydism is longstanding and deep.”1117 His opinion is 
backed by a Zaydi scholarly family supporting them:  
The Huthis have support from Hashemites who do not believe in the group’s religious 
ideas, but who sympathise with them because of ethnic1118 affiliation. The movement also 
enjoys support from a wider subset of Zaydis, who, like the Hashemites, do not believe in 
all of the ideas or actions of the Huthis. But they sympathise because Huthis are Zaydi 
and because, as a group, Zaydis feel marginalised by the state and Islah.1119 
The statement throws an ambivalent light on the importance of identity versus the impact of 
framing: According to the interviewee, solidarity with the identity group to a certain extent 
trumps the consensus with the Houthis’ strategies and religious interpretation. This view is 
shared by others, among them a sheikh from Jawf, who is “sympathetic to the Huthis”1120: 
“[I]f the Huthis turn their back on Zaydism, they will die in Yemen. If they announce that 
they are Twelver, all of the Zaydis will turn against them. But if they hold on to Zaydi ideas, 
                                                          
1114 Here, ICG adds “[Zaydi Hashemites]” to make clear the presumed reference. Unless there is specific 
reference at another point of the interview that supports the claim that it only refers to the Hashemites, I disagree 
with this limitation for as I read the quote, he refers to Zaydis in general, not only Hashemites, when he refers to 
schools and jobs, as well as defense – schools to take just one example were open to all so consequently all 
would have suffered from discrimination resulting from their closure.  
1115 ICG, “Defusing”, 12. 
1116 Ibid. 
1117 ICG, “Huthis”, 10. 
1118 By the term ‘ethnic’ they mean to refer to the identity group of sadah/Zaydi Hashemites.  
1119 ICG, “Huthis”, 10.  
1120 Ibid.  
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the road will be long for them.”1121 The bond of a very salient shared identity certainly needs 
to be acknowledged; it also provides an adjuvant perspective to evaluate the regime’s 
attempts to delegitimize exactly this connection, the authenticity of the Houthis as Zaydis (see 
the following chapter on counterframing). However, other variants of the link between Zaydi 
identity and political stance in the conflict are equally present, as are different and much more 
frame-based explications of why people follow or support the Houthis. All of these add 
further pieces to the picture. The story of a Zaydi human rights activist, for example, 
describes how it was only due to the political situation and the available frame in the 
background that his personal identity as a Hashemite became salient: 
I am secular but the political situation has led me to take a closer look at my origins, 
which are Zaydi and Hashemite. Once, when I handed my passport to an immigration 
officer at the airport, he asked me whether I was a Hashemite, as if it was legal to 
question my origins, as if the law demanded it and favored such discrimination.1122 
It shows how the criterion of ‘experiential commensurability’ essentially contributes to 
successful frame resonance: The interviewee states how in a situation under stress or pressure 
the ‘injustice frame’ made him more attentive to how he was treated by non-Zaydis. In an 
average situation, that is one assumed to have occurred on a regular basis, he then perceives 
the frame as correct, ‘confirmed’ by his personal experience.  
 Stories of enforced disappearances and (arbitrary) detentions affirm the perceived 
connection between Zaydi identity and the injustice frame, which is more or less explicitly 
(rather the latter) causally attributed to the regime. HRW documented the following case, told 
by the wife of a detainee in the summer of 2008:  
His father went to the local police. There, the officer asked him, “how does your son 
pray, with his arms by his side [in the fashion of Shiʿa Muslims], or with his arms crossed 
[in fashion of Sunni Muslims]?” His father replied that Yasir is a Zaidi Muslim and a 
preacher in a Zaidi mosque. The officer said, “Aha, then I think I know where he is. Go to 
Political Security.1123 
The depiction of the political situation for sādah during the wars sounds similar in the words 
of another wife of an arrested Hashemite: “[O]nly non-Hashemites are allowed to criticise the 
war in Saada. If you are a Hashemite and a Zaydi and you are against it, you face immediate 
arrest.”1124 
                                                          
1121 Ibid.  
1122 ICG, “Defusing”, 12, n. 79. 
1123 HRW, “Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the Armed Conflict with Huthi Rebels in Yemen”, October 
2008, 19.  
1124 ICG, “Defusing”, 9.  
282 
 
Turning from identity towards the actual content of Houthi framing, we again find different 
opinions. A young journalist and Houthi adherent described the internal debate between 
Hussein and established ʿulamāʾ and the consequences they drew from their respective 
positions as follows:  
Husayn tried to break the monotony of fiqh, usul al-fiqh, and mechanical memorization. 
For example, he believed that to look ten years on the centuries old Kitab al-Azhar is a 
waste of time. The American enemy is upon us and our scientists spend their time 
studying and teaching the memories of Imam al-Hadi. Husayn said that these memories 
are valid in their context, which obviously does not correspond to ours. He was not 
dogmatic and the renewal he tried to introduce in the Zaydi landscape has not been 
received as a good thing by our scholars. (...) Some students of Husayn went to Sanaa and 
dared to face our old ʿulamāʾ saying: You are the ʿulamāʾ regarding menstruation and 
childbirth, a way to mock the lack of renewal in their teachings.1125 
This tells us a number of things: First, he and the students of Hussein he mentions strove for a 
modern, pragmatic interpretation of Zaydism, which Hussein’s approach satisfied. This, 
however, led to tensions with a circle of older established religious scholars. A generational 
cleavage can be assumed to be part of these tensions; Hussein was part of the younger 
generation and it was thus easier for him and his brothers to get in touch with the younger 
Zaydis. We find this hypothesis supported. Second, the desire for action was successfully 
connected to the perception of “the American enemy” and an implicit drive to act against him, 
i.e. the anti-US framing resonated. And third, related yet worth noting separately, it resonated 
with an educated person. While the same accounts for some of the earlier citations as well and 
can partly be ascribed to a distortive accessibility of sources by educated followers to the 
disfavor of the many unheard uneducated members, it is crucial to acknowledge the 
simultaneous resonance among different social strata. It helps to substantiate the resonance of 
the various components of the frames, here e.g. its religious basis for the call for action as 
developed by Hussein in the malazim.  
 By another member of the post-revolution generation of Zaydis, however, the reaction was 
quite the opposite. Muhammad Sharaf al-Din, a sayyid who has always had a distanced 
relationship towards his creed and supposed status, actively distanced himself from activism 
as well:  
This is no time for activism. Many people got killed [since the conflict began in 2004] 
and all Hashemites are paying the price for it. My brother was a police officer. It is well-
known that he is the son of a revolutionary. Seven months ago he was dismissed from his 
job because of his name. Now he is doing minor clerical work. My cousin’s sons got 
killed in the war. [As a result] their father his lost job, too. Issues related to the [Zaydi] 
madhab should not have been brought up again. They belong to the past. Besides, not 
                                                          
1125 Dorlian, Mouvance, 148. Interview conducted in April 2007. Personal translation.  
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everybody is a Zaydi. They [the activists] should talk about government corruption rather 
than the madhab. My cousin did some research on the medieval imamate. There were 
three or four imams at a time and each one came up with a different interpretation of the 
Qurʾan. We do not need that sort of thing.1126 
He is deterred by the consequences of the war and the repression faced by the regime that 
punishes sādah collectively or as soon as they perceive any connection to the Houthis. In 
addition, he would prefer the issue of Zaydism to remain in the depth of history rather than to 
be activated again as a distinct identity with its own model of a social order – one which he, 
based on rather superficial information, holds to be inadequate. What he does believe to be 
true in spite of his renunciation of Zaydism, however, is the grievance of regime corruption. 
His view, as it were, is the reverse of the previously stated solidarity and adherence based of 
collective identity despite different opinion: Muhammad agrees with at least part of the 
diagnosis but denies the salience and significance of Zaydi collective identity. Yet, on the 
basis of the existing sources I want to argue that his position appears to be a minority 
perspective, at least among his generation and the successive ones.  
  
Blaming external powers: Anti-US, anti-Israel, and anti-KSA positions 
A female student interviewed in 2007 reproduces matter-of-factly the frame of American and 
Israeli dominance in her assertion of Hussein’s call for an active stance of believers: “Sayyid 
Husayn is right to say that at the time when America and Israel dominate the Arabs and 
Muslims it is not proper to retreat into perfect Zionist circles of knowledge.”1127 
 Visitors of the ‘Jerāḥ ʿAmīqah’ exhibition reflect upon their perception with the following 
reactions:  
I have seen photos and examples and it was a noticed effort from the youth people. 
However, I believe the reality is greater, bigger, harder and more disastrous. The Zio-
American plan is performed with Arabic and Islamic hands and ignorance is one of the 
most important reason.1128 
 
Really deep injuries. And what happened in Saada because of the wars and violation is 
only a clear sign of hatred of the Zionist on the Yemeni people and the Islamic people in 
general. But God is not unmindful of what the wrongdoers do.1129 
While the first commentator regards the Arab/Islamic regimes as guilty of executing the “Zio-
American plan” – as Hussein had framed and as was picked up in the exhibition – the second 
                                                          
1126 Vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 218f. She describes his difficult relationship with his faith and heritage over time.  
1127 Dorlian, Mouvance, 148. Personal translation.  
1128 See: ‘Jerah Amiqa’ exhibition, photo186, digital appendix E. 
1129 Ibid., digital appendix E. The commentator identified himself as “judge”, i.e. well-educated.  
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somewhat unconnectedly holds “the Zionist” immediately responsible (maybe in an 
unreflected response to the just seen exhibits).  
 A comment on one of the Facebook pages by Ansar Allah becomes more explicit in the 
accusations:  
Our enemy the United States and Israel (...) you move the intelligence in Sanaa and other 
Yemeni provinces and the work of explosions and assassinations here and there as it 
happens these days to disturb people and throw the security and safety in [disorder] to 
prove that the Yemeni army and security are unable to bring security to the country so it 
will ask the US government. (...) First we accuse America and Israel [of] all what is 
happening in Yemen. America is the head of evil (...)1130 
Besides this more elaborate position, the page furthermore hosts numerous written 
‘exclamations’ of the slogan with its inherently anti-US and anti-Jewish stance, the prediction 
that “[u]nless we insist on Ansarallah we [will become] clients [of] the Jews and 
Christians”1131, as well as countless abusive revilements against Israelis/Jews/Zionists.  
  More enlightening, however, than a long list of anti-US/anti-Israel statements are the most 
precise specifications of frame resonance. In regard to the KSA’s involvement in Yemen, for 
example, a Zaydi scholar declared: “Saudi Arabia is scared of the Hashemites. They are the 
only group that could directly compete with the Saudi royal family.”1132 This threat towards 
the KSA to him explains their strong anti-sādah and anti-Zaydi engagement – financially and 
ideologically with their offensive export of Wahhabism. Saudi financial resources are 
considered as prolonging the war(s) (or even facilitating them in the first place): “If there is a 
will to stop the war, there will be a solution. But the government wants the war to continue in 
order to continue receiving financial support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”1133 As with 
anti-US and anti-Jewish sentiments, the negative perceptions of the KSA and 
Salafis/Wahhabis find one channel of expression in verbal abuse online. Calls to “destroy the 
Wahhabi criminal”1134 and accusations that “Saudi assassinated Al-Houthi”1135 are among the 
more moderate statements. Nevertheless, the regime remains the central recipient of guilt 
attributions.  
 
 
                                                          
1130 Facebook page ‘Maukaa Ansar Allah’ [‘Ansar Allah site’], comment on February 2, 2014, accessed February 
4, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/ansarallahweb?fref=ts.  
1131 Ibid., comment on January 31, 2014. Other comments from the period (i.e. late 2013/early 2014) also refer to 
the then-focus of Houthi framing with the goal of the ‘liberation of Jerusalem’ among others. 
1132 ICG, “Defusing”, 13. Interview conducted on January 11, 2009.  
1133 Ibid. Same date of interview, but with a different scholar.  
1134 Facebook page ‘Maukaa Ansar Allah’ [‘Ansar Allah site’], comment on January 23, 2014, accessed February 
4, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/ansarallahweb?fref=ts.  
1135 Ibid. Comment on January 21, 2014.  
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Responsibility for Injustice and Violence: Anti-Regime Sentiments 
A Yemeni youth on his blog wrote the following summary about his perception of the ‘Jerāḥ 
ʿAmīqah’ exhibition:  
Phosphorus bombs; bombardment of families in their houses; siege lasting for months; 
torture and abductions; the disappearances of children; all those are few of the inhuman 
crimes that happened in a trail of six wars that were fumed by continuous religious 
provocation and government campaigns. No wonder the Youth Cultural Forum called 
their art forum (...) deep wounds. Up to this day, even though a number of countries 
including the USA, Saudi Arabia, and several others participated and funded those six 
wars, these wounds remain unheard by the people of the world.   
The six wars launched on Sada’a beginning in 2004 through 2010 left severe destruction. 
Even though the Government of Yemen recently apologized for the unnecessary wars that 
were meant to silence a people who were obliged to shout out against the American 
occupations, this apology has not been displayed in complete honesty. The truth about 
what happened needs to be told. Not only that these people’s practices are peaceful in 
using non-violent expression, the first two years before the attacks started over Sada’a 
there were already thousands of illegally imprisoned youth who were unarmed and some 
for only being sympathetic with Ansaruallah (Houthis). The art gallery brought together a 
summary of what women, men, and children had to endure in defending their lives and 
values.1136 
The fronts are clear: The GoY has committed crimes against its peaceful population. It 
illegally and aggressively arrested youth who were part of the people who – legitimately – 
protested non-violently and pushed the region into war. Enemies are labelled, victims created; 
no mention is made, however, of specific Zaydi discrimination (it was downplayed in the 
exhibition). The language is strongly shaped by a rights discourse and the aim of the people 
merely defense. In a nutshell, it’s an exact reproduction of Houthi frames by an arbitrary, yet 
vocal member of the audience, who himself functions as a potential multiplier to a wider 
public (beyond his immediate circle of personal acquaintances). 
 Other voices support the argument that the injustice frame resonated. One Zaydi states 
about the Houthis in late 2009: “Their demands for justice are within the demands of the 
Yemeni nations as a whole”1137, thereby aiming to overcome the special role attributed to 
Zaydis for the sake of a more inclusive, national unit of reference.1138 Commentators on the 
exhibition emphasize it over and again: “What we have seen left in our souls deep injuries 
about the crimes which the regime made against Saada’s people and their supporters.”1139 
                                                          
1136 See: http://www.globalrevolts.blogspot.de/2013/10/jerah-amygh-where-did-we-go-wrong-with.html 
(accessed October 31, 2013).  
1137 King, “Zaydi Revival”, 441. 
1138 HRW quotes a Yemeni judge in voicing a critical comment about the state of justice in regard to the Houthi 
wars: “Our problem is that justice is not working. All arrests are politicized and the course of justice is blocked.” 
HRW, “Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests”, 23.  
1139‘Jerah Amiqa’, comment in guestbook, photo 185, comment 1, see digital appendix E.  
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“[W]hat happened in Saada is one of the most awful war crimes. There is no power but from 
God.”1140 The ‘foreign enemies’’ role is perceived as framed as well:  
I have seen photos and examples (...). However, I believe the reality is greater, bigger, 
harder and more disastrous.1141 The Zio-American plan is performed with Arabic and 
Islamic hands and ignorance is one of the most important reason.1142 
 
Really deep injuries. And what happened in Saada because of the wars and violation is 
only a clear sign of hatred of the Zionist on the Yemeni people and the Islamic people in 
general. But God is not unmindful of what the wrongdoers do.1143 
God as source of justice sides with the people of Sa’ada, who are suffering from oppression, 
and there is a greater purpose involved: “In spite of what happened to them, I am sure God 
will not let all what they suffered be in vain. God is with the oppressed people.”1144 It 
becomes specified in this comment: The ‘greater purpose’ is the end of oppression and a 
peaceful future – which will be reached through the actions of the Houthis:  
The exhibition embodies the amount of destruction that happened to the Yemeni people 
and their souls. It is also a proof of a period full of oppression and the absence of 
democracy. I am sure by the revolution of the youth of Saada [the Houthis] peace and 
prosperity will start soon and the end of all the oppression will be revealed and 
published.1145 
In this particular case, however, a critical view is necessary as to how far the democratic 
involvement of the Houthis at that time might have influenced the perception of their 
democratic disposition. Nevertheless, the constitutive positive tenor remains.  
 Interviews from early 2014 substantiate that the Houthis were able to uphold people’s 
respect. Despite their temporal distance to the wars, these statements (in a similar way as the 
one above) provide evidence of the general perception the interviewed have of the group and 
the direction it takes. A qabili from the governorate al-Jawf, for instance, declared:  
The Huthis have been able to spread in Jawf because of the injustice that exists there. 
Huthis provide security where none existed before. They work honestly with the people 
and focus on fulfilling the people’s needs, like ending revenge killings. The Huthis also 
implement the judgements of local courts. In the north of Yemen, the most important 
thing is to solve problems between people, like revenge killings, and to provide security. 
These are the two things people want most and the Huthis are providing it.1146 
                                                          
1140 Ibid., photo 185, comment 2. 
1141 In fact, a sharifa commented on the overwhelming reality in regard to the depiction: “In spite of all that they 
were not told as I experienced them. My injuries are very deeply buried.” Ibid., photo 220, see digital appendix 
E. 
1142 Ibid., photo 186, see digital appendix E. 
1143 Ibid., photo 189, see digital appendix E.  
1144 Ibid., photo 199, see digital appendix E. 
1145 Ibid., photo 207, see digital appendix E. 
1146 ICG, “Huthis”, 6. Interview conducted in February 2014.  
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The Houthis are evaluated in light of perceived prior injustice and their performance in the 
provision of security and judicial services, i.e. pragmatic criteria. Another qabili puts it quite 
similarly when he says:  
The Huthis went to the squares and spoke for the oppressed. The traditional parties joined 
the revolution too, but now they are in the government and corruption has just shifted to 
their hands. Huthis are not part of this. They are not corrupt.1147 
Their stance and de facto action against corruption were promoted by the Houthis, especially 
from fall 2014 onwards. Their lack of inclusion into the government fostered the image of 
their genuine incorruptibility and created approval; the more so when – as described in the 
above citation – new office holders were allegedly quickly absorbed into the existing 
patronage system. Some ideational valuation stems from a sheikh who holds that:  
Ansar Allah is a Yemeni movement for freedom and dignity. The Yemeni people are 
against the entire corrupt old regime, not just one person [Saleh]. But thus far the GCC 
initiative has preserved the same pattern of corruption. The transition has been a time of 
dividing the spoils between traditional forces.1148 
Throughout the ‘revolution’ the group has managed to hold up their image as (a) close to the 
people, (b) connected with the central revolutionary values of freedom and dignity, and (c) 
incorruptible as mentioned above. If there had been serious objection to their actions during 
the wars, I doubt there would be such a positive image only shortly thereafter. A drastic 
change from the positive, no negative, perception of a movement is likely because major 
expectations are disappointed. The opposite appears less likely, for it would be much more 
problematic to overcome an existing rejection of a group’s behavior and create enough trust 
and credibility in its future consistency of action. Thus, I consider the linking of the Houthis 
with the positive values as an indicator of a principally positive perception during earlier 
years.  
 
Houthi Defensive Use of Violence 
In line with the general resonance of Houthi frames as described above is also their ‘defense 
frame’ as a legitimization strategy resonated among different audiences. A “Zaydi intellectual 
and founder of a Sanaa research institute” is quoted saying that “(…) the Houthis have no 
agenda whatsoever. They never articulated any conditions for peace other than to be left in 
                                                          
1147 Ibid., 7. Interview conducted in February 2014.  
1148 Ibid. Interview conducted in February 2014.  
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peace – not to be attacked and not to have their villages bombed.”1149 A (non-Zaydi) journalist 
affiliated with the YSP expressed a similar opinion: 
Whenever the state declared an end to the fighting, the Huthis immediately stopped. They 
respected the decision and only responded when the army attacked them. Husein al-Huthi 
had no plans of any kind. It is the government and the army which, through their 
mistakes, wrongdoing and violence, gave rise to the rebellion.1150 
As put here, legitimacy is attributed to the actions of the Houthis on the basis that rebellion 
against aggressive violence is justified and that the Houthis are solely in a defensive position 
in the conflict. Blame is attributed solely to the GoY’s actions.   
 Furthermore, Houthi violence is described as selective: “The Huthis have never exercised 
violence against neutral people; they have only attacked people who were supporting the 
government and collaborating with the army.”1151 The use of violence against non-immediate 
army members again is legitimized by anti-Houthi actions of the targeted individuals and 
groups, i.e. by declaring it defensive.   
 There is evidence suggesting that the more fighting took place, the more destruction of the 
region resulted, and that the more civilians got killed, the more people joined into the fighting 
on the side of the Houthis. Although, this was not necessarily due to religious reasons or their 
stance as a whole but to the intensification of grievances and repression, the source of which 
was the government. In the words of a GPC member of the governments Consultative 
Council:  
The Houthis seem to have a lot of followers, not for religious reasons but because the 
population feels discriminated against and excluded from development policies. 
Unfortunately, the destruction of villages has not helped fight that impression.1152 
Since these experiences fit well the Houthi frames of attributing aggression to the GoY and of 
portraying Zaydis (i.e. the majority of Northerners) as victims, it confirmed and fortified its 
‘empirical credibility’.  
The Necessity to Fight 
Proving the resonance of immediate calls for violence is difficult. The main reason lies in the 
prolonged inaccessibility of the war region to journalists and scholars and the resulting lack of 
contact to Houthi fighters. Fighters themselves did not produce written reactions like other 
                                                          
1149 ICG, “Defusing”, 12. Interview conducted on January 14, 2009.  
1150 Ibid. Interview conducted on January 17, 2009.  
1151 Ibid., 14. Interview conducted on January 11, 2009.  
1152 Ibid., 13. 
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segments of the population cited above, due to lack of alphabetization, access to media, and 
potential lack of interest in external communication.  
 The slogan, however, deserves reflection in this regard; its meaning needs distinction. 
While it has one level of meaning on which it merely serves as an icon of common identity, 
abstracted from its content,1153 two more should not be overlooked: On a second level, it 
voices deep discontent with foreign intermeddling in Yemen and implies the need and 
impetus of those chanting or otherwise citing it to act; it does not imply, however, immediate, 
severely violent action. Lastly, a third level expresses the will to use violence to attack an 
enemy that is in some way or another tied to the decried US/Israeli adversary (i.e. the allied 
GoY, the KSA, and – related to the latter – the Wahhabis); it is a war cry.  
 Manifestations of the first type include for example ‘digital chanting’: During April 2014, I 
witnessed on a number of occasions how apparent Houthi adherents opened group chats on 
Facebook and exchanged little more than the slogan. Group size varied between less than ten 
to more than 25 chat members; all of them had previously joined Houthi-affiliated Facebook 
pages/groups such as ‘Mawqaa Ansar Allah’ (‘Ansar Allah Site’)1154, ‘Jeish Ansar Allah al-
Iliktrouni’ (‘Electronic Soldiers of Ansar Allah’)1155, or ‘Ṣarkhah fi wajh al-mustakirīn’ (‘A 
Scream in the Face of the Arrogants’)1156. The few other components of these seemingly 
regular practices included blessings of the Houthi leadership. Chats were short, for in a few 
minutes at maximum everyone had once or repeatedly ‘chanted’ (i.e. written) the slogan in the 
chat; after that, it was closed. The limited character of the encounter, the mere focus on 
reciprocal assurance of presence, and a shared background and view assert the argument of 
the irrelevance of the slogan’s content; commonality is the main theme.  
 Exemplary for the second type are rallies organized by the group. The participants are 
united by their general grievances, blame for which they attribute among others to foreign 
interference. Chanting the slogan is thus an expression of discontent, yet general in nature. 
Since a wide array of grievances can be attributed in that way, the hurdles to chanting are low. 
Besides, when a crowd shouts, social pressures potentially push more ambivalent individuals 
to join in anyways.  
  In the context of martyrs’ celebrations, the meaning is more difficult to decipher and can 
only be speculated about. The chanting is embedded in emotional speech and in statements of 
                                                          
1153 For a convincing elaboration of the slogan as identity component see: Pottek, “Anfang”, 112–119. Salmoni 
et al., Regime, and the US Embassy in their cables (see Wikileaks, “Who are the Houthis?”).  
1154 See Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/ansarallahweb?fref=ts (accessed May 5, 2015). Refounded 
in 2015.  
1155 See Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/ansarallaharmy (accessed May 5, 2015). Refounded in 2015 
after first foundation in February 2014. 
1156 See Facebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/alsrkhah/?fref=ts (accessed May 5, 2015).  
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pride in the martyrdom of individuals, which are heroicized and to whom succession is 
promised. In the laden atmosphere created at such events, the chanting becomes equally laden 
with emotions and transmits again an emotional, hostile message. 
 The slogan as genuine war cry is de facto related to the fighters and/or the battlefields. 
Video capture from the seizure of war booty displays emotional fighters enthusiastically 
shouting the slogan. More interesting and relevant, however, are recordings by individuals 
who are watching scenes like Saudi attacks or Houthi-initiated explosions and chanting the 
slogan in the background. Those scenes are less posed and more likely to convey spontaneous 
support for armed action. Nevertheless, these interpretations unfortunately remain unflanked 
by explicit immediate statements due to a lack of sources.  
 Social media comments during a later stage (early 2014) mirror praise for jihadists and 
militant statements much clearer: “Peace upon the mujāhid Mr. Abdulmalik Badr al-Din. May 
God protect him and a tribute to all the mujāhidīn who were victorious for the vulnerable 
against extremist groups.”1157 “May God kill the Jews!”1158 “Death to America and its 
[Yemeni] allies!”1159 “May God fasten Ansar Allah and provide them with soldiers!”1160 
“Down with the government of hypocrisy and corruption!”1161 “Bless the mujāhidīn! God is 
great!”1162 “Oh God, destroy targets of our security and our stability and allied with the 
Americans and the Jews!”1163 It might be discussed if they are to be attributed rather in the 
middle or on the openly pro-violence end of the spectrum, however, support for militant 
action is at least verbally provided over time.  
 
7.1.5. Frame Contestation 
There was no internal frame contestation we know about. The dominant contester was the 
regime. Beside it, solely two more parties are worth mentioning:1164 First, some prominent 
Zaydi ʿulamāʾ, who in the beginning warned of Hussein as erring and distanced themselves 
from him in a manifesto, but who quickly revoked their statement after GoY attacks against 
                                                          
1157 Facebook page ‘Maukaa Ansar Allah’ [‘Ansar Allah site’], comment on February 2, 2014, accessed February 
4, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/ansarallahweb?fref=ts.  
1158 Ibid. Comment on January 26, 2014. 
1159 Ibid. Comment on January 30, 2014. 
1160 Ibid. Comment on January 29, 2014. 
1161 Ibid. Comment on January 23, 2014. 
1162 Ibid. Comment on February 1, 2014. 
1163 Ibid. Comment on February 2, 2014. 
1164 Salafi counterframing is not considered separately for it either consists of a simple continuation of prior 
contestation of Zaydism and its revivalist activities, or coincides with regime framing to such a degree that 
attunement appears probable. Its distinctness emanates rather from its natural audience and the additional modes 
of distribution along religious channels available to Salafis (but not to the regime).  
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Hussein and the region. They did so not merely on the basis of army aggression, but more so 
since they had been used to legitimize these acts. After the manifesto had appeared 
approximately two weeks before the violent escalation in June 2004, the government had 
quickly taken on. It claimed the manifesto to be an “equivalent to religious approval for the 
military campaign in Saada”1165 and had it republished in regime press shortly after the 
commencement of fighting. The coopted scholars reacted with two further publications in 
which they opposed the GoY’s violent incursion and underlined that it had been a doctrinal 
dispute with Hussein and nothing more.1166 After this incident there were no more equally 
public contestations despite a continuation of tensions or disagreements between the Houthis 
and Zaydi ʿulamāʾ. The impact of the brief counterframing episode can thus be said to be 
marginal and limited to that one specific context.  
 Second is Mohammad Izzan, the prior companion of Hussein and the other revivalists 
during the 1990s and BY. Izzan was arrested by the regime after a return from Lebanon in 
July 2004 and kept in detention until April 2005. Thereafter, he distinctly and vocally 
distanced himself from the Houthis and repeatedly denounced them, among others, in the ‘26 
September’ newspaper of the armed forces.1167 In 2007 he became head of a radio station in  
Sa’ada city and inter alia responsible for anti-Houthi programs.1168 Hence, his (probably 
forced) co-optation is evident and his Houthi frame contestation can be classified as an 
expansion of GoY frame contestation, i.e. not as stemming from an independent actor.  
 His framing is directed against Hussein as a person, blames the Houthis for the violence in 
the North, and relativizes Zaydi oppression and discrimination:  
Husayn wanted to end the curricula of Youth Believer so we had enough of him. He had 
an oversized ego, [he] was a visionary. I was against it, but when the war began in Saada, 
the state did not distinguish between supporters and detractors of Husayn in the Believer 
Youth. And so it was that I was[imprisoned]. This indiscriminate answer of the state that 
the majority of those that were against Husayn became solidarity with him, but I opted for 
abstention.1169 
Beyond the personal critique of Hussein, the citation furthermore stresses the alleged impact 
of government repression on Houthi group solidarity, which intensified as a result. This might 
partly explain the limited contestation from within. Hussein’s legitimacy was moreover 
disputed on a doctrinal level:  
                                                          
1165 Dorlian, “Saada War”, 196.  
1166 For the whole account see ibid., 195f. 
1167 Article by Muhammad Izzan: “We disagree with Hussein Badr al-Din because he wanted to give up on our 
goals and change our curricula”, 26 September, March 15, 2007, accessed April 7, 2015, 
http://www.26sep.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=24535.  
1168 Dorlian, Mouvance, 200ff., Haykel, “Rebellion”, 200. 
1169 Interview Muhammad Izzan with Samy Dorlian on January 28, 2007. Cited in: Dorlian, Mouvance, 201. 
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We took a look at these Malazim and found in them much which we had never read and 
with which we did not agree which impelled us to issue a communiqué and to attempt to 
block and isolate him as he did not represent us and we did not support him or bear 
responsibility for him or his followers. Others besides us among the ʿulamāʾ did the same 
and we entered into disputes with them... up until the beginning of hostilities in 2004.1170 
By using the plural “we”, Izzan presents himself as speaking for a group of opponents of 
Hussein and likewise mentions ʿulamāʾ siding with them, thus supporting his stance through 
the reputation of religious authorities. His accusations included ‘fitna’, i.e. the creation of 
strife or sedition among Muslims.1171 Such religious division is among the gravest possible 
denunciations and was among the same lines that were taken by the regime (as will be 
described below). The ideological battle that was being fought was therefore about religious 
truth or ‘true Zaydism’1172 in a republic in which Zaydi identity as a whole was still contested 
and marginalized. The counterframing thus fits well into the prior politics of accepting the 
existence of Zaydism generally (by including Izzan and his moderate, co-opted position) 
while simultaneously upholding wide-ranging suspicion against the creed and its potentially 
destructive impact on the Islamic community.  
 The range and resonance of Izzan’s counterframing are hard to estimate; there are no 
separate sources and since it was closely linked to GoY counterframing it cannot be reliably 
distinguished from the overall resonance towards the ideas spread therein. Its significance 
rather emanates from his role and prestige as a Zaydi revivalist, which was employed by the 
regime to catalyze anti-Houthi sentiment among an audience naturally uninclined to react 
positively to mere GoY framing. The same strategy was employed with Abdullah al-Houthi, 
the son of Hussein. After imprisonment, he, in a much similar fashion to Izzan’s, took 
position against armed struggle and Houthi frames.1173 Overall though, he was less vocal than 
Izzan.  
 Government counterframing had five leading dimensions: an identity dimension according 
to which the Houthis were ‘alien’ and ‘colonialist’; a political dimension rendering them 
‘anti-republican’ and ‘separatist’; a religious dimension that accused them of ‘sectarianism’, 
‘fitna’ and ‘erring’; a social dimension portraying them as ‘anti-people’; and a legal 
dimension that vilified them as ‘criminals’ and ‘terrorists’. Many times the framing combines 
two or more aspects, thus making it difficult to exclusively assign it to merely one dimension. 
                                                          
1170 Lux, “Last Imam”, 377.  
1171 Izzan, “We disagree”. The implication is “schism (...) in which the purity of a believer’s faith is in grave 
danger”. Gardet, L., “Fitna." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015. <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/ 
encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/fitna-SIM_2389, accessed May 2, 2015. 
1172 Cf. Dorlian, Mouvance, 201.  
1173 Salmoni et al., Regime, 309.  
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Such combination not only aligns the various strands of the counterframing, but also aims to 
foster the impact beyond single-stranded attributions by mutually increasing resonance. 
Additionally, quite a number of more or less far-fetched claims were brought up, however, 
they by and large quickly vanished. 
 ‘Alien’1174 and ‘colonialist’ ascriptions tackle the two separate but linked lines of identity 
defamation of the Houthis: They were on the one hand depicted as Iranian proxies in a Sunni-
Shiʿa conflict and on the other as foreign colonizers equal to the British in the South. A 
government representative in early 2009 described the alleged role Iran played in Houthi 
armament:  
Despite their denial and the fact they say that they are against foreign intervention, the 
Iranians fund the Huthis, for example through hawzas (prestigious Shiite religious 
seminaries) and charities. Furthermore, presenters or Iranian radio and television 
programs call for support for the Huthis and refer to them as Twelver Shiites. (...) 
Iranians are not arming the Huthis. The weapons they use are Yemeni. Most actually 
come from fighters [government soldiers and allied militia members] who fought against 
the socialists during the 1994 war and then sold them.1175 
He is trying to make the point of mediate financing by Iran, contradictory to numerous earlier, 
and some later, insistences that Iran was immediately supplying the Houthis with weapons. In 
any case, the alleged Iranian support is financial as well as ideological, whereby the 
ideological component is rhetorically linked with the claim of the rebels being Twelver 
Shiites as the Iranians, thus adding a religious dimension of negatively attributed 
otherness.1176 Salafi media took up a related strand when they charged them with “secret plans 
to spread the Iranian revolution”1177 imputing ideas of a radical religious overthrow to their 
adversaries. In accordance with the religious tensions at the core of their enmity, the 
counterframing of the Salafis defines them as ‘religious other’. A more political version 
around a very similar core narrative was made by the Vice Minister for Security and Defense 
in regard to the BY:  
The Believing Youth started their activities under different names in the 1980s in the 
context of the Iranian revolution. They were trained in Iran during the Ayatollah 
                                                          
1174 Cf. Salmoni et al., Regime, 169ff. See also the quote of the former editor of the pro-government newspaper 
‘Al-Mithaq’ who called the Houthis a “foreign conspiracy” against the “patriotic flesh”. Al-Gumhur, April 18, 
2009, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 25. 
1175 Ali al-Anissi, head of Bureau of National Security, in an interview with the ICG on January 14, 2009. ICG, 
“Defusing”, 12.  
1176 The mausoleum for Hussein, for example, was also compared to that of Khomeini in Tehran. Al-Shumu’a, 
May 9, 2009, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 74. 
1177 Title of an article in the Salafist monthly magazine Al-Muntada in April 2005, cited in: ICG, “Defusing”, 9. 
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Khomeini’s era with the objective of spreading the revolution. Between that time and 
2004, the Houthis prepared themselves to launch operations against the state.1178 
It stresses the long hand and long-term planning of the alleged conspiracy of Iran against the 
Yemeni state: About 20 years before the actual outbreak of armed conflict is purported as the 
cradle of Iranian involvement in Yemen through proxies – an argument which potentially 
emphasizes the cunning of the enemy. 
 A heterogeneous accusation linking religious and national aspects can be found in the ‘26 
September’ newspaper in regard to the Houthis’ celebration of ʿEid al-Ghadīr. It is referred to 
as “alien to the Islamic creed and the Yemeni people” and to “engender mischief and break 
national unity”.1179 
 Based on an analysis of late 2010 speeches and editorials, King finds the imamate to be 
“consistently, almost formulaically, equalized with British colonialism in the South”.1180 He 
for example cites a congratulatory phone call by Saleh to high officials on Independence Day 
in which the president referred to “the legacies of the loathsome imamate and oppressive 
colonialism”.1181 In a very similar fashion, the defense minister praised the revolutionary 
martyrs “liberating our people from the bygone system of the clerical and racist imamate and 
the loathsome colonialism”.1182 This shows how versions of the ‘colonialism frame’ as the 
ascription of ‘being foreign’ are used on both sides – the Houthis’ and the GoY’s – to 
discredit the respective other. It suggests that attributions of colonialism and foreignness have 
been perceived by both parties as powerful categories to influence sentiments; they are 
presumed to be salient enough among the audience to reach them and impact them.  
 In the political dimension the republic and unity are the central values the regime resorts to 
in its contestation of Houthi frames. The group is portrayed as confronting both the 
republic,1183 which an earlier generation of Yemenis had fought hard to establish as well as 
national unity, that was equally hard-won and lies at the basis of the nation. It thus questions 
or rather threatens the state and the nation in their essence: The goal of the Houthis, according 
to the counterframes, is to reinstate the imamate with its attributes of “ugliness of this horrible 
backwardness, total ignorance, lethal isolation and abominable authority, as well as injustice 
                                                          
1178 Ibid., 11. The interview was conducted on January 11, 2009. The ICG annotates how “the accusations are not 
adequately sourced and often come from unidentified institutions [and how] overall, evidence appeared 
incomplete and biased.” 
1179 Cited in: Winter, “Ansar”, 108; see also: Pottek, “Anfang”, 74. 
1180 King, “Zaydi Revival”, 420.  
1181 Ibid.  
1182 Ibid. 
1183 Cf. Salmoni et al., Regime, 176ff.  
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and misery”1184. Government media and officials accordingly refer to the Houthis as 
‘mutamaridūn’ (‘rebels’)1185, ‘imamyīūn’ (‘imamists’)1186, “remnants of the past royalist 
imamic regime disguised as Shi’i”1187, ‘rajʿyīūn’ (‘reactionaries’)1188, and adherents of 
‘ʿunṣuryīa’ (‘racism’)1189 and ‘sulalaīah’ (‘dynastic rule’)1190. Their actions are described as 
khurūj,1191 as “hanker[ing] for personal dictatorship and the racialist imamic regime”1192. The 
dichotomy1193 that is created consists of backward, elitist1194, exclusive, and anti-
democratic1195 Houthis versus the progressive, revolutionary, inclusive, and democratic 
regime.1196 Houthi practices and Hussein himself are equally portrayed as breeding problems 
for the state and nation (employed interchangeably in an attempt to make them co-
constitutive, hence inextricable in their current form): Saleh e.g. in a speech in July 2004 
declared the slogan inacceptable not on the basis that is was anti-US and anti-Israel, but on 
the grounds that “it harmed national interests”. At the same time he emphasized how he 
himself frequently criticized US and Israeli politics, in an attempt to gain reputation for doing 
so (a popular sentiment which – he apparently felt – needed an outlet) while vilifying the 
method the Houthis had chosen based on the harm to the nation (i.e. everyone).1197 Hussein 
                                                          
1184 Al-Thawra Daily, September 25, 2010, cited in: King, “Zaydi Revival”, 420.  
1185 26 September, July 15, 2005, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 25. The speaking title of the article was: ‘“Al-
tamarrud al-imami fi Saada: Istihdaf li-l-nizam al-gumhuri wa li-munjazat al-thawra wa-l-wahda” [“The 
imamic rebellion in Saada: Targeting the republican regime and the gains of the revolution and unity”]. 
1186 Ibid.  
1187 Akhbar al-Yawm, April 11, 2005, cited in: vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 203.  
1188 Hamidi, “Inscriptions’”, 174.  
1189 ‘Racism’ here implies the adherence to a social order dominated by Hashemites to the disadvantages and 
discrimination of other social strata. The ‘racism’ therein is privilege due to birthright. Al-Gumhurriyya, May 5, 
2009, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 25f.  
1190 Ibid.  
1191 A former minister and member of the Consultative Council e.g. is quoted saying: “At one point, the Huthis 
felt they had enough power to rise up (khurūj) against the central state and declare the president unfit for power.” 
ICG, “Defusing”, 10. Interview conducted on January 12, 2009. 
1192 Saleh in a speech on the “Day of Victory for Unity” on July 7, 2004, Akhbar al-Yawm, July 8, 2004, cited in: 
Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 174.  
1193 Similar King, “Zaydi Revival”, 421; Pottek, “Anfang”, 24f. 
1194 Hamidi holds that official statements and media recommenced an anti-Hashemite rhetoric “reminiscent of 
the 1960s” which vilified them as elitist monarchist strata of society. Before 2004, this kind of stance would 
have been considered inappropriate for it undermined the narrative of republican unity. Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 
175, n. 62. As an example, he cites a member of the political intelligence who in a newspaper (Al-Balagh, May 
3, 2006) threatened to “annihilate all Hashemites”. Ibid., 175. 
1195 Cf. ICG, “Defusing”, 10; Al-Thawra, March 29, 2005, cited in: Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 175. King poses that 
Saleh tried to “remove any separation between his person, the Republic and a unified Yemen” in order to 
stabilize his rule over time. This direction is subtly present in the undertone of the framing attempts as well. 
King, “Zaydi Revival”, 441.  
1196 Pottek cites an article in which a leading member of the GPC elaborated in the backwardness and ignorance 
Yemenis suffered from before the revolution and the achievements thereafter, among which are armament, 
knowledge due to universities and institutes of art, science, and schools. The pluralist political system created all 
this and is at the root of the people’s emancipation. Therefore “it is impossible to return to an imamic system or 
the era of abhorrent separation”. Al-Gumhuriyya, May 5, 2009, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 35, n. 141. 
1197 26 September, July 15, 2004, cited in: ICG, “Defusing”, 3.  
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was accused of lowering the Yemeni flag in exchange for his own1198 or the Hizbullah flag1199 
and as having made the daʿwah, i.e. the call for allegiance in khurūj with the aim to become 
imam, making him a ‘pretender’ (‘da’i’)1200.  
  This direction of framing has proven constant over time; it was still found during the more 
recent phases of Houthi political participation in 2013 and 2014. ICG interviews provide 
strong citations by leading figures that highlight the above profile of the group even in light of 
Houthi participation in the NDC. Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, for instance, holds that:  
[T]he outcomes of the dialogue – building a civil state – are dangerous for the Huthis, so 
they will want it to fail. This is why they are fighting in the north now. Their real goal is 
to have a state that is ruled by the Imam. (...) The deal is that the Huthis will rule the 
north and the southern movement will rule the south.1201 
He still propagates the negative impact of the Houthis, their striving for an imamate state, and 
their actions against unity. Similar voices could be heard from “sceptics from across the 
spectrum” (GPC, Islah, independents etc.); among others they hold that they are “by nature 
discriminatory against non-Hashemites” and pose an “existential challenge to the state that 
must be faced with force” – an opinion articulated during Houthi political inclusion!1202 The 
same rigorous perception is shared by the presidential adviser Abdulkarim al-Eryani:  
[T]he Huthis are not really reinventing themselves. They are living with the legacy of the 
past [the Hashemites’ privileged position under the imamate] and only trying to coexist in 
the present. Their current politics is still too much guided by a past that is not compatible 
with modern Yemen.1203 
The same ‘incompatibility’ is also constructed in the religious dimension of the 
counterframing.  
 A conversion from Zaydism to Twelver Shiʿa is among the dominant accusations1204 
targeting Houthi legitimacy in the eyes of the Zaydi population. Others pose a distancing from 
Zaydism in other regards, e.g. that “Hussein al-Houthi hijacked Zaydism just like Osama bin 
Laden hijacked Islam”1205 or that they were “unbelievers” and “polytheists”1206. Hatred of 
Sunnis is another theme:  
                                                          
1198 Mounasser, “Mediators”.  
1199 Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 175; Winter, “Conflict”, 107. 
1200 26 September, April 23, 2009, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 32. 
1201 ICG, “Huthis”, 13. Interview conducted on November 7, 2013. The reference to fighting refers to the Houthi-
Salafi clashes in Dammaj and surroundings in fall 2013.  
1202 Ibid. Cf. Salmoni et al., Regime, 171ff. 
1203 Ibid., 14. Interview conducted on April 14, 2014. 
1204 Ibid., ii, 13; ICG, “Defusing”, 9f. 
1205 Ibid., 11. Interview conducted on January 13, 2009. 
1206 Stated by Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. He also referred to the Houthis as “forces of darkness”. See Hamidi, 
“Inscriptions”, 174. 
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We cannot allow Shi’i teaching in the country because it will teach hatred [of the Sunnis]. 
We do not want a divided society; we need to be unified. We no longer need debates 
about the legitimacy of rule [in the earlier centuries of Islam] and about what happened 
over a millennium ago. We do not need people who curse Mu’awiya. My grandfather 
used to curse Mu’awiya twenty times a day.1207 
A similar statement was made by 22 Saudi ʿulamāʾ in 2008 who labelled the Houthis 
‘rāfiḍah’ (‘rejectionists’) and warned Sunnis not to trust Shi’ites because they created enmity 
among Muslims and denied Sunnis their rights (as could be seen in Iran and Iraq, where they 
were ruling).1208 Fighting them was justified by the KSA as jihad against “mulḥidūn” 
(‘heretics’).1209 Saleh used the term ‘jihad’ during a speech the same month; the Houthis were 
“idolaters who drift away from the community of Muslims”.1210 Even harsher, Saudis and 
Salafis moreover indicted them of having “abandoned religion” altogether. A Salafist 
pamphlet for instance held that there was a multitude of theological errors in Zaydi doctrine 
generally1211, another magazine that “[i]f the armed forces have a great role to play in 
eradicating the Huthi sedition, the intellectual forces must eradicate its roots”1212. In sum, this 
dimension of counterframing was intended to outlaw the Houthis in religious terms, the most 
value-laden dimension, to mobilize strong emotions and opinions against them. It was a rather 
drastic measure by the GoY for it had the consequence of fostering sectarian sentiments 
among the population, which were previously inexistent, and which carried the danger of 
leading to long-term unrest. However, considering Saleh’s standard practice of posing various 
actors and groups against each other to his own advantage, it was a gamble typical for his 
politics.  
 The social dimensions were essentially aiming to vilify the group as anti-people in that 
they were blamed for the wars and the resulting destruction and other consequences.1213 A 
senior official sanctified the military actions by saying:  
No government wants war and ours, like any other, wants its citizens to live in peace. 
Since 2004, there have been various efforts and as many as seven or eight mediation 
committees, but these all failed. Military action was the last resort.1214 
                                                          
1207 Senior government official in reference to educational policies with the goal of equalizing madhahib. Vom 
Bruck, “Regimes”, 197, personal communication 2005.  
1208 Hamidi, “Inscriptions’”, 172. 
1209 Al-Ahram, November 19, 2009, cited in: vom Bruck, “Regimes”, 204. 
1210 Ibid., 218. Rumors also held that Hussein had a Qurʾan “different from everybody else’s”. Hamidi, 
“Inscriptions”, 175. 
1211 “Zaydism in Yemen: An Open Discussion’, published by the Al-Kalima al-Tayyiba Center (2008), cited in: 
ICG, “Defusing”, 9. 
1212 Al-Muntada, April 2005, cited in: ibid.  
1213 Cf. Salmoni et al., Regime, 174ff. 
1214 ICG, “Defusing”, 10. Interview with Rashad al-Alimi, conducted on January 11, 2009. Parallel to that, the 
GoY sought to present itself as pro-people. See Salmoni et al., Regime, 178ff. 
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The Houthis are recurrently presented as those responsible for the failure of mediation and 
peace efforts, due to their “war rage”1215, the repeated incitement of the insurgency by Badr 
al-Din and Abdullah al-Razzami1216, their “oppressing communities and households”1217, and 
the violence they employ against the people. “Waylaying”, “assassination”, and “destruction 
and looting of public and private property” are among the specifications of their anti-social 
acts.1218 Their violent intentions are moreover responsible for the delay in government-
sponsored reconstruction and for the fact that thousands are still homeless, die, or losing 
everything they have.1219 Overall, the group is claimed to be responsible for the misery of the 
people living in the war zones.1220 
 The legal dimension ties in with these allegations. Accusations against the BY were still 
moderate, but already carried the label of illegality:  
The Believing Youth came into the picture as an anti-Salafi group. Gradually, it deepened 
its political involvement and took advantage of the international situation to mobilise 
support. The government intervened to stop some demonstrations because they were 
illegal. The conflict escalated when the Believing Youth asked people in Saada to stop 
paying taxes and started interfering in government affairs.1221 
According to its own statements, the GoY had at a certain point asked the UN to declare the 
BY a terrorist organization (this was dismissed).1222 Extending its allegations to the Houthis, 
the regime held them to be “terrorists” preparing “attacks against Western interests, (...) [and] 
to kidnap foreign diplomats” as well as the internal acts of “spraying acid on unveiled women, 
poisoning water reserves, murdering officials and bombing public places”1223. These claims 
obviously aimed at international support and at furthermore defaming the group. Immediate 
                                                          
1215 26 September, July 6, 2009, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 34. 
1216 ICG, “Defusing”, 3 (in regard to 2005), 22 (interview with senior GoY official, conducted on January 7, 
2009). 
1217 26 September, April 2, 2009, cited in: ibid., 25. HRW has documented statements according to which the 
Houthis demanded pledges from the population. HRW, “Invisible Civilians”, 24. 
1218 26 September, June 20, 2009, cited in: Pottek, “Anfang”, 34.  
1219 Al-Gumhur, April 18, 2009, cited in: ibid., 37. 
1220 One issue that was not taken up by the GoY in its counterframing was the kind of ‘rule’ the Houthis exerted 
in the areas they dominated. The image presented by international observers is ambiguous: One director of an 
international NGO holds that they imposed very strict rules such as prohibiting male teachers for girls (with the 
consequence of preventing them from attending school), he simultaneously emphasizes how their involvement in 
local conflict solving make them appear in a positive light to the population and “gain the community’s trust” 
(ICG, “Defusing”, 11; interview conducted on January 13, 2009). Another humanitarian worker on the contrary 
states that his organization has “been experiencing problems in some of the areas controlled by the rebels as 
well. The Houthis are seen by the population as very brutal. They intimidate people they consider neutral 
including through kidnapping.” (Ibid., 14; interview conducted on January 5, 2009). It remains obscure why the 
regime did not attempt to exploit the fact of the apparently overtly strict ‘Houthi regime’ to its own favor.  
1221 Senior government official. Ibid., 10. Interview conducted on January 7, 2009. For claims about the more 
recent phase of 2013/2014 cf. ICG, “Huthis”, 6. Here the emphasis is on illegal detention of and attacks on 
political enemies.  
1222 Senior government official. ICG, “Defusing”, 11. Interview conducted on January 11, 2009.  
1223 Ibid. Also 3; 25.  
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Western backing failed to appear;1224 Yemeni sources on the other hand likewise lack 
evidence of resonance of this specific frame.  
 Lastly, there were some claims of little credibility, such as ‘the Houthis as agents of 
international freemasonry’1225 and else. Additionally, rumors were widespread. However, 
both did not seriously affect the population’s position towards the group in a noticeable 
manner.  
 
Counterframe Distribution 
In comparison to Houthi frame distribution which could rely on numerous traditional, 
culturally embedded means of communication as well as more professional media channels, 
regime frame distribution was in a clear disadvantage: It could merely access official media 
and institutions but was to a large extent excluded from the highly effective unofficial 
channels such as qat chews, audio recordings, networks based on kinship, qabila, religious 
groups, age cohorts and else. Accordingly, the counterframing was spread through state media 
(print, radio, TV, later websites), through the curricula of teaching institutions, loyal religious 
scholars (others were replaced)1226, the distribution of special leaflets in certain areas in the 
North1227, and in the form of speeches and interviews of government officials and Saleh 
himself. Complementary to these measures, the GoY furthermore sought to limit pro-Houthi 
stances as related frame distribution by repression towards journalists and other potentially 
detrimental actors, media blockage, and ostentatious trials of Houthi members and 
sympathizers.1228 Overall, however, the regime could not keep up with the complex spectrum 
of distributary mechanisms of its adversary.  
 
Countering the Counterframing  
How, then, did the Houthis react towards the regime’s counterframing? Regarding the most 
common and acknowledged allegation of support from Iran and a close ideological linkage 
based on common Shiʿa belief, Yahya al-Houthi in an interview in 2009 said that:  
                                                          
1224 A US intelligence report notes that despite the militant slogan there were no cases of immediate anti-US 
action taken by the Houthis. Based on that they were evaluated to pose no threat at that point in time. Wikileaks, 
“Who are the Houthis?”. 
1225 This and other implausible assertions were spread by a newspaper close to army officers. Al-Shumu’a, April 
21, 2005, cited in: ICG, “Defusing’”, 26.  
1226 For example, a leaflet in which prominent (Sunni) ulama denounce the Houthis as ‘rafida’, their ‘fitna’, and 
the danger they pose to the umma, and legitimize violent action against them. See Salmoni et al., Regime, 175.  
1227 Salmoni et al. present a leaflet proclaiming that the Houthis dressed as women to cover up assassinations – a 
culturally inacceptable behavior, the allegation of which is meant to delegitimize the rebels as dishonorable. 
Ibid., 177. 
1228 Ibid., 168ff., 181. 
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Iran plays no role whatsoever. It is only Westerners, Saudis and the Yemeni government 
that accuse it of involvement. In fact, we do not need the Iranians in any way, as Zaydis 
have their own symbols, references and reasons to fight, and these are sufficient to wage 
the rebellion.1229 
This was the line they took throughout the whole conflict up to late 2014 when an approach 
towards Iran occurred in the wake of taking over ever more government duties.  
 In a similar manner they denied any intentions of reestablishing the imamate. On their 
website they declared: “The authority’s accusations about the imamate are just a media war 
(...) We are not asking for positions, we are asking for rights and justice. The essence of the 
crisis is political.”1230 And Yahya highlighted in an interview that they adapted to the will of 
the people: Since the people wanted democracy “we do democracy”.1231 Furthermore, they 
were responsive to allegations of buying weapons from the army and having received support 
from the government in the times of the BY; they denied both, at least to a large degree. In 
regard to weapon acquisition Yahya admitted few buys from the army, whereas the major part 
stemmed from stealing and seizure in battle.1232 They attempted to refute any contacts 
between themselves and the GoY that could in any way be interpreted as cooptation in order 
to undermine any allegations in that direction. By doing so, they strengthened their credibility, 
a component of their framing they held in high esteem; rightly so, as we have seen in the 
resonance: quotes from their audience show that their credibility was high and based to 
significant parts on their incorruptibility.  
 The remaining aspects were seldom responded to directly; they were, however, countered 
independently in Houthi framing as described. 
 
Zaydi ʿulamāʾ voiced some reaction towards the GoY counterframing attempts. Since the 
following were neither members of the Houthi movement nor coopted by the regime, their 
position takes a middle ground, but still deserves some distinction from an uninvolved 
audience. A year into the armed phase, a number of those who had accidentally provided 
legitimacy to the government’s military campaign in the very beginning due to their 
positioning against Hussein, published another statement in which they condemned “the 
military campaign ‘against the citizens and the weak’”1233: 
We assure the president (may God protect him) that the situation would not have reached 
this point had it not been for the intriguers and individuals out for their own ends [i.e. the 
                                                          
1229 Quote from an interview with ICG (ICG, “Defusing’, 12, n. 75). 
1230 Cited in: Wikileaks, “Who are the Houthis?”.  
1231 Interview with Pottek, February 3, 2009. Pottek, “Anfang”, 118.  
1232 ICG, “Defusing”, 16. Interview conducted on February 3, 2009. 
1233 Al-Balagh, June 23, 2005, cited in: Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 174, n. 53.  
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Salafis, T.G.] who are trying to turn people away from [their loyalty to] the president and 
[thus] prejudice him against them. What these individuals want is to spread dissension 
and hate. One hopes that the president (may God protect him) will not support them or be 
pleased by them.1234 
The blame is attributed to a third party, the Salafis, thereby diplomatically clearing the 
Houthis as well as the GoY. The reverence towards the president enables them to take this 
position and makes it easier to reach out to an audience that does not wish to offend the state. 
Another prominent Zaydi scholar who took an intermediate position, Yahya al-Daylami, 
denied that Houthi actions had anything to do with khurūj:  
It wasn’t announced as hurug. Rather, [the Houthis] said with total clarity that the 
President of the Republic is Ali Abd Allah Salih and that our Constitution is the Yemeni 
Constitution. They didn’t undertake the hurug. If it were the hurug, then they would have 
denied the presidency and regime.1235 
 
The Resonance of Regime Counterframes 
Among the Yemeni population some regime counterframes resonated very well while others 
appear to have dissolved. Iranian support for the Houthis and their doctrinal closeness was the 
component that resonated best and was hardly disputed.1236 On social media sites, the group is 
regularly reviled as Iranian proxy1237, Twelver Shiites/Jaafari, or magi.1238 The khurūj 
allegations are less present in this context, however, they were still a dominant theme in 
describing the Houthis; the same accounts for the reinstatement of the imamate. Even in 2014, 
for instance, a Yemeni academic summed up the goals of the Houthis as perceived by him in 
the following manner:  
The Huthis are an ethnically based [Hashemite], armed movement that strives to bring 
back the rule they lost after the 1962 revolution. The new element of the movement is the 
hidden Iranian agenda. They want to bring back the rule of the Hashemites, but not 
through Zaydi principles. They say they are Zaydi, but their hidden agenda is a Twelver 
coup.1239 
The exclusiveness of the sādah is explicitly stressed; the counterframes that highlight this 
aspect fell on fertile ground among those who were discontent with traditional endogamous 
                                                          
1234 Ibid. 
1235 King, “Zaydi Revival”, 427, n. 71. Al-Daylami was exposed to massive repression due to his criticism of the 
GoY. Cf. HRW, “Detention and Arbitrary Arrests”.  
1236 For a similar evaluation see Pottek, “Anfang”, 117. 
1237 The American Ambassador Edmund Hull was strongly convinced of this aspect. See: Interview with the U.S. 
Ambassador to Yemen (mid-2001–mid-2004), Edmund James Hull, in Association for Diplomatic Studies and 
Training, “Yemen Country Reader”, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.adst.org/oral-history/country-reader-
series/, 197–217. 
1238 See exemplarily: Facebook page “Maukaa Ansar Allah’ [‘Ansar Allah site’], accessed February 4, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/ansarallahweb?fref=ts. 
1239 ICG, “Huthis”, 13. Interview conducted in February 2014. 
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Hashemite marriage patterns.1240 On a practical level, many people distanced themselves from 
those closely associated with the Houthis due to voluntary affiliation or incidental family 
relatedness: They refused services or else in places as far from the combat zone as Sanaa.1241 
It can be interpreted both as a distancing in regard to their position or as a reaction out of fear 
in a climate of repression against anyone suspected of sympathizing with the rebels.  
 In sum, those counterframes, which took up prior suspicions in regard to the Zaydis, can be 
traced in reactions of the targeted audience, while those that strove to bring up new 
allegations (e.g. criminals, terrorists) cannot. This backs the supposition that the GoY could 
only intensify to a certain degree what had been salient before; original frames could not be 
established widely in contestation with Houthi frames despite superior resources. Reasons for 
this might be a lack of both credibility and salience of the counterframes:1242 While the 
credibility of the government might be acknowledged, the Houthis probably reached a higher 
degree at least among Zaydis, based on their manifold local prestige and traditional legitimacy 
(in contrast to official, political legitimacy in a perceived distant capital). The GoY equally 
scores poorly (overall, and in comparison to the rebels) regarding the consistency of their 
framing, the centrality and experiential commensurability of it for the audience, and moreover 
concerning the narrative fidelity. The terrorism allegation, for instance, is taken from a global, 
post-9/11 discourse that has little resonance (at least not in the intended direction) among 
Yemenis; the Houthi framing is much more ‘tuned to’ the targeted audience in this regard. 
‘Imamate restoration’ on the contrary qualifies well in this regard, as I have demonstrated. 
Regime counterframing, according to the conclusion, is deficient in more than one respect and 
could thus not trump Houthi framing among the audience in the North.1243 
 
7.2. Al-Hirak’s Frame Development 
In comparison to Houthi frame development, the Hirak’s frame development is different in 
two aspects. First, where Houthi framing is centralized at the immediate leadership circle, the 
Southern Movement’s framing is much more decentralized and multivocal. This aspect is 
                                                          
1240 Frequent among social media comments. See exemplarily: Muhammad al-Houthi, “Who are the Houthis? 
And Other Questions”, Yemen Press, September 6, 2007, accessed April 7, 2015, http://www.yemen-
press.com/news1053.html, comment 3. 
1241 Hamidi, “Inscriptions”, 175, n. 62. 
1242 The fact that the army allegedly looted in the areas they controlled, and that the GoY recruited ill famed 
jihadists (‘Afghan Arabs’) and asked the KSA and Salafist al-Zindani to fund the militia certainly did not 
improve the regime’s standing among the population. HRW, “Invisible Civilians”; ICG, “Defusing”, 16. 
1243 The relevant audience is dominantly the one in the North, among which the Houthis mainly mobilized and 
whom the GoY sought to prevent from supporting the rebels, not the Yemeni population as a whole. Thus, the 
assessment tackles only that section.  
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closely related to the lack of a genuine leadership or rather the multitude of leadership claims, 
in addition to highly active and vocal followers, who themselves are more involved in 
framing than Houthi followers. Second, there is no shift from the call for nonviolent to the 
calls for violent action. Rather, there is (a) a variance over time in calls for equality within 
unity to secession; both, however, proceed nonviolently; (b) there are ‘branches’ in the 
prognostic framing depending on which central framer/faction frames; some aim at 
federalism, others at secession; notwithstanding, all keep promoting peaceful strategies; and 
(c) there are some call for armed struggle that fail to yield resonance; they, too, will be dealt 
with as branches but receive special attention in order to explain their lack of success.  
 The basic structure of the section is the same as in the corresponding section of the Houthi 
case study, it merely lacks the additional distinction in a pre- and post-escalation phase.  
 
7.2.1. Diagnostic Framing 
The following quote from a 2013 document published on the website of Aden Live TV, in 
which the comprehensive demands and history of the Hirak up to that point was presented 
from the perspective of al-Beidh.1244 It summarizes the core of the Southern issue as 
commonly perceived:  
The Southern Movement defines the southern cause as a cause of a homeland, a people 
and a fate. It describes the southern situation as being occupied by Yemen and that the 
occupation started in the year 1994, considering this is obvious through seizing a whole 
homeland by security and military forces, as a way chosen by the Yemen Arab Republic 
regarding the Southern Society. Therefore, it looted the South property, wiping out its 
identity, legacy, and history. This occupation replaced the southern people by another one 
that was transported to the South and found a political entity other than southern in the 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (Arab South). The Southern Movement says that unless 
some factors like: popular rejection, peaceful resistance, demonstrations, straightforward 
authors, and visible media, the people would have lost its identity, national affiliation and 
societal virtues, as it has lost its state which was built across tens of years.1245 
Three central diagnostic frames are noted therein: the ‘occupation frame’, the ‘threat frame’, 
and the ‘attribution of responsibility’. The ‘occupation frame’ as a main frame here subsumes 
the sub-frames of ‘looting’ and ‘militarization’, which are both attributed to ‘Yemeni’ forces; 
the ‘threat frame’ contains the sub-frames of ‘threatened identity’ and ‘physical threats’; and 
the ‘attribution of responsibility frame’ in this extract highlights the YAR regime, so far 
without rendering it more precisely.  
                                                          
1244 It also lets begin the history of the Hirak with the accession of al-Beidh in May 2009, without pointing out its 
prior existence for two to three years. “Introduction to the Southern Movement and its Development Stages”, 
April 16, 2014, accessed April 16, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-13278.html. 
1245 Ibid.  
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What is missing in this description (though not the document) is the preconditional or 
antecedent diagnosis of ‘failed unity’, possibly because of implied obviousness (the document 
was published in 2014, two decades after the first opposition and years after the initiation of 
structured protest). This ‘failed unity frame’ and two more main frames (the ‘injustice frame’ 
and the ‘civil state frame’) are added elaborately in other sources. They will be analyzed in 
the following.  
 
For the Aden Live TV document, the fact that in the 1993 parliamentary elections each 
population voted merely for its own representatives is already interpreted as a proof that unity 
had failed.1246 Others pose that it was the war that had this effect:  
The southern elite and leaders considered that this war abolished the consensus united 
state by military means and converted unification into occupation by using legislations as 
a coup to repeal the legal bases of the unified state and to take over the resources of the 
south by eliminating its state.1247 
Whichever the exact point in time that is invoked as the final stroke, the common message is 
that the end to unity was final without the option of ever returning to it:  
If the invading war of the south eradicated the legitimacy of the unity politically and 
legally, the attitude of Sana’a regime in the south after the war towards the southern 
people and their land, history, culture, and identity, has destroyed all the noble values and 
concepts of the unity as a national dream for them to a nightmare in their lives. In the 
name of the unity, the rights were confiscated, wealth was plundered, freedoms were 
violated, and dignities were trampled on the thresholds of the Northern regime and its 
prisons, until the pain and moan of the southerners became a betrayal to the unity, which 
only exists in the pockets and accounts of the northern leaders and their followers.1248 
Unity is framed in ethical terms, and the actions of the Northern regime has betrayed, 
trampled upon, and ‘killed’ the values inherent therein. It was instead transformed into their 
material benefit. We can only speculate about the impact of such a materialist turn on an 
audience which partly grew up in a socialist state and was exposed to anti-capitalist ideology 
on a daily basis; it might play a role in the frame’s resonance as well.  
 This list of grievances contains seven major aspects: violence and repression, 
disadvantageous laws, the looting of property and resources, the destruction of Southern 
                                                          
1246 Ibid. 
1247 Mohammed Alsaqqaf, “Internal Dynamics of the Southern Movement in Yemen”, paper presented at a 
workshop on the “Impact of Political Change on Yemen’s relations with the United States”, no date (post-March 
2011), 6. 
1248 “A Brief Introductory on the Southern Issue ’To every fact-researcher and whoever is keen on justice and 
freedom’”, published online by Correspondence and southern informative action team (Wasel), May 21, 2011, 
accessed May 10, 2015, http://www.rooosana.ps/store/9/11_05_21-23_48_46-4nQ1@0.pdf, 13.  
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history and identity,1249 lacking social services, lacking/blocked job opportunities, and – 
interesting regarding symbols of Southern identity – the ‘closing’ of Al-Yemda and the 
degradation of Aden. In other words, grievances are physical (as directed against humans), 
material (resources), legal, and ideational.1250 They are articulated over and again, with little 
modification; phrasing and tone of the language change depending on the audience that shall 
be reached, but the message remains consistent.1251 The three following depictions of the 
situation by movement followers constitute an example of this. The first is an excerpt from a 
submission to the UN, prepared by Hirak activists living in the UK (one of which is a lawyer):  
The 1994 war effectively began the occupation of the South, whilst after the war and 
under the rule of the unified state dominated by the victorious North, Southern people 
were unrepresented and discriminated against. Repeated attempts by southerners to secure 
justice and equality through legitimate demands within the unity state have been ignored. 
When Southerners resorted to peaceful protest rallies, they were subjected to excessive 
use of force, arbitrary detention, torture and indiscriminate and targeted killings of 
protestors and activists. Southerners sought a remedy to their grievances within the unity 
state. The failure to address their grievances and to cease its discriminatory practice and 
breaches of human rights give South Yemen the justification to demand secession and the 
re-establishment of the southern independent state.1252 
The language is (human) rights-based1253 and on this basis builds a logical line of 
argumentation for the steps taken by the Southern Movement. In this, it seeks to employ the 
appropriate language for the UN, an international institution based on legal regulations.  
 A flyer on ‘The Southern Issue’ equally distributed by activists in the UK, i.e. targeting the 
Yemeni diaspora but even more an international audience, uses a much more aggressive and 
emotional tone:  
Unity was revoked on the 7th of July 1994 war (...) It was declared collectively by Saleh, 
Islamists, Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar & the tribal leaders. The South have [sic!] been looted 
& the nation has been discriminated by all four players. (...) Shortly following unification, 
an apparently hidden Northern agenda to take over control of the South began with a 
campaign of assassinations against Southern leaders. The ruling Northern establishments, 
                                                          
1249 The Hirak’s program (2014) or ‘manifesto’, as movement adherents refer to it, frames the grievances in a 
very similar way as “looting of property and identity and heritage and history of the South”. This phrasing makes 
obvious how the damage affects the past, present, and future (property = used to build a future). See also: Hassan 
Muthanna Al-Aqeel, Summary of Book ‘The Cause of the South’. And Facts of the Robbery of Properties of the 
state of People’s Republic of South Yemen, digital copy received from a Hirak activist, 2012, 23;  
1250 Another movement document precisely lists “a historical, identity, legal, social, political, military and 
security, economic, cultural, religious, and geographical dimension of grievances”. “Roots of the Southern 
Issue”.  
1251 Unlike the wide variation in Hussein al-Houthi’s diagnostic framing, with which he aimed to include a wide 
range of audience. Cf. 5.6.1.1. 
1252 “The Southern Issue”, 14.  
1253 Legal discrimination is also listed by the Aden Live TV document as one of the aims why “[t]he occupation 
regime replaced the South institutions with southern individuals belonging to the occupation regime itself in 
order to act according to its will and interests to (...) 5. Deprive them from rights and duties.” See: “Introduction 
to the Southern Movement”.  
306 
 
including the tribe, the military and the extreme Islamist groups conspired to affect the 
complete takeover of the South. (...) Following the occupation, tens of thousands of 
Southerners were dismissed from their jobs in the military, the police and the civil 
service. Southern resources were divided up between the war victors and vast areas of 
land were gifted to corrupt tribal chiefs, military figures and extremist groups. An 
increase in discriminatory practices and oppression coupled with a deliberate attack on 
the Southern identity resorted in a rise in Southern anti-Northern sentiments. Southerners 
demanded equality and an end to the corruption taking place but such demands were 
ignored. Faced with this rejection, Southerners began their peaceful movement known as 
Al-Hirak. The movement represented the desire of the Southern people to break away 
from the unity agreement and the re-establishment of the independent Southern state, as 
the only way left to regain the dignity and freedom of Southerners.1254 
Beyond its language, or rather, in combination with it, this depiction adds the dimensions of 
blame and identity. In fact, it highlights it within the we-they divide. ‘They’ – attributed as 
“corrupt”, “extremist” and “discriminatory” – are “Saleh, Islamists, Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar & 
the tribal leaders”, who on purpose acted in a very hostile and violent way. ‘We’, the 
Southerners, are depicted as the victims of these bad intentions and connected to “equality”, 
“peaceful[ness]”, “dignity”, and “freedom”, i.e. positive ethical criteria.1255 ‘We’ are forced 
by ‘them’ to (re)act as we do. Before the identity dimension will be elucidated in detail, it is 
interesting to look at the third depiction.1256 
 While it is still intended to inform outsiders about the movement, as the authors claim, it 
stems from the heart of the movement in the South, and its language is much less well-tuned 
to an international (i.e. Western) audience, but resembles much more the language used in 
local, internal communication.1257 
Aden was shocked on 7/7/1994 by the barbarian invasion of the northern forces and tribes 
(...) It was exposed to a moral and humanitarian disaster which it has never witnessed in 
its history, and only happened in the defining moments of human history, which has been 
handled by the memory of generations as the most hideous form in which human beings 
stripped of their humanity and values. The day of invading Aden brought to human mind 
the Mongol Tatar invasion of Baghdad (...) The Sana’a invading hordes brought that dark 
image back on 7/7/1994, when they destroyed and looted all the physical and cultural 
elements of modern city, in a Hooligan scene that can never be forgotten by its people 
(...)1258 
 
                                                          
1254 “The Southern Question”.  
1255 In a similar vein, Southerners proudly declare how their movement was a predecessor for the Arab Spring 
protests: “This civilized style became a new form setting an example for the Arab Spring revolutions, and an 
international occurrence in a region with peculiar politically and socially complicated characteristic. But the 
civilized fight which ran contradicting to the type of the tribal structure of Sanaa authority was faced with its 
repressive and police instruments and army units, the intelligence and the allied Alqaedah elements.” Muthanna 
Al-Aqeel, Summary, 23. 
1256 With its emphasis on the seizure of Aden it has a slightly different focus, however, the style of description of 
the situation is the main point of interest. In the end, the grievances are related back to the ‘barbarian invasion’.  
1257 This claim is based on my comparison with the numerous documents, observations on social media 
platforms, personal written communication, interviews, and conversations I analyzed or conducted, respectively. 
1258 “Brief Introductory”, 12. 
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[T]he Situation imposed by tyranny regime of Sana’a to South since 7/7/1994, by using 
oppression tools, tribal heritage cultural that practice booty and cheating, and use ‘Divide 
and Rule’ etc., inevitably lead to revolution of [the] South, to [the] current situation 
imposed by [the] Sana’a regime where South[ern] people’s feel that they are out of 
contemporary life and backward to earlier centuries with no hopes and aspirations, due to 
suffering and pain (...)1259 
It is expressed in a drastic, emotional way1260 with a graphic comparison to ‘invading 
barbarian hordes’. And, again, blame and identity are closely linked, with the latter following 
a dichotomous black-and-white logic. Contrasting identity claims, be they moderate or 
radical, serve multiple purposes for the Hirak: First, they frame their collective identity; 
second, they frame the ‘evil other’; and third, they build the foundation on which the 
legitimacy of and need for two (nation) state foots. Hence, there is a strong effort to make this 
point unmistakably. The declared position of the Southern Movement is that North and South 
“have been historically independent geographically and politically, and totally different in the 
social and cultural dimensions with the absence of the administrative, historical, or political 
alleged links”.1261 The Northern regime is “a barbarian and sectarian occupier that does not 
pay attention to any noble humanitarian virtues”1262, a “pastoralist tribal system”1263, a 
“tyranny regime”1264 which supports armed terrorist groups and, “reviv[es] the culture of 
tribal conflicts, retaliation and religious extremism”1265 and in itself “lack[ing] the 
infrastructure of a modern state and (...) any rule of law”1266. The Northern population shares 
the characteristics of tribal backwardness, religious extremism, and racism, and the relations 
between regime and population are those of “tribal society that was existing before the 
state”.1267 
 The Southern state, in contrast, is described in bright terms: 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the economic poverty it was suffering from, The 
South, benefiting from the positive elements of British colonisation and subsequently 
socialist rule, was able to develop into a society far more civilised and developed than its 
northern counterpart. An effective infrastructure of state institutions existed, corruption in 
                                                          
1259 Ibid., 17f. 
1260 Slightly less drastic, but equally categorical is the following situation description: Al-Aqeel, Summary, 9. 
1261 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. The point of historical distinctness without common history is 
similarly made here: “The uniqueness of land and people between South and North just a fake emotional slogan, 
disapproved by facts and history of South Arabian Peninsula, it is sufficient prove that South was region of units 
Sultanates and Emirates and didn’t mention name of Yemen to South through ages.” “Brief Introductory”, 22. 
1262 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
1263 “Roots of the Southern Issue”.  
1264 “Brief Introductory”, 17f. 
1265 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
1266 “The Southern Issue”.  
1267 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
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all aspects of society was non-existent and, most importantly, rule of law was upheld 
throughout the country.1268 
The Southern state has a ‘civil state’ and a ‘civilized society’, the North lack either of the two. 
The achievements of that civil state are generally ascribed to British rather than to socialist 
rule; they are listed as “concepts of state, administration, rule of law, civil society, political 
and partisan pluralism, parliamentary life and diverse newspapers”.1269 It is even noted how 
those who fought the British in the anticolonial revolution today glorify the period of “British 
occupation as it did not confiscate any of the lands of the state or citizens and ruled in a state 
of law”.1270 
 Besides these achievements, the “vast opportunities” in the South are listed as “wide 
territory”, “huge wealth”, “important strategic location”, “economic and trade structures”, and 
“southerners’ conscience and culture”.1271 Emanating from this historical legacy and the 
resources and opportunities in the South is a “nation”1272 with a “civilian and civilized 
identity” and with a “noble history and values”.1273 The Hirak, who consists only of 
Southerners1274 and is part of the project of overcoming earlier civil conflict1275, has “proved 
its ability to continue and maintain its peaceful, civilized, and liberating character in spite of 
persistent attempts to drag it to the cycle of violence”1276. In opposition to the Northerners, it 
is therein driven by “Islamic instructions, International conventions, and humanitarian culture 
as the basic and fixed references”, all of which are considered acknowledged civilizational 
achievements and values.  
 The war is interpreted as the result of “irreconcilable differences between the two social 
and political cultures”1277 and of priorly held bad intentions and undermining policies by the 
                                                          
1268 Adel Mutlak Abdulla Hassan, Saleh Ali Alnoud, and Abdulrazaq Saleh, “The Southern Issue (Yemen). The 
past, present and the fragile future” (October 2011), 9. Prepared as a submission to the UN.  
1269 Alsaqqaf, “Internal Dynamic”, 4. 
1270 Ibid., 7. 
1271 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”.  
1272 Interestingly, the title of the flyer “The Southern Question” was “The Southern Question. Not a Rights 
Movement But a Nation’s Struggle for Independence”. The rights’ aspect certainly is still present and the initial 
emphasis of the movement were rights. However, I received the flyer in January 2013 and it was printed not long 
before (given the facts it contained); thus, it very well reflects the change towards a stronger identity-based focus 
over time.  
1273 Al-Aqeel, Summary, 22. 
1274 Alsaqqaf, “Internal Dynamics”, 3. 
1275 I.e. the ‘Tasamuh wa Tasaluh’. “Introduction to the Southern Movement”.  
1276 Ibid. 
1277 “The Southern Issue”, 9. They also argue that the war in 1994 was “an armed war between two armies, two 
systems, and two states” and as support cite the Security Council Resolution 924, which takes that view. “South 
Solution Hirak”, 6.  
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Northern regime.1278Although Southerners did everything to mend the relations with the 
North and international outsiders were involved, they failed.1279 
 Attempts for national mediation and comprehensive conflict settlement through the NDC 
are disregarded as merely reproducing the conditions of occupation and repression:  
Southerners now believe that the National Dialogue is no more than a process by which 
the old ruling establishments that occupied the South can achieve renewed legitimacy to 
continue to rule in the way they did over the years and to continue their occupation of the 
South.1280 
The accusation of providing the old establishment with renewed legitimacy indirectly refers to 
the international community, for the NDC was part of the internationally supported GCC 
Initiative.  
 Beyond this point, the aspect of international involvement generally deserves further 
attention. On the one hand, international involvement has not led to significant changes in 
1994, neither the mediation and the supported Document of Pledge and Accord, nor the UN 
Security Council Resolutions 924 and 931. The regime simply ignored “its commitments to 
the international community” as it “didn’t pay any attention neither to the calls of the 
international community nor to the pleas of the rights and humanitarian organizations and 
bodies”.1281 Rather than being bound to shared norms, standards, and laws, it currently rather 
makes use of the fear and wary of neighboring countries and the international community of 
AQAP in order to legitimize the forceful suppression of the Hirak.1282 Notwithstanding the 
disillusion that has come with the lack of results of international involvement in 1994 for 
Southerners, the movement nevertheless calls on the international community again to support 
its claims and assists its struggle for self-determination and – as has been shown above – 
orients its appeals accordingly.1283 There is critique of the UN,1284 e.g. in the set-up of the 
NDC1285 and its lack of concern in regard to the integration of the Southern Issue, which was 
                                                          
1278 Ibid., 13; “Brief Introductory”, 2, 6; “Together to decide on the Southern people’s destiny”, Conference 
publication, ‘Cairo Conference’ of wing of the Hirak, November 20–22, 2011. Copy received by a Hirak activist 
and conference participant living in the UK, April 2013. Personal translation. 
1279 “Brief Introductory”, 8.  
1280“The Southern Question”.  
1281 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
1282 “Brief Introductory”, 19. 
1283Another claim is the uniqueness of their position: “South Issue’s totally differ from other conflicts and issues 
existing in the World such (South Sudan, Somalia, North Iraq and Sahara in Morocco), because it is issue 
between two countries recognized by united Nation and World.” Ibid., 22. 
1284 Al-Beidh, for instance, in the Aden Live TV document in three of the nine points his anniversay speech in 
fall 2012 refers to the UN: He voices his opposition against the regime’s and UN’s preference for unity over the 
will of the people, praises himself for sending a letter with demands to the UN, and asks the UN to provide 
security. “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
1285 The divergent perspectives in regard to the NDC will be discussed in 6.6.2., for they are immediately related 
to the proposed solutions.  
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directed immediately against the General Secretary Ban Ki Moon after his speech on the first 
anniversary of the signing of the GCC Initiative.1286 But at the same time the movement is 
exertedly trying to diffuse potential international concerns about its alleged connections to 
AQAP and a destabilization of the region in case Southern demands were met1287; it 
emphasizes how its aims are “fully in contradiction” with those of AQAP, that the South is 
capable of confining the terrorist group, that they intend to continue good, peaceful relations 
with the North, and that “[t]he United States and European countries will find an ally in the 
southern state for protecting international routes and combating the elements of religious 
radicalism.”1288 
 The term ‘religious radicalism’ leads over well to the last dimension of the diagnostic 
framing, the religiously based defamation of and calls for violence against Southerners: 
[The] Sana’a regime considered this as a holy war and religious war against the enemies 
of Allah from infidels, atheists and communists, as they claimed. So, their scholars issued 
a fatwah, permits killing of Southerners, their women and children (...)1289 
This refers to the fact that during the 1994 war, famous Islamist scholars such as al-Zindani 
issued fatawa with the described content. Southerners not only felt betrayed and insulted by 
the allegations of lacking faith, they furthermore feared the incendiary power of such fatawa. 
Thus, they were alerted when the constitutional changes after the war led to a precedence of 
religion of the state, as they interpreted it: 
Among the articles abolished from the 1994 constitution was the article provided for in 
the Global Declaration for Human Rights stating ‘there shall be no discrimination 
between citizens based on sex, color...or faith’. An article from the 1970 constitution of 
the north was reinserted in the new constitution (...) stating that ‘defending religion and 
the country is a holy duty’ so it mentions religion before the country.1290 
The practice of issuing fatawa has continued. The Hirak condemns it, for it 
(...) considers that the fatwah of the so-called Yemen clerics, especially that issued on 
Thursday 22 November 2012, was a new expiatory fatwah that renewed the Fatwah of the 
war issued in the summer of 1994 (...) [It portrays] defending the Yemeni unity as a 
                                                          
1286 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
1287 Contrarily, they argue that a continuation of the situation in the current state, which is “worse than foreign 
occupation”, would lead to “a threat to regional security and stability, and even threat to unity of Arab nations 
and integration of Islamic nations”. “Brief Introductory”, 23. 
1288 Alsaqqaf, “Internal Dynamics”, 8, 10; see also the reference to a speech of Ba’oum in which he expresses his 
wish that the EU ambassadors would attend the event to listen to the “clear message from the southern people to 
the world”. “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
1289 “Brief Introductory”, 9f. 
1290 Alsaqqaf, “Internal Dynamics”. 
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religious duty (...) the statement is nothing but an unjust bias against the South under the 
name of religion.1291 
Southern activists1292 regard these practices as an expression of extremism and a threat 
towards a civil culture based on human rights. Religious expression thus forms another 
division line between the North and the South, with the majority of Southerners taking a 
moderate position and mourning the loss of former freedoms like, for instance, the situation 
for women as described above.1293 It contributes to the ‘threatened identity frame’. On a 
practical level, this perspective, which is linked with the collective memories of Islamist 
forces looting Aden and other cities in the war, leads to permanent tensions with the Islah 
party in the South.  
 Based on this problem description, the next section examines the suggested solutions and 
strategies. As has already been noted, the prognostic dimension shows a wider variation 
between different groups or factions under the umbrella of the Hirak. The presentation will be 
structured according to these variations.  
 
7.2.2. Prognostic Framing 
As has been presented in the above section, unity is no longer a feasible option for the Hirak, 
for none of the factions. Instead, the goals range on a spectrum of more or less autonomy in 
relation to the centralized unity state: Immediate secession and independence of the South is 
on the one end of that spectrum, a two-state federal solution (‘confederation’) with a 
subsequent referendum on independence in the middle, and a federal state with the South as 
one or two (NDC proposal) states within the federal state as a whole forms the most moderate 
demand. The two contrasting positions on how to solve the framed problems, i.e. the 
strategies, are ‘through peaceful means’ versus ‘through armed struggle’. Armed struggle 
thereby logically aims at secession without considering alternatives. Other components of the 
suggested strategy include the unification of the movement and calling on foreign countries 
and/or the international community for support.  
 I begin with the presentation of the peaceful secessionist stance and proceed towards the 
more moderate aims. The calls for armed struggle will be introduced last. Subordinate 
strategies will be integrated within this greater systematization.  
                                                          
1291 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. 
1292 Of course this cannot be generalized for all Southerners, numerous of who view a stronger role of religion in 
society as a positive development. There are even some Islamist voices within the larger Hirak, one of them is al-
Salami. The claim should thus be comprehended as a majority view.  
1293 See also: “Yemen’s southern rebels emerge from the shadows”, The Guardian, November 11, 2011, 
accessed April 16, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/11/yemen-southern-rebels-hirak-secession.  
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Federal State  
The most notable figure open to the discussion of a federal state solution is Mohamed Ali 
Ahmed. He joined the NDC, albeit under the precondition of serious discussion of the option 
of independence for the South. When this was not met, he finally pulled out in November 
2013.1294 Ahmed has not been very vocal on his goals and lacks both the popularity as well as 
eloquence of al-Beidh; neither does he possess a symbolic status like Ba’oum. Besides, his 
position is viewed critically by many for his role in 1986, as has been noted in 6.3.2.1. 
Nevertheless, he is well connected in Abyan and can still build on a certain allegiance due to 
his former political office.1295 
 In a rare interview in mid-July 2012, when he had not yet announced his participation in 
the NDC, Ahmed insisted that while peaceful struggle was the way for Southerners to regain 
their rights, violence might be a last resort. “We don’t believe in violence, but if doors are 
closed on our peaceful paths, no one can keep us away from our cause.”1296 In the following, 
he elaborates further on how non-violence is a conscious choice of the people, whom he 
suggests to be following (i.e. not leading them): 
Actually, peaceful struggle is our principal goal and we think it is the best tool by which 
to gain our independence. It is the tool our people have chosen for the southern 
movement. However, revolution has two types of goals: strategic and tactical. The 
strategic goal is to gain independence using different means: peaceful struggle, protests, 
demonstrations, etc. If it is necessary, it will turn into armed movement. This is only if we 
cannot achieve our goals through peaceful means. But southerners have chosen 
peacefulness up to now. However, if the nonviolent strategy fails, that will be something 
we cannot control. The reality and our people will make new choices.  
Violence is presented as a feasible option; there is no reference to inherent practical 
challenges, but the option is available if necessary and chosen by “our people”. Overall, the 
picture he draws is one of democratic choice of the affected population with the ultimate goal 
of independence. Even before the NDC and his contested role therein, he ostentatively pays 
respect to the masses. It seems as if he was trying to cajole them and potentially increase 
resonance – a notable step especially later, when considering the difficult role of participating 
in the NDC without wider appeal.1297 Other Southern NDC participants equally paid respect 
                                                          
1294 “Divided South Yemen Separatists Vow to Achieve Independence”, Middle East Eye, September 30, 2014, 
accessed October 6, 2014, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/divided-south-yemen-separatists-vow-achieve-
independence-830553601.  
1295 In the context of his interview with Ahmed, Farea al-Muslimi describes the situation in his house as “packed 
with southerners from different social levels and groups”, i.e. he is respected and it is considered worthwhile 
seeking his support/patronage. Al-Muslimi, “Returned South Yemen Leader”. 
1296 Ibid.  
1297 Cf. interview with the journalist Iona Craig in Mafraj Radio, Episode 8, November 10, 2013, accessed June 
12, 2015, http://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/podcast/episode-8/. 
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to the people’s opinion and suffering in what appears to be a similar vein of modesty and 
maneuvering of their volatile position as hardly acknowledged ‘representatives’.1298 
  
Confederation 
The most prominent event organized by the faction around Ali Nasser Mohamed and Haydar 
al-Attas, who aim at a two-state federal solution,1299 was the so-called ‘Cairo Conference’ 
held from November 20–22, 2011.1300 It was entitled “United to Decide the Southern People’s 
Destiny”.1301 The aim of the conference according to the program was “to gather all Southern 
people and to unify their aims in order to stand as a whole and to resist the continuous 
attempts of the North and foreign countries to exploit Southern resources”. Chairman of the 
conference was Ali Nasser Mohamed, who in his introductory speech explicitly sought to 
dispel fears – raising from his history as leader of the PDRY government – that he might seek 
to gain any power of positions from his engagement in the conference by underlining that he 
“merely dreamed of a stable country that was based on fairness, democracy, and a happy, 
dignified life for the people”. The conference overarchingly emphasized its conviction that 
“[t]he peaceful struggle (...) is the only way to the successful revolution” and that the South 
was seeking to keep peace with the North. The major goal of the proponents was “self-
determination” in form of the establishment of a two-state federalism between the North and 
South (within the borders of May 21, 1990) with a referendum on Southern independence 
after a span of a few years (unspecified). Steps of state building include the formation of a 
new country with a new name, a new constitution that guarantees the regime of Ali Abdullah 
Saleh must not return into power, a two-chamber parliamentary system (with each a 50/50 
share in allocated seats for each partner), two federal governments and parliaments, percental 
access to natural resource wealth for every region, and a rearrangement of the security forces 
on a federal basis.1302 In addition, they ask for comprehensive “removal of the [1994] war 
                                                          
1298 For example Abdulkawi Mohamed Rashad al-Shabei, head of the Coordination Council for Southern 
Revolutionary Groups. In an interview he made the following statements: “Thus, like the land, the Southern man 
was lost and fragmented too.” “We even lost the army we built. We thought our army as invincible. It sustained 
significant damages. It was a huge tragedy.” “The 1994 war defeated people’s souls.” “Abdulkawi Mohammed 
Rashad Al-Shabei to the Yemen Times: The Southern Movement was the First One to Reject Injustice and 
Humiliation”, Yemen Times, January 21, 2013, accessed February 17, 2014, 
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1644/intreview/1878/Abdulkawi-Mohammed-Rashad-Al-Shabei-to-the-Yemen-
Times-The-Southern-Movement-was-the-first-to-reject-injustice-and-humiliation.htm1/. 
1299 Al-Attas had officially pushed for a four-year interim federalism with subsequent option for secession in the 
framework of a referendum already in May 2010. “Al-Beidh Calls for U.N. Fact Finding Committee over South 
Yemen”, Yemen Post, May 22, 2010, accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789 
aspx?ID=3&SubID=2208&MainCat=3.  
1300 There had been two precursor conferences in Cairo in May and July 2011 by the same main actors.  
1301 Based on: Programm of the Cairo Conference, see: Digital Appendix G. 
1302 It is explicated that the projected state will have an “Arab Islamic identity”.  
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effects”, i.e. a return of property, reinstatement of those retired into their position, and 
appropriate compensation schemes. All shall be prepared for and initiated within a 12–18 
months pre-transitional period under international and regional supervision. In the section on 
political system reforms, three of the nine specified points highlight good relations with 
neighboring countries and the international community, adherence to international human 
rights standards, and charters of international organizations.1303 Furthermore, fighting 
terrorism plays a prominent role. Lastly, the immediate steps are specified as setting up an 
initiative to collect funding for the “Southern revolution and its peaceful Hirak”, whose 
peaceful activities shall be continued (no further specifications), and for “putting a plan to 
implement the output of the conference”.  
 This faction is the single one with an explicated roadmap, albeit limited in its detailedness: 
It is quite procedural, with a strong belief in conferences and dialogue (between the regions 
and subsequently directly between North and South) and written with a legalistic turn to it, 
reminding one of socialist planning documents. Furthermore, the repeated reference to 
international bodies becomes highly evident. At the same time, it alludes to emotional terms 
like “destiny”, “happ[iness]”, and “dignity”, appealing to the audience on a more personal, 
human level – the same on which the feeling of injustice would be located, which cannot be 
grasped by legal terms. Nevertheless, on the downside, it needs to be taken into account that 
the conference and its content remain an elite-centered endeavor; those attending stemmed 
merely from the political, intellectual, and international (diaspora) circles,1304 and only few 
efforts have been made to widely promulgate aims, roadmap, and means in a generally 
accessible manner to reach out also to less elaborate masses. In addition, Ali Nasser 
Mohamed has a credibility problem, which might diminish the resonance of his framing; he 
was a member of the ‘Zumrah’, as was Hadi (and Mohamed Ali Ahmed). This connection is 
still held against him and he is being accused by some of trying to keep the country united for 
Hadi and thus viewed with suspicion.1305 
 
 
 
                                                          
1303 The diagnosis already makes extensive reference to the UNSC Resolutions 924 and 931 and the Northern 
regime’s nonobservance. Reference to international institutions and involvement is frequent within the 
document, especially in central passages.  
1304 Based on interviews (April 2013) with Southerners living in the UK who participated in the Cairo 
Conference. 
1305 Although suggesting itself, the same accusation is not articulated against Mohamed Ali Ahmed in the same 
explicity. It can be speculated that in Ahmed’s case it is not necessary to criticize him on that level for other 
arguments better suit that purpose (one might be that he delegitimizes himself by attending the NDC).  
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Independence 
The ‘independence camp’ is split into two major factions worth treating separately: Those 
following Ali Salim al-Beidh and those supporting Hassan Ba’oum.  
 Al-Beidh has lived in exile in Oman and later Germany since the war. While he had never 
ceased to be involved in Southern opposition, he remained quiet in regard to the Hirak until 
May 2009, when he entered the stage – and aimed to stay there. In his speech on the 
anniversary of his declaration of secession in 1994, May 21, he aimed to set himself at the 
forefront, to “lead [the] peaceful struggle” to reclaim “the occupied south”:1306 
Dear Southerners inside our country and outside it...we are calling upon you today to 
stand united in the epic of our peaceful struggle and hang on to it and to not deviate away 
from it by any way that could serve the occupier or prolong the occupation period... it is 
in my personal capacity and on behalf of my colleagues in the pro-unification authority, 
who stand today by their people, to offer my apology to the great people of the South for 
all the harm that have been inflicted upon them in the past periods due to circumstances 
and global political factors beyond our wills and wishes.1307 
Mobilization, unity, nonviolence – these are the dominating messages send by al-Beidh. 
Mobilization therein targets those inside the country as well as the diaspora, certainly a 
significant aspect when considering the large numbers of (wealthy) Southerners abroad. Unity 
has always been a pervading theme for the Southerners and more than once posed an obstacle 
to collective action; the salience is hence equally high as for mobilization or, in other words, 
the urge to act against the perceived injustice and ‘occupation’. Lastly, he strongly 
emphasizes the need to remain peaceful for strategic reasons: in order not to provide any 
excuse for the regime to take action against the movement.  
 His apology and emotional language, specifically in the beginning, serves as a means to 
smooth ruffled feathers. Many were and are still distrustful or even hostile towards him for his 
role in the unification process; some might have become more open by his words. Taking the 
same line, he denied any interest to revive his former role and any return to Cold War politics: 
“I’m not in a party, and will not join any party, but after liberation I may like to be an 
advisor.”1308 
 In addition to encouraging Southerners, al-Beidh also calls on international actors for 
support: On the one hand, he poses that “[i]t is very important to make a brotherly and honest 
                                                          
1306 Translation posted by Jane Novak on: http://www.armiesofliberation.com/archives/2009/06/01/al-beidh-
speech-52109-official-translation/.  
1307 Ibid.  
1308 Cited in: Ginny Hill, “Economic Crisis Underpins Southern Separatism”, Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2009, 
accessed June 10, 2015, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=23191. Similarly see: 
“Former South Yemen President to Continue to Call for Secession”, Al-Monitor, May 27, 2013, accessed August 
12, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/ali-salim-beidh-president-south-yemen-
secession.html. 
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plea to all the Arab leaders, their majesties and highnesses in the Arab world and the friends 
all over the world and brothers in Sanaa” to be as wise as Nasser when he disengaged the 
unity with Syria, i.e. he calls for good will. On the other, he calls on human rights 
organizations and international bodies to act against “dictatorship of Sana’a”,1309 hence using 
a rougher language to denounce the regime. Finally, he equally denounces attempts by Sana’a 
to connect Hirak with terrorism and acknowledges and honors those who suffer and die for 
the struggle, ending on this note1310, which connects him with his audience.  
 As has been elaborated before, al-Beidh has been the most visible and articulate figure 
over time. Plus, he modified his stance a few times, or rather, he more than once was not clear 
or even inconsistent in his framing – noted by his audience as well and perceived as reducing 
his credibility.1311 
 In an interview half a year after this initial speech, al-Beidh overall affirmed his earlier 
stance: “The only way out of this conflict is political. We said this from the beginning. I think 
the Arab League can and should play a leading role in extinguishing the fire before it rages in 
other areas.” International support,1312 a positioning against sectarianism, and continued 
attempts to unify the movement are reproduced. A specific emphasis is furthermore on 
distancing the Hirak from the Houthis – employed as negative example for a violent path to 
illustrate how violence does not solve political problems – and AQAP, who in May had 
declared their support for the movement (see 6.4.).1313 Merely a few months later however, in 
early 2010, al-Beidh declared that the peaceful character of the Southern Movement was not 
without its limits,1314 hence weakening his nonviolence stance.1315 
 The positioning and framing by others, who also count to his faction, should not be 
disregarded, specifically, the more militant section in Dhaleh/Radfan. In the midst of the 
negotiations surrounding Saleh’s stepdown in November 2011, General Nasser al-Taweel, for 
                                                          
1309 Translation posted by Jane Novak on: http://www.armiesofliberation.com/archives/2009/06/01/al-beidh-
speech-52109-official-translation/. 
1310 Rhetorically he connects “martyrs”, “homeland”, and “nation” in a way that lingers on.  
1311 Based on interviews with Hirak activists living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1312 In early June 2010, for instance, al-Beidh called on the international community to protect civilians in the 
South after clashes had occured in Dhaleh. “Exiled Leader Appeals for South Yemen Protection”, AFP, June 8, 
2010, accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALegM5hX4NsKRilNh3G 
WWghOjh1jDmlfNg.  
1313 “’Yemeni Top Brass Dragged Saudis into Conflict’. Regime Is Causing Serious Crises in Sa’da and South of 
the Country, Yemen’s Sectarian Leader Says”, Gulf News, November 29, 2009, accessed April 2, 2012, 
http://www.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/...ct-39-1.533543.  
1314 Al-Jarida, January 25, 2010, cited in: Lutz Rogler, “Jemen versus Südarabien? Zur Entwicklung der 
‘Bewegung des Südens‘”, inamo – Informationsprojekt Naher und Mittlerer Osten 16 (Sommer 2010), 24–29, 
here: 29. 
1315 On August 2, 2010, he then again emphasized his dedication to non-violent struggle until self-determination 
was granted. “Yemen’s Ex-President Vows to Keep up Fight”, Yemen Post, August 1, 2010, accessed June 27, 
2012, http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=2460&MainCat=3.  
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instance, found more than clear words towards Sana’a: “We give the regime this ultimatum: 
either you acknowledge our legitimate demands to self-determination or you will soon find 
Yemen split once again into two countries.”1316 With a strategic political opportunity in mind 
and prompting tone, Mohamed Omar Ahmed Jubran draw the attention of youth activists to 
the regime’s weakness at that point: “The regime is expending all its firepower on the north. 
We must seize this opportunity to regain our rights.”1317 These statements demonstrate how 
the same faction varies between the more political, defensive tone of the leading figure and 
the more action-oriented perspective on the ground; the perceptions and actions of movement 
members, then, can take yet another specification.1318 
 In the run-up to the NDC, al-Beidh in December 2012 re-emphasized the position he had 
started with: Southern ownership of their future and the shape it is going to have.  
I won’t take a position because of the international community’s demands. What’s 
important are the demands of my people. To say ‘the international community wants 
this’, great, that’s the international community. But we are the owners of the issue – we, 
the sons of the south.1319 
He thereby counters what has become problematic in regard to international involvement in 
the Southern issue: The Hirak has since its initiation called for international involvement and 
support for their issue. Now, in the face of international involvement pro-unity, a 
differentiated dealing with the ‘international support frame’ is indispensable. Al-Beidh re-
adjusts and re-prioritizes the relation between ‘international support’ and ‘self-determination’ 
by giving the latter clear precedence – a move that should also account for resonance among 
adherents.  
 Another statement on the same occasion, however, was much more problematic and costly 
for him. There has been constant (regime-supported) suspicions that al-Beidh was secretly 
supported by Iran,1320 an allegation he denied for years. Yet in the interview he declared: “If I 
have received money from Iran, I was (doing so) to help our people.”1321 This step, i.e. 
opening the floor for further doubts in regard to his contacts to Iran, was very damaging to his 
                                                          
1316 “Yemen’s southern rebels emerge from the shadows”, The Guardian, November 11, 2011, accessed April 
16, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/11/yemen-southern-rebels-hirak-secession.  
1317 Ibid.  
1318 Nasser al-Noubah in October 2012 furthermore warned that some small groups, not necessarily of the Hirak, 
might pursue armed struggle for their own ends. He called on Northern politicians and international forces to 
take this into account in their considerations. “Movement for South Yemen Secession Braves the Odds”, Al 
Akhbar English, October 15, 2012, accessed April 3, 2013, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12972.  
1319 “Long-Exiled South Yemen Leader Beidh Defends His Call for Secession”, McClatchy Newspaper, 
December 5, 2012, accessed March 13, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/12/05/176491/long-exiled-
south-yemen-leader.html#storylink=cpy.  
1320 That he eventually moved to Beirut and operated Aden Live TV there was among the points held against him 
as was the fact that his daughter married a (Lebanese) Shiʿa.  
1321 “Long-Exiled South Yemen Leader”.  
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credibility and reputation. Even those who assumed distant contact at most were confounded 
by his inconsistency.1322 
 Overall and despite this ‘faux pas’, al-Beidh’s consistent rejection of the NDC upheld his 
popularity. Over time, he made a number of points. First, rejection of the GCC initiative: 
“The GCC initiative does not have anything concerning our Southern issue, therefore it does 
not concern us – it is designed to solve the issues of those fighting for power in Sana’a.”1323 
Second, denunciation of Southerners participating therein: “Southerners participating in the 
National Dialogue only represent themselves.”1324 Third, denial of the legitimacy of the NDC 
processes: “We (...) know that this dialogue is directed in a certain way, and overseen by 
certain parties, that want to use it to reach what they want, which does not agree with what 
our people want and aspire to in the south (...)”.1325 Instead al-Beidh demands an immediate 
North-South dialogue:  
We are calling for a dialogue between the north and the south based on the dialogues that 
were carried out between us and them after we announced secession in 1994. At the time, 
there were two delegations, one from the north and one from the south, holding a 
dialogue in Geneva. The Security Council issued two resolutions at the time, Resolution 
924 and Resolution 931 (...) in June 1994, they said that unity cannot be achieved through 
force.1326 
The international legalistic basis he gives his demand are once more in line with the 
remaining frames. Fourth, rejection of the NDC outcomes: “We reject everything that comes 
from this dialogue (...).”1327 Among others, this encompasses the apology that was issued by 
the Yemeni government for the 1994 Civil War on behalf of past governments: “We reject 
this apology and we consider that they need to apologise for this apology.”1328 And 
furthermore rigorously the six-state federal solution:  
No, we do not agree to the proposal of establishing a federal region. Our people take to 
the streets daily to demand the restoration of their identity and their state. We demand 
that a referendum be held in the south. The people of the south have three choices: unity, 
a federal region or secession.1329 Let the people decide their own fate. You see how the 
                                                          
1322 Based on interview with Hirak activists living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1323 “A Tale of Three Presidents”, http://www.alshamahi.com/2013/09/03/a-tale-of-three-presidents/. Concerning 
his own position, he denies any contacts with Hadi, whom he criticizes for being a ‘token Southerner’, as well as 
Saleh. Similarly: “Former South Yemen President”.  
1324 “A Tale of Three Presidents”.  
1325 Ibid.  
1326 “Former South Yemen President”.  
1327 “A Tale of Three Presidents”.  
1328 Ibid.  
1329 Another inconsistency: In December 2012 he had still emphasized that “[i]t’s not about secession. We’re 
demanding the restoration of our state and the end of northern occupation.” Thereby he had underlined the fine 
difference between a very first separation and the reinstatement of a prior condition, which for many is an 
important facet. “Long-Exiled South Leader”. 
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people today are taking to the streets, what do these people want? Are they being paid 
money or do they support a cause? You saw the recent million-man rally. What do we 
consider this? Don’t these people have rights to their lands and their identity? We support 
them but we cannot impose anything upon them. We walk with them and stay behind 
them. We all want secession, and we’ll let the coming generations decide for the future if 
they want unification or not.1330 
He employs the well-established elements of self-determination, rights, identity, and 
(notwithstanding his use of the majestic plural for himself) emphatic modesty concerning his 
own role. New from his side is the call for a referendum as an option; so far he has 
concentrated on immediate independence. This renewed modification might be problematic. 
Fifth, insistence on nonviolent struggle as (favored) pathway: “We hope that our brothers in 
Sana’a, if there is someone with sense amongst them, listen to what is happening in the South, 
we’re looking for a peaceful solution.”1331 He underlines that they can restore the state via the 
Peaceful Southern Movement, yet: “[I]f they don’t respond to our demands or listen to us, the 
people will be forced to adopt other methods in their struggle.”1332 Sixth, a vehement 
distancing from AQAP and simultaneous linking of the terrorist group to the returned Afghan 
Arabs. By this, he implies an involvement of Saleh and Ali Mohsen – i.e. Northern core 
leaders – with AQAP,1333 and signals to Western powers that their security concerns were 
better off with Southern independence, which would exterminate any acceptance or even 
support for terrorists. Seventh, a positioning towards international actors, between the 
expression of frustration and hope:  
For a long time, we have been sending messages to the Security Council, the US 
administration, major states and the Gulf countries to explain our cause. However, the 
international position, including that of the Gulf, supports the Gulf Initiative. We are not 
included in this initiative and it ignores the issue of the south.1334 
To the role of the US in Yemen he held: “What should I say to the US ambassador? The US 
ambassador has transformed into a tribal sheikh...He has become an Islahi sheikh.”1335 By 
this, he sets the US ambassador in the position of an adversary (or worse: enemy) of the 
Hirak, for the Islah is one and the equalization of the ambassador with an Islahi sheikh makes 
him one, too. Concerning the US as a whole, however, he softens:  
We know that US foreign policy works for an (...) unstable Middle East, what goes on in 
many Arab countries is related to this – that there is no stable Arab country. (...) We feel 
                                                          
1330 “Former South Yemen President”.  
1331 “A Tale of Three Presidents”.  
1332 “Former South Yemen President”.  
1333 “A Tale of Three Presidents”. 
1334 “Former South Yemen President”.  
1335 “A Tale of Three Presidents”.  
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that the US doesn’t understand our situation (...) I hope that with time they will 
understand.1336 
He speaks of hope for understanding, something that was lacking internationally so far, as has 
serious attention: “There is total international silence when it comes to the suffering of the 
people of the south, who have persisted in their struggle.”1337 
 In 2014, al-Beidh (though not immediately but in clear association with his faction) gave 
slightly more developed guidelines for movement action. One focus was on internal unity:  
(...) since [the movement] considers the war it is fighting as a conflict of existence and 
that southerners must not give the enemy the opportunity to find internal divisions (...) 
[tasks are]: 1. Resisting the authority projects, notably the sectarian, religious, and 
provincial ones. 2. Uniting the southern forces rejecting the Sana’a authority. 3. 
Contacting Arab, Islamic, and foreign countries to stand by the independence demand.1338 
The very explicity with which he refers to it as “a conflict of existence” is mirrored in other 
passages of the long document. Five years after his accession to the movement, that is, years 
into regular demonstrations and campaigns without results, the tone becomes more direct. So, 
too, does the addressing of risks being faced by the Hirak (de facto touch upon the issue of 
weaknesses, mistakes, and self-criticism, all delicate aspects to tackle publicly in this 
context). As “internal risks”, he identifies the emergence of extremist positions, the 
emergence of the term ‘armed struggle’ (implying that it might then be realized), mobilization 
over all sectors (which accounts rather as a challenge for the movement), the need to set up 
rules for the security and military sectors “for the peaceful Movement not to be detracted” (to 
violence), and a lack of, or delay, in centralization/unification of the movement. As “external 
risks” he lists: containment/repression, a lack of reaction of international organizations 
(contains the danger of violent escalation), movement fragmentation as a result of external 
pressure, and separatist regional tendencies with the danger of violent escalation.1339 At the 
bottom line, these points – though no further specified – form the recommendation for action. 
They do no significantly deviate from prior advice: moderation to avoid extremist positions; 
sticking to nonviolence and containment of those sectors involved in security and unification 
etc. That al-Beidh returned to this set serves as evidence that it is the most promising in regard 
to resonance, which will subsequently be shown in 7.2.6.  
 The last point to consider concerning al-Beidh’s prognostic framing is his positioning in 
                                                          
1336 Ibid.  
1337 “Former South Yemen President”. 
1338 “Introduction to the Southern Movement and its Development Stages”, Aden Live TV, April 16, 2014, 
accessed April 16, 2014, http://www.adenlivetv.tv/articles-13278.html. In addition, he calls for an integration of 
all Southern movement organizations and groups, and caution towards leadership and parties located in Sana’a, 
whom he denounces aas “serv[ing] as a cover for [the] legitimacy” of the regime.  
1339 “Introduction to the Southern Movement and its Development Stages”. 
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regard to other leaders. How his relation with Ba’oum was for years shaped by tensions has 
been noted before. His attempts at unifying dialogue with Ali Nasser Mohamed, al-Attas, and 
al-Jifri since 2009, however, are equally critically assessed by him in May 2013 (i.e. at a time 
of heightened attention to the NDC and increasing tensions between at least the Ba’oum and 
al-Beidh factions; this might be reflected as well in the relations between other leading 
figures):  
These leaders have rejected our calls for secession and agree to remaining unified and 
propose establishing a federal region. They justify this stance by saying that we are 
unable to restore the state, after the armed forces were dissolved. Yet, we cannot accept 
maintaining unity with Sanaa, even for a single day, after 1994. If we accept this, we will 
never be able to secede in the future. But the people have taken to the streets with the 
slogan ‘No to unity...no to a federal region’.1340 
Again, he raises himself above the others whom he describes as pessimistic and allusively 
unregenerate; he, on the other hand, presents himself as assertor of the will of the people, a 
role he has been striving to convey from the beginning of his involvement – apparently it has 
been to his advantage, specifically when noting that his is the dominant picture raised in 
demonstrations. The ‘why’ will be further discussed in 7.2.6. as well.  
 
In comparison to al-Beidh, the appeal of Hassan Ba’oum lies less in his rhetorical competence 
and political background than in his long-term dedication to opposition and protest on the 
ground. Frequent detention has fortified his credibility and symbolic character. His position, 
however, is more difficult to grasp for he concentrates much less on public frame distribution 
through speeches and interviews than al-Beidh. As far as can be reconstructed, he has not 
changed his stance over time. He is a proponent of complete independence (he does not speak 
of secession) for the South and places emphasis on its specific identity: “The south has never 
been part of the north. We have had our own identity since the dawn of history.”1341 In this 
framing, Aden has a special place: “Aden, capital of the South and the historic capital, which 
embodies the unity of all Southerners (...) humane wonderful coexistence, openness, and 
tolerance (...) [All] must recognize the specificity of Aden.”1342 Ba’oum consequently calls for 
a peaceful struggle for self-determination:1343 “We’re waging a just struggle. And the whole 
                                                          
1340 “Former South Yemen President”.  
1341 Craig, “Trouble”.  
1342 “National Congress for the People of the South”, held in Aden, December 16–18, 2012 (final document), 
received from Hirak activist, December 16, 2012. 
1343 Already in mid-2010, for instance, Ba’oum had accused al-Beidh of sabotaging peaceful efforts by allegedly 
financing violent attacks. “Rift in Southern Movement Leadership after Recent Unrest”, Yemen Times, June 24, 
2010, accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=34277.  
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of the world must comprehend that we’ll continue, peacefully, until victory.”1344 In 2013, he 
admitted to not having a roadmap (implying that the whole movement had none).1345 At the 
first mass-demonstration in Mukalla in April 2014 (note that Ba’oum is from Hadhramawt), 
he again called on Southerners to unite, underlined that violence of the regime will not deter 
them, and held that federalism conceived as a “plot”.1346 Despite his alleged closeness to the 
KSA, he did not categorically rule out future support from Iran, stating that: “We are calling 
all the world to support us and would welcome any party that would support our 
revolution.”1347 
 As indicated at the beginning of the paragraph: Ba’oum is a figure who captivates more 
through his actions than his talk. His statements are few and not far from others’ standpoints. 
Nevertheless, his example of continued peaceful struggle can be assumed to have had a strong 
non-verbal impact in regard to delineating how to protest.  
 
Calls for Armed Struggle 
Ba’oum’s peaceful stance is diametrically opposed to a number of calls for armed struggle, 
which have been made over time. Four will be analyzed. While it can reasonably assumed 
that these have not been the only ones, they were the most widespread, i.e. those targeting the 
most general audience.  
 The first call for armed resistance was made during the phase of accession of leaders in 
mid-2009 by Tariq al-Fadhli. In an interview he recounted:  
My brothers in the Southern Movement are not listening to me, but this regime doesn’t 
understand what political dialogue is, they only understand force. I am in favor or 
[armed] resistance and instituting a military movement. (...) Frankly, I do not find any of 
our allies in favor of my opinion. All are unanimously in favor of [limited] self-defense 
and the peaceful option.1348 
It has not been possible to reconstruct how exactly he attempted to convince his audience to 
take up arms, however, it seems that resonance has failed to appear. There are a number of 
arguments that theoretically both catalyze and inhibit resonance. What might tip the scales for 
al-Fadhli is his prominence, social prestige, and well-established networks in Abyan, Sana’a, 
and among Islamists. What can be held against him, on the other hand, partly coincides with 
                                                          
1344 Adam Baron, “The South (of Yemen) Will Rise Again”, Vice, March 5, 2013, accessed March 5, 2013, 
http://www.vice.com/read/the-south-of-yemen-will-rise-again.  
1345 Iona Craig on Mafraj Radio, November 10, 2013.  
1346 “AFP: Demonstration in Southern Yemen to Demand Independence from North”, April 28, 2014, accessed 
April 28, 2014, http://www.honahadramaut.com/2014/139557.html.  
1347 Craig, “Trouble”. 
1348 Cited in: HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, telephone interview conducted August 27, 2009, 21.  
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these strengths: Hirakis are overwhelmingly religious moderates, in whose view al-Fadhli’s 
Islamist connections and jihadist past are rather discrediting, i.e. lowering his credibility and 
scaring off moderates. Moreover, his (prior) good contacts to the regime are suspicious, and 
his rapid changing of sides from the regime to the protesters makes him look opportunistic, 
again taking a toll on his credibility. And mainly, as Southerners themselves hold, the 
majority does not appeal to violent action or, as interviewees have interpreted, at least were 
not appealing at that early stage. As a consequence, also of not creating resonance among 
other leaders, as al-Fadhli himself admits, his framing failed.  
 That he did reach at least a group (potentially of his immediate personal followers and 
clients) is, according to HRW, backed by a video. It shows clashes between a large 
secessionist crowd waving the southern flag and government troops at an event of al-Fadhli’s 
festival on July 23 in his compound. A number of the secessionists were visibly armed, which 
suggests that they might have been an intended core for the militia al-Fadhli had stated he 
wanted to create.1349 Government repression and the lack of resonance, however, limited his 
further options in that direction.1350 He instead took a more moderate stance after some time, 
integrating himself in the midst of the Hirak, until rumors held it that he drifted more towards 
Islamist circles again.  
 The second call for armed struggle was published anonymously (in the name of the Hirak, 
as reports claim) in the Aden Post on February 23, 2013. It followed immediately after the 
killing of protesters during the demonstration on February 21.  
What our South faces right now, the looting of its resources, wiles of its sons, killing, 
distortion, vandalizing, and the schemes that target our leaders, give us no option than to 
defend our South and ourselves. Even if we have limited possibilities and resources, our 
brave sons have already proven that they are able to save the South and the best evidence 
are those who gave their souls for its sake. The sons of the South are out of patience and 
all the possible doors are closed in front of them and even the foreign aids are getting 
useless in helping them reclaim their own rights and saving their people from killing, 
torture, chase, and prison. Now they have nothing to do except defend themselves. That is 
why we have decided to start the armed struggle because it is a legal right that is 
guaranteed by all the international conventions for those people who live under 
occupation. Therefore we have decided to move to another stage of the struggle of 
liberating our South. Especially after what we find by the end of the first stage our 
peaceful people’s Hirak with that great success and fruitful results. We now declare – 
with the support of God – the beginning of our armed struggle with a civil disobedience 
                                                          
1349 Ibid., 21f. 
1350 When Al-Fadhli’s home was under military siege again in March 2010 following a shooting, al-Beidh called 
on Southerners to help him. “Yemen Separatist Shot Dead, Southern Tensions Rise”, Reuters, March 4, 2010, 
accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6233B220100304. This should be interpreted 
as a statement of support for al-Fadhli’s ambiguous yet clearly militant position, for only on February 17 al-
Fadhli had called for a secessionist ‘intifada’ (‘uprising’). “Amid Persistent Violence in South, Hirak Says Will 
Launch ‘Stone Uprising’”, Yemen Post, February 17, 2010, accessed June 27, 2012, 
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1885.  
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in all the Southern provinces that will paralyze the occupier’s steps and confuses his 
plans. It will be the first warning in starting the armed revolution, which will be formed 
of the popular forces. In addition, it will sign the end of the peaceful struggle that has 
already given the all-occupying organizations and the foreign forces the sufficient chance 
to solve the case politically.1351 
Despite its core message of proclaiming the commencement of armed struggle, the text uses a 
very moderate language and rather argues than motivates to fight: It portrays the step as the 
last option after all other (nonviolent) means have been exhausted, speaks of armed struggle 
as defense, and remains within a rights framing; besides, the change is the ‘next stage’ (i.e. 
logical continuation) of the prior, honorable efforts of the martyrs. The regime, on the other 
hand, has had its chances and must now accept the consequences; yet, even those proceed 
slowly, with a first, non-violent step as a warning.  
 According to reports, “al-Beidh called from Beirut (...) for the armed struggle to begin 
stressing Sana’a was never serious in its efforts to address southerners’ grievances – stolen 
lands, discrimination, stolen benefits and unfair repartition of resources.”1352 This accounts for 
one more inconsistency in al-Beidh’s behavior and it must be questioned in how far it was 
supporting or rather detrimentally affecting the resonance of the call. The inherent tension 
between message and tone can be seen as an attempt not to scare off the followers that the 
prior moderate and legalistic framing had resonated well amongst, while at the same time 
prescribing a massive change in strategy, i.e. the prognostic component. Although the 
approach of ‘meeting’ the audience in an established frame anchoring generally appears well 
reflected and sensible, the implementation is lacking in a number of regards: First, 
notwithstanding its proclamation in the wake of a major event of repression (strengthening the 
empirical credibility), the change comes very abrupt. The nonviolence frame is too well 
established to uproot it so rapidly. Second, an anonymous announcement in a newspaper has 
both a very limited credibility and a limited reach; relatedly, an article initially reaches out to 
the single individuum and hence does not generate catalyzing effects in collectives. Third, the 
call stands isolated without on the ground events, i.e. what it is calling for is not visible in any 
form but remains in the abstract, a fact that makes it more challenging to evoke resonance. 
Fourth, and lastly, as has been noted above: Al-Beidh’s involvement – and sudden change of 
position – further complicates the issue. In conclusion, while the frame development is 
coherent, the noted deficiencies inhibited a success of this prognostic framing.  
                                                          
1351 See Digital Annex F.  
1352 “Southern Movement Declares Armed Struggle”, Yemen Post, February 24, 2013, accessed February 25, 
2013, http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=6604. It also mentions that the Hirak 
was about to “set up a revolutionary committee which will be charged with overseeing the popular liberation 
movement”. 
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A third announcement of armed struggle was made by the so-called ‘Southern Resistance’ on 
January 18, 2014. It took the form of a broadcast on Aden Live TV, where their statement was 
read out. Therein they announce that the Southern Resistance had attacked the 33rd Armored 
Brigade stationed in Dhaleh channeling strong popular anger and responding to the killing of 
Sheikh Saleh, as well as invoking retribution for the crimes that the enemy (the Yemeni army) 
performed against Southern people, specifically in al-Dhaleh. After a reporting of gains and 
small victories, they assert that their armed struggle and their actions will continue until the 
Yemeni occupation was defeated, the last meter of Southern soil was liberated, and 
Southerners had reclaimed freedom on all levels: politically, economically, and militarily. 
Once more in reference to international law, the group announces that all captured Yemeni 
soldiers would be handed over to the International Red Cross and, lastly, they warn the 
Yemeni army that any violent action against Southern citizens would be spontaneously 
replied and retributed by the Southern Resistance.1353 
 Anew, the announcement can be linked to al-Beidh due to the fact that it was launched on 
‘his’ TV channel.1354 He does not position himself publicly in this case, though. According to 
observers and in concordance with my own findings, this was the first time that a wing of the 
Southern Movement admitted to attacks against the military and referred to it as “the army of 
the enemies”.1355 As was the case with the second call for arms above, there had been a severe 
case of repression shortly before the declaration: the shelling of the funeral tent in Dhaleh in 
late December. This time, the character is more of a statement rather than an immediate call to 
arms, although this certainly is implied in the subtext. Yet, another more moderate measure 
called for is a sit-in at the quasi concluding NDC with the aim to demand a removal of the 
notorious 33rd Armored Brigade (the one the group was fighting) from Dhaleh, an ousting of 
its general Abdullah Dhaba’an, and holding him accountable for the crimes he committed in 
the area.1356 
 Especially in comparison with the prior call for armed struggle in 2013, this one has some 
strengths: It was spread via a popular medium and transmitted orally, which lets it reach a 
wider audience; it has a named frame distributor; the outrage after the shelling was much 
more fundamental and the audience could thus be reached more easily on an emotional level; 
                                                          
1353 See Digital Annex F.  
1354 Rumors in the Hirak connect the Southern Resistance with Shallal Ali Shaie and a soldier named Al-Jamajim 
fighting with him; another aspect of these rumors moreover stresses the connection between this violent cell and 
al-Beidh. Interview with Hirak activist living in Germany, July 22, 2014.  
1355 Mohamed al-Kibsi, “Lead [sic!] by al-Beidh Southern National Resistance Declares War Against Army 
Forces”, January 19, 2014, accessed January 19, 2014, http://www.mohammedalkibsi.blogspot.de/2014/01/lead-
by-al-beidh-southern-national.html.  
1356 Ibid.  
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it was not an immediate call to get involved in armed struggle, with the mediacy potentially 
acting in favor for it rather pulls than tries to push the audience; the enemy is clearly named 
and personally known (at least to those local to Dhaleh), with a notorious record of violence; 
the group is building a record of ‘achievements’ to back their position and to add to their 
credibility; and, lastly, the prime arena is an area with already established, though small, cells 
of armed resistance, hence softening the step towards it, as does the observance of 
international law explicitly pointed out. Among the weaknesses are: possibly the noted 
mediacy of calling to join the group; the lack of a prominent figure with social prestige and a 
network; and the short-term nature of the call without (at that point) a permanent campaign 
and comprehensive framing.  
 The Southern Resistance generated some reports related to attacks as well as losses from 
clashes in early 2014, yet, this soon declined. In 2015, however, they were able to mobilize 
followers to fight against the Houthis and regime troops, i.e. in the face of immediate invasive 
militia/military threat towards the South.1357 Section 7.2.6. will further elucidate the resonance 
of its announcement and actions (for the group probably impacted more through action than 
words).  
 
Figure 7.9.: The logo of the Southern Resistance as distributed on social media platforms etc. in early 
2014. It shows the PDRY’s coat of arms – in which the official name of the state has been replaced by 
‘Al-muqāwamah al-janūbyīah’ – with two rifles in the back.  
 
The fourth and last official step towards a violent strategy was the declaration of the Hirak’s 
Military Council on September 23, 2014 by a group of retired military.1358 This occurred at a 
time of instability in the North in the wake of the Houthi seizing of Sana’a, which increased 
overall insecurity and created a political opportunity. This council proclaimed that starting 
from the commemoration date of October 14, they would follow the Houthi model of toppling 
                                                          
1357 Susanne Dahlgren, Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, “The Multiple Wars in Yemen”, MERIP, June 18, 2015, 
accessed June 19, 2015, http://www.merip.org/multiple-wars-yemen.  
1358 Here and in the following: “Divided South Yemen Separatists Vow to Achieve Independence”, Middle East 
Eye, September 30, 2014, accessed October 6, 2014, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/divided-south-yemen-
separatists-vow-achieve-independence-830553601.  
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the government. They called for mass demonstrations and extensive campaigns of civil 
disobedience with the aim of taking control of cities and ultimately declaring an independent 
state. Saleh Tammah, known for his involvement in HATAM and one of the founding 
members of the council, said in an interview: “We think the time is ripe for declaring our 
state. (...) The south is totally controlled by its people. Most army generals, governors of 
provinces and directors of districts are southerners.”1359 As an incentive to join, the council 
promised all army personnel a permanent position. Tamah justified this on the basis of 
optimal human resource use: “Those army officers have military know-how, since they 
graduated from prestigious Russian schools. They want to share their expertise with the young 
southerners.”1360 
 Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of this announcement and call is less unequivocal 
than in the prior cases. The Houthi’s seizure of the capital was observed with caution by 
Southerners, thus potentially making them more open for a more militant solution. In 
addition, the great number of retired military enjoys a high reputation among the general 
population; for them, the suggested role and the promised perspective of permanent 
employment must sound seductive. If all of them joined, larger parts of the population would 
probably follow. Furthermore, the procedure of first creating a council and then slowly and 
reflectedly escalating measures appears appropriate in the cultural (political) setting. Yet, the 
nonviolence frame is well-established and the impact of a Tammah calling for a drastic shift 
when more well-known leaders are still in favor of sticking to the prior strategy would make a 
more comprehensive campaign either of systematically convincing the retired officers or – 
regarding the whole population – of spreading the frame necessary.  
 Which role exactly the Military Council played in the mobilization for the post-October 14 
protest camp on Al-Arood Square and the accompanying campaigns in the run-up to the 
November 30 ultimatum is equally difficult to assess for lack of definite affiliation of 
protesters with the group. It was present among the protesters, that much is assured. The 
absence of action after November 30, however, is a clear sign that no sufficient numbers 
joined the quest of simply declaring independence as a consequence of de facto territorial 
control as delineated by Tammah.  
 
This section has presented the various directions the prognostic framing of different groups 
and individual actors has taken. They differ in strategy and goal or simply in that they are 
                                                          
1359 Ibid.  
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propagated by one ‘leader’ or the other. I have furthermore pointed out the respective 
strengths and weaknesses of each framing from a theoretical point (in regard to credibility, 
consistency, reach, timing, etc.). The analysis of the resonance they factually evoked will be 
conducted in 7.2.6.  
 
7.2.3. Motivational Framing 
“We call on the people of the south to actively participate in this event [commemorating the 
withdrawal of the last British troops]... while holding dear their civil values and civilized 
manners and peaceful means in changing opinion.”1361 This early call of Nasser al-Noubah to 
all Southerners on November 21, 2008 is representative for the vast majority of those to come 
in the subsequent years. The core invocations are always: Participate in the struggle and stay 
peaceful for you are civilized. The latter two are, as a rule, combined in a causal connection 
between identity (civilized) and consequential action (nonviolence). Through the linking of 
demonstrations and mass events to dates of commemoration and through the strong emphasis 
on the British legacy, identity is permanently (re)invoked and (re)created. Interestingly, 
despite the violent character of these commemorative events (especially the Politburo 
massacre and the commencement of armed resistance against the British), they are interpreted 
as evidence for ‘civilized nonviolence’.1362 
 Some calls to join the struggle aim at specific groups. In his speech in May 2009, al-Beidh, 
for instance, explicitly mentioned ‘collaborators’: “I call upon all Southerners who are 
working with the occupying authorities, to put the interest of the South above their own 
interests and to join the caravan of liberation of the South.”1363 Other specifically targeted 
collectives include Southerners in the diaspora, especially those in the Gulf States who might 
provide financial support and approach their respective host governments to acknowledge the 
Southern issue, and Hadhramis, to better integrate the movement in all of the South and 
counter potential Hadhrami secessionism. All of these addressed, however, were faint in 
comparison to regular mass mobilization attempts.  
 Another strand of motivational framing aims at unity of the movement (particularly since 
2014) and therefore at closing the ranks and overcoming differences. It is logically rooted in 
                                                          
1361 Cited in: HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, 17, n. 28. 
1362 When twisting the argument, one might also reason that they intentionally put such a strong emphasis on 
nonviolence to overcome the danger of previous escalation and that the linking to commemoration dates should 
serve as a reminder of the past doom of violence. However, it was never explicated that way.  
1363 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. He also explicitly calls on the youth.  
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the core challenge of overcoming fragmentation and factionalization, and it formed the very 
first step in 2006 (‘Reconciliation and Tolerance’). 
 ‘We have suffered wrong and demand compensation and our rights.’ This, in short, is a 
strong motivational frame (or, rather, a combination of three elements), and it immediately 
relates to the diagnostic frames. In addition, it relates to the call on international actors for 
support – albeit mainly for those in favor of peaceful struggle. Their logic holds that once 
Southerners get the attention of the international community, they can prove how they have 
and are continuously suffering from injustice, and then gain the restoring of their 
internationally guaranteed rights. Therefore, the aim must be to get attention and present 
themselves as worthy members of the international community – of which they are aware. To 
do so, they (a) collect evidence on what they have lost during and after the war of 1994 (see 
the respective documents in which this has been done), (b) document human rights violations 
by the regime, (c) present the Hirak as a democratic people’s movement, (d) argue in legal 
terms (e.g. demand for self-determination), (e) advocate the advantages for international 
actors’ interests (e.g. containment of terrorism), and (f) remain nonviolent in their repertoire 
of contention (i.e. demonstrations, rallies, civil disobedience campaigns, etc.).  
 Since activists as well as uninvolved persons are becoming victims of repression and 
regime violence, the movement is pursuing a balancing act in its call for an ‘adequate’ 
response, i.e. a response that gives victims the feeling of acknowledgement and worth, yet 
restraining them from violent escalation. This is also the part in which proponents of 
nonviolence and armed struggle, respectively, differ the most. The former put the main 
emphasis on ‘being civilized’, having a glorious past as a ‘civil state’ with numerous 
achievements, and ‘rightfully deserving’ justice. They allow for ‘self-defense’ but underline 
the ‘civilizational superiority of a peaceful struggle’. The latter, on the other hand, consider 
their ability to expel the ‘Northern occupier’ as part of the ‘glorious Southern past’ that 
successfully expelled the British. The ‘success’ of the resistance cells in Dhaleh are presented 
in that light, underlining Southerners strength and preparedness for defense and battle. 
Accordingly, the ‘doves’ motivate along the lines: ‘defend yourself but let’s show them our 
superiority by remaining peaceful’, whereas the ‘hawks’ frame it as ‘let’s end victimization 
and show them our strength (in fighting)’. Apart from the diametrical difference between the 
‘doves’ and the ‘hawks’, the motivational elements are combined in a modular manner by the 
various actors, often reassembled to distinct packages. As a rule, they often contain an 
element of ‘follow my leadership’.   
As for the Houthis, the table below summarizes the analysis of the Hirak’s frame dimensions.  
330 
 
D
IA
G
N
O
S
T
IC
 F
R
A
M
E
S
 
W
h
at
 i
s 
th
e 
p
ro
b
le
m
/t
h
e 
is
su
e 
at
 s
ta
k
e?
 W
h
o
 i
s 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
le
 f
o
r 
it
?
 
  
MAIN FRAME  SUB-FRAME CORE CONTENT 
FAILED UNITY FRAME  unity between the North and the South has 
failed 
OCCUPATION FRAME  Southern state is illegally occupied by 
Northern regime forces 
 Looting Northerners have been looting Southern 
property and resources since 1994 
 Militarization militarization of the South by Northern forces 
and repression of Southerners 
 Violence/ 
Physical Harm 
violence, killings, and a dire humanitarian 
situation as a result of Northern presence and 
violent policies  
THREAT FRAME  there is an existential (cultural and/or 
physical) threat emanating from a specific 
‘other’ 
 Threatened Identity Southern history is manipulated and heritage 
is destroyed in order to eliminate Southern 
identity 
 Physical Threats violence, “genocide”, and demographic 
threats are directed against Southerners 
INJUSTICE FRAME  defined group suffers from injustice directed 
against it 
 Southern 
Marginalization 
South is/Southerners are systematically 
marginalized in regard to infrastructure, 
(government) jobs, natural resource income, 
political representation and inclusion, and the 
condition and status of Aden, which has been 
marginalized, neglected, and degraded 
 Legal Discrimination Southerners are deprived of their rights 
 Lack of Dignity lack of justice, equality, and freedom for 
Southerners; relative deprivation; religious 
defamation through Islamist clerics close to 
the regime 
CIVIL STATE FRAME   only a civil state is a good state 
 Civilized Southerners in their own state Southerners had a good, 
civil, progressive constitution and 
administration, partly as a legacy of the 
British era 
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Table 7.5.: Summary of the Hirak’s diagnostic frames  
 Lack of State & 
State Services 
Northern-dominated state lacks genuine state 
capacities; it is characterized by a corrupt and 
despotic system 
ATTRIBUTION  
OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 responsibility must be attributed for the 
various diagnoses on various levels: national 
and international 
 Northern Cultural 
‘Other’  
Northerners are tribal barbarians 
 Tyranny Regime regime had malevolent intentions from the 
beginning and engages in brutal willful 
destruction 
 International 
Community 
international community fails to live up to its 
own declarations and resolutions and support 
Southerners 
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Table 7.6.: Summary of the Hirak’s prognostic frames  
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MAIN FRAME  CORE CONTENT 
NONVIOLENCE FRAME everything we do must be peaceful; nonviolence is superior to 
violence and a sign of us being civilized 
FEDERALISM FRAME there is a way to resolve the problems within unity; the NDC 
provides a framework within which we can potentially develop 
solutions through internationally supported negotiations 
CONFEDERATION 
FRAME 
a two-state federal solution should be established for an interim 
period, followed by a referendum in the South  
INDEPENDENCE FRAME after unity has comprehensively failed and in the face of the 
massive injustice and crimes committed by the North against the 
South, immediate independence is the only option; it is not an 
issue of secession for unity was merely a contract between two 
independent states; thus, independence is simply a restoration of 
the status quo ante  
ARMED STRUGGLE 
FRAME 
we have exhausted all other options and now need to take up 
armed struggle in order to fight injustice and regain our 
independent state; if we do not fight, we will in the long run be 
defeated and our identity extinguished 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
FRAME 
Southerners have a right to self-determination; the people must 
be able to decide about their political and social future in a 
referendum 
RIGHTS FRAME international law guarantees Southerners numerous rights they 
are deprived of; these rights need to be regained; all we demand 
is legally justified 
LIBERATION FRAME end occupation and ‘colonialism’ by Northerners 
SOUTH ARABIA FRAME regain our own South Arabian identity, which is unlike Yemeni 
identity that has been imposed upon us; underlying axiom: South 
Arabia has never been part of Yemen 
INTERNATIONAL 
SUPPORT FRAME 
we will win back our state when the international community 
pays attention and acknowledges our struggle as justified and 
legal 
333 
 
M
O
T
IV
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 F
R
A
M
E
S
 
W
h
y
 i
s 
it
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
n
d
 p
ro
m
is
in
g
 t
o
 j
o
in
 c
o
ll
ec
ti
v
e 
ac
ti
o
n
?
 
MAIN FRAME  SUB-FRAME CORE CONTENT 
THREAT FRAME  counter the threat! 
 Necessity for Action without action the (culturally & to a lesser 
degree physically) existential threat will 
continue and intensify 
COMPREHENSIVE 
MOBILIZATION 
FRAME 
 participate in the struggle! 
 Mass mobilization all strata of society need to be mobilized, 
among others to gain the attention of the 
international community 
 Specific Groups every Southerner is needed; diaspora can 
help by financial support and by 
approaching host governments to 
acknowledge Southern issue; Hadhramis are 
Southerners as well and need to unite with 
the movement 
NON-COOPERATION 
FRAME 
 demonstrate your opposition through non-
cooperation with the regime! 
 End of Cooperation stop any cooperation with the Northern 
regime, especially those still working for it 
 Civil Disobedience block the system by laying down your work 
on a regular basis (twice a week)  
MOVEMENT UNITY 
FRAME 
 unite the movement (to be more effective)! 
 Reconcile Past 
Divisions 
overcome the divisions of the 1986 political 
infighting through ‘Reconciliation and 
Tolerance’ 
 Overcome 
Leadership 
Factionalization 
overcome factionalization between old 
leaders in order to avoid internal fighting 
and concentrate energies on the struggle 
INTERNATIONAL 
SUPPORT FRAME 
 gain the support of the international 
community (sometimes added: it is 
indispensable for movement success)! 
 Civilized Member of 
International 
Community 
the South is a civilized member of the 
international community and suffering from 
severe injustice; this can be proven by 
evidence about dispossession, 
documentation about human rights abuses, 
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Table 7.7.: Summary of the Hirak’s motivational frames  
on a legal basis, and through our democratic 
and nonviolent character 
 Advantages Southern independence has advantages for 
the interests of international actors, e.g. 
containment of terrorist groups on its 
territory 
RESPONSE TO 
REPRESSION FRAME 
 we need to respond to the repression we are 
suffering from! 
 Nonviolence only peaceful struggle will lead to success 
(specifically with the need to get 
international support and 
acknowledgement); stay peaceful! 
 Self-Defense self-defense is legitimate 
 
 Armed Struggle peaceful means have been exhausted; it is 
time to fight for our liberation 
 
FEASIBILITY FRAME  it is feasible to act in the prescribed way and 
be successful! 
 
 Historical Example we have succeeded in the anticolonial 
struggle and can and will succeed again 
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7.2.4. Decentralized Framing 
So far, the framing emanating from leadership circles (including events with prominent 
figures) has been focused on. Of significant importance for the Hirak, however, is moreover 
the decentralized framing by movement members themselves. As has been noted, the 
movement has set off initially without the participation of a strong and coherent leadership 
and the overwhelming number of events and communication still function without leadership 
involvement. Rather than leaders steering movement adherents, the initial impulse and core 
frame content has originated with those who early on got together and with those who 
followed suit. As Bin Fareed had recounted, the original issues centered around 
socioeconomic grievances and rights, and they were directed peacefully at the government 
and – when there was no reaction and out of reasons of spatial closeness of the representation 
– to the EU. Without going into details (for which there is a lack of sources), a basic structure 
of a collective action frame had been set by that time: The diagnostic framing held that the 
South had been looted by Northern regime forces and elites, and that Southerners were 
marginalized and discriminated against. In regard to prognosis, the initial demand was to gain 
an equal status within the unity state and a compensation for and/or restoration of losses 
(property and positions) since 1994; both were backed by ‘facts’ which had been compiled, 
i.e. the demands were made within a rational, rights-based mode. The way to attain these 
goals was peaceful protest to achieve acknowledgement of the articulated grievances and 
(pragmatic) solutions. Motivation seems to have been generated through example: The first 
small group (most of who had been active in opposition before) went to the streets to protest 
and through this action spread their frames. They had a strong empirical commensurability, 
particularly in the wake of acts of regime repression in the immediate context of protest 
events; consequently, they successfully catalyzed participation in the events as well as 
permanent mobilization.  
 When the old leadership began to join in mid-2009, they sought to align their own framing 
with what they found already present; the movement by then had been active for roughly two 
years and the frames had fortified to a certain degree. To be ‘heard’ and accepted, Al-Beidh 
and others had to align their frames with the frames of their audience. In a first step, their 
framing needed to be compatible with what they found, i.e. the core content of the respective 
frame dimensions had to have sufficient overlap. Only in a second step, after having 
established themselves as privileged members and then ‘leaders’ of the Southern Movement, 
could they begin to influence and shift the frame content. Their perspective, their interests, as 
well as external developments they and the movement needed to react to shaped the trajectory 
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of the framing, and then it still entered into the (re)adaptation process in interplay with the 
resonance it is able to create among the audience: No resonance leads to a modification of the 
framing in order to generate resonance; this feedback loop is repeated as long as it takes to 
reach a high level of resonance. Once resonance is established, the need is to uphold it by a 
wider distribution, intensification, or advancement.   
 These are the basic processes and mechanisms of elite framing in the Hirak. In parallel to 
these, however, decentralized framing never lost its role; it merely changed its character. With 
the entry of the old leaders, their framing – when it was able to assert itself – took over some 
kind of ‘guiding role’: It was not able to dominate, yet the movement groups and members 
geared their own decentralized framing to the leadership frames. In other words, the 
decentralized framing took up the main frames’ ideas, but sometimes deviated slightly from 
them. This interlocking between the two levels contained within it the great potential of 
catalyzed frame distribution through manifold actors, who all participated in the decentralized 
framing (i.e. square leaders, organizers of decentralized smaller events, youth leaders, etc.), 
and simultaneously of highly audience-specific adaptations of the core messages. Having said 
that, these advantages came at the risk of loss of control and unregulated modification, which 
might contradict the original framer’s intentions. Despite there being little control and even 
less predictable reaction in any event, these risks were still more than acceptable in return for 
the noted benefits.1364 
 From the point of frame analysis, decentralized framing generally, and the described 
interlocking with what I call ‘elite framing’ particularly, poses methodological as well as 
practical challenges: First, the delineation between decentralized framing, (to a lesser extent) 
frame distribution, and frame resonance is ambiguous. Especially between the first and the 
last option, it can be merely a question of degree (to what extent is the frame different from 
the elite frame?1365) and weighing (is the actor/the group spreading the frame influential 
enough to be considered framers themselves?1366). Second, accessing decentralized framing is 
much more complex than accessing elite framing, for it is less well documented and 
straightforward, but rather loosely connected.  
 For these reasons, I do not present a separate section with solely the content of 
decentralized framing but confine myself to indicating the mechanisms and to selectively 
                                                          
1364 It is highly questionable in how far there can ever be any control in framing. 
1365 This aims at the question of originality: To what extent is a frame merely being distributed or does the 
(re)action soley pose resonance and not an independent act of framing?  
1366 In order to be considered a genuinely own framing act, the framer needs to possess the agency and capacity 
not only develop (at least a new variant of) a frame, but also to distribute it. As the above criterion, the answer 
can merely be approached by estimation.  
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presenting one medium I believe to be pivotal in this regard: cartoons. They are drawn once 
by a single actor who usually invests a lot of thought into them, transport pointed, often 
emotionally laden messages (frames), are understood also by an illiterate audience, more 
easily memorized than the written or spoken word, and can be distributed with relatively low 
effort by print or digitally through social media. These qualities make them a prime medium 
for framing endeavors. In addition to the below exemplary presentation of selected 
cartoons,1367 I will in the subsequent sections on frame distribution and resonance furthermore 
highlight aspects that might alternatively be classified as decentralized framing (pursuant to 
the noted challenge of delineation).  
 
  
                                                          
1367 All cartoons have been collected from Hirak-affiliated Facebook groups between February 23 and March 7, 
2013. They have been widely circulated, i.e. they appeared in at least three different groups and have been liked 
and shared more then 100 times each.  
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Diagnostic Framing 
 
Fig. 7.10.: The North is killing the South    Fig. 7.11.: “April 27. The day when the war 
while pleading friendship began and unity was killed” – The North is 
stabbing the South with a dagger 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.12.: The South is being hanged by Islamists  Fig. 7.13.:Saleh and the army butchering the South 
        in the name of unity 
 
 
Prognostic Framing 
 
Fig. 7.14.: UN is turning its back to the masses  Fig.7.15.: Arab media looking solely to Syria  
of Southern protesters and their demands   while Southerners are being killed by Northerners 
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Fig.7.16.: Aden, February 21, 2013: Peaceful Southern Fig. 7.17.: March 18 (2013, NDC start): South  
protester has been killed by Islah representative and  Arabia being led to execution by GCC initiative 
his thugs: “Mission accomplished and the celebration and UN; writing on the wall: “Unity of Death”.  
is set, Sheikh.” Repainting the ROY flag and the slogan  Spectators are US Hunt Oil, French Total Oil, a 
“Unity or Death”1368 with blood    Canadian (oil) company, and a Gulf company 
 
 
Motivational Framing 
 
Figure 7.18.: “My brother is a Southerner and my sister Fig. 7.19.: Graffiti in Aden: Southern flag, English 
is a Southerner. Your contribution in publishing photos, call for mobilization, Arabic “Yes to the South, yes  
videos, and news of the mass rally on April 27:  to freedom, no to occupation.”1369 
like and share Southern news = publish/spread the    
Southern issue across the world 
 
  
                                                          
1368 The frame of “Unity of Death” was vehemently spread by Saleh. In spring 2010, for instance, Heinze has 
documented a large billboard with his picture and the slogan in ROY national colors. Marie-Christine Heinze, 
“Für Einheit und Sezession wider die Erinnerung und das Vergessen. Eine rezente Geschichte des politischen 
Kampfes mit visuellen Mitteln im Jemen”, Jemen-Report 45 (2014): 19–26, here: 20.  
1369 Although this is no cartoon, it is included for its relevance and good illustrative capacity. 
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7.2.5. Frame Distribution 
The Southern Movement very early on engaged in a wide range of frame distribution 
activities. As Bin Fareed vividly described, the initial event(s) were characterized by 
gathering, engaged and emotional discussion, and speeches. Those who spoke were figures 
with social standing and often a prior history of engagement in opposition, yet no established 
‘leadership circle’; they would enter the stage in 2009. Settings for such gatherings were often 
either commemoration days of Southern history, on which Southern identity was affirmed, or 
within the realm of regional assemblies (possibly in connection with a qat chew), where 
regional identities were affirmed. These special contexts served as fertile ground for 
movement frames, since the ‘non-Northern/non-Yemeni identity’ element was already salient.  
 Demonstrations with banners and soon slogans, first very limited, then with ever growing 
numbers of participants partly reaching the hundreds of thousands, who travelled far 
distances,1370 were complemented by petitions addressed to national and – mostly – 
international actors. Notable about many banners and slogans (also in form of graffities) is 
that they frequently not only in Arabic, but in English too, or even only in English. This 
illustrates the conscious attempt to gain international attention and subsequently support: 
These slogans are less directed towards the local population and the regime than to the 
‘international community’ in whom activists set such high hopes. If English slogans are 
employed depends on the content. It is those slogans that contain very clear demands or core 
positions of the movement, which are translated for instance:1371 “South peaceful mobility to 
restore the country & identity of Southern people (lead of Arab spring revolution)”, “Freedom 
for South”, “Dear UN, can u [sic] see us?”, “We reconciled”, “With no independence we will 
not accept”, “The decision is ours”, “Unity is dead”, “No more occupation”, “Stop Genocide 
against the people of the South”, “We demand the international Security Council and the 
United Nation[s] to practice the laws 931-924 [sic!]”, “People want to restore the state of the 
South”, “Independence is our aim”, and “The Peaceful Struggle is our choice”.  
 Slogans in Arabic tackle a wider range of topics. Anne-Linda Amira Augustin has 
conducted extensive research on the Hirak’s slogans, graffiti, and chants. She distinguishes 
between six groups of slogans, depending on their content: (1) Slogans of Southern History, 
(2) Slogans of anti-North rhetoric, (3) Slogans of Independence, (4) Slogans of Social 
Questions (Demanding Dignity and Justice), (5) Slogans of the Arab Spring, and (6) the 
                                                          
1370 For a video documenting the journey of activists from somewhere in Hadhramawt to the mass rally in 
Mukalla see: Digital Appendix I. 
1371 For the following slogans see: Digital Appendix J. 
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Southern Flag.1372 What becomes apparent through the examples is the pervading presence of 
identity invocation (besides the demands, which are congruent with the English versions). The 
terms ‘shaʿb’ (‘people’), ‘hawyīah’ (‘identity’), ‘arḍ’ (‘land, territory’), and ‘tārīkh’ 
(‘history’) are frequently used or alluded to, as are ‘South Arabian identity’ and ‘love for 
Aden’ – all with emotional appeal. Moreover, martyrs are praised and movement members 
vow to continue the struggle and follow in their footsteps until liberation will be realized.1373 
Chants and songs are often abridged versions of old unity songs changed into nationalist 
South Arabian versions, or equally abridged versions of Arab Spring chants adapted to the 
context.1374 They again stress common identity and furthermore position ‘South Arabia’ 
among the ‘revolutionary nations of the Arab Spring’.  
 Graffiti are widely spread; besides slogans they frequently depict the Southern flag, faces 
of prominent figures (e.g. Ba’oum), and else. These graffiti and the dominant presence of the 
flag on private and public buildings, squares, homes etc. should be interpreted as territorial 
claims and as the creation of facts; specifically the replacement of the ROY flag with the 
Southern flag poses a performative act of transformation. The same applies for the changing 
of names of streets, squares, and schools from symbolic names of the unity state into 
symbolic names of Southern identity; in a similar vein, placards were installed welcoming 
visitors to the ‘Capital of Aden’. This dominance and claim-making in the public sphere is 
moreover complemented by a variety of token objects such as umbrellas, clothing, hats, etc. 
with the flag1375 and the demonstrative depiction and exhibition of PDRY memorabilia such 
as passports1376 and uniforms.1377 ‘Body practices’ such as painting oneself with the flag or 
communal performances1378 additionally enrich the repertoire of action during these events.  
 The extent of these modes of distribution at least in Aden is impressive: As Augustin has 
documented for spring 2014, the movement had established a precise schedule of daily 
demonstrations, rotating through all quarters of the city. This was supposed to set the 
threshold for participation at a low level by eliminating the need for transportation. In 
                                                          
1372 Augustin, “Tawra Tawra Ya Ganub”.  
1373 Ibid.  
1374 Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, “’Erhebe deinen Kopf, du bist ein freier Südaraber‚ – Gesungene Slogans und 
Sprechgesänge der Bewegung des Südens”, Jemen-Report 46 (2015): 49–54; Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, 
“Chanting for Southern Independence”, Middle East Report 273 (Winter 2014): 11–13. 
1375 Especially children are often dressed in clothing made out of or showing the flag and garnished with tokens.  
1376 ROY passports are on the contrary occasionally publicly burned. 
1377 See digital appendix K. Augustin describes that Southern policemen in 2013 began to wear their old PDRY 
uniforms when controlling traffic. Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, “’Bewegung des Südens‚ im Jemen. Aden probt 
die Unabhängigkeit im Stillen”, Zenith Online, July 16, 2013, accessed July 18, 2013, 
http://www.zenithonline.de/deutsch/politik//artikel/aden-probt-die-unabhaengigkeit-im-stillen-003726/.  
1378 For example the creation of commemoration dates by positioning people, see digital appendix L. 
342 
 
addition, these demonstrations were filmed and broadcasted on Aden Live TV, thereby further 
multiplying their impact.1379 
 
 
 
Period 
 
Mode 
0
1
/2
0
0
6
–
0
7
/2
0
0
7
 
0
8
/2
0
0
7
–
0
4
/2
0
0
9
 
0
5
/2
0
0
9
–
0
2
/2
0
1
1
 
0
2
/2
0
1
1
–
0
4
/2
0
1
1
 
0
5
/2
0
1
1
–
0
3
/2
0
1
3
 
0
3
/2
0
1
3
–
0
1
/2
0
1
4
 
0
1
/2
0
1
4
–
1
1
/2
0
1
4
 
1
2
/2
0
1
4
–
0
3
/2
0
1
5
 
Assembly/Discussion x x x x x x x x 
Speech x x x x x x x x 
Newspaper Article/Opinion Piece1380 x x x x x x x x 
Demonstration/Rally x x x x x x x x 
Commemoration x x x x x x x x 
Poster/Banner x x x x x x x x 
Petition x x x x x x x x 
Website x x x x x x x x 
Photo/Image x x x x x x x x 
Funeral1381 x x x x x x x x 
Newspaper1382 x x     x x 
Text/Brochure/Book1383 ? x x x x x x x 
Slogan ? x x x x x x x 
Film/Video ? ? x x x x x x 
                                                          
1379 Augustin, “Erhebe deinen Kopf”. The channel also mixes sequences from the 1960s with those of today’s 
conditions and clashes, thus drawing another close connection. Susanne Dahlgren, “A Poor People’s Revolution. 
The Southern Movement Heads Toward Independence from Yemen”, Middle East Report 273 (2014). 
1380 Notable here are Al-Ayyam and – especially also for regular and frequent opinion pieces by a number of 
authors (among them Bin Fareed) – Aden al-Ghad and Shibam News online. See: http://www.adenalghad.net 
and http://www.shibamnews.com.  
1381 Funerals of movement members killed during protest or through repression, celebrated as ‘martyrs for the 
cause’. I define a funeral as a medium in that it – as a very distinct act – carries a unique message.  
1382 Newspaper here refers to the (symbolic) significance of an independent Southern newspaper as manifest in 
Al-Ayyam; it does not imply its content as such.  
1383 Albeit Southern literature takes up the topic of Southern grievances, (until mid-2013 at least) it has not 
tackled the movement as such. Personal communication with two Southern authors in favor of the Hirak, March–
April 2013.  
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Cartoon ? ? x x x x x x 
Interview   x x x x x x 
TV1384   x x x x x x 
Token1385   x x x x x x 
Flag   x x x x x x 
Memorabilia1386   x x x x x x 
Conference   x x x x x  
Social Media    x x x x x 
Web forum    x x x x x 
Graffiti    x x x x x 
Civil Disobedience1387    x x x x x 
Protest Camp    x   x  
Poetry ? ? ? ? x x x x 
Radio ? ? ? ? x x x x 
Music ? ? ? ? x x x x 
Sites1388    ? x x x x 
Body Practice1389     x x x x 
 
Table 7.8.: Media of Hirak frame distribution throughout the previously defined periods  
 
 
                                                          
1384 The most relevant channel is Aden Live TV. Early broadcasting started on February 11, 2009, yet it was 
merely intermittent due to frequent change of satellite and scare resources. The station was finally set up with its 
studio in Beirut on February 11, 2012. “About Us”, Aden Live TV, accessed February 24, 2014, 
http://www.adenlivetv.tv/about.html.  
1385 This refers particularly to objects with the PDRY flag on them, e.g. umbrellas, hats, badges etc.  
1386 Memorabilia of the former independent Southern state in form of stamps, banknotes, passports, other IDs, 
uniforms, photos of the era, and other state insignia.  
1387 While there have been isolated days of civil disobedience and strikes before, more frequent and later regular 
campaigns commenced only in the wake of the Arab Spring protests.  
1388 Sites can be distinguished into two categories: First, sites like checkpoints in which the opposition manifests 
itself in confrontation with the adversary (i.e. state power); second, sites of the Hirak’s own organization, e.g. 
smaller squares in which regular or even permanent gatherings occur, where teaching and mobilizing activities 
take place, and on which identity claims are made and demonstrated (for instance in form of decoration with 
flags etc.).  
1389 E.g. painting faces with the Southern flag.  
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Photos and videos of demonstrations are moreover extensively shared on websites and social 
media; they document the events and at the same time circulate the respective frames. The 
movement early on set up websites, web forums, and social media sites despite the low 
prevalence of internet access in the country;1390 these sites are not only partly run by 
Southerners in the diaspora, but also specifically target diaspora as an audience and an 
intermediate distributor.1391 Sometimes, photos are sent by mobile phone or else and then 
uploaded abroad (with higher speed and a more reliable internet connection). Furthermore, 
there is an active community of bloggers who spread reports on movement events and 
repression, which would otherwise suffer from restrictions.1392 Telephone contacts and 
messenger services (Yahoo messenger, WhatsApp) have been emphasized by various activists 
as core means for communication1393 and also for sharing photos, audio files, and short 
videos.1394 There are numerous permanent groups, e.g. in WhatsApp, in which these files and 
discussions are shared between those on the ground and activists all over the world. As one 
activist put it: “No matter how big a march you make, if you don’t spread it, it doesn’t pump 
up. You know, and [if you don’t] broadcast [it], then there’s no point in doing it.”1395 
 While hardly anyone seems to perceive an active radio channel (though there are), TV – 
especially Aden Live TV – plays an important, yet, contested role. The channel is associated 
with al-Beidh and broadcasts the views of his faction. A number of interviewees doubted its 
credibility (see 6.8.), yet, at the same time they and analysts certify its immense reach ‘into 
almost every household’. Particularly before the rise of Aden Live and partly thereafter, 
phone calls during shows on other channels such as BBC were made by activists, for instance 
to pose critical questions to representatives of the GoY or to inform about and comment on 
the situation in the South. The aim was once again to gain international attention.1396 
 Material such as texts, flyers, brochures, and books self-evidently belong to the media used 
by the Southern Movement. The documents listing the allegedly looted property, reports of 
                                                          
1390 A main argument made in this regard is that the internet plays such a pivotal role for “the diaspora as well as 
Southerners cannot depend on media information for there is ‘zero credibility’”. Personal communication with 
Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1391 According to activists, to catalyze mobilization is an important function of the diaspora: “[T]he revolution of 
the south [is] fueled by a large overseas [sic!] to help people to attend the rally as large as millions.” Personal 
communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1392 HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, 61f. They list Sawt al-Janub, Shamsham News, Al-Khalif Aden Network, 
Al-Dhali Forums, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, Mukalla Press, and armiesofliberation.com (run by Jane Novak) as 
examples.  
1393 They were always accompanied by traditional media such as posters announcing events etc. as well.  
1394 Based on interviews conducted with activists living in the UK, April 26–27, 2013 
1395 Interview with activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013. Similarly: “[T]he 'issue of the south’ is made of 
people from large groups through Facebook and Twitter and WhatsApp, forums etc. Then that information is 
quick in the net and became the new media is the master of the situation, especially for us southerners.” Personal 
communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1396 Interview with activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
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human rights violations1397, the booklet of the Cairo Conference1398, and the flyer distributed 
in the UK1399 are merely examples for a wide range of similar texts. Interviews with the old 
leaders and with figures of regional influence are common, as is extensive use of political 
cartoons and satire. Poetry, in contrast, is used only restrictedly. Music, as has been 
mentioned before, is employed in demonstrations and rallies;1400 besides abridged texts, 
genuine pieces are created for the struggle, and other music is played too.  
 As has become explicit in the chronology, conferences enjoy a high reputation as a 
democratic instrument for discussion, negotiation, and decision-making. They play a 
prominent role in the attempts to unify the leadership and – including wider strata of 
participants – to come up with a unified roadmap for a durable solution. Numerous 
‘conferences’ have occurred on more than one level, i.e. from the elite to smaller units. The 
output, however, was mostly meager. Despite the intention to use them for inclusion, de facto 
they were not able to prevent ever greater factionalization. On the contrary, there is evidence 
that these numerous extensive gatherings even furthered differences of opinion with the 
consequence of the founding of an increasing number of sub-groups and organizations.  
 The civil disobedience campaign began with single half days and since around late 2013 
escalated into whole days twice a week (Wednesday and Saturday). They were intended to 
send a strong and visible signal and to pressure the government into meeting Southerners’ 
demands. From October 14, 2014 onwards, a protest camp on Al-Arood Square1401 posed a 
kind of climax of this instrument of refusal, visibly inspired by the repertoire of the Arab 
Spring. Protesters camped on the square for weeks and established a personal administration 
with spokespersons, councils etc. Remotely comparable, yet much smaller sites had been in 
place for a while: Small squares all over the city served as central spaces for movement 
                                                          
1397 See the reports of the Southern Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), http://www.sohr-aden.org, and the 
Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights (YOHR), http://www.yohr.org.  
1398 See digital appendix G.  
1399 See digital appendix M. 
1400 One popular song, for example, is a well-established song (in the context of Palestinian struggle) with the 
text “Where are the Arab People?” A Southern singer performs the song in a much viewed video posted on 
YouTube on February 24, 2013, i.e. three days after the Karama Day (the subtitle lays the blame for the event on 
the occupation forces and Islah). The video shows sequences of the protest march, the violent acts committed by 
the armed forces, and the victims. The song asks: “Where are the Arab people? Where are our Muslim 
neighbors? Where is the Arab community? (...) We are asking for freedom, we are asking for liberation (...) it is 
the Southern revolution (...) Where is the Arab League? Where are the UN? (...) They are killing the Southern 
people. (...) Where are the US, France, Berlin, Moscow, London, Rome, China, Doha, Muscat, Bahrein, 
Morocco, the Land of the Two Holy Mosques [KSA], Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Kuwait?” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4s-Te_Ubuo&feature=youtu.be (accessed June 24, 2015). Other parallels 
drawn with the Palestinian struggle include e.g. posters with photographs of Yassir Arafat and al-Beidh in 
juxtaposition.  
1401 The square in Aden has been a significant place for protests since 2007.  
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members to meet, exchange, discuss, mobilize, prepare activities, teach, socialize, for cultural 
activities etc.1402 
 
As has become evident, the Hirak’s frame distribution was diverse and provided ample space 
for decentralized framing, for instance within the setting of squares where minor ‘leaders’ or 
eloquent activists had the opportunity to develop their own variants of movement frames.  
 The following section will now elucidate the crucial aspect of frame resonance: Which 
frames resonated among the audience? Which failed? And why? The presentation is 
structured along topics, not chronologically, due to the imbalance of sources; most stem from 
a more recent period and thus make it difficult to adequately represent the earlier phases. It 
will, however, seek to portray the widest variation in opinions possible, and moreover give an 
appraisal of the extent of their pervasiveness.  
 
7.2.6. Frame Resonance 
Resonance can be subdivided into the ‘answers’ to nine main questions; they are partly 
corresponding to the framing dimensions, yet go beyond them in tackling certain additional 
aspects:1403 (1) Who are we? (2) What is the state of unity? (3) What are we suffering from? 
What is threatening us? (4) Who is to blame? (5) What is the solution? (6) How are we going 
to get there? (7) Who can and shall lead us? (8) Which role shall/must the international 
community have? (9) What are our prospects? While there is variation regarding the solution 
to be aspired, the leadership (in fact connected issues), and – in parts – the prospects, the 
perception of all other issues is surprisingly similar and coherent. Quotations have hence been 
selected on the basis of their illustrative quality and/or conciseness and represent the 
dominant shared perspective as emanating from my sources.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1402 Susanne Dahlgren, “Rebels without Shoes: A Visit to South Yemen’s Revolution Squares”, April 22, 2014, 
accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.muftah.org/rebels-without-shoes-visit-south-yemens-revolution-
squares/#.U14gkndpeTU. She also makes the point that in these squares there is relaxed gender intermingling, 
which makes them attractive and is reminiscent of the open culture in the PDRY. Urban poor women take over 
major roles in demanding socioeconomic improvement, and large numbers of those gathering in the squares and 
attending lectures are equally poor. Here, the youth learn about life in the PDRY, “when there were no power 
and water cuts and every graduate got a job”. Dahlgren, “A Poor People’s Revolution”.  
1403 Some issues are overlapping more than one topic; they are presented were thought fittest.  
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(1) Who are we? – Identity & ‘Civil State’ 
“It’s not about looting. It’s a war about identity, culture, knowledge. We have been 
suppressed. Unity (with the north) is internal colonisation worse than the British.”1404 This 
statement by a former Southern minister is echoed and amended by a young Hirak activist: 
“The Southern issue is not only an issue of separation of one state into two, but it is an issue 
of regaining identity, restoring dignity, and demising occupation.”1405 The need to preserve a 
distinct Southern identity is strongly emphasized over and again when talking to movement 
members and even non-followers of all shades. Identity therein is simultaneously an 
emotional, a social, a cultural, an ethical, and a political category: 
As for the Houthis, it’s quite different than the south[ern] issue. The Houthis’ issue is an 
ethnic religious strife. (...) While the south[ern] issue is an identity, home issue. Restoring 
our state means there was a government with a complete independence different from the 
north in Sana’a. The people in the south are entirely different from people in the north; 
there are variations in customs, costume, even in dialect. (...) Before the unity, we had a 
flag, we had a coin different from the north and we had a perfect membership in the UN. 
We have a known ancient history and heritage. Nobody could deny it.1406 
The emotional category is most clearly captured by the (itself highly ambiguous) concept of 
‘home’. It speaks of attachment, memories, and a sense of belonging, and it arouses intense 
immediate and long-term feelings. The transformation into action this can lead to should not 
be underestimated, specifically since the emotion in this context is a ‘social emotion’, i.e. it is 
not individually felt but socially constructed and commonly invoked. “South Arabia is not the 
home in which we live, but the home which exists in us.”1407 This invocation is triggered 
among others through the social revivalism of memories, for instance by sharing photos or 
memorabilia. One activist describes the effect in regard specifically to Aden: “For us, Aden is 
a holy city. Like Mecca for Muslims. (...) When you show people old photos of Aden they 
start to cry. This is no longer our Aden.”1408 
 The social category moreover underlines the shared characteristics of all Southerners; these 
traits are constantly accentuated in a positive manner, for example strength and courage: “The 
patience that the Yemeni people showed the ability of sacrifice and facing the guns with 
uncovered chests are the characteristics of a very strong people who will not accept any 
                                                          
1404 Iona Craig, “Trouble with the South”, October 18, 2013, accessed October 31, 2013, 
http://www.beaconreader.com/iona-craig/trouble-with-the-south?ref=profile.  
1405 Personal communication with Hirak activist living in the KSA, January 31, 2014.  
1406 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 6, 2013; also: Interview with Hirak activist living in the 
UK, April 26, 2013.  
1407 Augustin, “Chanting”. 
1408 Interview with Hirak youth activist living in Germany, February 26, 2014. The specificity of Hadhramis, 
who insist on their own identity, is downplayed in the general, Aden-centered Hirak.  
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threats of fears. ”1409 What is shared is also culture and virtues, i.e. 'good' ethics. These were 
and are threatened and already partly destroyed:  
Occupation did not aim only at the money and resources, but it aimed more at destroying 
the Southern character. To destroy people’s conception of dignity, democracy, fair[ness], 
and – what is more critical – morality.1410 
 
In 1990, what the south presented to the unity was the mentality. We've lost the mentality 
of the people, the culture of law abiding citizens, people respecting the state, respecting 
the law, equality, justice, all these fundamental sort of beliefs have been completely 
eroded from the south. And the south has been corrupted with corruption, injustice, 
discrimination... So we have a problem and I think the most difficult challenge is to 
reestablish the old southern mentality (...).1411 
Through the destruction of these inner values and the political system that rested on these 
values and ethics, their self-conception as ‘civilized’ was severely affected. “We were 
developed before, and they were tribes. But now it is like we are the other way around. We 
are the tribes and they are the developed people.”1412 In this and the above quotes, Southern 
identity is affirmed in contrasting it with the ‘Northern other’; this other is the source of the 
imminent threat of further and irrevocable loss of identity. Since this threat is created 
intentionally, Northerners – at least certain ones, as the following quote holds – can and must 
be blamed (hence answering aspects of questions 3 and 4). “The conflict in Yemen is not 
between the South and the North but with a group of corrupt people in authority who plunder 
the North and when it turned empty, they started to think of the South to do the same!”1413 In 
order to counter the threats, Southern identity must be reconstructed, revived, and affirmed. 
To this purpose “[n]ationalism now is the strongest weapon as in the current situation 
circumstances are not likely to improve to a better state at all because of the psychological 
factor.”1414 The political concept of the ‘nation’ is hence complementary to the social concept 
of ‘community’ broached above. The two are closely linked and an interdependence is posed 
as is the case with ‘culture’ and ‘civil state’, i.e. the cultural, essentialist quality of 
Southerners and its political manifestation: “The culture of the people in the South will ensure 
that is will be a civil state, not as Yemen today.”1415 According to Southern voices, this “new 
South” is characterized by the rule of law, honest administration, industrial development, 
                                                          
1409 Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013.  
1410 Interview with former diplomat and prominent Hirak member living in the UK, April 29, 2013. [Awad 
Karama] 
1411 Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013. 
1412 Salisbury, “Analysis”. 
1413 Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013.  
1414 Interview with leading TAJ member and Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013. [Abdo Naqeeb] 
1415 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 2013. [Faisel Abdalugbar] 
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dignity, rights, safety, and economic and political stability. It is the memories of the alleged 
qualities of live in the PDRY which shape this vision:  
I know the good the good aspects of that era and they were unbelieveable. Things you 
would hope for: the law and order, no corruption, access to health care, these are things 
that we took for granted those days. Today people will die on the doorstep of a hospital 
and nobody would care about it.1416 
 
Notwithstanding the continuous emphasis of the creation of a capitalist country (in order to 
prevent fears by other states who might view socialism critically), other elaborations still 
contain strong elements of state-subsidized social services reminiscent of the PDRY era:  
We look forward as Southerner after independence to build a democratic federal civil 
state based on political pluralism and partisan women have an active role as an essential 
partner to her brother. (...) Separation of three powers legislative, executive and judicial. 
Based on the rule of parliamentary power, and the peaceful transfer depend on the rule of 
the parliamentary majority. Work to establish an economic system based on market 
economy and individual initiative. Southern citizens’ right to [receive] free education and 
health and social care, residential and freedom of expression.1417 
The vision of the desired Southern state comprises numerous unrealistic features when the 
economic situation is taken into account. Social services to the extent noted, however, are 
(despite or even because of their utopian character) highly attractive to the poor strata of 
society, who are strongly motivated to participate in the Hirak to improve their economic 
prospects. While the more prosperous, more intellectual activists likewise seek socioeconomic 
improvement, they focus more strongly on liberal political values and good governance. 
Again, they do this in contrast to the North, ascribing them primordial tribalism:  
The North before the unity in 1990 was not a real country of organizations. It was only 
named a country but it has no content. It was a mixture of different military brigades and 
tribes…”1418  
In the North, there are some poor people of course, but they are used to their habit (...) it's 
a free market. It's feudal society almost, it's still tribalistic. They did not rely on the 
government and the government belonged to the strongest sheikh and that's how it is. If 
you go to Sana'a you will struggle to find proper institutions working, it's very difficult. 
You find a sheikh of a tribe putting someone in prison outside the law. You'll find Ali 
Abdullah Saleh or Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar or Hamid al-Ahmar above the constitution 
because he is who he is: sheikh. He's a leader of the tribe, they've got their own prison, 
they've got their armies, they've got their own gangs, they've got their own businesses, 
they don't pay taxes...a lot of awful things. And if there is anything good, they'll take it 
over. Nobody can oppose them or can stop them. They will just take it by force or by 
other means.1419 
                                                          
1416 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1417 Personal communication with Hirak activist, May 31, 2013.  
1418 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1419 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
350 
 
In a nutshell, the we-they divide is over and again described in the essentialist opposites 
‘civil’–‘tribal’, ‘civilized’–‘backwards’, ‘peaceful’–‘violent’.1420 The perception among Hirak 
activists is hence in line with the frames.  
 
(2) What is the state of unity?  
As with the vision of the “new South”, statements concerning the state of unity again differ in 
regard to emphasis between those more focused on basic material needs1421 and those that 
highlight political conditions:  
Unification...it was a dream in the 1990s, that's why Ali Salim Al Beidh signed it. It was a 
dream all of a sudden turned into a nightmare (...) Otherwise, who would oppose 
unification if there is a proper state, proper rule of law, institutions, equality, respect of 
human rights and a government that would be elected by the people, a government that 
would come to address the needs of people, and try to resolve their issues, day-to-day 
issues I mean, like schooling, employment, health, electricity, roads. This is what people 
want, they're not fighting oppositions, they’re fighting for survival. And we are 
supporting them to establish a state that will take care of everybody and the rule of law 
and true democracy, not the false they've got.1422 
The prominent activist Huda al-Attas considers it less an issue of unity generally as a problem 
with the regime (whom she once more attributes essentialist qualities inhibiting the creation 
of a ‘civil state’):  
The problem is that unification was a mistake. Unification did not emerge on an honest 
basis. From the first day on, the south was ruled by the north. Southerners understood 
from the beginning that unification was a mistake. There were many bad signs, such as 
the assassination of Socialist cadres, regressive amendments to laws, and enforcement of 
the northern mentality and culture. The war in 1994 cemented all these developments. (...) 
[However, t]he problem is not unity with the north. The problem is the power center in 
Sanaa, which will not be able to build a civil state in Yemen, not even in a hundred 
years.1423 
There is wide agreement on a definitive and irrevocable termination of unity; reasons are 
generally credited to Northern actions and the resulting destruction of trust between North and 
South. While some consider the ultimate break to have occurred already with the war in 1994, 
others rather perceive it as a (comprehensive) deterioration over time: 
Everything between the South and North is over. There are things that can never be fixed. 
After 25 years of power abuse that erased people’s identity, left victims, created new 
                                                          
1420 Laconically formulated by one activist: “Tribes are greedy, corrupt people who never change but their 
techniques do.” Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 14, 2013.  
1421 This would particularly be the poor. Cf. Dahlgren, ‘Poor People’s Revolution”.  
1422 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1423 Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, “An Interview with Huda al-Attas”. 
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social classes, refugees, poor, hat, discrimination etc., things can’t be the same again even 
within the federal state (...)1424 
 
“Because the other side did not keep the covenant and agreement document in Amman in 
January 1994, and chose the military option to solve the problem, it is impossible to trust the 
same people in different time.”1425 Or, similarly, “their motto is ‘Unity or Death’ (...) in the 
south they say the opposite: The unity ended in the year 94 AD!”1426 
 Some voices particularly of young Southerners, who have grown up in unified Yemen and 
who have been told many stories about an allegedly much better life in the PDRY according 
to their own statements, hold more differentiated views, for instance: “Unity is not a sin alone, 
nor the separation itself a virtue.”1427 In a similar vein a young Southern woman positions 
herself in a 'neither-nor' mode, yet does not account herself to some third collective: “I don’t 
support Hirak, I am not a Hiraki. But I no longer support unity either.”1428 These statements 
are an example either for merely partial frame resonance1429 or for the fact that the diagnosis 
is shared by many independently of the movement's framing. 
 Solutions are searched for example in the study of other cases of secession.1430  
I have read about many similar cases like the case of the Czech, Slovakia, Sudan and 
South Africa and many others. I, as many of the political elites, see that the trial of unity 
has failed and we have to end it up as soon as possible in order to keep the coexistence 
and cooperation between the two people. In addition, it is very important to realize that 
every delayed day in taking this step will cost the both sides more than anyone can 
imagine.1431 
In the subtext of this call for a constructive solution is a perceivable fear of violent escalation; 
i.e. despite the very definite position of failed unity – the core answer to the section's guiding 
question – the wish for a peaceful solution remains strong.  
  
(3) What are we suffering from? What is threatening us? 
The diagnostic dimension circles around the topics of injustice, occupation, threat, and 
repression; often they are overlapping. The following interview excerpt summarizes the 
typical responses to the question about grievances:  
                                                          
1424 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014.  
1425 Personal communication with Hirak activist, September 6, 2013.  
1426 Personal communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1427 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1428 Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Intifada”.  
1429 She shares the diagnosis of failed unity.  
1430 As a German, I was specifically asked by a number of interviewees about the experiences with German 
unification. It was considered as an example of 'fair' treatment between states and of a successful case.  
1431 Personal communication with Hirak activist, September 7, 2013.  
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[I]t's very well known now internationally that after 1994 Southerners have almost lost 
their citizenship to their own homeland. (...) Since July 1994 we have always viewed the 
South as under occupation by the Northern regime that aligns itself with the Jihadist. (...) 
We have witnessed many people suffering from poverty, from all sorts of illnesses as 
well psychological illnesses, mental illnesses, all the physical treatable illnesses because 
Southerners used to rely on the government. It was a socialist government and the state 
used to provide these social services like health in particular, education, free education for 
all, employment (...) They used to create employment for people, the government used to 
take care of it etc. And all of a sudden all of that has been lost (...) They have lost 
everything, so they complained and complained and tried to seek support from the 
international community, from neighbouring countries, but nobody listenened to them. 
And every time they tried to protest they would be faced with harsh treatment by the 
regime. People were killed and imprisoned and that's the reason why they staged to call 
for independence, for their own country.1432 
Occupation – poverty – suffering – loss – repression. They are at the root of Southern 
grievances and are elaborated on in variations by Hirak members and other Southerners. 
Besides the attribution to the regime and particularly “Jihadist[s]”, what is notable is the 
underlying frustration with the international community who did not respond. Merely 
thereafter and, moreover, in response to repression has the movement initiated their calls for 
independence – because, according to the prior account, when they still had their state the 
situation was much more favorable. What they want is the return of what they had, with the 
exception of internationally ostracized socialism. This is the message behind the next quote: 
We want there to be the basis for a future Southern state. We want equality, we want 
justice, we want law and order. We don't want corruption, we want access to health care, 
we want people to be equal. (...) But people are worried (...) we don't want the Socialist 
Party to come back because we want freedom, we want democracy, we don't want one 
party rule (...) It's a struggle between those two ideas but whatever it is, I think people 
have gotten to a stage where they just want the Southern state and they will sort it out. 
Status quo is no longer acceptable.1433 
The last sentence is at the core of the definition of a diagnostic frame: The respective 
collective is suffering from an intolerable situation that needs to be changed. The goal then, 
i.e. the prognostic dimension, echoes the rights framing. It mentions freedom, democracy, 
equality, law and order, and justice, all components of the movement's framing. “[South] 
Yemeni people deserve to have their full rights”1434 as another respondent posed. Dignity is 
closely tied to rights: “The youth wants to regain their dignity and their country.”1435  
                                                          
1432 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1433 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1434 Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013.  
1435 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 1, 2013. Along similar ethical lines a participant of a qāt 
chew affirmed the high moral standards in terms of purity: “The people on the street is the purest Hirak, the 
cleanest aspect of the revolution is the people experiencing their pains, the suffering of being occupied.” Group 
discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013. 
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On the other side of the moral divide, anger and rage against an essentialized category of 
Northerners lays open: “One view that is shared by all factions is that Yemenis destroyed 
South Arabia. The backward, illiterate, Zaydi savages plundered our country.”1436 Slogans are 
even more offensive: “Death for Hamid al-Ahmar”, “Death for the dog Hamid and Ali 
Muhsin”, and “Get out Dahbasi” can be read in Aden1437, the “deliberately neglected, badly 
neglected”1438 ‘capital of the South’. Old photographs tell the story of how Southerners won 
their independence from a world power, how in the past things were better, and how the 
situation keeps deteriorating. They are defining the abyss between ‘what we had and could’ 
and ‘what they did to us’, i.e. injustice, as diachronical, essentialist, reified. It serves as the 
basic diagnosis whose further elaboration and differentiation forms the ground in which all 
prognostic frames are rooted.1439 
 ‘Occupation’ is such a differentiation of injustice. When in early May 2009 an armed 
group (not associated with the Hirak) clashed with the army in Habilayn, one of their 
members justified their actions as follows: 
We are fighting the thieves, the occupiers. Today, we ask, what unity – the unity of tanks 
above our homes? They have started the shooting. They have pillaged our land, 
consumed our wealth. We have no more patience for these oppressors, death is 
preferable.1440 
 
When I questioned an activist living in the KSA about the emergence of the ‘Southern 
Resistance’, a comment he made discernibly showed how this perception unites the violent 
and non-violent opposition. He explained that in his view the group was announced on Aden 
Live TV due to the persistence of the occupier, their mistreatment of people, and the 
“massacre” of December 27, 2013. Resistance was equivalent to the right of self-defense “as 
guaranteed by the documents and international laws”. Nevertheless, he simultaneously 
stressed that “the struggle of the ‘Southern Movement’ will remain peaceful until the 
liberation of the south, but the occupier is forcing people to confrontation because it deals 
with arrogance and hatred.”1441 Opposition against “the occupier” is thus the common 
denominator.  
                                                          
1436 Comment made on July 3, 2013 on the article ‘Challenges Faced by the Southern Movement’, La Voix du 
Yémen. The Voice of Yemen, June 30, 2013, accessed June 26, 2015, 
http://www.lavoixduyemen.com/en/2013/06/30/challenges-faced-by-the-southern-movement/4048/.  
1437 Augustin, “Chanting”.  
1438 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1439 Interview with former diplomat and prominent Hirak activist living in the UK, April 29, 2013. 
1440 Cited in: HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, 19. 
1441 Personal communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
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Yet, who exactly belongs to ‘the occupier’ is contested: While leaders speak out against a 
discrimination of ordinary Northerners living in the South, harsh words and occasionally also 
assaults are common on Southern streets.1442 In the words of a prominent activist and former 
MP: 
I always repeat, our conflict is not with the Northern people, it is not North vs. South. The 
struggle is between oppressors and oppressed, executioner and victim. It is a struggle for 
reclaiming robbed rights and resources. (...) [T]he critical challenge is to convince people 
that the struggle and conflict is not between the people, but against the corrupt authority 
that harms them both.1443 
Despite the fact that the authorities have not shown any significant reaction on the 
comprehensive and long-term civil disobedience campaigns1444, protesters hold that they “will 
remain steadfast regardless of how much we have to suffer”.1445 Accordingly, an old female 
activist cautioned one of the ‘occupying’ Northern officials: “Do not think we cannot throw 
you out of our country. We did that to the British, who had a much bigger army than you 
do.”1446 
 The perceived threats are twofold: One is directed against Southern identity, the other 
allegedly aims at the physical extinction of Southerners. The former is considered to be 
realized in a great number of measures: 
After unification, everything was changed, even the historical names were changed to 
Northern ones; the names of the schools, streets, and even the name of the TV channel, it 
was Aden Channel, they changed it into The Yemeni Channel. They aimed at making the 
Southern people forget their identity and forget that they had a real country one day. They 
even claimed that the people from the South were Somalis to impose the impression that 
they came from outside of Yemen. They insisted on oppressing people in the cities, 
especially Aden, to force them to leave the country. They did not offer them jobs and they 
became not able to live in Aden and had to leave. They planned to offer them jobs in, for 
example, Sana’a, and tried to cut any connections between the different Southern cities 
like Aden and Hadhramaut, and Aden and other cities. I mean that they tried – by all 
means – to destroy the South in order not to see it a standing country once more.1447 
The physical threat is described in regard to the violence and killing suffered by Northern 
military forces1448, in terms such as ‘crimes against humanity’ and ’genocide’, and in form of 
fierce images. Dahlgren refers to a video posted by Southern activists on YouTube in 2008 in 
which Saleh is depicted between mutilated bodies. The accompanying text states that: “In this 
                                                          
1442 Dahlgren, “Poor People’s Revolution”.  
1443 Interview with former MP and prominent Hirak activist living in the UK, April 29, 2013.  
1444 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1445 “Southern Movement Youth Coalition Spokesperson”. 
1446 Dahlgren, “Snake with A Thousand Heads”. 
1447 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1448 Personal communication with Hirak activist living in the KSA, March 4, 2014.  
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image he is swearing, swearing to clean the land from the owners...us!!!”1449 Drone attacks 
and a large relocation campaign are mentioned as among his means. Allegedly, Saleh and his 
cronies Ali Muhsin and al-Zindani construct a terrorist threat and hold that Southerners are 
terrorists; resultingly, US drone attacks are targeting them, killing many civilians. 1450 As 
regards the demographic argument, it holds that five million Northerners shall be moved to 
the South in order to effect in demographic change: Southerners would be the minority on 
their own territory, which “is how they can extinguish the concept of the South from Yemen 
in general”.1451 
 Lastly, repression is considered to be a favored regime strategy for dealing with 
opposition. It serves as a catalyzer of conflict, as an intended provocation,1452 and as an 
attempt to defame the Hirak through deception. Protesters hold that had the regime taken 
serious steps towards equality after the initial demonstrations, it would have been sufficient. 
“But they left it and then dealt with it by cracking down and started to kill people, started to 
imprison people and that was (...) no return.”1453 Provocations are seen in the repression of 
Southern media or independent reporting about the Hirak, respectively; the suppression 
against Al-Ayyam is probably the most prominent example. 1454 Moreover, undisguised 
attacks against peaceful protesters such as the Southern ‘Karama Day massacre’ in February 
2013 are counted into the category of intended provocation. At that time, calls for armed 
struggle were spread by militants in Seyoun and Mukalla who vowed “to revenge their fallen 
brothers and South Yemen’s honor”. A local Hiraki official held:  
The Southern Movement does not want to draw first blood at this point. That being said, 
many feel Thursdays attack was the last straw. I don’t see how we can walk from this. As 
many people pointed out last Thursday, South Yemen revolution already started.1455 
Interviewees pose that triggering a violent reaction was the ultimate goal of the regime to 
legitimize more severe repression against the movement. Targeted killings of prominent 
activists, such as Khaled Junaydi,1456 too, add to this category. Defamation is achieved by 
                                                          
1449 Susanne Dahlgren, “The Southern Movement in Yemen”, ISIM Review 22 (Autumn 2008), 50f., here: 50.  
1450 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1451 Interview with former MP and prominent Hirak activist living in the UK, April 29, 2913.  
1452 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014. Personal communication with Hirak activist 
in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1453 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1454 Personal communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1455 “Violence grips south provinces – point of no return say separatists”, Yemen Post, February 25, 2013, 
accessed February 26, 2013, http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=6606.  
1456 He died on December 15, 2014. After the killing, an activist posted on Facebook: “It is better once to die a 
martyr than to have a long life as the living dead!” Cited in: Susanne Dahlgren, “Killing the Ambulance Man”, 
MERIP, December 17, 2014, accessed January 7, 2015, http://www.merip.org/killing-ambulance-man.  
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regime-staged violence, which should be attributed to the Hirak. Simultaneous to one of my 
interviews, the following occurred and was reported in (at least Southern) media:  
Today, 27 April 2013, armed groups have gathered and joined the demonstrations in 
Krater, Aden. They are armed, they kept cutting the streets and raise al-Beidh’s pictures 
and the Southern flags. They claim to be of the Hirak members but, in fact, they belong to 
the North and are funded directly from the Northern Yemeni police. The direct 
responsible person for them is a member of the National Security in addition to a 
Northern intelligence agency. They give them money, weapons and we are aware of this, 
(...) They prevent people from joining the Hirak, so how can they be part of us. It is a 
matter that cannot be realized. It is known that the retarded regimes in the Third World 
uses retarded ways and methods that debunk their intentions. They follow some methods 
like hiring people to spoil the demonstrations and prevent people from joining in the 
events.1457 
According to activists' perception, these spoilers have been sent with the immediate 
endorsement of or even by order of Hadi, whose personal reputation is low among the 
movement. His military background and past actions are held against the Southerner: “Abdul 
Rab al-Mansour [Hadi] himself is a violent person. He's a military person, he participated in 
the 1986 war, he participated in the 1994 war, he continued with Ali Abdullah Saleh until 
February, until he was put in his place.”1458 
 Looking at these grievances – injustice, occupation, threats, repression – the resulting 
question must be: Who is responsible? 
 
(4) Who is to blame? 
This question can be answered on more than one level: First, who is responsible for the 
overall situation? Second, who is responsible for its permanence, i.e. who is profiting? And 
third, which share does the Hirak have in that, or, in other words, what impedes improvement, 
i.e. the movement's success? 
 The first question was answered to the point by one interviewee: “It's all due to a dictator 
who neglected them [i.e. Southerners] and abused them, humiliated them, oppressed them all 
the years, and stifled the whole process of development and democracy.”1459 A removal of the 
dictator Saleh alone, however, was by a majority of respondents found insufficient to solve 
the problem, for the whole regime was considered to inhibit any positive change. This 
structural component accordingly provides the response to the second question:  
See how many people have suffered! Made redundant. There is no income for the 
government. Who's gaining from that? It's just the few families, the rulers. Because they 
                                                          
1457 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1458 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1459 Ibid.  
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normally sign these contracts with big companies. The oil, if you look at the oil: Who are 
the agencies with these big oil international oil companies corporations? It's just Ali 
Abdullah Saleh's family and Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar and Hamid Al-Ahmar. It's just 
families who are ruling. The people have nothing (...).1460 
 
The patronage system and oligarchy lead to a strong interest of those in control to maintain 
the system's core mechanisms, since they are to their profit. Change, especially a change that 
could risk their control over resources such as the oil resources located in the South, must be 
prevented at all cost. Resultingly, these mechanisms were kept up even after the fall of Saleh. 
As one activist put it, the “failure of the political forces and parties in the management of 
public affairs after the revolution of 2011 contributed to the growing discontent, and provided 
a favorable climate for the expansion of the Southern Movement and Houthi group”.1461 To 
what extent this “failure” was in fact a ‘failure’ or rather the intentional stabilization of 
favorable conditions for these actors can merely be speculated about; the latter assumption is 
the dominant one among the movement.  
 Beyond mere criticism of external factors, however, Hirak members are also sensitive to 
internal problems that pose obstacles to positive change. The main point of weakness 
frequently mentioned was factionalism. Ordinary activists are frustrated by the “lack of any 
real consensus” and the striving for personal interests they perceived to reign among a 
“multiplicity of tribal and political factions”. Therefore, “[t]he people of the South and the 
fans in all areas of the South no longer trust most of these factions who lack credibility in the 
fight for the interest of the southern state whether it is peaceful or even armed struggle.”1462 
How this plays into the recognition of leaders and the impact of their respective framing will 
be discussed under question (7).  
 Finally, external actors are considered to negatively impact on the South: “The most 
important problem is direct and indirect outside intervention from countries such as the UAE, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (...) especially the religious groups and terrorists.”1463 
 While this picture attributes responsibility to a multitude of actors, it is important to 
emphasize that the Hirak generally considers the main blame to be with the Northern regime; 
internal challenges and external involvement are taken into account and as far as possible the 
movement tries to positively influence these factors (e.g. through mediation between factions 
or petitions to various governments in the Gulf states), however, they do not form the central 
concern.  
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(5) What is the solution? 
The Hirak's framing proposes three different solutions: federalism, confederation, and 
independence. Since there is no reliable data on the support quotas for each goal,1464 the 
resonance of each prognostic frame can (again) only be tackled by approximation. The result 
of this, however, shows an overwhelming majority for independence, while both federalism 
and confederation find merely few supporters but many critical voices.  
 The view on federalism can be divided into three stands: (1) Federalism in interest of 
some, but not in the interest of the people;1465 (2) Federalism is theoretically good, but 
practically not applied correctly;1466 (3) Federalism is imposed1467 and will not have any 
positive effects. One movement follower – yet the only one of my respondents – argued in 
favor of federalism on the grounds of a just and “equitable distribution of resources” within 
an “acceptable system” of a united Yemen.1468 Exactly the aspect of a 'just distribution' within 
a federal system is generally doubted. Representative in this regard was the statement: “An 
initial impression I have got from the people around me, friends, and people in the 
transportation etc., [is that] there is a satisfaction to a certain extent with the decision of a six-
region federal state”. Then he added the ‘but’: There were concerns about details, such as the 
scope of authority, the distribution of natural resources etc. Hopes on the other hand aimed at 
the elimination of excessive centralization, investment in the South, a restoration of cultural 
freedom and lost identity, and an improvement in the standard of living.1469 Overall, so his 
conclusion, people were doubtful about the process. These doubts can be overwhelming. 
Numerous respondents mentioned tribalism as the major obstacle to federalism; according to 
the, Northern tribalism could never be overcome and in its essence was not conducive to a 
federal cohabitation with ‘civilized Southerners’.1470 This assumption is simultaneously 
assigned to the regime:  
The people now realize that [the] federal system means the continuity of Saleh’s brutality 
and his tribal domination in Yemen. Even if another person holds the position of the 
president, he will not be better than Saleh. They all have the same mentality and goals, so 
they will follow the same route one after another.1471 
                                                          
1464 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014.  
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1466 Personal communication with Hirak activist in Dhaleh, March 2, 2014.  
1467 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1468 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014.  
1469 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 3, 2014.  
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Lack of trust extents to the NDC, i.e. the institution in which the six-state federalist solution 
was developed as well. “Southern people do not trust this dialogue because it includes the 
reasons of the conflicts and they will never be a part of the solution.”1472 In addition, 
protesters denounce a lack of Southern representation for they hold that those participating do 
not represent the 'true position' of the population but have been brought in externally by 
international powers. As a result, the Southern issue is not appropriately dealt with but 
“circumnavigated”.1473 
 In spite of these severe doubts or even outright rejection by the Southern public,1474 those 
responsible for the negotiations signed the decision about the six-state federalism. When I 
asked more than two dozen Hirak members a few days thereafter, however, the responses 
were all either reneging the so-called ‘just solution’ (as it was called by its proponents) and 
instead advocating for a referendum or independence, or those I asked had not even heard of 
the just solution, yet, and when informed reacted deprecative.1475 The large protest marches 
on February 21, 2014, roughly a month later, were interpreted as a clear sign of popular 
rejection by the movement.1476 One person uttered his concern in regard to a voting on the 
new constitution (at that point still to be charted); he held that when trying to pass a 
constitution containing the federalist clause through a referendum, things would get worse, 
clashes and violence would increase.1477 
  As should have become explicit, federalism lacks notable support by movement members, 
notwithstanding the NDC provisions for representation and its allegedly participatory design. 
Neither the framing by the interim government and by international actors such as the UN 
envoy in the wake of the NDC nor the (limited) framing emanating from NDC participants 
supposedly representing the South managed to generate significant resonance among the 
population.  
 With confederation the situation is similar because of the telling difference that there was 
generally little perception of the option at all. Although it was occasionally dropped in talks, it 
was hardly ever judged; in many cases it was merely considered a possible intermediate step 
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1473 Craig, “Trouble”.  
1474 See exemplarily: “The six-regional federation is expected to turn catastrophic for the whole Yemen. It is a 
problem rather than a solution. A federal state of two regions (South & North according to the borders of 21 st 
May 1990) could have been of effect. So that neither the outcome of the NDC nor the SC resolution 2140 [issued 
against spoilers] is to bear anything good for the South or – even – the North.” Personal communication with 
Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1475 I contacted the respective Hirak members through Facebook between January 22 and 24, 2014. 
1476 Personal communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1477 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014.  
360 
 
towards full independence.1478 A former Southern MP commented in regard to the Cairo 
Conference, the most serious attempt towards a unified Southern stand for confederation: 
“The documents that came out of this Conference were fantastic, but unfortunately they were 
not activated (...) because people’s mood in the South demanded a higher level of demands, 
they do need separation and insist on it.”1479  
 In short: Confederation has no resonance.  
Reactions on the announcement of six-state federalism illustrate how independence for many 
has become the sine qua non goal. One comment on a Yemen Times article elaborates:  
That is the choice of people who participated in the NDC not the choice of people who 
carry their hearts in hands to get freedom [and] are asking for our country. [They are] not 
asking to make a business deal. All the people in the south will not accept any solution 
[that] does not carry their free[dom] for all the south without sharing it with the north.1480 
Another comment simply states what I have heard from all sides, from the vast share of my 
respondents inside and outside the country: “We in the south want full independence.”1481 The 
option of independence has been prominent since 2009, yet, a few years later (as we have 
seen above in the lack of resonance of the alternatives) it was almost uncontested. Responses 
over time exemplify this:  
Now, by mid-2009, all of the southern factions demand secession from the north. The 
government in San’a only looks at how to stop these groups, not at how to solve the 
problems that have created them. There are elites in south Yemen who feel marginalized, 
but the groups they head represent real grievances of the people. The people want lower 
prices, better services, and more employment. That is the reason they line up behind the 
secessionist slogans.1482 
This appraisal stems from shortly after the accession of the old leaders, which means that their 
respective framing was still recent at that time. While the socioeconomic reason given for 
people’s support of “secessionist slogans” certainly holds true to some extent – especially for 
poor movement adherents – it turned into a more ideational issue the more time passed. Since 
2010/11, identity differences were much stronger framed, which is equally reflected in 
statements. The longer the independence frame was spread, the more important it became, and 
the less significance was attributed to socioeconomic grievances.  
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A poll conducted by the Yemeni Center for Civil Rights in 2010 found that around 70% of 
Southerners supported independence; for the period after the Arab Spring protests, analysts 
assume that more than 90% shared this stance.1483 As has been noted before, the mere 
removal of Saleh did not suffice those who seek a restoration of the Southern state: “After that 
[i.e. the stepdown of Saleh], many voices in the North said that Abdullah Saleh has gone so 
what is the reason for keeping a call for separation! But the Southern people did not agree 
with this idea.”1484 
 At the height of leadership competition, critical voices pointed out the challenges related 
with “separation” (another term for independence) due to factionalization, yet despite that 
they still kept it on the table. In fact, during the long interview from which this quote is taken, 
no other options were mentioned. 
Separation is still a political option that is not bad or harmful; it is an option. If the 
separation was undertaken, the greatest challenge comes afterwards. The South was 
united before the 1990s, but now, as you see, it is no longer united. Consequently, the 
greatest challenge if this happened is uniting the South once more and organizing the 
differences between different groups.1485 
Catalyzed by the rejected outcomes of the NDC and apparent (at least ostentatious) 
rapprochement between the factionalized old guard leadership, 2014 was less plagued with 
doubts and articulated challenges, but with focus on and optimism about the aim of 
independence. Respondents now unequivocally stressed their common goal: “Restoring the 
Southern state is the only option for the people of the South.”1486 Others held that up to 90% 
of Southerners shared the same goal: liberation and independence. The sole difference was 
their idea on ‘how’ to reach it, in which they were influenced by various actors. Influences 
from outside, however, were referred to with suspicion.1487 Huda al-Attas argues with the 
people on the streets: “There is not a single milyūnyīah that has called for federation!”1488 
 The relation to the framing can be seen even more explicitly in the stated perception of 
youth. A 17-year old, for instance, who has never personally experienced the PDRY is 
convinced that pre-unity “life was better". He compares it to his current life and draws his 
conclusion: “The government gave me nothing. I want independence.”1489 It is a clear 
connection between the stated loss (i.e. grievance), blame, and the goal. One day before the 
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proclaimed end of the deadline set by the Hirak for Northern officials to leave, on November 
29, 2014, the following statements were made on occupied Al-Arood Square: “Those 
[exploitative] people in the north, they don’t care about us, and Hadi is just a puppet for 
[them].” “Tomorrow is the anniversary of our independence from the British, and, inshallah, 
it will also be the anniversary of our independence from the north.”1490 The framing in the 
run-up to November 30th, intensified moreover by the return of prominent figures from exile, 
clearly created strong resonance and great expectations.1491 It surprises even more that after 
what has been called “another missed opportunity”1492 public frustration remained without 
violent consequences.  
 Since the al-Beidh-affiliated Aden Live TV channel played a notable role in frame 
distribution for independence, its perception shall be briefly elucidated. Overall, the channel 
gets a mixed response. Despite its high degree of outreach, its credibility gets critical reviews. 
The channel is doing a great job to promote the cause of South Arabia and it plays an 
important role to raise awareness about what is going on in the South. However, I think it 
needs to professionalize its work and operate as a channel for the people of the South, not 
one faction.1493 
 
The media is important and in fact we depended on it in our first calls for the revolution. 
We used it – mainly Aden Live channel – to crowd people in the streets. Sadly, this 
channel has been taken out of our hands. Al-Beidh bought it and literally spoilt it. He 
tried to use it as a tool to perform his plans.1494 
The critical evaluation notably stems from the strongly perceived partisanship of the 
channel.1495 While even al-Beidh's supporters and those with a highly positive opinion about 
the channel concede its partiality, others openly articulate their defiance about his domination 
of one of the most important and influential Southern media. In regard to al-Beidh's 
accentuated role still others take a pragmatic position:  
Even if al-Beidh is not so popular in most of the people’s opinion, they raise his picture 
because they need a model and figure. The most probable model has to be the last 
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president. People search for a code, even if they do not like him so much, but they feel 
that he represents the South as he was the last president of their independent country.1496 
This interpretation of al-Beidh’s role as a functional one has been given by a number of 
respondents and appears as logical consequence of the Southern symbolical stylization of the 
former state and its representations: Despite all what can be criticized in him, he is turned into 
the same ‘category’ as the flag, anthem, commemoration dates, banknotes, Al-Yemda airline, 
songs, names etc. He was the president and his picture is thus rather iconic than a sign of 
support for his person.  
 This being said and with the above interim judgement of al-Beidh's role in mind, it can 
nevertheless be concluded that the goal of independence has by far the greatest resonance of 
all three options.  
 
(6) How are we going to get there? 
Option 1: By means of nonviolence.  
“It is well-known that the Southern people are peaceful by nature.”1497 This overtly optimistic 
self-image is not shared by a majority; yet, despite the admittance that the Southern past has 
been all but peaceful and that there would be the option to take up arms again, the 
movement’s peaceful stance is considered essential. From the beginning it has been inscribed 
even in its name: The Southern Peaceful Movement. In line with central framing attempts, 
emphasis is hence on having changed in comparison to earlier times, in having chosen 
nonviolence based on the fact of being civilized.  
I think that, if people tried the dialogue as a way of solving problems and the elections in 
taking important decisions will not repeat wars and fighting. 20 years of occupation 
taught the Southern people many lessons. Now we are very different from the past but we 
do not fight! [This] peacefulness distinguishes Hirak from its predecessor 
organizations1498 
 
[W]e have faced a lot of violence from the state...Whenever there is a [major] rally, 
people are killed. But people in the movement are peaceful – and this is a historical 
development in a tribal society where everyone is armed. Most of the protesters have 
legal weapons at home, and they know how to use them, but we prefer to be peaceful.1499 
Interviewees repeatedly stressed the challenges involved in remaining peaceful and in keeping 
the great number of followers to do so. These challenges include regime repression and 
provocation, the widespread availability of arms and the equally widespread capacity to use 
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them, recent historical examples of armed struggle, increasing frustration over time due to a 
lack of visible improvement, and internal calls for violence. All these are legitimate concerns 
and have partly been discussed in chapter 6. They can hence be considered imminent 
questions under the given conditions. Notwithstanding, Hirak members insisted that they had 
so far managed to overcome these challenges. Since this tackles the core argument of the 
dissertation, it is worth looking at some more statements:  
[I]t happens that every now and then some voices reveal that they are fed up with 
peacefulness and that they should find other ways to reach their aims. Sometimes, even 
leaders state that if peacefulness is not that fruitful they may reconsider other means. (...) 
So, the biggest challenge is to keep the peacefulness of the movement although most of 
our leaders are excluded army men, which means that they can use all the kinds of 
weapons from the gun to the plane, but they do not because they are convinced [emphasis 
added, T.G.] that peace is the best way to reclaim the stolen rights.1500 
 
To be honest, my biggest fear is that people lose hope. As this may lead people to adopt 
any regional or extremist agenda that will not be fruitful for any side, the regional or 
international community. (...) However, all their actions remain peaceful. (...) I consider it 
a miracle of the Hirak. It is a miracle that the Hirak has convinced [emphasis added, T.G.] 
those people who live in tribes to participate in peaceful demonstrations without their 
weapons as it is seen as a shame on them.1501 
 
Regarding to the case of Hirak, people agreed [emphasis added, T.G.] on the peaceful 
struggle. (...) Some people insist on spoiling the idea about Hirak and keep repeating that 
we adopt violent struggle. However, we do not think about this at all, as in case we did, 
our state had an army we could use to defend our country and ourselves, but we did 
not.1502 
 
Definitely, even if the peaceful Hirak did not succeed, we will not ever turn to an armed 
one. The Southern people refuse [emphasis added, T.G.] it, as since the English 
colonialism we were insisting on the peaceful resistance to return our rights. I mean, we 
will keep resisting until we regain our democratic nation that was stolen out of our hands. 
They do their best to force us to be violent; they even adopted the policy of hunger. They 
keep tightening the situation in the South, our revolution now is called a revolution of 
hungry.1503 
The reasons people give for this sustained peacefulness range from identity (and related 
values), conviction, ‘traumatic memories’ of violence, to effectiveness. After more than seven 
years of nonviolent protest, the spokesperson of the Southern Movement Youth Coalition 
proudly declared in December 2014: “We are a peaceful people and do not have a tendency 
towards violence.”1504 
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The good thing is, people are still ambitious, they still have hope to chance things for the 
better. They have the courage to stand for their rights and peaceful means, which is a 
quite a good indicator towards showing who these people are. Will they be trusted to 
govern themselves again?1505 
 
We do not want to take the opportunity just to take advantage of the current situation. We 
will keep struggling until the Yemeni people in the north and the international community 
believe in our demand. We are not so low that we would exploit the security vacuum and 
announce separation.”1506 
Especially the last quote is telling: According to this representative of the Hirak youth 
movement, their values and the integrity towards peacefulness even outperform a potential 
opportunity for secession. They want to convince, not merely reach their goal. Despite the 
fact that this idealistic position needs to be relativized (particularly when considering other 
statements that highlighted leadership disagreements about how to proceed after November 
30, 2014), it still speaks of a strong dedication to the chosen path. This conviction or choice 
has a clearly rationalist core as becomes explicit in the following comments: “Southerners 
prefer dialogue and peaceful struggle based on reason and logic (...) particularly the 
intellectuals do not prefer the way of violence.”1507  
The struggle by southerners is a civilized and peaceful one. Everyone knows that Yemeni 
citizens have enough weapons to enable them to resist. However, we realize [emphasis 
added, T.G.] that violence, fighting and chaos will not allow us to reach our goal 
peacefully. We hope we will not resort to such means.1508  
Another notable aspect of numerous claims is that activists hold that armed struggle is not 
only possible, but even likely; the danger that – despite better knowledge and will – violence 
might erupt is frequently present. A TAJ member actually recollects accusations from within 
the movement for not taking a more militant stance: “We hold our principle [emphasis added, 
T.G.] of the peaceful Hirak although we faced many criticisms, as we are the ‘keyboard 
opposition’ and that we are not courageous enough to perform a real opposition.”1509  
 These voices pushing for more militancy are ascribed to those who have demonstrated 
their violent character before, among them always al-Beidh: “[A]rmed resistance is causing 
all the problems of violence in the South (...) Ali Salem is the leader of this trend”1510 Among 
the effects of this path, Hirak members claim to have learnt to abstain from violence. “20 
                                                          
1505 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1506 “Southern Movement Youth Coalition Spokesperson”. 
1507 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 5, 2014.  
1508 “Al-Arood Square Spokesperson to the Yemen Times: ‘We Are Telling the Entire World That the Southern 
People Want to Regain Their State’”, Yemen Times, February 5, 2015, accessed February 13, 2015, 
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1857/intreview/4868/Al-Arood-Square-spokesperson-to-the-Yemen-Times--
%E3%80%9CWe-are-telling-the-entire-world-that-the-southern-people-want--to-regain-their-state.  
1509 Interview with leading TAJ member and Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1510 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 5, 2014.  
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years of occupation taught the Southern people many lessons. Now we are very different from 
the past but we do not fight!”1511 Memories of violent episodes in the past (1986, 1994) are 
laden with suffering and traumatic memories, which are no less mentioned among the reasons 
given against armed struggle: “I think we’ve had enough bloodshed in the South.”1512  
 And, lastly, peaceful protest is considered superior in its effectiveness to pressure the 
regime. The specific example of the Houthis is taken, from whom the Hirak actively distance 
themselves: “The Houthis did not succeed to this extent, they lost seven armed rounds in 
different places. They secured themselves, but they did not gain any benefits as well. Their 
using all these weapons did not harm the country as we did with our peaceful movement.”1513 
 Yet, the pressures and suffering does not remain without effect, despite the pride of the 
movement in its stance and despite its self-affirmation about their inherent superiority and 
efficacy. “[T]he South street is tired”1514, as it was put by one respondent. He was referring to 
the many victims over the years. Consequently, self-defense is regarded legitimate even by 
stringent advocates of peaceful struggle. Huda al-Attas, for instance, declared: “Our 
revolution will remain a peaceful revolution. But it is impossible for us to accept the daily 
killings by the Sanaa regime without a response.”1515 It was also voiced publicly in an 
interview with the Yemen Times: “[T]he peaceful revolution has a limit if violations against 
the southern people continue. There is nothing that prevents us from defending ourselves and 
the south. We will defend the south as much as we can.” 1516 According to the definition 
provided by another respondent, self-defense still counts as a peaceful strategy:  
Peace has many definitions. The Yemeni perspective on peacefulness is a bit different. 
For example, when we go out in a peaceful demonstration and in return we are killed and 
injured and no one stands for us, no authority to defend us, no one punishes the murderer, 
that time I think defending ourselves with all means is considered peacefulness.1517 
What, then, is the way forward for the proponents of nonviolence? The trajectory of the 
Southern Movement has become as fragile as the state itself since the Houthi expansion and 
subsequent initiation of ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ by the KSA. The most recent unaffected 
                                                          
1511 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013. This statement is representative especially for 
statements made by activists who consciously lived through these violent episodes, i.e. not by the younger 
generation.  
1512 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1513 Interview with leading TAJ member and Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1514 Personal communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1515 Augustin, “Interview with Huda al-Attas”. Similarly: “Hirak wants to stay peaceful which it has been for 
years. Yemenis are weaponry individuals, the average individual to gun ratio is for every 1 person there is 4 
guns. Any type of weapon you want you can find in Yemen. The government has killed many south Yemenis in 
mass graves.” Personal communication with Hirak activist with very active family, June 12, 2013.  
1516 “Al-Arood Square Spokesperson”.  
1517 Interview with leading TAJ member and Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
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statements by movement members are accordingly those that surrounded the November 30th 
deadline and those made during the weeks following that date. The first quote was still made 
before the expiration of the deadline, however, it was made by the spokesperson of a youth 
organization and provides a glance on the overall intentions: 
We are referring to military leaders and influential individuals who still live in the south 
and are accused of looting lands and starting business at the expense of southern people. 
(...) We called on military officers and those with influence to leave the south. We will 
form popular committees to protect both public and private institutions and maintain the 
security.1518 
“Popular committees” were supposed to take over security in a very first move. For the 
subsequent period, plans had been made to establish what one of my interview partners had 
delineated already in 2013, at that time as his vision:  
I think the best way to go forward is to have a southern national conference where they 
could elect a trusted leadership and work according to some rules, policies, and also to be 
clear of their vision for the future. So they could tell people ‘this is who we are, this is 
what we want for you, and this is how we're gonna do it’. The mechanism should be 
consulted open within the public people.1519 
Similar demands had been made for a long time, but the return of certain figures in November 
2014 opened up some additional options, and the moves of fall 2014 had for a brief period 
brought in new energy. A first step in the above direction was the set-up of a 72-member 
council led by Abdulrahman al-Jifri and Mohamed Ali Ahmed, whose quality according to 
respondents lay in their connectedness with the street.1520 From this council onwards, this 
‘steering group’ allegedly wanted to expand into a larger and better-established representative 
institution, yet, the overall escalation in the country gave the situation a new direction. But 
still, nonviolence of the movement had been the continued aim.  
 
Option 2: By means of violence.  
The resonance to this option attracts attention through (almost) complete absence. In my 
research, I asked people about three different aspects: their perception of a violent option 
generally, their perception of that option after the funeral attack in Dhaleh in December 2013, 
and their perception of the ‘Southern Resistance’ as declared in January 2014. These 
questions were also asked at different points in time; the first in April 2013, the second and 
third in early 2014. Nevertheless, answers differed only slightly. To foreclose the 
                                                          
1518 “Southern Movement Youth Coalition Spokesperson”. 
1519 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1520 Interview with Hirak activist living in Germany, February 1, 2015.  
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overwhelming response: While respondents admit that increased repression and killings cause 
ever more frustration among activists and violence cannot be completely ignored as 
something people resort to in the last instance, the central conviction is that the Hirak is so 
inherently nonviolent that it will never become the dominant pathway of the movement. 
Exceptional cases of violent reactions, however, are exactly that: existent, but exceptional.  
 A policy of armed struggle is rejected even in retrospect: “HATAM wasn’t welcome a lot, 
like I said, because it was violent from day one.”1521 Yet, activists do acknowledge that 
grievances are building up and becoming ever more severe, and that the fact that peaceful 
actions have so far (until 2013) remained without any sizable success have created frustration: 
“I would be naïve if I was to say to you ‘No, this will continue to be peaceful’.”1522 As with 
the peaceful stance, however, self-defense is conceded to be legitimate to a certain extent – 
albeit such developments are attributed to some non-controllable dynamics, i.e. responsibility 
is attributed away from acting subjects:  
I would never see that the Hirak will adopt violence as their way forward, but I think it 
may come from the ground and force everybody in a direction which they're not willing 
to follow but they'll be forced upon... And that will again depend on how the others act. 
The more violent they are, then people will think, this is our right to defend ourselves 
(...).1523 
The same argument is made by another Hirak member, and he does so with the same stress on 
(bad) memories of the past as noted above:  
What I know for a fact is that people had enough, enough of violence, they don't want it 
anymore. But who knows, if people don't listen to them and people came to a conclusion 
or to a stage where they cannot differentiate between life or death, then there might a 
recourse to violence. (...) If they continue their oppressive practices to Southerners, then I 
will not be surprised if people start to recourse to violence, even though it's against their 
will, they don't want it.1524 
‘Not wanting violence’ is leading back to essentialist peacefulness and conviction of 
peacefulness – the case made by those explaining the Hirak’s nonviolent character. In fact, the 
difference between this section and the preceding one is in degree only: The last held that the 
movement is peaceful in any case except self-defense; this one holds that if people resort to 
violence they do it reluctantly and out of self-defense. The theme is the same, it is merely 
elucidated under different preconditions.  
 Already the intention to summon people to take up arms is judged negatively:  
                                                          
1521 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1522 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1523 Ibid.  
1524 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
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Who would call for violence? Only fool ones and nutters or terrorists. Nobody wants 
violence at all. I haven't heard or seen anybody talking about carrying a weapon against 
Northerners and they don't want it, they want to keep that good relationship. What they 
want [is] a peaceful, a right to self-determination to be given to them (...).1525 
Who this refers to particularly is Tareq al-Fadhli, who in 2009 called for an armed uprising. 
The interviewee held him as well as all others following his path to be “terrorists”, thus 
excluding them from having any significance or legitimacy to represent Southerners.  
 In between this rigorous rejection of any kind of violence emanating from Southerners in 
an offensive manner and the events of gross repression in Dhaleh in December 2013, a 
respondent in September that year held at least calls for strategic violence imaginable: “The 
lack of united leadership and – consequently – discipline may cause scattered minor groups of 
Hirak to turn to such acts. However, that is not to make any real change. The calls for armed 
struggle are not expected to have concrete influence or response.”1526 
 The killing of 15 people in a funeral tent on December 27, 2013 had the potential to change 
things in a way that resonance of calls for armed struggle might become more probable. Yet, 
respondents still insisted that reactions were isolated cases and due solely to the gravity of the 
‘crime’ committed by the regime forces; the event had not changed the Hirak’s general stance.  
While the perception was that situation in Dhaleh was “extremely dangerous”1527, many 
insisted that there was no organized resistance organization (i.e. the later announced Southern 
Resistance), but that escalations were solely “natural” reactions under the given 
circumstances. The media was biased, for the real crimes were massive human rights 
violations still uninvestigated. The NDC, still active at that time, had “no legitimacy at all” 
but the responsibles were still old rulers, tribes, families etc.1528 When I asked 24 Hirak 
members on the appraisal of the situation (Would there be a violent escalation or no?), 15 of 
them expected one, while only nine were convinced that nonviolence would dominate. One of 
the latter assured me that “every hour the number of dead rises, but we counter peaceful[ly]. 
Every one of us is ready to sacrifice all he has for the restoration of freedom, security and 
safety in the south (...).”1529 Other voices, however, were less rigorous. They admitted to 
’defense’1530, to “some armed groups [...with] no public support”1531, to “a contribution to the 
                                                          
1525 Ibid.  
1526 Personal communication with Hirak activist, September 17, 2013.  
1527 Personal communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014.  
1528 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 4, 2014.  
1529 Personal communication on Facebook, Januar 24, 2014. 
1530 Augustin, “Interview with Huda al-Attas”. 
1531 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 3, 2014.  
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breadth of feelings of hatred”1532, and to ‘limited support among the relatives of those 
killed’1533.  
Armed resistance is not supported by our people. Nor does it represent any real tendency 
within the Hirak whose strategic choice is to regain the Southern independent state 
through – and solely through – peaceful movement. Self-defending is different. The so-
called ‘Southern Resistance’ is thought to be a radical reaction to the extreme violence 
practiced by the authorities over civilians, particular in Dhali’. My information about its 
leading individuals is too vague to be useful.1534 However, it has no future. I think that the 
irrational minority – secretly backed by al-Beidh himself – is responsible for many 
disorders in our peaceful struggle, including this fragmentation.1535 
The language of this quote is one of extremes and it is creating a stark dichotomy between 
‘the Hirak’ and ‘the irrational minority’. The existence of the Southern Resistance is here 
accepted, yet it is downplayed as small and without future. 1536 Besides an extreme reaction to 
repression, other reasons are given to explain why Dhaleh saw violence despite the 
movement’s insistent distancing from it. First, Dhaleh is said to be special for its position 
immediately at the border with the North; there is more military presence and more repression 
originating from the troops.1537 Second, many former army members are living in the area, 
which – according to interviewees – made an escalation more likely for they are “very well 
trained in the use of weapons” and suffer from a high degree of frustration enabling a quicker 
resort to arms when they or their families experience renewed humiliation or repression.1538 
Third, the staff of Aden Live TV to a large extent comes from that area, and by giving special 
attention to the events and making more militant statements (something the channel is known 
for), it further catalyzes escalation. 1539 And fourth and last, intentional instigation of violent 
acts against the population by the regime that knows about the above special characteristics of 
the area: “The regime in Sana’a knows it well and is now trying to do whatever possible 
suppression of the power of the voice of Dhaleh in the belief that it will lead to the 
                                                          
1532 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014.  
1533 Ibid  
1534 Others speculate that Shallal Ali Shaia and/or Taher Tamah (the head of the Military Council) might be the 
leaders. They had been calling for armed struggle before and headed those groups already involved in clashes 
and repeated fighting with army units in Dhaleh before. Beyond an immediate reaction to the events it could thus 
also be considered a further escalation of an existing strive to instigate armed struggle. Personal communication 
with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014. [Hadrami Ana] Tamah is a contested personally; allegedly he had been 
calling for the assassination of Southern politicians as well, potentially those who were considered as ‘aligning’ 
with the North. Interview with former MP and prominent Hirak activist living in the UK, April 29, 2013.  
1535 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1536 Similarly: Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1537 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 5, 2014; Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, 
April 27, 2013. 
1538 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1539 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014; personal communication with Hirak activist, 
March 5, 2014.  
371 
 
suppression of the southern secession demands.”1540 The one fact to which the vast majority 
agrees, however, is that “it is not an attitude, it happens individually”.1541 
 Besides this claim, the role of the international community is brought into the question of 
violence as well. It is simultaneously attributed with co-responsibility for potential escalation 
due to its negligence of the situation1542 and considered as positive intervening force and 
reference point for peacefulness. Which argument is made depends on a degree of weighing: 
Complete lack of involvement or just enough to have a mildly positive effect? The two 
following quotes each represent one side of the spectrum:  
In the future if they feel disillusioned with all these false promises, if they are humiliated 
more than what they have been or deprived from their basic human rights, then they 
might do... against their will of course because nobody is hungry to go and take arms to 
fight. (...) They've tried in the south and that's why they hate it. Even in 1994 the vast 
majority refused to take arms against the north (...) Only few took up arms and they 
expected an intervention by the neighbouring countries and the international community 
to stop this regime from invading the south. But nobody intervened basically, they just 
stood with the strongest, with the winner. And we found that to be very cruel, very very 
cruel.1543 
The last sentence specifically bespeaks the blaming of the internationally community.  
There are calls for the adoption of the armed option in the south, but this is not all the 
factions. It is the faction of Ali Salem [al-Beidh], which threatened (...) to resort to this 
option as a last resort in case of non-response to their demands. But in my belief this will 
not happen and the reason therefore is the rejection of the international community of 
violence in the south and the lack of support for separatism. In case of the use of weapons 
the Security Council will impose sanctions on leaders who stand behind this option and 
freeze their financial assets and prevent them from travelling. And for this reason the 
southern leaders will not adopt arms because they realize the seriousness of the option of 
adopting arms and that it will to international isolation (...)1544 
In addition to the belief of the international community’s role, the quote once more exposes 
al-Beidh as the source of calls for armed struggle.1545 “He owns the Aden Live channel. It is 
                                                          
1540 To these additionally count the following: “What is going on in Dhaleh is a complex case of liquidation of 
feuds in the South (...) Dhaleh after the war in 1994 represented the spearhead in the process of rejection in the 
South of the results of this war and has resulted in the launch of the Southern Movement in Dhaleh in March 
2007. And before that, Dhaleh was the only county that did not vote overwhelmingly for the former President 
Ali Abdullah Saleh and his ruling party in the 2006 elections.” Personal communication with Hirak activist, 
March 5, 2014.  
1541 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1542 Another statement equally voiced in regard to lacking international involvement that if people’s demands 
continued to be unheard, there would be “civil war”. Personal communication with Hirak activist with very 
active family, June 12, 2013.  
1543 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1544 Personal communication with Hirak activist, September 10, 2013. The same respondent affirmed this view 
on February 28, 2014. 
1545 Claims that the Southern Resistance equals earlier armed actors who just strategically changed names in 
order to get support similarly imply a connection with al-Beidh, who had been involved in such earlier militant 
groups. Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 4, 2014.  
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easy to notice that this channel encourages Southern people to adopt the violence as their last 
option.”1546 As has been noted, many set little trust in the channel and its reporting, i.e. the 
resonance that these calls generate is to be considered low.  
 Unofficial channels of communication and mobilization might be more effective, as 
Southern youth perceive: “In public, leaders say that we are peaceful, but behind closed doors 
they tell us to do what we want, to fight. For young men with nothing, this is an attractive 
proposition, but it will be the youth who risk the bullets.”1547 Although some hold that small 
groups had managed to recruit youth, there have been no corresponding actions of a notable 
scale. And, still, the groups are supposedly responsible merely for protection, i.e. defense. 
The Sanaa authorities don’t differentiate between civilians and armed resistance, they are 
shelling the city randomly. The resistance should deter and do their duty. But in fact they 
are still small groups dispersing all over the southern provinces without one identified 
leader. In every province there is a leader unfortunately. But with the same aims to 
protect civilians. And of course they are spreading gradually and there are more adult 
youths joining every day.1548 
I would like to conclude the section with three statements that well summarize the positions 
and the unresolved issues. They form a climax, yet it should be remembered that there was no 
observable systematic shift in movement behavior until the end of the period under 
observation (nor beyond).  
 First: Calls for armed struggle and some reasons for non-resonance.  
Yes, there are calls for armed struggle, but this is not in the welfare of the south and we 
do not have enough weapons (...) or the necessary support. We had wars enough, enough 
killing and destruction... Our country is exhausted and our people poor... It’s time for 
dialogue to resolve our cause.1549 
Second: Repression and international silence catalyzed escalation. 
With deliberate disregard by the assembled regional and international levels to the 
demands of southerners in the restoration of their state and the silence on the crimes that 
were practiced and practiced against southerners (...) which contrast the peaceful struggle 
(...) and which culminated in the recent massacre of Dali and the absence of any 
international condemnation of her, I think that this will pay off armed struggle 
inevitably.1550 
                                                          
1546 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014. 
1547 Affirmed by a female youth who insisted that “[t]he leaders are very hidden in what they really want.” 
Salisbury, ‘“Analysis”. 
1548 Personal communication with Hirak activist in Dhaleh, March 2, 2014.  
1549 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 3, 2013.  
1550 Personal communication with Hirak activist via Facebook, January 24, 2014. 
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Third: Exhaustion of peaceful means. “I think that patience was carried out seven years of 
peaceful struggle. [There] must be the fight because the use of force can only be detracted by 
force.”1551 
 
(7) Who can and shall lead us?  
The Hirak suffers from a lack of credible and legitimate leaders1552 – this is the dominant 
opinion held by many activists. Not only has fragmentation has been a problem since 19671553 
and decreased belief in the respective factions; the main argument held against the various old 
leaders striving to set themselves at the forefront of the movement is their absence during the 
initial phase.  
We must understand that Hirak began without these. They weren't anywhere to be seen. 
Some of them joined years after that, while the Hirak has begun its own initiative, the 
people’s initiative. These leaders have joined the Hirak and joined the people, and the 
people can easily continue without these leaders, you know, the people don't depend on 
the leadership to create momentum (...).1554 
This absence of leaders and reliance on the ‘people’s power’ is often viewed not as a 
weakness, but as a strength of the Hirak; it emphasizes the agency and capacity of the people: 
“No one Southern leader can say ‘I began’. (...) it’s a very genuine movement, very genuine 
revolution cause it started from the bottom. It started with people feeling unwell, if you like, 
and it builds up.”1555 “The main player is the Hirak, which is the people.”1556 
 It is from this starting point that their legitimacy, i.e. the legitimacy of all those old guards 
who claim to be leaders, is denied by large parts especially of the middle-class and intellectual 
strata of the movement.1557 They are deemed “helpless” or “harmful”1558 or even identified as 
the “main obstacle”1559 to movement success. The accusations revolve around their perceived 
                                                          
1551 Ibid. 
1552 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1553 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013. [Abdulrazaq] It has furthermore been severely 
aggravated in 1986: Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014. A milder opinion is held by 
certain spokespersons who are are trying to emphasize that despite “minor differences” all believe in the same 
cause and that the fragmentation is negligible in comparison to Northern disunity. Cf. “Southern Movement 
Youth Coalition Spokesperson”. 
1554 Group discussion during qāt chew Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013.  
1555 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1556 Ibid.  
1557 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1558 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014; Baron, “The South (of Yemen) Will Rise 
again”. 
1559 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 6, 2013. [Saleh Hydarah] The same contact even went so 
far to claim that they were the “only” great obstacle to the goals inside a few months later. Personal 
communication with Hirak activist in Dhaleh, March 2, 2014.  
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lack of actions despite great words1560; the allegation that they acted more in their individual 
interests than for the common good1561; their lack of unity and apparent unwillingness or 
incapacity to overcome this problem1562; their character traits (especially al-Beidh is described 
as highly “unbalanced”, “moody”, and “suspicious”1563); and the assumption that because of 
their ‘entrapment’ in old, socialist thought the international community refused to cooperate 
with the movement1564. When the central figures finally attempted to unify in Beirut in early 
2014, resonance was restrained: Despite prior wishes for a unified leadership, the dominant 
judgement now was “unimportant”.1565 
  Even the support by the Southern diaspora, which is usually highly welcomed and 
supported, is seen in a negative light because “they lead to internal conflict due to leadership 
rivalry”.1566 
 Notwithstanding all these negative perceptions, it needs to be acknowledged there is, at the 
same time, a large share of the populace that does support these leaders for various reasons. 
On the one hand there are pragmatic reasons held mainly by the middle-class and 
intellectuals. They are rooted in the assumption that (1) these leaders with experience are to 
be preferred over a volatile attempt for democracy under the given circumstances; they have 
the ability to unify Southerners.1567 Moreover, (2) the international community demands a 
united Southern leadership with a clear vision to deal with: 
The world wants to see to how the southern people deal with one another, deal with 
regional countries, and our stance on terrorism and human rights issues. Therefore, there 
should be one united leadership (...) to send a clear message to the world at a time when 
Houthi militants are controlling Sana’a.1568 
                                                          
1560 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013; Baron, “The South (of Yemen) Will Rise 
Again”. 
1561 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 6, 2013.  
1562 Personal communication with Hirak activist in the KSA, February 26, 2014; Iona Craig, “Trouble With The 
South”, October 18, 2013, accessed October 31, 2013, http://www.beaconreader.com/iona-craig/trouble-with-
the-south?ref=profile. Not without sarcasm, one respondent said: “Those three guys [al-Beidh, Ahmed, al-Attas] 
are part of our problem, not part of the solution, because all three of them are presidents. If we have one 
president there are problems. How do you think we [can] have three presidents, not one???” Interview with 
former diplomat and prominent Hirak activist living in the UK, April 29, 2013.  
1563 Interview with leading TAJ member and Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1564 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 6, 2013; personal communication with Hirak activist, 
March 2, 2014.  
1565 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 4, 2014; personal communcation with Hirak activist, 
February 28, 2014. Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 5, 2014.  
1566 Interview with former MP and prominent Hirak activist living in the UK, April 29, 2013. Besides petitions 
etc. the diaspora groups furthermore organized demonstrations, try to inform about the Southern issue, or simply 
strengthen morals and the feeling of presence in the world by posing with flags in front of international sights 
(e.g. the Eiffel Tower).  
1567 The comment also holds that the South had failed to do without them. Interview with Hirak activist living in 
the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1568 “Al-Arood Square Spokesperson”.  
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A second group, on the other hand, either believes in the experience of the old or, rather, is 
attracted by its symbolic capital. A blunt example of the first group – interestingly a female 
activist in her twenties – said: “The elders are wiser and they have been through much more 
than the youth. They would have much more insight than the younger generation. They have 
been through it all, separation and unity and now they call for separation again.”1569 As for the 
second consideration, al-Beidh is conceived symbolically as the last president and as “the first 
one to announce the secession before the civil war broke out in 1994”1570. In addition, his 
person is associated with the socialist state and thus he “seems popular among urban poor 
who long for steady prices, jobs and access to education of the socialist era”.1571 And lastly, 
he made the desire of the majority of movement members for independence his own and is 
associated with it, thus securing him the greatest loyalty of the street.1572 Huda al-Attas, 
however, stresses the need to differentiate between genuine support for his person and for 
what he has become symbolic for – the wish of the people:  
The people are not with Ali Salim al-Bayd – that is for sure. The Hirak emerged in 2007, 
two years before he joined it. People flash his picture at demonstrations because he shares 
their point of view as regards the liberation and independence of the south. He is the only 
politician of his prominence who is for liberation and independence.1573 
Ba'oum, too, has significant symbolic capital and is mentioned numerous times as a legitimate 
leader. Nevertheless, his age is held against him: “[P]eople like him. But he's very old now, he 
can't even think straight. He's the one who has always been fighting for the South since 1994. 
He was put in prison, he was humiliated, he was beaten up, but he was firm, he's still (...).”1574 
 When it comes to the personal impact of individual figures, opinions differ more widely, 
which is similarly identified as a problem by the movement but for which there has not yet 
been a solution.1575 Al-Beidh's strengths have already been mentioned. Banners, posters, and 
slogan's tell their audience: “The legal president is Ali Salim” and (with his picture) “Leader 
of the Liberation and Independence”.1576 But the list of aspects that damage his reputation and 
that of his framing is similarly notable: His “difficult character”1577, his repeated changes 
between calls for nonviolence and violence, the perceived abuse of the large influence ‘his’ 
                                                          
1569 Personal communication with Hirak activist from very active family, June 12, 2013.  
1570 “Southern Movement Youth Coalition Spokesperson”. This seems quite surprising since he was the one who 
had entered unity first of all, yet, many keep up their respect for they consider him to have done so with the best 
intentions. Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1571 Dahlgren, “A Poor People’s Revolution”. 
1572 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1573 Augustin, “Interview with Huda al-Attas”.  
1574 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1575 Ibid.  
1576 Augustin, “’Tawra Tawra Ya Ganub’”. 
1577 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
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channel Aden Live TV has – all these factors negatively impact on his credibility. What 
makes the issues even graver is that they throw a negative light on the Hirak and thus 
seriously threaten the cause: 
In terms of whether peaceful, whether violence he has contradicted himself on a number 
of occasions where he would say ‘This is a peaceful movement, we’re peaceful’, but there 
would be a time when he would say: ‘but if this doesn't work then we will look for 
alternative means’, giving the indication that he's altered. And that creates unease 
amongst a lot of Southerners because we need to portray ourselves and it's true, we need 
to be telling the truth. (...) And that's the criticism of Ali Salim Al Beidh: Why should we 
bring negative attention to it when it's not merited because it is peaceful?1578 
The same applies to his utterances about the role of Iran. He more than once differed in his 
statements between a denial of Iranian support and saying that whoever would help the cause 
was welcome and if he had taken money, it was for Southerners. Activists were enraged about 
his wanton negligence, since it provided backing for the regime's counterframing that they 
posed a threat to the state by allying with hostile foreign powers; the KSA – a potential and 
decisive supporter – was equally scared off. Plus, it was of little internal use for nobody 
would have viewed support from Iran as positive. Al-Beidh “causes many troubles for his 
people.”1579 
 The perception of Aden Live TV's role changed over time: While in April 2013 its 
influence was reckoned to be very high – the framing allegedly generated great resonance – a 
year later its credibility was found to be low and its program deteriorating with repetition.  
I don't like the course that the channel is taking. In terms of how influential it is, I think 
it's very influential at the moment. It's the only channel that speaks the mind of the people 
and that is now widespread in Aden. It's almost in every home now, everybody has Aden 
Live because it tells the people what they want to hear, and it is shared experience. It has 
shaped people's minds, it's playing a big part in that.1580 
 
Aden Live is not a credible source of information that we take or rely on information 
from, even in Aden people know that. The channel has no accountability. It causes more 
damage to the southern cause than good.1581 
Since the channel was immediately linked to al-Beidh, his impact and credibility were 
simultaneously negatively affected; its partiality was deemed less acceptable as well:  
Had it not been for the channel, for Aden Live, I don't think Ali Salim al-Beidh would 
have been as popular as he is. I think it's clearly a pro-Ali Salim al Beidh channel and it 
goes out of its way to make that obvious to the extent that whenever there is another 
leader al-Attas or al-Jifri or anybody else that comes and says something really pro-South 
                                                          
1578 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1579 Interview with leading TAJ member and Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1580 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1581 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
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and it's something credible and worth of broadcasting they would go out of their way to 
not to broadcast it (...)1582 
As has been noted above, the reason for Ba'oum's popularity was foremost his personality and 
symbolic capital as an activist for the (independent) South since the British. He had no media 
apparatus to mediate that, but relied on his presence and reputation: 
Whilst Al-Beidh got his popularity through the channel and through speeches, Ba'oum 
has got it on the ground. He has been imprisoned, released and reimprisoned, released and 
been back to prison. So he suffered and I think a lot of people appreciate it a lot, they 
appreciate that this man is willing to put himself in danger repeatedly. That's the ultimate 
sacrifice, that's what people say, and that's where he's getting his popularity from. I think 
he's still popular, but the rift between him and Al-Beidh has divided the people that 
followed him at one time. It's been very unhealthy for the southern cause.1583 
The mentioned rift occurred between 2012 and 2013 and, in spite of the rapprochement 
between the two in February 2014, which has been very clearly geared towards the media, it 
could not be mended successfully under the given conditions of their decreasing health and 
the Houthi takeover later that year.  
 “Leader Ba’oum, at your service”, “Good day, leader Ba’oum”1584, his image as huge 
graffiti on a wall – Ba'oum's popularity is similarly tangible as al-Beidh’s. In that, his 
reputation never got scratched as al-Beidh's did, and it is more strongly tied to his person as 
well (and not to a former office and its fame). At least until 2014, his influence and credibility 
can thus be considered relatively high even in comparison to al-Beidh's media presence in 
Aden Live TV and international media (whose coverage usually included the former president 
and figurehead but less the famous, often imprisoned activist – among others for reasons of 
accessibility1585).  
 Mohamed Ali Ahmed evokes rather extreme reactions; hated by some for his past actions, 
he can still build on strong loyalties in his home province of Abyan. “Mohamed Ali Ahmed, 
he's a killer. (...) In 1986 he murdered tens of thousands (...) if he’s in power he will do it 
again and again. I think people should avoid him. And he is participating the National 
Dialogue because Abd Rabbo Mansour used to work under him.”1586 While his participation 
in the NDC was rejected, his withdrawal regained him some respect. From fall 2014 onwards, 
he was furthermore involved in the setup of the so-called ‘People’s Committees’ in the South 
as a kind of vigilante force against the army and later on the Houthis. An estimated 8,000 
                                                          
1582 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1583 Ibid.  
1584 Augustin, “’Tawra Tawra Ya Ganub’”. 
1585 Al-Beidh in Beirut was easier to meet than Ba'oum in Hadhramawt.  
1586 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
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members of these group took the control over security in Abyan with the majority following 
Ahmed, who later on sent higher numbers to Aden as a support.1587 This responsibility aided 
his credibility, yet at a time when the active role of the movement decreased due to the 
general deterioration of stability and security, he could not have any strong leading influence. 
Overall his role appears more effective as a military leader than as a political leader of the 
Hirak, among which his views were hardly supported.  
 Al-Attas was similarly rarely mentioned, usually solely when inquired about. As one 
interviewee held, he was a good politician but acted rather in the background and often in 
secret, so that people did not know what to think and tended to be skeptical.1588 In 
consequence, his position did not generate much resonance.  
 Ali Nasser Mohamed has remained abroad as has al-Beidh. In addition to not being in the 
streets, which decreases frame resonance, he has no media. His framing is thus far less widely 
perceived than al-Beidh’s. He can build on his prestige as former offices as president and 
prime minister, and although he is better included into meetings etc. of other leaders. The 
popular resonance of his framing attempts pale when compared to others.  
  To these ‘others’ belong some less high-ranking figures, who, however, demonstrate great 
presence among activists and at events having thereby gained respect and followers. 
Salah al-Shanfarah is this one. The people who really started the Hirak, it's this one 
Shallal [Ali Shaie]. He's a nutter, but he started the Hirak and he was tough. And Salah 
Qais Shanfarah, and Ba'muallam, Ba'oum, Askar [Jubran], Aidaroos al-Naqeeb (...) They 
are inside the country and they are leading big factions, the biggest, in Dhaleh (...).1589 
Al-Shanfarah and Shaie are the names affiliated with the armed cells in Dhaleh; Ba'muallim is 
a religious sheikh and sanctions the Hirak's actions on religious grounds;1590 Qassim Askar 
Jubran was among the founding members; and Aidaroos al-Naqeeb was a well-known MP 
and even in exile still is a vocal writer of opinion pieces with great outreach. Each has 
supporters, and since individual activists always back more than one figure, there is a 
complex web of loyalties and resonance. Although it is too complex to be elucidated here, 
these ‘second row leaders’ deserve to be acknowledged for there is evidence that the 
resonance they are able to generate locally leads to significant mobilization independent of the 
great names. It should rather be considered as a notable part of the decentralized framing.  
 Abdulrahman al-Jifri was for a long time associated with al-Beidh and Aden Live TV for 
which he worked. In the wake of the fall 2014 protests, however, he took over a more 
                                                          
1587 Interview with Hirak activist and son of a Southern general living in Germany, February 1, 2015.  
1588 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1589 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1590 Interview with Hirak activist living in Germany, February 1, 2015.  
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prominent, more independent role. He returned to Aden in early November and soon became 
head of the 72-member group of movement representatives that was referred to as 
“parliament” and the aim of which it was to establish a democratic body of a united Hirak.1591 
Allegedly he argued that it was time for the leadership to enter the street instead of merely 
acting in the back. While there are hints that he is well-respected in the council, I have no 
further data on his stance and its resonance other than that he was part of those aiming for 
independence.  
 Finally, two actors remain: the YSP and the youth. The former has played a neglectable 
role; its stance has been unclear and far from what 'the street' sought for. One comment aptly 
summarizes the dominant opinion among movement members: “Acutely the Yemen Socialist 
Party abandoned the southern issue by participating in what is called ‘the National Dialogue’, 
which means neglecting and ignoring the millions of people in the south who demand their 
country back.”1592 
 The youth on the other hand forms a very visible (yet not dominant!) group among 
protesters. They have grown increasingly frustrated with the old leaders, the ballast of the 
past, and the slow progress they see resulting from it. In the words of activists in their 
twenties: “In the South we have a lot of leaders, but about 90% with the minds of old fossils 
who reject modern youths’ thought (...).”1593 “No one talks to the youth about what they want. 
It is like they only exist in social media, in Twitter.”1594 Especially the November 30th 
deadline, the surrounding events in which youth organizations were very active, and the 
absence of change increased impatience – of everyone. 1595 “The people want something new, 
something more this time. They keep hearing November 30th, November 30th, and now they 
want something to show for it.”1596 Tamam Basharaheel, the editor of Al-Ayyam, stated: “It 
really seems that the people have exceeded the leaders: people have grown hopeless and 
angry and no one has control.”1597 While there has always been great hesitance to pass over 
the old leadership, in the wake of this 'failure' to come up with a next step, more voices have 
begun to articulate the readiness and willingness to take over at least partial responsibility 
(intended to soften the break): “We have youth leaders from the south who are qualified to 
                                                          
1591 Ibid.  
1592 Personal communication with Hirak activist, September 6, 2013. 
1593 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 3, 2013.  
1594 Salisbury, “Analysis”. 
1595 Personal communication with Hirak activist, February 28, 2014. 
1596 “Yemen Secessionists Face Leadership Crisis”, Al Jazeera, December 1, 2014, accessed December 1, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/yemen-secessionists-face-leadership-crisis-
20141216356662352.html.  
1597 Baron, “The South (of Yemen) Will Rise Again”.  
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take responsibility for ruling the southern state in collaboration with the former southern 
leaders.”1598 But, again, this development was brought to a hold by the dominant security 
situation in early 2015.  
 
(8) Which role shall/must the international community have? 
Reference to the international community is great on all levels. It is shaped by various 
characteristics, though. First, there is the grievance of being left alone and even betrayed by 
the international community. Statements in this direction are often related to frustrated 
demands and violence suffered by the regime. In March 2013, for instance, after the Karama 
Day massacre, an activist rhetorically asks:  
Where is the international community in all of this? Where are our rights? In the north, 
they fought for one year, people were killed, and the international community gave them 
their peace. The northerners have dominated us, killed us, stolen from us since unity. 
Where is our dialogue with the north? We have been fighting for 20 years, but still they 
ignore us.1599 
The same half accusing, half desperate tone is chosen by another one:  
International actors do not look for our suffering, to the justice of our demands, to what 
we are exposed from exclusion and marginalization. [They] help the Yemeni government 
to abuse us. [The] United Nations is only concerned with how to maintain the interests of 
America and great countries, it is not interested in the kill[ing] and dying. They are unfair 
with us, as well as the League of Arab States (...).1600 
These quotes clearly reflect central frames: justice, democracy, suffering, exclusion, 
marginalization, regime violence, and, above all, rights feature prominently. People insist on 
their perceived right to international support in the face of human rights abuses. After the 
events in Dhaleh in December 2013, the lack of international action was denounced as a 
                                                          
1598 “Southern Movement Youth Coalition Spokesperson’. They are supported therein by the intellectuals: “[T]he 
Academic Group suggested a paper that discusses the possibilities of uniting all sides of the Southern Hirak, 
discusses the problems they face, and finally suggests a list of solutions. Now in the South a new youth people 
movement appears. A movement that will present new leaders who will have the authority to speak officially in 
the near future about their own new political ideas and aims. They have already proved [sic!] their abilities and 
that cannot be denied in dealing with civil society organizations, organizing the civil disobedience and 
organizing the events of the Southern Hirak etc. Therefore, the International community and especially the civil 
society organizations should support this movement by training those youth leaders as they did with other 
emerging countries.” Personal communication with Hirak activist, September 7, 2013.  
1599 Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Intifada”. It should be added that petitions requesting intervention had been 
handed to the UN, the Islamic Conference, Arab League, and GCC by the Hirak after Karama Day and had 
shown no effect; a fact, which had been widely publicized in the South. “Southern Revolutionary Forces and 
Components Send Urgent Letter to United Nations, the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council”, Aden Live TV, February 25, 2013, accessed February 26, 2013, http://www.aden-tv-
live.tv/articles-638.html. 
1600 Personal communication with Hirak activist, June 3, 2013.  
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“conniving betrayal of the international community” in failing to protect civilians.1601 
Similarly, the grandmother of a killed youth asks: “Where is the United Nations? Where are 
our human rights?”1602 Along the same lines of victimization also runs the judgement about 
state1603 and international media (particularly Al Jazeera and BBC), which are found to be 
“misleading” and trying “to ruin our peaceful resistance claiming that Hirak is armed.”1604 
 A second perspective is more demanding: It strains that “the international community has 
to understand that [the] region has strategic significance”1605 and that there is a need to 
stabilize Yemen.1606 The base for these demands is partly following a realist logic, partly 
arguing with rights – both in varying tones.  
 One realist perspective is that in order to get international support, Southerners need to 
demonstrate1607 why it is in the interest of other states to stand with them. Once this succeeds, 
so the assumption, support will be provided: 
We've shown in the past that we can be a civil state, we can be a state that will not harbor 
terrorists – contrary to what the Republic of Yemen has been for the last 20 years and 
prior to that. So we need to convince the West. The West have their own agendas, we 
need to go and find out what those agendas are and try and deal with them rather than 
expect that the West will feel sorry for us. I think that it's something that we must get 
away from. Human rights, the United Nations and their role... We can read articles that 
are sympathetic towards us, but at the end of the day if we don't have the political power, 
the political ability to convince the West that we can offer you, we can serve your 
interests, if we don't do that then we're gonna struggle (...).1608 
The need is to overcome the assumption of international actors that “their interests are safer 
with the traditional powers in Yemen”1609; arguments are with the common exploitation of oil 
and gas resources1610, stability in the region1611, and – relatedly – the successful containment 
of terrorism1612 and Houthi expansionism1613. Instead of allowing an escalation towards civil 
                                                          
1601 Personal communication with Hirak activist in Dhaleh, March 2, 2014. The “betrayal” is furthermore felt to 
originate specifically with “the governments of countries represented by the Security Council and the Arab 
League” Personal communication with Hirak activist in KSA, February 26, 2014. [Adnan Halboob] 
1602 Dahlgren, “Poor People’s Revolution”.  
1603 Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013. 
1604 Personal communication with Hirak activist, September 16, 2013.  
1605 Augustin, “Interview with Huda al-Attas”.  
1606 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 5, 2014.  
1607 At this point there are numerous comments seeing the duty of Southerners to provide the necessary data and 
spreading it in the media etc. Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013; 
Interview with former diplomat and prominent Hirak activist living in the UK, April 29, 2013; “Southern 
Movement Youth Coalition Spokesperson”. 
1608 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 27, 2013.  
1609 Personal communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1610 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1611 Personal communication with Hirak activist with very active family, June 12, 2013.  
1612 Personal communication wit Hirak activist, March 5, 2014.  
1613 “Al-Arood Square Spokesperson”.  
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war as in 1994,1614 Southerners must “raise our voices” and force the UN to act, so a former 
colonel of the PDRY army.1615  
 Such action is rendered an “entitlement”, specifically in reference and comparison to the 
negotiation with the Houthis.1616 
There are clearly provisions in international law that would support the right of the 
southern people towards self-determination. Obviously, this can be interpreted 
differently, but there are clearly provisions there that support the cause and although 
international law is always secondary to the political will of the superpowers I still think 
it is something important to consider and try and put into the scenario (...).1617 
In these regards, the key arguments are the right to self-determination, previous examples of 
internationally guaranteed self-determination for the Falklands and Kosovo (both of which are 
found very small and hence theoretically less entitled to that right)1618, the legal difference 
between separation/secession and “the break away from a unity from a contract that was 
[entered] voluntarily”1619, and the content of the already adopted SC Resolutions 924 and 
9311620.  
 In sum, the Hirak very closely observes international reactions and holds international 
support to be crucial. Despite frustration with a lack thereof so far, hopes are kept up as are 
attempts to influence international opinion in their interests.  
Though they do not publicly support the southern issue, we feel they are understanding 
the southern issue and will one day openly declare their support for the southern people 
and their right to regain their state. Stability in the south reflects on stability in the 
region.1621 
 
(9) What are our prospects? 
Opinions of youth depict very well the wide range of perceptions of the Hirak's prospects:1622 
One young Southerner, for instance, is irritated about the extensive civil disobedience 
campaigns: “It is affecting people’s daily lives; it is a mess. You cannot go anywhere or do 
                                                          
1614 A threat scenario painted is state collapse as in Iraq and Afghanistan, clearly aiming at international fears 
surrounding these countries. Comment made on al-Beidh's speech on May 21, 2009, posted June 2, 2009 in 
reference to the translation posted by Jane Novak on: http://www.armiesofliberation.com/ 
archives/2009/06/01/al-beidh-speech-52109-official-translation/. 
1615 “Tensions Soar at Southern Yemen Protest Camp”, November 29, 2014, accessed December 1, 2014, Al 
Jazeera, http://www.en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/tensions-soar-southern-yemen-protest-camp-151251483.html. 
1616 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1617 Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013. 
1618 Interview with Hirak activist living in the UK, April 26, 2013.  
1619 Group discussion during qāt chew of Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013. 
1620 Personal communication with Hirak activist, May 31, 2013.  
1621 “Al-Arood Square Spokesperson”.  
1622 Salisbury, “Analysis”.  
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anything in this situation.” Another is convinced of victory (in the sense of gaining 
independence); he simply states: “We will win.” A third one is pessimistic about the 
developments: “There will be a civil war.” And still another one, a young woman, raises 
concerns about the effectiveness of the proposed solution; she is rather doubtful: “If we 
separate, the question is would things be better? We see a lot of problems, but separation is 
not necessarily the solution to these problems.” Furthermore, besides the aim she doubts the 
leaders: “The people who are leading us are not trustworthy.” 
 The mood within the Hirak suffered from ups and downs; the second half of 2014 was 
characterized by both: exhaustion after eight years of struggle1623; refrained optimism 
regarding a unifying old leadership; worries concerning the Houthis; hope for change before 
November 30th; disappointment afterwards; and lastly anxiety and ambiguity after the Houthi 
takeover and in the new year with Hadi's resignation1624.  
 The events would have been highly challenging for most groups. A specific aggravation 
results from the divide between (unrealistically) great expectations and assumptions held by 
Southerners and the complexities of the actual situations, in addition to the apparent lack of a 
comprehensive roadmap for the sought after post-independence period. The expectations 
mainly concern the economy; the assumption is that the South would have had the potential of 
prosperous Gulf cities like Dubai were it not unified with the North.1625 After unity, many 
hope for a sudden cure of economic woes based on the income from oil, gas, and the recreated 
port of Aden. Better governance and administration shall guarantee a stable and prosperous 
social market economy. Even those who might anticipate the huge economic challenges 
coming with independence hardly discuss them openly. Some dreams, however, reach high:  
I would love the south to be able to offer an outstanding education for the citizens. I 
would first start with a closed economy and once the country has become stable I would 
open the market. More modern streets and bridges. Less power outages and cutting off 
the water supply. The Corniche needs to be reconstructed and planned out with coffee 
shops, ice cream shops, playgrounds for children to play instead of playing on the streets. 
Qāt needs to be banned gradually. Encourage qat farms to produce other types of crops 
and give them incentives for the first ten years. Paved roads. Zone areas and have 
standards and building codes because right now people are building anywhere and 
anyway they want which causes the country to look messed up.1626 
This example stems from a young female activist, the daughter of an active Hirak member in 
Aden. Particularly social services and infrastructure generally have a high priority. It often 
                                                          
1623 Personal communication wit Hirak activist, March 5, 2014.  
1624 “Hadi and the South: Brothers in Arms or a Marriage of Convenience?”, Yemen Times, March 30, 2015, 
accessed April 4, 2015, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1872/report/5012/Hadi-and-the-south-Brothers-in-arms-
or-a-marriage-of-convenience.htm.  
1625 Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, “Wir werden wie Dubai sein”, Zenith 6 (März 2014): 66–70.  
1626 Personal communication with Hirak activist from very active family, June 12, 2013.  
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includes expectations about recreating the Aden port to its former glory. Other voices equally 
want to return to past conditions, yet, in regard to people:  
Beside the mentioned obstacles that the South will face while establishing the new state, 
the most important and critical challenge is the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the 
humans themselves. Without having good humans who are aware of their responsibility 
towards their nation, we will not be able to conquer the corruption, which is spreading in 
all the organizations.1627 
Again, the statement stresses the components of identity and nation and distances itself from 
what is perceived as ‘Northern vices’. These elements are pervading all fields.  
 At the bottom line, there is no clear picture when looking at the question of prospects; 
instead, there is a changing prism of chances and challenges, each of which dominate at 
certain times and from certain angles.  
 
7.2.7. Frame Contestation 
Internal frame contestation between the different factions has been discussed in the preceding 
sections. External frame contestation has its main source in the regime, yet, it is much more 
restricted than the counterframing against the Houthis. The main – and interrelated – elements 
of the counterframing are (1) a threat to unity, (2) support by Iran, (3) non-Yemeni, non-
Muslim elements.  
 In April 2009, for instance, Saleh warned:  
If anything happens to unity, God forbid: The country won’t be divided into two parts, as 
some might think, but into many (...) People would fight from house to house, and from 
window to window (...) They have to learn a lesson from what had happened in Iraq and 
Somalia. 1628 
In the following weeks and months, i.e. around the time that the old leaders joined the Hirak 
and made first speeches, he and other official sources intensified along that line: On May 21, 
Saleh marked them as “outlaws aiming to hit at the nation and its safety and to stir unrest”1629, 
while the governor of Aden spoke of armed persons who were part of “chaotic elements” who 
had “conducted unrest and sabotage acts” and were responsible for the death of protesters.1630 
Two months later, the Ministry of Defense website labelled them “anti-unity activists”.1631 
Pro-government militias were created, the so-called 'Committees to Protect Unity' (CPU) and 
                                                          
1627 Group discussion during qāt chew Yafa’e community in the UK, April 28, 2013.  
1628 HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, 17.  
1629 AFP, May 21, 2009, cited in: ibid.  
1630 Saba News, May 21, 2009, cited in: ibid.  
1631 Ibid.  
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the regime attempted to coopt local sheikhs in the South, among others, by promising military 
training. Activists of the Hirak, however, referred to the CPU as “janjawīd”.1632  
 In addition to the danger of violence that emanated from these vigilante groups, HRW 
documented the mistreatment of activists in detention; it comprises physical and verbal abuse. 
Testimonials of the latter uncover perceptions and allegations against Southern activists at 
that point in time, which revolved around identity defamation: “They asked me who supports 
our movement, and they insulted me, saying we aren’t true Muslims, that we are traitors, 
insects, dogs.”; “Why are you trying to spread hatred between the people?”; “You are an 
Indian. You are Somali. You are not Yemeni.” 1633 The line of argument remained the same 
even under Hadi, who in 2013 called on the Hirak/Aden Live TV:  
Stop this talk on satellite channels. We are Yemenis, we must live together, we must 
forgive. We must close the file against the past. Stop with this stuff on Facebook and the 
internet, inciting the Yemeni people against each other. 50 years we’ve been fighting 
against each other.1634 
Although his message on the outward is to overcome this issue,1635 the underlying accusation 
of a threat remains. Even Saleh found new fodder for such allegations at that time, based on 
the fact that the president and the prime minister were Southerners; furthermore, he argued 
along the lines of Arab nationalism (once the basis for the ‘dream of Yemeni unity’):  
And now these people criticising (...) unification – it was put to a referendum, a national 
referendum (...) the Herak etc., these are all remnants of the past. They want to bring back 
the Southern state, you now rule North and South. How can you return the Southern state 
when you now rule in Sana’a, ruling the North and the South, and you’re a Southerner? 
What’s the problem? You’re a Yemeni.1636 
That these thoughts still resonated among the population will be shown below.  
 Accusations in regard to receiving support from Iran were made particularly against al-
Beidh – in whose case even Hirak members had their doubts, as has been elaborated earlier. 
Linkages were posed to exist between the movement and AQAP, yet, theirs resulted in 
                                                          
1632 HRW, “In the Name of Unity”, 36f.  
1633 Ibid., 42ff. 
1634 “A Tale of Three Presidents”, http://www.alshamahi.com/2013/09/03/a-tale-of-three-presidents/. Hadi did 
not further his popularity when on January 19, 2015, he made a phone call in which he spoke dismissively about 
the Hirak, insisting that he was more important than the movement as a representative of the South. Despite this 
and despite Hadi’s insistence that his moving to Aden did not mean any compromise on his pro-unity stance, the 
movement affirmed its stand behind him in the situation of open conflict with the Houthis. Personal 
communication with Hirak activist, March 2, 2014.  
1635 This was part of the campaigns during the NDC, as were other outreach activities during that period who 
aimed among others at gaining backing for the federalist solution. Cf. Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in 
Ymens National Dialogue”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 342, February 2014, accessed July 
7, 2015, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR342_Process-Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-National-Dialogue. 
pdf 
1636 “A Tale of Three Presidents”, http://www.alshamahi.com/2013/09/03/a-tale-of-three-presidents/. 
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reverse accusations: Huda al-Attas, for instance, stated that AQAP had been a regime 
conspiracy to begin with1637, hinting at the regime’s complicity with Islamists.  
 The distribution of this counterframing was mainly done in TV programs, official 
speeches, through the setup of the CPU, state media, and public posters/placards and else (like 
the slogan ‘Unity or Death’).  
 
The Resonance of Regime Counterframes 
The resonance of regime counterframes was directed less towards Southerners (at the most 
they affirmed certain concerns in regard to al-Beidh's involvement with Iran) than towards the 
Northern population. Here, it can be called successful in respect to reactivating the original 
unity frame, in blocking the Hirak's rights framing, and to a certain degree in raising 
suspicions about foreign involvement. Some quotes gathered by the Yemen Times a few days 
before the November 30th deadline ended illustrates a few of these aspects:  
The southern people do not have the right to be independent, and this will never happen. 
The south and north became one country after the Yemeni people gave huge sacrifices to 
realize this national achievement. They have every right to express their grievances and 
they can refer to the government to address their issues. The government is the mother of 
all [Yemeni] people. Secession will destroy the economy, divide the people, and 
undermine the state. It is not sane to allow this to take place.1638 
Rights, sacrifices, nationalism, economic, and political concerns – the response of this traffic 
policemen well reflects the regime's main counterframing points.  
 Fears of external intervention motivate this businesswoman from Ta’izz who moreover 
also refers to historical precedents: 
I do not uphold the secessionist demands because seceding means further divisions in the 
country. We cry out to unite our efforts and be one hand at this particular point in 
Yemen’s political history. I think secession will only serve the purpose of foreign 
countries that are interested in dividing Yemen. I am still optimistic the Yemeni people 
are aware of this critical stage and will not allow Yemen to slide into such a dangerous 
situation.1639 
Two female students of Sana'a University equally argue with rights, unity, history, the 
security and freedom of Northerners, and economic aspects – again very much along the 
counterframing:  
                                                          
1637 Augustin, “Interview with Huda al-Attas”.  
1638 “Sana’a residents give their view on southern independence”, Yemen Times, November 27, 2014, accessed 
July 7, 2015, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1837/report/4634/Sana%E2%80%99a-residents-give-their-view-
on-southern-independence.htm.  
1639 Ibid. 
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We think the Southern Movement does not have the right to call for secession. Unity is 
the right of all Yemenis, not only the south. At the same time, the government should 
listen to the southern demands and fairly take their voices into account. The Southern 
Movement should not adhere to their calls for separation because separation will return 
us to the dark past. If the south secedes, we will not be able to go to the south freely as 
we do today given the fact that Yemen will be two separate countries. This is not for the 
good of Yemen. Also, lots of northerners are living in the south. How could they be 
evacuated? This is really difficult. Separation will also have negative consequences for 
the economy and tourism, among other things.1640  
The position of a Houthi member, however, differs in regard to the question of rights and 
instead highlights the ‘injustice frame’ the Houthis share with the Hirak (in that they both 
hold the regime to treat them unjustly): 
  
The southern people have the right to secede so long as the government does not fulfill 
their demands. We do not accept injustice. So, I hope the government will take heed of 
their demands and give them the rights they deserve. Those who say they will sacrifice 
themselves for the sake of unity are liars – they only want to provoke the southern people. 
We are with the southern people, and they will have their own rights and resources even 
if they secede. Injustice is always unacceptable.1641 
A comment on Facebook about what Hadi had said (see above) on the contrary argues with 
patriotism and how the Hirak lacks it, providing an inaccurate and eventually 
counterproductive stance:  
When people from the Gulf states, and tourists, come to visit, they are surprised, and say 
that Yemen isn’t like what we read on Facebook, on the Internet, in the press – Yemen is 
ok. You don’t know how to write anything but Yemen’s negatives. They don’t know 
about the positives... A person should write what’s important to his nation, and what 
affects his nation...not just go on the Internet and write anything. He should know that 
Internet sites go around the world – what company will come and invest when it sees the 
situation like that, what country will give you aid? They should have an ounce, not a ton 
even, an ounce of patriotism.1642 
These few examples provide just a glimpse on Northerners’ opinion. As far as comments on 
social media, articles, and else show, however, they are representative for larger numbers. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1640 Ibid. 
1641 Ibid. 
1642 “A Tale of Three Presidents”, http://www.alshamahi.com/2013/09/03/a-tale-of-three-presidents/. 
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8. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS  
This chapter provides a comparative interpretation and discussion of the results of the framing 
analysis. The points of comparison are structured thematically and roughly follow the 
chronologically succession of the framing process; their complex interdependence thereby 
allows for alternative options. 
 
(1) Grievances  
Both identity groups have been holding a mixture of cultural, socioeconomic, and political 
grievances for an extended period prior to the founding of the respective movements. These 
have found expression in other modes of contention in the case of the Zaydis (revivalism, 
teaching, party) and a war, adding the formation of preceding oppositional groups in the case 
of Southerners; i.e. Zaydis have escalated their measures over time while Southerners 
relatively soon initiated drastic means, the failure of which not only significantly intensified 
their grievances, but moreover constituted an obstacle for a successful reorganization of 
opposition.   
 While individual members’ perceptions might have distinct emphases, either movement 
framed the intolerable status quo explicitly as a threat towards the cultural dimension of their 
identity group: It was their cultural identity which should be extinguished by the regime. In 
order for this frame to succeed, there was a need to create salience for a common identity.  
 
(2) Structural Factors 
The issue of grievances leads over to considering the remaining structural factors as well. The 
testing of established theoretical approaches has shed light on a number of factors impacting 
the risk for escalation. Results indicate a heightened overall risk, yet the propositions are 
ambiguous: If the overall risks are sufficient for armed conflict, then we would see it in both 
cases because the level of risks is comparable. Since this is not the case – we get a false 
positive for the Hirak – we can merely conclude that the explanations are not sufficient.  
 This notwithstanding, the identified structural factors that did indicate increased risks lie at 
the basis of the integrated model I propose. In addition, opportunity windows opened and 
closed repeatedly over the course of movement activism; this factor will appear over and 
again, yet in more limited a scope and with a less far-reaching implication than structuralists 
claim: it merely facilitates framing dynamics.   
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(3) Identity Work 
There are numerous overlapping and rivalling identity categories in both parts of Yemen, the 
most outstanding of which are qabili, regional, factional, and the urban/rural divide. Since 
individuals associate with more than one identity at a time, movement leadership needs to 
invest in ‘identity work’ in order to make the one category on which they build more salient 
than others. Merely then can a collective identity become the basis for collective action.  
 The (later)1643 Houthis engaged in Zaydi revivalist activities, hence supporting the salience 
and positive assessment of Zaydi identity among the younger generation. Additionally, they 
sought to consciously reach out beyond this core base and attract other denominations and 
qabila with their diagnosis, which was complex and multi-layered for this purpose. Yet, this 
did not include the prognostic dimension, it having remained more restricted. In the absence 
of clear evidence, we can solely suspect that the effect might have been the creation of 
sympathies and a basic consensus mobilization among non-Zaydis.  
 Southern opposition was facing the challenges of overcoming stark division lines between 
(a) Adenis and non-Adenis; (b) strong regional ties; and (c) the lasting rift between the 
Zumrah and Tughmah factions of 1986. The rift was the most severe of the three and the 
opposition overcoming the precondition for everything that was to come thereafter. This is 
well illustrated by the fact that the founding of the Hirak occurred in the wake of the 
reconciliation process initiated by oppositionals. The Adeni-non-Adeni rapprochement was 
aided by active outreach towards the hinterland (planned commemoration activities in Radfan 
in October 2007) and contingency (repression in repetition of anti-colonial struggle). In 
combination, this triggered an inclusive trend that overcame the differences: Once the core of 
the movement was no longer perceived as highly Adeni, ever more other, more rural identity 
groups joined in; via networks, this turned into a snowball effect. The remaining hurdle, i.e. 
the inclusion of Hadhramis, merely occurred at the much later stage of when the status quo’s 
unacceptability became more salient in the wake of repression-related deaths.   
 Either group hence invested in identity work and ultimately succeeded. For both 
movements, but even more so for Southerners, the invocation of shared memories embracing 
lost grandeur formed an important instrument therein.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1643 Hereafter I will omit this indicator of distinction between pre-movement foundation period and post-
foundation period for reasons of legibility.  
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(4) Mobilization 
Once a collective identity was established (and it overlapped with the process of its creation), 
the actual mobilization through framing could occur. The content of each dimension has been 
specified in detail, as have the means of distribution. Worth acknowledging is the skill with 
which both movement framers aligned their frames with the predominant cultural and 
discursive backgrounds and adapted to changing circumstances.  
 The sources provide some anecdotic evidence that consensus mobilization was rather 
rapidly successful in the Southern case, whereas the Houthis invested over an extensive 
period; and at a later point many, who in principle shared their diagnosis, were still unwilling 
to join the movement. Due to a lack of data, a further exploration of this dimension remains 
obscured. The threshold for participation in the Hirak’s activities, however, appears to have 
lowered once there was widespread consensus on the diagnosis, empirical 
credibility/experiential commensurability due to obvious repression, and the more so after 
some famous figures joined the movement. Given the more moderate repertoire of Hirak 
contention in comparison to the Houthis, however, this tendency is comprehensible (or, rather 
the other way around: the reluctance to pay much higher participation costs in more militant 
Houthi activities is). 
 The scope of mobilization at each movement’s height is impressive: Participant numbers in 
protests reached six-digit for both (more precise estimates are difficult to make); the number 
of combatants with the Houthis during the wars are equally stated as reaching around 
10,000+. Considering the total population for each identity group, these numbers attest their 
mobilizational success.  
 The location of events varied, but typically Houthi mobilization occurred in smaller towns 
or even rural areas (accounting for the setting they were most popular in), whereas the Hirak 
is much more associated with city-based (specifically Aden-based) events. Occasions 
comprised both protests and representational and identity-asserting contexts such as 
commemoration days or religious holidays. While both kinds exhibit elements of internal and 
external impact (contestation vs. identity-assurance), they do so with inverted priority: 
protests primarily serve contestation, other gatherings primarily serve representation and 
identity-related aspects.  
 Once a critical number of participants were reached and mobilization had occurred for 
some time, it became routinized. Socialization within this framework likewise acted as a 
motivational factor. In a potentized form, this accounts for the encampments during the Arab 
Spring protests and the fall 2014 Al-Arood Square protest. 
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(5) Frame Alignment 
Houthi frame alignment managed to successfully bridge and tie together three separate 
elements: the regional ‘anti-US’ protest frame, the domestic ‘Zaydi marginalization’ frame, 
and the overarching Islamism discourse.1644 All three were highly salient at that time and – 
besides the skilled composition of the movement frames as well as their distribution – 
Hussein al-Houthi’s charismatic personality further stimulated their successful resonance.  
 The Houthi slogan pointedly connects the anti-US and Islamist elements, while the 
malazim establish the linking between these two and the audience’s everyday life shaped by 
marginalization and discrimination. The overall conceptualization is hence well concatenated 
and coherent. 
 Hirak frame alignment is more straightforward: The cause of their grievances is attributed 
to the regime; it is framed in legal terms and aligned to human rights and international law 
discourses. It is thus quite procedural, yet manages to resonate among Southerners who 
experienced the procedural and bureaucratic socialist state; the young generation, too, was 
socialized in reference to the value of procedure and ‘law and order’, and solely after years of 
futile activism did discontent began to rise and people begin to lose patience with the 
repetitive attempts for conferences and international appeals.  
 The specific and continuous reference to self-determination is intriguing in the light of 
continued insistence on nonviolence. ‘Self-determination’ might well have the quality of a 
master frame with which more than one secessionist movement aligns and which – given its 
legalistic and normative emphasis – inhibits the option of violence. One aspect in this respect 
is the need for international recognition in order to accomplish the desired status. Repeatedly 
mentioned in the sources was the conviction that international actors, notwithstanding their 
respective strategic interests, reject violent struggle by principle. As a consequence, appealing 
to the UN demands strict abstinence from violence. 
 Language and repertoire of the Hirak reflect this rationale: The language is interspersed 
with legal terms, rights terms, and references. Demands and core statements are frequently 
made in English, and there is immediate addressing of the UN and other international actors 
by banners (including other peripheral communications). During rallies, movement 
representatives, along with regular activists in the diaspora, have repeatedly appealed to 
international governments and institutions for support. Even in cases of gross repression, the 
                                                          
1644 Hussein’s framing fits well into the general criteria for Islamist discourse and framing that Wiktorowicz 
delineates. See: Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism.  
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tactic was to publicize and appeal, not to confront – all in line with the struggle for positive 
acknowledgement.      
 
(6) Repertoires of Action 
Repertoires of action have already arisen in the above sections. Either of the two movements 
employed a wide range of diverging activities based on the available cultural tool kit, cross-
fertilization and diffusion with other movements at a time of prominent protests in the 
region,1645 and role models (e.g. Iran and Hizbullah for the Houthis).   
 The cultural tool kit offers a longstanding tradition of complex mechanisms of mediation 
(contention is likewise an element), an elaborate ‘system’ of poetry and persuasion, qāt chews 
as ideal setting for extensive political discussion, and, in the South, extensive experience with 
labour unionism, protest etc. Knowledge and techniques could easily be transferred and 
utilization in the service of the movements.  
 Main differences in the repertoires consist in the characteristic extensive shouting of the 
slogan, huge religious celebrations, very prominent and intricate celebration of a martyr’s cult 
in the case of the Houthis, routinized civil disobedience campaigns, discussion circles in 
squares, and legal/political international appeals by the Hirak. Obviously too, the employment 
of violence as a means of contention.  
 
(7) Violence 
The Houthis always justified violence as a defensive measure, but apparently its 
legitimization proved challenging in the face of the wars’ destructive power unleashed in the 
region. As I have demonstrated, the shift from nonviolence to violence solely occurred after a 
severe breach of the mediation tradition on top of numerous earlier offensive acts by Saleh in 
relation to the movement. Hence, despite the rooting of legitimate violence against unjust rule 
in the malazim, the initiation of armed conflict against the regime appears to have been in 
need of strong ideational support – which it received from the prestige of Badr al-Din al-
Houthi.  
 Rather intriguing is the capacity of Houthi framers to revoke the violence frame in early 
2010 and later on to reactivate it against the Salafis and the ‘new’ regime. This might be an 
interesting question to explore in another study.  
                                                          
1645 Not part of the repertoire but of language is the adoption of demands for ‘dignity’ which pervaded not only 
the Arab movements during this period, but likewise ‘Occupy’ and related movements.  
393 
 
From the very beginning, the Hirak strictly distanced itself from a violent path; reasons 
consisted ofneeds for internal and leadership unification, an anticipation of rejection among 
the population who vividly remembered the defeat and its consequences in 1994, an honest 
rejection of violence as a solution, and strategic considerations in respect to international 
perception.  
 The calls for violence that were articulated all failed, and even the opportunity to take the 
initiative for secession during the Houthi takeover passed unused. Widely distributed 
movement publications and public discussions regarded an escalation towards violence as a 
threat that was to be inhibited; the sole exception that was admitted was defence in the face of 
life-threatening repression. Popular resistance against the Houthi invasion in early 2015, 
which partly related to the stepping up of militia units under the command of those former 
PDRY army officers who had been among the first Hirak supporters, demonstrates what 
before could solely be suspected: That the capacities to fight and the sufficient stock of arms 
are present. In conclusion, merely the will to fight was absent previously bearing witness to 
the decisive impact of the nonviolence frame.  
 
(8) Organizational Structure 
A comparison of the respective organizational structures juxtaposes the hierarchical structure 
of the Houthis with the much more decentralized organizations under the Hirak. Even though 
the Houthis, too, exhibit a number of branches, as I have argued before, the framing is 
centralized and lies with the al-Houthi family; family succession of leadership additionally 
strengthens continuity. The focus of their efforts is directed to internal cohesion and 
expansion among other Zaydis, i.e. self-referential.  
 On the contrary, the Southern movement simultaneously targets an international audience 
in the pursuit of support and recognition. To this end, their decentralization is both helpful 
and counterproductive: On the one hand it provides flexibility in the interaction with different 
counterparts, on the other hand it is criticized by international actors for the lack of a coherent 
program and legitimate representation.   
 Movement members achieved some degree of cohesion over time through regular 
participation in activities and resulting social interaction and bonding. The established 
leadership, however, failed to unite; instead ever more sub-organizations emerged, partly 
supported by prominent figures, and competed for constituents. What attracted people to join 
new factions remains in the dark; potentially they were unrelated issues like local competition 
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or else (this is what interview partners suggested). In any case: Leadership fractionalization 
and disunity proved a major handicap. 
  
This is the appropriate point to assess the explanatory power of Pearlman’s argument that 
movement cohesion is a necessary condition for nonviolent protest:  
 Notwithstanding the theoretical appeal of integrating organisational aspects, the case 
studies refute her assumptions: Similar to what I have just stressed for the framing, Houthi 
field commanders enjoy a relatively high degree of independence, but the group is 
nevertheless characterized by a discerned hierarchy at whose top are leaders from the al-
Houthi family and their immediate proxies.1646 According to Pearlman, they might have 
chosen nonviolence instead. Nevertheless, this does not yet disprove the theory.  
 The Hirak, contrariwise, adheres to nonviolent protest despite internal fragmentation and 
contestation for leadership, and moreover meddling of the regime with potential leaders (such 
as Mohamed Ali Ahmed’s invitation to the NDC), thus likewise contradicting – and hence 
refuting – the theory.  
 
(9) Leadership 
In regard to leadership what remains to be added is merely a question of emphasis. Leadership 
credibility is one major evaluation criterion for the quality of frames. An apparent tendency 
that is not reflected in the model is the perseverance of ‘old guards’ in spite of doubts about 
their credibility. Ali Salim al-Beidh poses as a good example: Notwithstanding his 
inconsistency and even expressed irritation of activists by that fact, he was nevertheless held 
high as the official leader; while one could argue that his symbolic role as last president plays 
into this, similar albeit less pronounced, claims can be made for Mohamed Ali Ahmed and 
others, too. Why do they not lose their position to other, more credible candidates?   
 While patronage networks might constitute an obvious reply, it does not apply in the 
present case. Certainly do the various personalities have a range of clients, yet this cannot 
explain the scope of followers of all kinds and from all regions; this transcends the extension 
of the (rather regional) clientelist networks by far. The most probable explanation is a lack of 
alternatives, in addition to the hesitation towards instituting a new, younger candidate. While 
critical voices admit to the disliked dominance of the old and ineffective leadership, none has 
brought up a serious alternative. This is a point where the lack of transregional support might 
                                                          
1646 Salmoni et al., Regime, 189–197; despite their claim that the group is more an ‘organism’ than an 
‘organization’ they clearly delineate a hierarchy leading to Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abdullah al-Razzami etc.  
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be felt; post-socialist Southerners never had the chance to utilize effective, centralized all-
Southern political and social structures to establish networks equivalent to the old, though 
absent, figures. But even then, the absence of any name surprises and tells a lot about the 
restraints the young generation is facing – not merely in respect to economic opportunities but 
also regarding recognition and trust within their own society.  
 
(10) Contestation 
Enough has been said about internal contestation, an issue predominant among the Hirak. 
Regime counterframing has succeeded in establishing serious doubts and suspicions about the 
intentions and connections of the Houthis to Iran. Allegations about their intentions to 
reinstate the imamate and their role as a proxy for Iran resonated, disregarding a lack of 
supporting evidence. This could be aligned with both the memories and/or public 
commemoration of alleged ‘tyranny’ by the imam and the regional Sunni discourse of distrust 
in Shi’i Iran. The underdeveloped Houthi prognostic framing moreover fostered suspicions 
about their goals and gave additional backing to these denunciations. Notably, some rather 
far-fetched and highly unlikely regime attempts for delegitimization of the group failed, yet 
did not permanently affect its overall credibility as a framer.  
 Undermining the success of the Hirak through counterframing proved more challenging 
and ultimately failed. Claims of links with AQAP and/or Iran could not be established; they 
lacked credibility, especially the former. In regard to the later it might be held that al-Beidh’s 
ambiguous statements gave support to them, however, this did not suffice to undermine 
widespread internal support and tendentially positive international views on the movement.   
     
(11) Repression 
Repression targeted both groups and fluctuated over time. Neither did the attempt at crushing 
the Houthis in summer 2004 succeed nor did the intermittent, comparatively small-scale, 
repression in the South. While it is unclear how exactly it impacted on the Houthis, for the 
Hirak we can state that it affected them, yet at the same time it rather catalyzed indignation 
and increased participation ratios. Injustice frames were given added credibility, particular so 
for the South in regard to international actors, who viewed repression against nonviolent 
protesters critically.  
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(12) International Actors 
The Houthi case de facto did not involve international actors except for the KSA for whom, 
however, a lot was at stake ideologically. Its self-given Wahhabi identity was questioned by 
the success of a Shiʿa movement in a permeable border region where, moreover, it had 
invested extensively for proselytizing. The US, while remotely concerned, was much more 
occupied with AQAP and the overall positioning of the Yemeni government in the WoT.  
With the KSA, the Houthis hence had a hostile antagonist by principle, into whom they did 
not need to invest any framing energy; it was, in fact, the contrary. The KSA made for a 
perfect enemy and could be framed that way without any restrictions.  
 In contrast, international actors played a crucial role for the Hirak, as previously 
elaborated. Since for them gaining international recognition was crucial, it required 
significant attention at the framing level and in the containment of the too obviously 
challenging voices calling for escalation (like, e.g. ex-jihadi Tariq al-Fadhli). With this 
rationale they were limited or at least preoccupied. 
 
(13) Internet  
Increased Internet availability has proven beneficial for both groups. It provided a medium in 
which frames could be disseminated without immediate repression and in new modes. The 
Houthis entered this sphere of activity around 2007 and rapidly expanded the concrete 
formats in which they communicated. What should not be underestimated either is how 
contentious actors learned from others via the Internet: how to strategically utilize formats, 
how to design, options for various actions, language – these and other aspects smoothly 
diffused online. YouTube videos evolved into a format in which they became remarkably 
adept: Their media unit produced ever more professional videos of varying genre and content, 
which sometimes reached six-digit access numbers. Supplementary to their other media, the 
Internet proved invaluable.  
 The Hirak concentrated more on the dissemination of news-style information like the 
documentation of events or repression. This lay in their interest of winning over international 
audience through convincing them of the injustice they suffered from. Moreover, opinion 
pieces were popular and received numerous comments and frequently very engaged 
discussions.  
 Social media use has been discussed before. It should be perceived as another means of 
(international) networking, social interaction, and frame distribution with some specifics, yet 
in the Yemeni context it would not consider it as revolutionary.  
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(14) Weaknesses in Framing  
Weaknesses in the overall framing process include the lack of an unambiguous prognostic 
frame for the Houthis and of a unified leadership for the Hirak. The fact that Houthi 
mobilization succeeded despite this major deficit can be explained with the very strong 
diagnostic and motivational components; they were able to compensate for a weak or 
ambiguous prognosis. The factionalized leadership of the Southern Movement on the contrary 
posed a heavy burden. A lot of effort and energy went into attempts for reconciliation and 
were wasted for internal competition. At the same time, the situation affected international 
perceptions, which were of the highest importance for the movement. In conclusion: it posed 
a major obstacle to their goals.  
 
(15) Alternative Explanations for Mobilization 
Alternative explanations beyond the structural factors that were discussed before could have 
been coercion and selective incentives (such as money or other assets, offices or else). There 
was no convincing evidence for either of the two; one single source mentioned testimony by a 
family whose head claimed to have been pressured to join the rebels and that they threatened 
those who opposed them. While it seems conclusive that the Houthis shall have exerted 
pressure, including threats against local opposition, there is no further reporting of coercion 
for active participation. Hence, the hypothesis can be discarded. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
Why do some opposition movements take up arms and enter armed conflict with the state 
while others persist non-violently under very similar conditions? The study has sought to 
answer this question by employing the previously introduced integrative model to a 
comparative case study of the Houthi rebellion in Northern Yemen and the Peaceful Southern 
Movement in the South of the country. The results have confirmed the explanatory power of 
the model for the cases.  
 The Houthis, who over time have shifted their prognostic framing from a nonviolence 
frame to a violence frame, subsequently turned into an insurgency. No alternative 
explanations could be found and the available evidence confirms the hypothesis of the frames 
as cause for the change in strategy.  
 The Hirak on the other hand has persistently remained nonviolent in its framing and 
collective action despite the capability to take up arms and challengers who called for armed 
struggle, but whose framing did not generate resonance. This case, too, confirms the 
hypothesized relevance of framing as a mediator between structural factors and collective 
action.  
 
While there is a need for further testing in a greater number of cases, these first results are 
encouraging. In these cases, the hypothesized mechanisms have proven their superior 
explanatory power over mere structural approaches that overwhelmingly focus on the macro-
level and frequently employ quantitative methods.  
 The model shifts the focus to the meso- and micro-level and makes case study designs 
indispensable, for frame analysis requires intimate cultural knowledge and in-depth 
engagement with a wide variety of sources. Research along these lines hence poses several 
practical challenges: (1) The use of multiple methods requires appropriate training. (2) 
Respective research ideally comprises field research in the countries under investigation. This 
is oftentimes difficult or even impossible in the context of volatile security situations, which 
naturally come with cases of armed conflict. In some cases it will be feasible to find 
alternative pathways to source collection, in other cases it might not. (3) Research will be 
time and resource intensive. (4) The collection of sufficiently rich data might not always be 
possible, specifically in historically distant cases.   
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A potential pitfall on the theoretical level includes the danger of drifting into an all-too 
holistic perspective that lacks a clear focus.1647 It is the consequence of giving up strict 
parsimony for a more complex, yet stronger model, and can be prevented by continuous 
reflexivity. Besides, the methodological tool kit so far is still rather based on experience and 
intuition than stringent and well-tested procedures. Many – especially in the field of digital 
data and social media analysis – are still in an exploratory or early stage. Contributions are 
thus welcome, however, researchers need to be open to contingency. This being said, the 
research field is highly dynamic and has received intensive attention in recent years; new 
findings and suggestions continuously emerge and steady the ground.  
   
There are a number of promising dimensions to be further explored in regard to the research 
question and model development beyond the scope of this dissertation. They relate to a more 
detailed tracing of frame changes over time; a better understanding of decentralized framing 
and its effects; an investigation of the role of emotions; and the possibility of including 
practice-theoretical concepts into the framing approach.  
 In regard to the first aspect, Hank Johnston has already provided a clear proposition:1648 In 
reference to Roberto Franzosi’s ‘story grammar analysis’1649, he has pointed out that frames 
can generally be described in form of a subject (S) – verb (V) – object (O) syntax. Therein the 
subject specifies who the collective actor is; the verb articulates what shall be done, which 
action shall be taken; and the object refers to the who or what regarding which the action shall 
be taken. Changes in the content of these elements, as they are voiced by movement leaders or 
within the groups themselves, signify such processes of (de)escalation. In a hypothetical 
example, the S-V-O structure ‘Southern Yemenis object to the National Dialogue Conference’ 
might escalate to ‘Southerners reject Northern rule’, and further to ‘Southerners need to 
struggle for independence’ and ‘Southerners need to fight for independence’. By tracing such 
changes in frame content and relating them to observable changes in protest behavior, it is 
thus possible to explicate in a more systematic way the transgression from non-violent to 
violent collective action. Exploring a case in detail with this method suggests to be highly 
rewarding.  
                                                          
1647 Thanks to Andreas Mehler for pointing this out during a related discussion in the Collaborative Research 
Centre 923 “Threatened Order. Societies under Stress” at the University of Tuebingen, December 7, 2012.  
1648 Hank Johnston, “Theory, Method, and the Robust Framing Mechanism: Reflections on the Syrian and 
Palestinian Insurgencies”, Special Issue, Civil Wars 17, no. 3 (2015) [forthcoming].  
1649 Roberto Franzosi, “Narrative Analysis: Why (and How) Sociologists Should Be Interested in Narrative”, 
Annual Review of Sociology (1998): 517–554.  
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The role of decentralized framing has flashed up in the analysis; while is has been discussed 
by a limited number of scholars, a comprehensive conceptualization and operationalization 
are still lacking. The case of the Hirak has highlighted the empirical relevance of 
decentralized framing and the potential benefit of a better understanding.  
 Emotions likewise remain underspecified. In spite of general agreement about the role of 
emotions for mobilization and collective action and, notwithstanding, some very insightful 
works on the topic,1650 satisfying conceptualization and sound methodology for research in 
the social science is – again – outstanding. Promising emotions in this regard are fear, shame, 
indignation, and the feeling of threat, but also humor and empathy.  
 And, lastly, practice-theoretical considerations, particularly in respect to embodiment and 
sensory perceptions, appear highly promising.1651 Collective action is a very physical 
experience; yet, even before potential movement adherents have sensory encounters with 
frames. Framing, so the argument, should not be reduced to a linguistic dimension, but should 
encompass all senses. Theoretically intriguing, this idea might prove methodologically even 
more challenging than the ‘regular’ framing approach; we should advance the latter first.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1650 Helena Flam and Debra King (ed.), Emotions and Social Movements (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005); Helena 
Flam and Jochen Kleres (ed.), Methods of Exploring Emotions (London/New York: Routledge, 2015); James M. 
Jasper, “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research”, Annual Review of Sociology 
(2011): 285–303.  
1651 For an exemplary case study see: Chandra Russo, “Allies Forging Collective Identity: Embodiment and 
Emotions on the Migrant Trail”, Mobilization 19, no. 1 (2014): 67–82.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A:  
 
List of Hussein al-Houthi’s transcribed and published lectures (given ca. December 14, 2001– 
August 29, 2003 according to the published versions). Together with these texts and in the 
same layout etc. is available another lecture, which is, however, not included in the original 
list and not consecutively numbered: “With the Call (daʿwah) to God” (15 pages).1652  
 
 
First Series – Verses of the Surah Ahl ‘Imran (The Family of ‘Imran) 
1 08.01.2002 Ahl ‘Imran– First Lecture 
2 09.01.2002 Ahl ‘Imran– Second Lecture 
3 11.01.2002 Ahl ‘Imran– Third Lecture 
4 12.01.2002 Ahl ‘Imran– Fourth Lecture 
Second Series – Verses of the Surah Al Ma’idah  
(The Table Spread With Food) 
5 13.01.2002 Al Ma’idah– First Lecture 
6 14.01.2002 Al Ma’idah– Second Lecture 
7 15.01.2002 Al Ma’idah– Third Lecture 
8 16.01.2002 Al Ma’idah– Fourth Lecture 
Third Series – Knowing God 
9 18.01.2002 Knowing God – First Lecture 
Knowing God – Yes (to) God 
10 19.01.2002 Yes (to) God – Second Lecture 
11 20.01.2002 Yes (to) God – Third Lecture 
12 21.01.2002 Yes (to) God – Fourth Lecture 
13 22.01.2002 Yes (to) God – Fifth Lecture 
Knowing God – Greatness of God 
14 23.01.2002 Greatness of God – Sixth Lecture 
15 25.01.2002 Greatness of God – Seventh Lecture 
16 26.01.2002 Greatness of God – Eighth Lecture 
Knowing God – And More and Ever More  
17 28.01.2002 And More and Ever More – Ninth Lecture 
18* 29.01.2002 And More and Ever More – Tenth Lecture 
19 30.01.2002 And More and Ever More – Eleventh Lecture 
20 04.02.2002 And More and Ever More – Twelfth Lecture 
21 05.02.2002 And More and Ever More – Thirteenth Lecture 
22 06.02.2002 And More and Ever More – Fourteenth Lecture 
23 08.02.2002 And More and Ever More – Fifteenth Lecture  
                                                          
1652 The printed versions of the published lectures were collected for the author by a research assistant of the 
American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS) in Sana’a in early 2014. Titles were translated by the author. All 
documents (with the exception of those which could not be retrieved, marked with an *) can be found in the 
Digital Annex A. The total number of pages of the available texts amounts to 980.  
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Fourth Series – Miscellaneous 
24 11.02.2002 “When We Directed to You a Few of the Jinn” 
25 10.02.2002 Neither the Jews nor the Christians Will Be Satisfied with You 
26 n.d. The Meaning of Praising the Prophet Mohamed and His Family 
and Companions 
27 09.02.2002 The Meaning of Glorifying God 
28 08.03.2002 Terrorism and Peace 
29 03.02.2002 The Dangers of Americas Entering into Yemen 
30  The Responsibility of the Ahl Al-Bayt 
31 09.03.2002 The Responsibility of Students of Religious Sciences 
32 04.08.2002 Qurʾanic Culture 
33 21.12.2002 There are No Excuses for Mankind in Front of God 
34 26.07.2002 My Life and Death for the Sake of God 
35* 01.02.2002 In Shades of The Call for the Good Ethics (1) 
36 02.02.2002 In Shades of The Call for the Good Ethics (2) 
37 24.11.2002 A Remembrance of the Death of Imam Ali 
38 20.02.2003 The Call of Guardianship 
39 03.03.2002 The Demand of Guardianship 
40 02.09.2002 “And Spend in the Way of God“ 
41 n.d.  “Those who have said ‘Our Lord is God and Then Remained on 
a Right Course“  
42 16.03.2002 The Criticality of the Stage 
43 2nd half February/ 
1st half March 2002 
Lessons Gained from Battle of Uhud 
44 02.09.2002 Islam and the Culture of Following 
45 15.11.2002 Verses of the Surah Al Waqi’ah (The Event) 
46 29.08.2003 Verses of the Surah Al Kahf (The Cave) 
47 1423h “Establish Prayer for My Remembrance“ 
48 1422h (26.04.2001–
14.02.2002) 
 
The Continuance and the Jaundice 
49 n.d. From Us and From Them  
50 n.d. “And If there Should Come to You Guidance from Me“ 
51 n.d. The Faithful Unity 
52 n.d. “And Hasten to Forgiveness from Your Lord“ 
53 16.11.2002 The Slogan Is A Weapon and State  
54  
 
28.05.–03.06.2003 
A Praise of the Qurʾan (1) 
55 A Praise of the Qurʾan (2) 
56 A Praise of the Qurʾan (3) 
57 A Praise of the Qurʾan (4) 
58 A Praise of the Qurʾan (5) 
59 A Praise of the Qurʾan (6) 
60 A Praise of the Qurʾan (7)  
Fifth Series – School Lectures 
61 14.12.2001 International Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day 
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62 17.01.2002 A Scream1653 in the Face of the Arrogants 
63 24.01.2002 “They Have Exchanged the Signs of God for a Small Price“ 
64 31.01.2002 The Faithful Identity 
65 07.02.2002 To Follow the Children of Israel 
66* 23.03.2002 Lectures Inspired by Ashoura 
 
  
                                                          
1653‘sarkha’, alternative translation as ‘slogan’. For all future translations of the word ‘sarkha’ ‘slogan’ will be 
used for it refers to the Houthi slogan or ‘battle-cry’ (‘sarkhat al-harb’). Here, however, ‘scream’ fits better.  
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Appendix B: 
 
List of Hussein al-Houthi’s transcribed and published lectures given during Ramadan 2003 
(October 27 – November 23, 2003)1654  
 
1* 27.10.2003 3. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 21–39 
2 28.10.2003 4. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 40–66 
3 29.10.2003 5. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 66–103 
4 30.10.2003 6. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 104–114 
5 01.11.2003 7. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 115–145 
6 02.11.2003 8. Lecture  Al Baqarah (The Cow) 146–186 
7 03.11.2003 9. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 185–214 
8 04.11.2003 10. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 215–252 
9 05.11.2003 11. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow) 252–274 
10 06.11.2003 12. Lecture Al Baqarah (The Cow)/ 
Ahl ‘Imran (The Family of ‘Imran) 
275 of Baqarah– 
32 of ‘Imran 
11 07.11.2003 13. Lecture  Ahl ‘Imran (The Family of ‘Imran) 33–91 
12 08.11.2003 14. Lecture  Ahl ‘Imran (The Family of ‘Imran) 92–116 
13 10.11.2003 16. Lecture Ahl ‘Imran (The Family of ‘Imran) 161 (or 116?)–end 
14 11.11.2003 17. Lecture An Nisa (The Women) 1–42 
15 12.11.2003 18. Lecture An Nisa (The Women) 42–116 
16 14.11.2003 20. Lecture An Nisa (The Women) 135–end 
17 15.11.2003 21. Lecture Al Ma’idah 
(The Table Spread With Food) 
1–26 
18 16.11.2003 22. Lecture Al Ma’idah 
(The Table Spread With Food) 
27–57 
19 17.11.2003 23. Lecture Al Ma’idah 
(The Table Spread With Food) 
55–end 
20 18.11.2003 24. Lecture Al An’am (The Cattle) 1–39 
21 19.11.2003 25. Lecture Al An’am (The Cattle) 39–102 
22 20.11.2003 26. Lecture Al An’am (The Cattle) 103–end 
23 21.11.2003 27. Lecture Al A’raf (The Heights) 1–137 
24 22.11.2003 28. Lecture Al A’raf (The Heights) 138–162 
25 23.11.2003 29. Lecture Al A’raf (The Heights) 163–end 
  
                                                          
1654 See annotation for table above. The total number of pages of the available texts amounts to 687. 
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Appendix C: 
 
Physical Map of Yemen 
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Appendix D:  
 
Brief chronology of Yemen’s modern history (colonial period – unification)1655 
 
Year/Period Events 
1839 (–1967) British seize Aden and establish a colony 
1872 (–1918) Ottoman occupation of (Northern) Yemen 
1904 (–1948) Reign of Yahya Mohamed Hamid al-Din (North) 
1905 Border between North and South established 
1911 Treaty between Ottomans and Imam Yahya 
1927–29 (Later Imam) Ahmad conquers the Tihama 
1934 Treaty of Sana’a: Yahya and Britain agree on administrative frontier 
War between Saudi Arabia and Imam Yahya 
Treaty of Ta’if: Saudis and Yahya agree on a frontier; Yemen loses Najran and ‘Asir 
1948 (–1962) Assassination of Imam Yahya 
Reign of Imam Ahmad 
1962 Revolution in the North (September 26): end of Imamate  
Establishment of Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) 
1962-1970  Civil War between royalists and republicans in the YAR 
1963 Federation of South Arabia: Aden and several hinterland states united 
Beginning of anti-colonial fighting against British in Radfan (October 14) 
1967 British leave Aden (November 29) 
Establishment of the People’s Republic of South Yemen with Aden as capital  
(changed into People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY] in 1970) 
1972 First war between YAR and PDRY 
1974 Rise in oil prices with subsequent remittance boom  
1978 (–2011) Rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (until 1990 YAR, then Republic of Yemen) 
1979 Second war between YAR and PDRY 
1983 + 1985 Balance of payment crises YAR 
1986 Coup and civil war in PDRY 
1990 Unification of YAR and PDRY into Republic of Yemen (ROY) (May 22) 
Beginning of Gulf War: Expulsion of Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia 
 
                                                          
1655 Based on: Dresch, History, 219–222; Caton, “History”, 31. 
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Appendix E: Map of Yemen’s qabila 
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Appendix F: Human Development Data for Yemen, 2014 UNDP; Yemen ranks 154 of 1871656 
 
Population total (millions) 24.41 
Population growth (%)1657 2.72 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 63.11 
Under five mortality rate (per 1000 under five children) 60 
Median age (years) 19.66 
Urban (% of population) 33.48 
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15+) 
male (2011 est.) 
female (2011 est.) 
65.3 
81.1 
48.5 
Mean years of schooling 2.51 
Internet users (% of population) 17.45 
Gender inequality index 0.733 
GDP per capita (2011 PPP$) 3,996.39 
Gini coefficient 37.69 
Unemployment rate (% aged 15+)1658 16.2 
Youth unemployment (% of ages 15-24) 33.7 
Child labor (% of ages 5-14) 22.7 
Share of working poor, below US $2/day 33.5 
Population in multidimensional poverty (%)1659 37.46 
Population near multidimensional poverty (%) 16.72 
Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%) 18.38 
Population living below US $1.25/day 17.53 
Consumer Price Index 227.65 
Domestic food price level index 1.63 
Price level volatility index 49.6 
Population living on degraded land (%) 32.4 
External debt stock (% of GDP) 20.48 
International trade (% of GDP) 65.07 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) -2.25 
Private capital flows (% of GDP) 1.89 
Net official development assistance received (% of GNI) 1.52 
Remittances, inflows (% of GDP) 4.43 
Total reserves minus gold (% of GDP) 5.41 
                                                          
1656 Unless otherwise specified: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2014, 
Yemen Country Profile, accessed November 12, 2014, http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/YEM. The 
report is based on the data available on November 15, 2013. 
1657 CIA, Factbook, accessed November 12, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ym.html. 
1658 This refers only to the official unemployment rate. Unofficial estimates commonly refer to 40% or more.  
1659 All numbers related to multidimensional poverty are based on 2006 data.  
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Appendix G: Oil and Gas Resources in Yemen 
 
Figure 1: Yemen’s oil and gas infrastructure (2013) 
 
 
Figure 2: Yemen’s oil production (1986–2013); the decline is due to natural decline of the well in 
addition to frequent attacks on the infrastructure1660 
                                                          
1660 Saudi Arabia in comparison produced 9,156.64 thousand barrels/day in 2001, while peaking at more than 
11,700.00 thousand barrels/day in 2012. According to the EIA, there were 15 attacks in 2012 only. For this and 
more details and numbers see: EIA, “Yemen’ Country Statistic”.  
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 Figure 3: Oil and natural gas rents in % of GDP1661 
 
 
 Figure 4: Yemen’s consumption and production of petroleum (2004–2013)1662 
 
                                                          
1661 The World Bank, World Development Indicators, accessed November 12, 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx#.  
1662 EIA, “Yemen’ Country Statistic”. 
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Yemen’s dry natural gas consumption and production (2006–2013)1663 
 
  
                                                          
1663 Ibid. 
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Appendix H:  
 
A List of Southern Grievances 
 
In regard to the grievances of Southerners, the Aden Live TV document provides a 
comprehensive 27-point list of all the “[h]ostile practices against the South from the 
Movement perspective”, i.e. on the consequences of the perceived occupation.  
It contains:  
1. Bloody invasion, aggression and Genocides; 2. Issuing fatwah against the people of the 
South; 3. Racism and Inferiority; 4. Military campaigns on cities and villages; 5. 
Oppressing peaceful events; 6. Arresting and kidnapping campaigns; 7. Physical 
liquidation; 8. Voiding the constitution of the unity state and adopting the laws of the 
Yemen Arab Republic; 9. Wiping the history and the political legacy of the southern 
people; 10. Promoting the term ‘the return of the branch to the origin and the daughter 
revolution to the mother revolution’;1664 11. Encouraging the culture of corruption (...); 
12. Destroying the archaeological monuments (...); 13. Hiding the South archive and 
falsifying documents and distorting them; 14. Manipulating history, geography, culture 
and political realities in books, educational booklets, seminars and media means;1665 15. 
Destroying the Southern military and its security institutions, facilities, and financial 
bases; 16. Destroying the industrial, trading, hospitality, service institutions of the public 
and mixed sectors (...); 17. Giving ownership of governmental facilities, buildings, and 
real estate (...) to the northern influential persons and permitting them to seize land; 18. 
Looting the oil, gas, and metal wealth and giving the ownership (...) to the governing 
family and northern tribal and military figures (...); 19. Putting an end to the essential 
services for citizens such as health, educational, electricity and environmental services; 
20. Looting the monetary reserve of the Southern currency ‘Dinar’ (...); 21. Closing the 
airline company ‘Al Yemda’ which was owned by the State of the South (...) This comes 
within the policy of wiping all what is southern; 22. Promoting demographic changing, 
impoverishing, and systematic starving and displacing; 23. Excluding southerners from 
public jobs or referring them forcibly to retirement; 24. Depriving them from affiliating to 
the military and security establishments as well as sovereign and diplomatic institutions 
and excluding them from obtaining scholarships abroad; 25. Weakening southerners, 
especially their representation by elections; 26. Marginalizing the capital of South, 
regarding its historical role in regional and international trades through impeding the 
projects of the port and Aden duty free (...) [and] cancelling most of the internal flights 
between Aden and the southern provinces; 27. Altering Aden from a political and trading 
city and capital having an international recognized stature to an unknown big village.1666 
 
                                                          
1664 This phrasing and the subordinate position allocated to the South therein has caused intensive defensive 
demeanor among Southerners, as becomes clear in another excerpt which refers to the naming of the unified 
state as ‘Yemen Arab Republic’: “This name strengthens the racist ideology of the leaders of the northern part of 
the country and implies that the south (the branch) returned back to the north (the origin) based on incorrect 
historical claims that Yemen was one country.” Alsaqqaf, “Internal Dynamics”, 1. 
1665 See also: “Roots of the Southern Issue. Presentation of the Conference of the People of the South”, digital 
copy received from a leading Hirak activist, June 2014. 
1666 “Introduction to the Southern Movement”. It furthermore speaks of the “[a]rrogance of Sana’a regime in the 
crisis and was as seen by the Southern Movement.” 
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